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THE PHAEDRUS OF PLATO.

WITH

ENGLISH NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS

By W. H. THOMPSON, D.D.

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THE
PHAEDRUS OF PLATO.


WITH
ENGLISH NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS

BY
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Φιλόμυθος ὁ φιλόσοφος πῶς ἐστίν.—ARISTOTLE.

LONDON:
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ERRATA.

Page 11, note, line 21, *for* Plut. Men. *read* Plut. Mor.

- 37, note, line 12, *for* παρ' θεοῖς *read* παρ θεοῖς
- 55, note, line 31, a comma is needed after 'the form so called'
- 61, note, line 15, *for* ἐπωνούα, *read* ἐπωνυμία,
- 64, note, line 4, *for* Ruhn. and Tim. *read* Ruhn. ad Tim.
- 107, note, line 32, *for* diacritic *read* diaeretic
- 122, note, line 37, *for* ὅλην *read* ὅλην
- 143, note, line 7 from the bottom, *dele* comma after γράψει
- 162, line 23, *for* which that desire *read* which desire
- 167, line 22, *for* the existing *read* the then existing
- 168, bottom of the page, *for* notions *read* notices

PREFACE.

Of this edition of the Phaedrus it may be said, and with better reason than Porson says of his Hecuba, "*tironum usibus destinata est.*" The Introduction and the first Appendix were read, together with much that is now left out, by way of prolegomena to lectures delivered to University students in the year 1859; and the notes, though not reduced to their present form until the year following, had in substance been written for the same hearers. The second Appendix, on Isocrates, was composed in 1861, also for oral delivery, though to a somewhat different audience. Very little has been added either to the notes or the dissertations; but pains have been taken in the correction of errors, and the omission or abridgment of controversial matter. The edition would probably have seen the light some years earlier, but I had laid it aside, together with one of the Gorgias framed on the same plan, in the hope of recasting both and adapting them to a more comprehensive scheme, which for various reasons is now abandoned. If this present 'opella' should be found useful to those for whom it is principally designed, the Gorgias will probably follow it at no long interval.

In editing this dialogue, I have made no new collation of manuscripts; but the text has of course been carefully compared with the Various Readings, especially those of the 'Clarkian' or 'Bodleian,' as given by Gaisford,—readings which are often suggestive, even when false. Of original emendations

but few have been introduced, and those not, I trust, very violent. For instance, in page 92 (260 c), for the received *προσενεγκεῖν*, I have suggested *πρὸς γ' ἐνεγκεῖν*. Ibid. for the readings, evidently corrupt, of the codices, I have restored from Hermeias *οὐ κρεῖττον γαστῶρ καὶ φίλον ἢ δεινὸν καὶ ἐχθρόν [εἶναι]*. The ejection of *εἶναι*, which is not found in these scholia, I have contented myself with recommending. Its absence might be defended by 238 E, *κρεῖττον δὲ καὶ ἴσον ἐχθρόν*.

In p. 100 (263 A), *τῶν ὄντων* has been taken into the text from one MS., in place of the too long received *τῶν τοιούτων*.

In p. 55, I have ventured to adopt a happy suggestion of my friend Dr. Charles Badham, whose name will frequently occur in these notes. Instead of the received *ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων* I read *ἰόντ'*; a daring change, for which I can give no reason except the reason of the case.

One nearly certain emendation has been overlooked. The invocation to the Muses, in p. 237 A, is thus quoted in the Homeric Allegories of Heraclitus: *ἄγετε δῆ, ὦ Μοῦσαι, εἴτε δι' ἡμῶν εἶδος λιγείας εἴτε διὰ γένος τι μουσικὸν ταύτην ἔσχετε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν, κ.τ.λ.* (P. 149, ed. Mehler.) Here *λιγείας* is of course wrong; but Cobet has rightly inferred that *τὸ Λιγύων*, which stands very awkwardly after *μουσικὸν* in the received text, ought to be ejected as a gloss upon *γένος τι μουσικόν*, which is the true reading of the passage. This, I think, is rather confirmed than refuted by the order of the words given by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *εἴτε διὰ γένος τὸ Λιγύων μουσικόν* (de Demosth. § 7, p. 969, Reiske), which is apparently a transitional reading.

In the matter of orthography, I have followed to a considerable extent the practice of the so-called Atticists. For instance, *ἐλατρός, ἑώρακα, κλέγω* are invariably read in place of the common forms, *ἐλατρώς, ἑώρακα, κλείω*. In elision, I have stopped very far short of Hirschig's and Cobet's practice, having yet to be convinced that all Attic writers are equally averse to the so-called 'concourse of vowels.' This dogma was certainly not held by the ancient critics. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, one of the earliest and best witnesses to Attic practice, assures us that while

writers in the *γλαφυρά καὶ θεατρικὴ λέξις*, of which Isocrates was a master, shunned as much as possible the *σύγκρουσις φωνήεντων*, those of an austerer type rather courted it; and he quotes instances of this collision from Demosthenes himself, which, as he thinks, increase the *σεμνότης* of the passages in which they occur. Dion. Hal. de Isocr. Jud. § 2, vol. v. p. 538, Reiske. Ibid. vi., pp. 964, 1069, 1076, 1090 (de adm. vi dicendi in Demosth. §§ 4. 38. 40. 43).

Of Plato's practice in this respect Dionysius gives us no direct information, but from § 3 of the *Judicium de Isocrate*, we may fairly, I think, infer that it was a mean between that of the smooth, or polished, and that of the 'austere' school. To his testimony add the following, from one of the more judicious of the rhetoricians of the Empire. *περὶ δὲ συγκρούσεως φωνήεντων ὑπέλαβον ἄλλοι ἄλλως. Ἰσοκράτης μὲν γὰρ ἐφυλάττετο συμπλήσσειν αὐτά, καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. ἄλλοι δὲ τινες ὡς ἔτυχε συνέκρουσαν καὶ παντάπασιν δεῖ δὲ οὔτε ἡχώδη ποιεῖν τὴν σύνθεσιν, ἀτέχνως αὐτὰ συμπλήσσειν καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε διασπασμῷ γὰρ τοῦ λόγου τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ διαρρίψει ἔοικεν οὔτε μὴν παντελῶς φυλάσσεσθαι τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν γραμμάτων· λειοτέρα μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἔσται ἴσως ἢ σύνθεσις, ἀμουσοτέρα δὲ καὶ κωφὴ ἀτεχνῶς. πολλὴν εὐφωνίαν ἀφαιρεθεῖσα, τὴν γινομένην ἐκ τῆς συγκρούσεως, κ.τ.λ.* (Demetrius *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, c. 68, in vol. ix. p. 34 of Walz's *Rhetores Graeci*.) Any one who will compare Hirschig's text with that of Bekker will perceive my motive for introducing these quotations.

In interpreting this dialogue it has been my duty to refer to my predecessors; in particular to Heindorf, Ast, and Stallbaum. From the first, when I have differed, it has been with reluctance; for no editor has so fine a sense of Platonic usage. Ast's larger Commentary is full of learned illustrative matter, excerpts from which appear in these notes. He also earned the thanks of editors of the *Phaedrus* by publishing the *Scholia Hermiae* entire in his edition of 1810. Many extracts from these will be found in this edition; for amidst a heap of Neoplatonic rubbish, they contain occasional learned and even sensible remarks. They

are also not without their use in fixing the text of disputed passages, for the 'lemmata' which they contain differ, sometimes for the better, though sometimes also for the worse, from the received readings. The text of Hermeias¹, as given by Ast, sorely needs revision, and I have had to make some obvious corrections in the passages quoted.

In illustrating the subject-matter of the dialogue, frequent reference has been made to the valuable and interesting essays of Leonhard Spengel; nor must I omit to mention a very painstaking and learned, though not well-written, monography on the *Phaedrus*, by the late Professor Krische of Göttingen. There is also a clever analysis of the dialogue by Sallier, in the French Academy of Inscriptions for 1736, of which the poet Gray's Argument is an abridgment. The notes written by Gray himself are so much to the purpose, that one regrets that they are not more numerous. Some of them the reader will find quoted in this edition: and also a few *adversaria* of Godfrey Hermann, -- possibly published elsewhere, but taken by me from the margin of his copy of Heindorf's *Phaedrus*, which was bought, at the sale of his books, for the Public Library of this University.

The dates given above will show that in preparing this edition I have made no use of some valuable additions to Platonic and the kindred branches of literature which have recently appeared. This, I am aware, is no recommendation; but I have not of late had the time necessary for a careful comparison of my own views either with those of Mr. Grote, in his great work on Plato and the Socratics, or of my friend Mr. Cope in his learned *Prolegomena* to the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle; or, lastly, with those of Professor Lewis Campbell, who, in his edition of the *Sophistes* and *Politicius*, has treated of the "dialectical method" with much judgment and ability.

I cannot end these observations better than in the words of a

¹ He was contemporary with Simplicius, Damascius, and the other survivors of the Platonic succession, who were silenced by the edict of Justinian, A.D. 529. See Gibbon, c. xl.

veteran interpreter, whose writings gave a great stimulus to the study of Plato in Germany in the early part of the century. "In scriptore tali qualis Plato est, permulta inveniri quae sua quisque ratione intelligat atque judicet, per se patet; quocirca haud mirabor, si varia, partim etiam iniqua, de meis annotationibus judicia in medium prolata videro."

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
February, 1868.

INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

ON THE SUBJECT AND INTENTION OF THE PHAEDRUS.

FEW of the Platonic dialogues have provoked so much controversy as the *Phaedrus*. This distinction it owes, partly to the complexity of its structure and the variety of its contents, and partly to the interest attached to it in consequence of a generally believed tradition that it was the earliest offspring of its author's philosophical genius. Hence have arisen two questions, neither of which, perhaps, can be said to have received a final answer. (1) What is the main scope and purpose of the dialogue, and what the relation its several parts bear to each other? (2) What is its relation to other dialogues? Is it to be regarded as a preface to the whole series, or to any assignable part of the whole series; or is its office that of a supplementary and subordinate, rather than of a vital and integral part of the system implied or developed in the Platonic writings?

That the first of these questions, that which relates to the leading idea of the dialogue, has been answered very variously, is evident from the bare enumeration of the different headings which the Greek commentators have prefixed to it. Φαῖδρος ἢ περὶ καλοῦ—Φ. ἢ περὶ ἔρωτος—Φ. ἢ περὶ ῥητορικῆς—περὶ τὰγαθοῦ—περὶ ψυχῆς—περὶ τοῦ πρώτου καλοῦ—περὶ τοῦ παντοδαποῦ καλοῦ—such are the titles by which scholars or philosophers have recorded their several impressions¹. None of these second titles possess the slightest authority; for we may be quite sure that the only one prefixed by the author

¹ Krische, über Platons *Phaedrus*, pp. 3, 4, where the references are given: "Hujusmodi additamenta a recentioribus esse profecta, jam Proclus significavit ad *Plat. Polit.* p. 350. 24—καθάπερ ἄλλαι τῶν ἐπιγραφῶν, προσθέσεις οὐσαι τῶν νεωτέρων." Ast ad *Protag.* init.

was that by which the dialogue was known to his disciple Aristotle, who quotes it by the sole name Phaedrus². The discrepancy of view implied in these contradictory headings is no proof that the problem defies solution, but may be regarded as an intimation that we must look for such solution rather to Plato himself than to his commentators. That the Phaedrus is a mere congeries of poetical descriptions, of brilliant metaphysical speculations, acute logical discussion, and satirical literary criticism, is a supposition which no one who has read one of the more considerable Platonic dialogues with attention will easily entertain. That it was not so regarded by its author, is pretty evident from his own testimony; for he tells us that "every written composition should resemble a living creature in its structure: it should have an organized body of its own, lacking neither head nor foot, but possessing a centre and extremities, adapted each to the other and in perfect keeping with the whole."³ This precept we cannot suppose to have been consciously violated by its author in the very dialogue in which it occurs, a dialogue in which his literary ability shines with greater lustre than perhaps in any other of his compositions.

The Phaedrus may fairly be described as a dramatized treatise on Rhetoric. The popular treatises on this art and their authors are held up to ridicule both in this dialogue and in the Gorgias: but in the Phaedrus Plato furnishes us with a scheme of a new and philosophical rhetoric, founded partly on 'dialectic,' and partly also on psychology,—the science which distinguishes the principles of human action, and the several varieties of human character upon which the orator has to work, in producing that "Persuasion" which is acknowledged to be the final cause of his art. *Ἡ τροπικὴ παθοῦς δημιουργὸς*⁴ is a definition which Plato virtually accepts in common with his opponents; but, unlike them, he follows out the principle to its logical results, which, as he shows, had escaped the notice of all teachers of Rhetoric from Tisias down to his own time.

For this exposition he prepares the way by an elaborate dramatic introduction. A speech of Lysias is read by Phaedrus, and severely criticized by Socrates⁵. The speech is an address of a lover to a youth whose favour he tries to win, and its merit is supposed to consist in the originality of the thesis it enforces, ὥς μὴ ἐρῶντι μάλλον ἢ ἐρῶντι οἷα χαρίζεσθαι. Socrates finds the discourse full

² *Iliad*, iii. 7. 11, ed. Oxon.

³ *Phaedr.* p. 264 c.

⁴ Plato's definition is to the same effect: λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία πρὸς 271 d.

⁵ *P.* 260 c.—266 f.

of tautology and deficient in invention. His young friend, unable to deny the justice of the criticism, insists that Socrates shall make a better speech on the same theme. This, after coquetting awhile, Socrates consents to do, and so far fulfils his engagement as to prove satisfactorily that it is better for the ἐρώμενος to reject the proposals of his ἐραστής⁶. This done, he suddenly breaks off, horror-struck at the impiety of which he had been guilty in putting a vile meaning upon the sacred name of Love⁷. He would gladly depart; but an inward voice⁸ commands him first to make his peace with the offended son of Aphrodite—a “god and goddess-born.” He will follow the precedent given by Stesichorus, who, struck with blindness for reviling the fair Helen, composed a palinode, in which he proved her good as fair, and thereupon straightway regained his sight. He, Socrates, will recite a palinode: in which due atonement shall be made to the injured majesty of Eros. Then follows that famous rhapsody on Love, which Socrates describes as “a kind of mythic hymn,” but which is quite as remarkable for its philosophic as for its literary and poetical merits⁹. It has accordingly made a deep impression upon successive generations of Platonic students, some of whom¹ have erroneously regarded it as the really important portion of the Phaedrus, to which the elaborate discussion on rhetoric which follows it is to be interpreted as merely accessory. In the course of the subsequent conversation², the second λόγος ἐρωτικὸς is more than once referred to by Plato, but without any reference to the passion of which it professes to treat, or to the matter, speculative or mythical, which it contains. It is used by its author for one purpose, and one only—to exemplify the dialectic-rhetorical theory evolved in the sequel of the dialogue.

Readers of the Gorgias naturally ask, How is it that Plato devotes a work so elaborate as the Phaedrus to the illustration of that art of rhetoric which in the former dialogue he pointedly condemns; which he pronounces to be no art, but a mere trick acquired by practice (ἄλογον πρᾶγμα, τριβή, ἐμπειρία), destitute of all scientific principle, and capable of subserving none but the most unworthy ends? Those who adhere to the tradition that the Phaedrus is a juvenile composition, are compelled to suppose that Plato, when he wrote the Gorgias, had survived the illusions of his youth—had, in fact, changed his mind, and ceased to regard Rhetoric as worthy the

⁶ P. 237 B—241 D.

⁷ P. 243 D.

⁸ P. 242 B.

⁹ A less favourable view is taken by Col. Mure, who calls it “an eloquent mystification.” A more indulgent phrase-maker might call it a “romance of the soul.”

¹ As Ficinus. See his “Argument,” prefixed to the English reprint of Bekker.

² Which begins p. 257 B and continues to the end of the dialogue.

attention of a philosopher. This opinion appears to me quite untenable. In the first place, the supposed second thoughts of the Gorgias are by no means the better thoughts. The view adopted in the Phaedrus is both more moderate and more deep and true than the narrow and passionate special-pleading of the Gorgias, a dialogue (as I may attempt to show hereafter) not improbably composed while the wound inflicted on Plato's feelings by the unrighteous doom of his master was still but half healed. In the second place, there are two passages in the Phaedrus, in which an unprejudiced eye cannot fail, in my opinion, to detect an allusion to the depreciatory language employed in the Gorgias. In Phaedr. 260 E, Socrates exclaims: "I seem to hear the approaching steps of a band of antagonist arguments (λόγοι): loudly protesting that Rhetoric is no art, as she lyingly pretends, but an ἄτεχνος τριβή." These personified λόγοι can be none other than those with which we are familiar in the Gorgias. No one before Plato ever used the phrase ἄτεχνος τριβή, nor is there any dialogue except the Gorgias in which the import of the terms τριβή and ἐμπειρία, as distinguished from τέχνη, is explained. In that dialogue the utmost pains are taken by Socrates to render them intelligible to the untutored apprehension of Polus, whereas here their meaning is assumed as self-evident. The distinction is repeated in p. 270 B, and there, as here, allowed to pass without comment or objection.

Lastly, if we refer to dialogues which we know for certain to contain the deliberate opinions of Plato's riper years, we find him assigning to Rhetoric much the same rank as that which it holds in the Phaedrus. In the Politicus (p. 304 A), for instance, he speaks of Rhetoric as an art of co-ordinate dignity and importance with the arts of the General and the administrator of justice: and he describes the functions devolving upon the rhetor in a well-ordered commonwealth, in terms which are but the application of a passage in p. 276 E of the Phaedrus. This passage of the Politicus is interesting in itself, and throws much light not only upon the Phaedrus, but on that very curious feature in Plato's writings, the frequent use of the philosophical mythus. "To what art," it is asked, "are we to assign the office of persuading the vulgar, by a method mythological rather than didactic?" "This function also," says the younger Socrates, "we must appropriate to Rhetoric." To the same effect speaks Phaedrus in this dialogue, where he describes the office of Rhetoric, as τὸ δικαιωστένης τε καὶ ἄλλων ὧν λέγεις περί μυθολογεῖν⁴.

⁴ Polit. 304 C.

⁵ P. 276 E. Compare Phaedrus, τῇ δὲ (ψυχῇ) λόγους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεις νομίμους καὶ ἄλλας περὶ τὴν βούλην καὶ ἀρετὴν παραδῶσειν (p. 270 B). There is an

These passages, taken in connexion, explain what might otherwise seem obscure; viz. Plato's motive for selecting Love as the theme both of Lysias' speech which he condemns, and of the two counter speeches of Socrates. They at the same time account for the discrepancy, in one point of view real, in another only apparent, between the mode in which Rhetoric is handled in the Gorgias and in the Phaedrus. In the Gorgias the *ρήτορ* and the demagogue are identified, and the Rhetoric which Socrates assails is that of the Agora and the Law Courts. But in the ideal Monarchy which is sketched in the Politicus, as well as in the ideal Aristocracy of the Republic, there is no room for either Pleader or Demagogue. Eloquence is thenceforth to exert her powers in what Plato conceived to be the nobler task of swaying and moulding the affections of the citizens into conformity with the principles of a State founded in righteousness. She was to be the handmaid at once of Philosophy and of Political, or, what in the ancient view was the same thing, of Ethical Science. Πείθουσα τὸ δίκαιον ξυνδιακυβερνᾷ τὰς ἐν τῇ πόλει πράξεις . . . κενώριστα πολιτικῆς τὸ ρητορικὸν ὡς ἕτερον εἶδος ὄν, ὑπηρετεῖ μὴν ταύτῃ (Pol. I. I.); or, as Aristotle, entirely in the spirit of his master, remarks: "Rhetoric is properly an offshoot of Dialectic, and of the science of morals, which is Politic properly so called."

Now, setting aside political uses, which are not contemplated in the Phaedrus, the Rhetoric of which the Erotic Discourse is an example is precisely that which Plato describes. As its author explains⁵, the discourse commences with a definition framed on dialectical principles. Having determined Love to be a Madness, it proceeds to investigate the varieties of Madness, and singles out that special variety to which Love belongs. It is, therefore, an example of a Rhetoric which is an "offshoot" of Logic or Dialectic⁷; for Dialectic it is which teaches us how to define "per genus et differentiam." It is also a μυθολογία περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἄλλων ὧν ἔλεγε πέρη—"a mythical discourse touching Justice and other topics of Socratic discourse." It relates to Justice; for that virtue, according to the Platonic Socrates, consists in the due subordination of the lower appetites to the Reason, aided, not thwarted, by the im-

ambiguity in the word μυθολογεῖν, which may bear the general meaning 'fabulari,' 'sermonicinari.' Heindorf denies that it has any more special meaning in this passage; but I think the context, coupled with the parallel passage in the Politicus, would justify the restricted and more usual meaning. Compare Rep. 377 c.

⁵ συμβάλει τὴν ρητορικὴν οἷον παραφύς τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικὴν. Rhet. i. 2, § 7.

⁶ Pp. 263 D, 265 E.

⁷ Rhetor sine dialectica nihil firmi docere potest. Et e contra Dialecticus sine rhetorica non afficit auditores. Utrumque vero conjungens docet et persuadet. Luther in Epist. ad Gal. c. 5.

pulsive or irascible principle; and this subordination is figured by the charioteer holding well in hand the restive steed, while he gives the rein to his nobler and upward-striving yoke-fellow⁸. It may also be justly said to embrace the other customary topics of Socratic discourse; for we recognize, under but thin disguises, all the peculiarities of the Platonic psychology: the immortality, antecedent and prospective, of the soul, its self-moving or self-determining properties ("freedom of the Will"), its heavenly extraction, its incarceration in the flesh, and the conditions of its subsequent emancipation; finally, that singular tenet of ἀνάμνησις which, in the *Phædo* and elsewhere is insisted on as one of the main props of the doctrine of immortality; and that not less characteristic doctrine of ideas or archetypal forms with which the theory of ἀνάμνησις is bound up. The speech is, moreover, manifestly psychagogic, to borrow Plato's term: designed, that is, to sway the Will of the hearer: πλάττει τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς μέθοις, μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν, as the licensed mythologer is said to do in the *Republic* (b. ii. 377 c). It is an instance of that species of rhetoric which alone seemed to Plato desirable or salutary: a rhetoric which, *mutatis mutandis*, answers sufficiently well to our eloquence of the pulpit, as distinguished from the eloquence of the bar, the senate, or the hustings⁹. It is intended to prove, by a living example, that the art which, as ordinarily practised, was a tool in the hands of the designing and ambitious, is capable of being turned by the philosopher to the better purpose of clothing in an attractive dress the results of his more abstruse speculations; and also of stimulating the minds of his disciples, if only by working in them that wonder which, as Plato elsewhere says, and as Aristotle said after him, is the fountain of all philosophy. In one word, the *Erotic Discourse* may be regarded as a master-piece of its author's myth-making genius: the exemplary specimen of an art of which he has left us many other instances, but none so brilliant and elaborate¹.

In one respect, indeed, this discourse may be said to differ from similar philosophical myths which are scattered in the Platonic

⁸ See Appendix I. p. 164.

Hence the decided preference of Isocrates over Lysias (in fine dialog.). Hence, too, the preference of Plato to Isocrates for the closet, and bad as the φιλοσοφία was, there was in his speeches undoubtedly "philosophia quædam," which is wholly wanting in the business-like speeches of Lysias. It evidently suited Plato's purpose to speak as civilly of Isocrates as he could, if only by way of depressing the rival λογογράφοι. Political sympathies may also have had their weight, for Isocrates was an aristocrat and "laudator temporis acti."

⁹ Compare 277 n. c. on a passage which is a description of the ἐρωτικὸς λόγος and the principles on which it was framed. Note esp. the clause, ποικίλη μὲν ποικίλους ἐστὶν παναρχαῖος διδακτικὸς λόγος, ἀπλούς δὲ ἀπλή.

writings; it is, in most of its parts, a deliberate allegory, in which the thing signified is designed to be intelligible to the instructed hearer or reader. This is not always nor usually the case with the Platonic myths, in most of which the sign and the thing signified are blended and sometimes confused, as in myths properly so-called; so that it is hard to say how much is (supposed) truth and how much fable². This distinct allegorical character has led some modern writers to regard the *Erotic Discourse* in the light of a mythical proem to a course of philosophy hereafter to be developed in a graver and more didactic manner by means of dialogues as yet unwritten; while other writers, for similar reasons, have treated the entire dialogue as a composition answering to an inaugural lecture, published by Plato on the occasion of opening his school in the Academy after his return from Sicily. The first of these hypotheses is adopted by Schleiermacher, the second by C. F. Hermann; the former of whom regards the *Phaedrus* as a preface to the entire series of Dialogues; the latter as a preface only to those composed after the date before mentioned. I am unable to adopt either view. First, because, as it seems to me, the mythical representations in the *Phaedrus* presuppose, on the part of its readers, a certain familiarity with the cardinal points of the Platonic morals and psychology, which it was impossible that any circle of Athenian readers could have possessed at the beginning of Plato's professorial life. Secondly, because both theories will be found incompatible with that unity of design which should characterize a work of high literary art, and which, if we are content to look upon it as a treatise on Philosophical Rhetoric, does really characterize the *Phaedrus*. Thirdly, because, as we have seen, such hints as Plato himself has vouchsafed to give us, point in the direction indicated³; and Plato's intimations of his own meaning, even when slight and cursory, and

² As instances of this fusion, take the mythic account of a state of retribution after death at the end of the *Gorgias*, and that of the migration of souls, &c., in the tenth book of the *Republic*, also the splendid description of the process of Creation in the *Timæus*.

³ That the *Phaedrus* of the dialogue is supposed to be something of a Platonist, is evident not only from his want of curiosity as to the meaning of the many fine things said in the *Erotic Discourse*, but from his familiarity with other Platonic distinctions, such as that between pure and mixed pleasures (258 E). "It is pleasures like these," says *Phaedrus*, "which alone make life desirable (the pleasures of hearing and reading discourses), not those which are necessarily preceded by pain and uneasiness, which is the characteristic of nearly all the pleasures of the body, on which account the latter are deservedly styled slavish." The distinction, expressed in this off-hand manner by *Phaedrus*, is in the *Philebus* given as the result of a careful metaphysical analysis (*Phileb.* 31 seqq.). The same theory of mixed pleasures is also implied in the description of the throbbing and pain attendant on the growth of the wing-sprouts in the *Erotic Discourse*, p. 251.

still more when, as in this dialogue, quite explicit, are of more value than the theories of his most ingenious expositors.

We may add to these reasons the not unimportant one, that Aristotle seems to have taken a view of this dialogue similar to that which we have adopted. His three books of Rhetoric are, in effect, an expanded Phaedrus. He accepts Plato's views of the subordinate relation of Rhetoric to Dialectic, and of the necessity of a thorough dialectical training to the future orator. He accepts also the view that he who would work effectually on mankind must first acquaint himself with human nature, with the springs of action and the varieties of character, so as to know by what arguments such and such classes of men are most easily swayed; and he agrees with Plato in condemning as unscientific the τέχναι or Arts of Rhetoric which existed in great numbers in his time. Like Plato too, he regards rhetorical figures and the arts of style (εὐέπεια λόγων) which composed the body of the popular treatises, as mere accessories to a philosophical theory of Rhetoric, not as essential or integral parts of the science. His second book is, in great part, but a working out of the three precepts laid down in the Phaedrus⁴. "Any one," says Plato, "who really means to give us an Art of Rhetoric worthy of the name, must first accurately describe the human soul: telling us whether it is one and uniform, or whether it admits of as many varieties as the body. Secondly, he must tell us how the different parts of the soul act, also how they are affected, and by what agencies. Thirdly, he must be able to classify (διατάξασθαι) the different kinds of arguments, as well as the different modifications of soul, and the affections of which these are susceptible, and then fit the several arguments to the several mental constitutions, and show why such and such souls are necessarily wrought upon by such and such discourses." With these three conditions of a τέχνη ῥητορικὴ Aristotle faithfully complies. His first book contains a classification (διάταξις) of the different πύσεις or modes of producing persuasion; his second embraces (1) a careful analysis of the παθήματα—the affections of which human nature is susceptible, and also of the causes by which such affections are called forth; (2) a descriptive catalogue of the various modifications of human character, and the sort of arguments adapted to each⁵.

The third part of Rhetoric, the *Præcepta bene scribendi*, to which

⁴ p. 271.

⁵ Thus the 2nd chapter treats of anger, its causes and the modes of allaying it. The 4th of φιλία and μῖσος, the 5th of Fear, the 6th of Shame, &c. Again, in the 12th chapter he describes the ἡθὴ of young men, in the 13th of old ones, in the 14th of persons of middle age: after which he describes the effects upon the character of nobility, wealth, power, &c.

Socrates allows a certain subordinate value, but which, when severed from dialectic and psychology, he pronounces rank quackery, is altogether evaded in the Phaedrus. Socrates approaches the subject⁷ only to dismiss it with a few characteristic remarks on the greater value of oral, i. e. conversational, as compared with written instruction. These remarks are introduced by a singular mythus, the scene of which is laid in Egypt, the supposed mother-land of written discourse. The moral of the tale is, that the art of writing operates on the memory and intellect rather as a sedative than as a stimulant; that it fosters the conceit of wisdom, *δοξοσophία*, rather than wisdom itself. This, it may be observed, is a view of his own art not likely to be taken up by a young writer; and the passage, so far as it goes, may be used as an argument against the early date of the Phaedrus. It is evidently Plato's object to exalt the art of Dialectic at the expense of Rhetoric; and we find in this portion of the dialogue a justification of the oral exercises which, as we learn from other sources, formed part of the teaching of the Academy, and which were ridiculed and disparaged both by the teachers of Rhetoric and the comic poets⁸. Aristotle, however, though, as we have said, he also treats the *ἐνέπεια* as an accessory rather than an essential part of a systematic Rhetoric, devotes to it a considerable portion of his third book; in which he handles the subject with his usual good sense, and in a manner more entertaining than might have been expected. His estimate of the Sicilian school of rhetors agrees with Plato's; and the third chapter of his third book *περὶ ψυχρᾶς λέξεως* is filled with instances of their bad taste.

This view of the Phaedrus may offend those who are in the habit of looking upon its theory of Love as one of the most sublime and characteristic mysteries of Platonism. But the question now before us is not the importance of the subject-matter, but the place which the Discourse on Love was designed by its author to fill in the general scheme of the Dialogue, and what is the point of view from which we can contemplate the Phaedrus with satisfaction, as a living and harmonious whole (*ἅρμον συνειρητός*). Now that Plato himself professed to hold a humbler view of the use of mythical compositions than that which has found favour with later Platonists, we may satisfy ourselves by reference to his own words⁹. "Shall we say," exclaims Socrates, "that the philosopher who possesses clear conceptions of Justice, Beauty, and Goodness, will exhibit less discretion

⁶ 268 A.

⁷ 274 B.

⁸ As particularly by Epicerates ap. Athen. ii. 59 c. Meineke iii., p. 370.

⁹ p. 276 c.

than the husbandman in disposing of these his precious seeds of truth?" "Surely not," says Phaedrus. S.—"He will not then set himself, by way of a serious occupation, to write his thoughts in water, or be content with sowing them in ink with his pen, in the form of discourses, which are incapable of defending themselves against assailants, or even of conveying a complete idea of the truth." Ph.—"That is most unlikely." S.—"It is so; and it will therefore be by way of pastime that he will sow his seed in such soil, writing, when he writes at all, for the purpose of laying up precious memorials against oblivious age; for himself in case he live to be old, and for all that pursue the same philosophic career. He will look fondly on these tender growths of his genius, and will find in them a choice substitute for the coarser recreations of the vulgar." Ph.—"Such pastime, Socrates, is as noble as those of the multitude are poor and contemptible: happy he who is able thus to amuse himself, who can weave stories (*μυθολογοῦντα*) about Justice and the other matters upon which you discourse¹." In this passage we may read Plato's explanation of his own purpose in writing, and of his practice of interweaving subtle dialectical controversy with discourses half playful, half serious, in which philosophical truth is blended with poetic fiction in varying proportions. Literary skill was not the attainment on which Plato most prided himself, or which he most admired in others. He wore it "lightly, like a flower," esteeming poetry and eloquence as dust in the balance when weighed against philosophic insight and dialectical subtlety. The man he was prepared to run after (*κατόπισθε μετ' ἔχθιον ὥστε θεοῖο*²) was one who knew how to collect and divide, to elevate common notions into scientific conceptions, to separate genera into their species by strict rules of art, to find the One in the Many and the Many in the One,—in a word, the consummate dialectician.

The original passage of which this is a part is well worthy of consideration. It professes to give us the key to Plato's philosophical method, and more than one of his dialogues may be viewed as a commentary upon it. In the *Sophistes* and *Politicus* he has given us elaborate specimens of his art of Division, *διαίρεσις*, or, as we should call it, Classification, with which in the former dialogue he has interwoven a refutation of the Eleatic or Eristic Logic, which was based on a principle antithetic to his own.

¹ Compare *Timæus* 59 D, where he speaks of the unrepented pleasure (*ἀμεταμέλητος ἡδονή*) afforded by speculating on physics, in accordance with *τὴν τῶν εἰκότων μύθων ἰδέαν*. This will be a philosopher's recreation (*παιδιὰ μέτριος καὶ ῥηρόνιμος*), in the intervals of his dialectical exercises.

² p. 266 D.

PART II.

ON THE PROBABLE DATE OF THE PHAEDRUS³.

THE notion that the Phaedrus was the earliest of Plato's philosophical productions rests mainly, if not entirely, so far as external evidence is concerned, upon a passage of Diogenes Laertius, who lived in the third, and one of Olympiodorus, who lectured on Plato and his philosophy in the sixth century after Christ. The passage of Diogenes occurs in the twenty-fifth chapter of his life of Plato (b. iii. § 38), a chapter containing six or seven unconnected notices of more or less interest, but of which two at least are demonstrably erroneous⁴. After speaking of the tradition that the books of the Laws were left by Plato at his death ἐν κηρῷ, i. e. written on wax tablets, and that his scholar Philippus of Opus, the reputed author of the Epinomis, first wrote them out fair, Diogenes proceeds as follows: Εὐφορίων δὲ καὶ Παναίτιος εἰρήκασι, πολλάκις ἐστραμμένην εὐρῆσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς πολιτείας, ἣν πολιτείαν Ἀριστοξένος φησι πᾶσαν σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Πρωταγόρου γεγράφθαι ἀντιλογικοῖς. λόγος⁵ δὲ πρῶτον γράψαι αὐτὸν τὸν Φαῖδρον καὶ γὰρ ἔχει μειρακιῶδες τι τὸ πρόβλημα. Δικαίωρχος δὲ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς γραφῆς ὅλον ἐπιμέμφεται ὡς φορτικόν⁶. "Euphorion and Panaetius have stated that the opening sentence of the Republic was found with

³ The following chronological table will assist the reader:—

Plato was born B.C. 427 or 429.

- | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------|
| — became acquainted with Socrates | 407 or 409 an. æt. | 20. |
| — left Athens <i>mortuo Socrate</i> | 399 | — 28 or 30. |
| — said to have returned thither | 395 | — 32 or 34. |
| — began to teach in the Academy | 386 perh. | — 40 or 42. |

⁴ Aristotle is made to say that "the diction of Plato is intermediate between that of prose and poetry:" evidently a misrepresentation of Rhet. iii. 7. 11, where the philosopher speaks only of the *Phaedrus*, in which he says that this style was adopted ironically (μετ' εἰρωνείας). He is also represented as having been the only one of Plato's audience who had patience to hear to the end the dialogue περὶ ψυχῆς, i. e. the Phædo. The genuine tradition on which this preposterous story is founded is well known and sufficiently probable. It was an oral discourse περὶ τὰ γαθοῦ, not the reading of the Phædo, which thinned the philosophic circle.

⁵ Vulg. λόγον, corrected by Cobet in his ed. of D. L.

⁶ Of the authorities here quoted

Aristoxenus was a disciple of Aristotle,	flor. circ.	320 B.C.
Dicaearchus do.	do.	— — 326—287
Euphorion a poet and historiographer	— —	240
	born	274, d. 221
Panaetius	flor. circ.	143

The last is called "gravissimus Stoicorum," Cic. de Off. ii. 14. 51. He was a Platonizing Stoic however—"Semper in ore habuit Platonem," de Fin. iv. 28. 79; "dissentit in nonnullis a Platone suo," Tusc. i. 32. 69, c. g. with reference to the Immortality of the Soul.

1 style end
Jaeger 330
2

the words written several times over, and each time in a different order, which Republic, Aristoxenus says, was almost entirely contained in the Antilogica of Protagoras; there is also a report that the first dialogue he (Plato) wrote was the Phædrus: for indeed the subject of that dialogue is one which a very young man would naturally choose. But Dicaearchus censures the style of the entire dialogue, which he thinks in bad taste⁷." In this passage Diogenes agrees perfectly with the statement of Olympiodorus, who says in his life of Plato, τοῦ Πλάτωνος τοῦτον πρῶτον γράψαντος διάλογον, ὡς λέγεται. In other words, the belief that Plato wrote the Phædrus first was a common rumour, founded on the juvenile character of its πρόβλημα—its theme, or subject proposed for discussion,—which those who accept the tradition suppose to be Love⁸. Others think that the story was borrowed from Dicaearchus, in which case it is conceivable that the "report" was an inference founded on his impression of the dialogue, which he deemed unworthy of an adult Plato. And this seems to be Schleiermacher's view, which is not on the whole improbable⁹. However this may be, the rumour was unknown to Cicero, who was familiar with the writings both of Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus, especially with the latter, whom he repeatedly quotes. In the Orator, c. xiii. 41, occurs the following passage: "Isocrates videtur testimonio Platonis aliorum iudicia debere contemnere. Est enim (ut scis) quasi in extrema pagina Phædri¹ his ipsis verbis loquens Socrates: 'Adolescens etiam nunc, o Phædre, Isocrates est: sed quid de illo augurer libet dicere. Quid tandem? inquit ille. Majore mihi ingenio videtur esse quam ut cum orationibus Lysiae comparetur. * * * * * Inest enim natura philosophia in hujus viri mente quaedam.' Hæc de adolescente Socrates auguratur. At ea de seniore scribit Plato, et scribit æqualis, et quidem, exagitator omnium rhetorum, hunc miratur unum."

We are compelled to infer from this passage that Cicero conceived the Phædrus to have been written when Isocrates had reached at least his full maturity (*senior*); in other words, long after the time at which the conversation between Socrates and Phædrus is feigned to have taken place. Plato himself was but six years the junior of Isocrates, and, therefore, could not have been a young man at a time

⁷ φορτικὸν seems to mean 'inflated,' 'turgid,' 'overdone,' 'pompous.' φορτικὸς καὶ ὑπερόγκος occur together in Dion. Hal.

⁸ Perhaps because Aristotle says, ὅτι οἱ νέοι ἐρωτικοί. Krische über Platons Phædrus, p. 5. But the καλῶν παίδων ἔρως seems to have been confined to grown-up men.

⁹ It is also the view of Cobet, who punctuates accordingly in his ed. of Diogenes.

¹ Phædr. p. 279 A.

when Isocrates would be justly described as "senior;" a term which a Roman would not have applied to any one much under fifty years of age. At any rate, Cicero supposes a considerable interval to have elapsed between the imagined conversation and the actual composition of the *Phaedrus*; but the interval must have been very short, if the dialogue was written in Plato's youth. Of the accuracy of Cicero's statement I give no opinion; but I think we may fairly allow it to counterweigh that of Dicaearchus, or Aristoxenus, or whoever may have been Diogenes's authority for the story he has handed down.

If now we consider the internal evidence of the dialogue, we shall find that (with an exception hereafter to be mentioned²) it favours the later rather than the earlier date. We have already seen that the *Phaedrus* lays down the theory of a dialectical method, of which the *Sophistes* and *Politicus* contain elaborate examples. These dialogues profess to be a continuation of the *Theaetetus*, which we know from internal evidence to have been written at least six years after the death of Socrates; and the entire trilogy may have taken up some years in its composition³. The dialogue which, in another part of its contents, the *Phaedrus* most resembles, is the *Symposium*, and this is known, from internal but conclusive indications, to have been a somewhat late work⁴. The similar vein of Erotic speculation in these two dialogues indisposes us to separate them by any long interval of time. Whether we consider the topics handled or its general construction, the *Phaedrus* seems to class itself naturally with the *Theaetetus*⁵, the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium*, and other considerable dialogues which occupied Plato's pen during the maturity of his manhood. Its place with reference to the *Republic* we cannot venture to fix; though, as the doctrine of the threefold division of the Soul, and the functions of the so-called irascible principle in the mental economy are clearly figured in the Erotic allegory, it seems highly probable that the *Phaedrus* was written at any rate after Plato's views on this subject had become known in philosophic circles.

Those, on the other hand, who hold to the tradition of the early date of the *Phaedrus*, have to explain the fact, that it is far superior as an effort of literary skill to the *Lysis*, the *Laches*, the *Charmides*, and even the *Protagoras*; which they as well as their opponents consider to have been written during the life of Socrates.

² See Appendix II.

³ It probably did so. The *Politicus* is written in a "later manner" than the *Theaetetus*.

⁴ See inter alia Stallbaum's *Prolegomena ad Symp.*

⁵ If I may venture on a guess, I should put it after the *Theaetetus*, and before the other two.

They have also to explain how it is that in these dialogues Plato touches upon none of the topics which are handled in the *Phaedrus*, and which must have employed the mind of its author for some considerable time at least before he gave the result of his speculations to the world. The *Lysis* is a conversation on Friendship: the *Laches*, a treatise on Valour; but of both these the positive results are meagre, and the doctrines by no means characteristically Platonic, but rather such as Xenophon or any other follower of Socrates might have gleaned from the teaching of his master. In the *Charmides*, which is an advance upon the *Lysis* and *Laches* in point of composition, notions are put forward which are incompatible with Plato's later opinions—the virtue of *σωφροσύνη*, for instance, is handled in a manner far from satisfactory; and even the *Protagoras*, though the most perfect specimen of his early manner, conducts us to none but negative results. It leaves us dissatisfied with the Socratic theory of Virtue, but neither substitutes a better, nor indicates in what direction we are to look for it. In maintaining therefore the early date assigned to the *Phaedrus* by tradition we should be driven to suppose that Plato in his first published work had presented the world with ideas and speculations which he afterwards allowed to slumber for some twenty years; vouchsafing no explanation of allegories which are quite intelligible to us, but which must have seemed mere enigmas to those to whom his leading doctrines were unknown.

In this attempt to fix approximately the date of the *Phaedrus*, no account has been taken of the Pythagorean matter which is found in the *Erotic Discourse*. Stallbaum and others have built much on this; for it is a well-known tradition⁶ that Plato owed the Pythagorean elements which enter into his scheme of philosophy, to his intercourse with the members of Pythagorean brotherhoods resident in Sicily and lower Italy; countries which he did not visit until some time after the death of Socrates. The argument hence derived is not without its weight, though it has been pressed somewhat too far by Stallbaum. It is, however, highly probable that the fondness for myth and allegory which appears nowhere in the purely Socratic—that is, as I venture to call them, the early—dialogues⁷, but which eminently distinguishes those acknowledged to be later, was a taste which Plato derived from this ingenious and fantastic school. The cosmical speculations which are implied in the *Erotic mythus*

⁶ Cic. de Repub. i. 10. 16. De Fin. v. 29. 87.

⁷ The apologue put in the mouth of Protagoras is only a seeming exception; for no one can fail to perceive that it is a composition altogether different both in form and spirit from the true Platonic mythus.

are of Pythagorean origin, though in many of the details Plato seems to have introduced considerable variations.

Arguments have also been drawn from the notices of Lysias scattered in this dialogue, compared with what we know from other sources of the biography of that Orator. We should infer from four passages in the dialogue⁸, that the reputation of Lysias as a *λογογράφος* had reached its highest point when the *Phaedrus* was written. He is styled "the ablest living writer," and appears to have been envied and decried in consequence. One of the public characters of the day having occasion to abuse him, had called him, says *Phaedrus*, *λογογράφος*. The word properly denoted one who composed for pay speeches to be delivered by others, particularly by plaintiffs or defendants in the law courts. Antiphon, of whom we read in the eighth book of *Thucydides*⁹, was the first who adopted this practice, and it is well known that all the extant speeches of Lysias, save one, were composed to be spoken by others. There is no doubt that some discredit attached to this profession of a *λογογράφος*, at least sufficient to deter a man of wealth and good connexions from engaging in it. Now it is well known that Lysias, though a 'metoec,' was a member of a wealthy family. At the age of fifteen (B.C. 443) he had left Athens for Thurii, where he settled as a *κληροῦχος*, and resided in affluence until the year 411. In that year he was driven out by the oligarchal or Lacedaemonian party, which had been strengthened by the disastrous ending of the Sicilian expedition¹. He returned direct to Athens, where his father Cephalus resided. There, as we learn from the opening page of the *Republic*, he made the acquaintance of Socrates and his friends, though he was not one of the Socratic circle, as his brother Polemarchus seems to have been. Living in affluence, as a member of a wealthy house, it is not likely that he would practise either as a teacher of rhetoric or as a writer of speeches, during the first years of his sojourn in Athens after his return. A man of literary tastes we may suppose him to have been, for we are told that, during his abode at Thurii, he had studied rhetoric under the Sicilian professor Tisias. He may, therefore, have written as an amateur (ὡς ιδιώτης); but that alone would not have justified Plato in calling him *δευνότατος τῶν νῦν γράφειν*, still less in making him the prominent figure in an

⁸ *Λυσίας δεινότατος ὦν τῶν νῦν γράφειν* (*Phaedr. init.* 228 A). *Λυσίαν τὸν τοῦ λόγου πατέρα παῦε τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν δέ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Πολέμαρχος τέτραπται, τρέψον* (257 B). *Λυσίαν τις τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐλοιδορεῖ, καὶ ἐκάλει λογογράφον* (ib. C). *εἴτε Λυσίας εἴτε τις ἄλλος πάποτ' ἔγραψεν ἢ γράψει ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ νόμους τιθεῖς, σύγγραμμα πολιτικῶν γράφων* (277 D).

⁹ He was feared, says *Thucydides*, *διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος*. Compare Plato's *δευνότατος τῶν νῦν γράφειν*.

¹ Grote, H. G. x. 530.

important dialogue like the *Phaedrus*. During the domination of the Thirty (B.C. 404) a change came over his fortunes. He was despoiled by them of a large portion of his property, of which however he retained enough to enable him to contribute nobly in aid of Thrasybulus and the exiles. It was after their return that he appeared for the first time in an Athenian court of justice. In the oration against Eratosthenes, spoken 403, he expresses great diffidence in his own powers, being, as he tells us, a novice in public business and public speaking², and he denies that either he or his father Cephalus had ever brought or defended an action. The speech is one of his best; and this leads to the conclusion that he had cultivated his talent of public speaking during his long residence at Thurii, where he appears to have been a considerable personage. But of his written speeches this against Eratosthenes appears to be the earliest. "Quarum aetatem eruere possumus eae omnes post XXXviratum conficiebantur," says his biographer Taylor³. As Lysias was deprived of the rights of citizenship shortly after he had acquired them, he was prevented from mounting the bema or appearing in the law courts: hence he devoted himself to the composition of speeches for others, as the only means he had left of retrieving his fortunes. His fame as a Logographus was therefore acquired late in life; for he was fifty-five years of age at the trial of Eratosthenes, and fifty-nine at the trial of Socrates in 399. He worked at this profession during the last twenty-five years of his life, and died at the age of eighty (B.C. 378)⁴.

These data are more consistent with the late than the early composition of this dialogue: at any rate, they seem to prove that Plato did not write the *Phaedrus* while still a stripling (μειράκιον), or about B.C. 406, when he was twenty years old; for at that date Lysias had not begun to employ himself as a Logographus, and could still less have risen to the head of that profession⁵.

² §§ 3, 4, Bekk.

³ The oration pro Polystrato was delivered in Ol. xcii. 4. B.C. 409. But its authenticity is denied. Comp. c. Eratosth. § 3, οὐτ' ἐμαυτοῦ πάποτε οὔτε ἀλλότρια πράγματα πράξας νῦν ἠνάγκασμαι . . . κατηγορεῖν.

⁴ Plato opened the Academy B.C. 388 or 386.

⁵ We must therefore understand Plato's epithet δεινότατος τῶν νῦν γράφειν, as put in the mouth of Socrates, to be a πρόληψις—a liberty of which he would not have scrupled to avail himself in composing a dialogue the time of which was placed so far back as that of the *Phaedrus* must have been. To explain away the anachronisms of Plato, is a favourite amusement of his commentators—a task πολλῆς δόξης—and we may add, οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχῶν ἀνδρῶν.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.

"A H... Summer Day"
W:1 Pl. I

t. p.
227 ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν ;

ΦΑΙ. Παρὰ Λυσίου, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ Κεφάλου.
πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περίπατον ἔξω τείχους· συχνὸν γὰρ
ἐκεῖ διέτριψα χρόνον καθήμενος ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ. τῷ δὲ σῶ
καὶ ἐμῷ ἐταίρῳ πειθόμενος Ἀκουμενῶ κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς
ποιοῦμαι τοὺς περιπάτους· φησὶ γὰρ ἀκοπωτέρους εἶναι
B τῶν ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς γάρ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, λέγει. ἀτὰρ Λυσίας ἦν,
ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐν ᾧ στεί.

227. φησὶ—δρόμοις] ‘he tells me that country exercise is more bracing than that taken in the public walks.’ ἀκοπα is a medical term, which Plato probably borrowed from Hippocrates, as ἐξάντης, p. 244 E. It included all applications, external as well as internal, for removing lassitude and strengthening the nervous system, answering to our ‘tonics.’ For δρόμοις compare Eupolis ap. Diog. L. iii. 7, ἐν εὐσκόις δρόμοισιν Ἀκαδήμιον θεοῦ. Plat. Cim. c. 13, τὴν δ’ Ἀκαδημίαν ἐξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ αὐχμηρᾶς κατὰρῥυτον ἀποδείξας ἄλσος, ἡσκημένον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ δρόμοις καθαρῶς καὶ συσκόις περιπάτοις. The word δρόμοι sometimes denotes the covered portico or cloister encompassing the great open court (ὑπαιθρον) of the palaestra or gymnasium. These δρόμοι were used not only for walking exercise, but also in bad weather for foot-races and other sports which ordinarily took place in the open area. They are also called ξυστοί, ξυστοὶ δρόμοι, κατάστεγοι δρόμοι. Vitruv. v. 11. 2, “Haec porticus ξυστὸς apud Graecos vocitatur, quod athletae per hyberna

tempora in tectis stadiis exercentur.” J. Poll. 3. 148, ξυστοὶ δρόμοι, ἐν οἷς αἱ ἀσκήσεις. He elsewhere cites a line from Aristias, ἦν μοι παλαίστρα καὶ δρόμος ξυστὸς πέλας. Xen. Oecon. xi. 15, ἐγὼ δὲ περιπάτω χρῶμαι τῇ εἰς ἀγρὸν ὁδῷ, ἵσως ἄμεινον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ εἰ ἐν τῷ ξυστῷ περιπατοίην. Comp. Euthyd. p. 273, εἰσελθόντες δὲ περιπατεῖτην ἐν τῷ καταστέγῳ δρόμῳ, of the Lyceum, as appears from the context.

B. ἐν ᾧ στεί] Lysias probably resided with his father Cephalus, whose house, as we learn from the opening scene of the Republic, was in the Peiraeus; or he may have had a house of his own there. Epierates is once, Morychus several times, mentioned by Aristophanes, the former as the possessor of an enviable beard, the latter as an eminent bon-vivant: Eccles. 71; Ach. 887; Pac. 1008. In Vesp. 506 Morychus is represented as (ὦν βίον γενναῖον, leading a life of gentlemanly ease and luxury. Comp. ib. 1142. Epierates, on the other hand, is described as a ῥήτωρ καὶ δημαγωγός, Schol. Eccles. l. 1. He would seem to

ΦΑΙ. Ναί, παρ' Ἐπικράτει, ἐν τῇδε τῇ πλησίον τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου οἰκίᾳ τῇ Μορυχίᾳ.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν δὴ ἦν ἡ διατριβή; ἣ δῆλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἰστία;

ΦΑΙ. Πεύσει, εἴ σοι σχολὴ προΐοντι ἀκούειν.

ΣΩ. Τί δαί; οὐκ ἂν οἶει με κατὰ Πίνδαρον καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πρᾶγμα ποιήσασθαι τὸ σὴν τε καὶ G17 723 Λυσίου διατριβὴν ἀκοῦσαι;

ΦΑΙ. Πρόαγε δῆ.

ΣΩ. Λέγοις ἄν.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκратες, προσήκουσά γέ σοι ἡ ἀκοή. ὁ γάρ τοι λόγος ἦν, περὶ ὃν διετρίβομεν, οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινα τρόπον ἐρωτικός. γέγραφε γὰρ δὴ ὁ Λυσίας πειρώμενόν τινα τῶν καλῶν, οὐχ ὑπ' ἑραστοῦ δέ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ κεκόμψευται. λέγει γὰρ ὡς χαριστέον μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶντι.

ΣΩ. ὦ γενναῖος, εἴθε γράψειεν ὡς χρὴ πένητι μᾶλλον ἢ πλουσίῳ, καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ἢ νεωτέρῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐμοί τε πρόσεστι καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡμῶν. ἡ γὰρ ἂν ἀστείοι καὶ D δημωφελεῖς εἶεν οἱ λόγοι. ἔγωγ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμῃκα ἀκοῦσαι, ὥστ' ἐὰν βαδίζων ποιῇ τὸν περίπατον Μεγαράδε, καὶ κατὰ Ἡρόδικον προσβάς τῷ τείχει πάλιν ἀπῆς, οὐ μὴ σου ἀπολειφθῶ.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ βέλτιστε Σώκратες; οἶει με, ἂ Λυσίας | ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ σχολὴν συνέθηκε, δευνόντα 228 τὸν ὦν τῶν νῦν γράφειν, ταῦτα ιδιώτην ὄντα ἀπομνημονεύσειν ἀξίως ἐκείνου; πολλοῦ γε δέω. καὶ τοι ἐβουλόμην γ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ μοι πολὺ χρυσίον γενέσθαι.

have succeeded to the 'Morychian mansion,' possibly on the death of its former occupant. Hence the point of Socrates's question, ἡ δῆλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἰστία; 'The character of the entertainments had changed with the change of possessors.

κατὰ Πίνδαρον] The entire passage is to be found *Isthm. i. 1, Māter ἑμᾶ, τὸ τέον, χρῆσασπι θήβα, Πρύγμα καὶ ἀσχο-
λλας ὑπέρτερον θάσσαι.*

D. ἡ γὰρ ἂν ἀστείῳ] 'would indeed be charming and a boon to the public.' *Inf. 242 B, ἡ εὐθελία αὐτοῖν πάνυ ἀστεία, 'quite refreshing.'* Stallbaum's idea of a double meaning is gratuitous.

[Ἡρόδικον] *Sch. ἱατρὸς ἦν καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἐξω τείχους ἐποιεῖτο, ἀρχόμενος ἀπὸ τινος διαστήματος οὐ μακροῦ ἀλλὰ συμμέτρου, ἄχρι τοῦ τείχους, καὶ ἀναστρέφων.* In *Protag. 316 D* he is styled ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον *Μεγαρεύς*, and his

ΣΩ. ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἔμαν-
τοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερά ἐστι τούτων, εὖ οἶδα
ὅτι *Λυσίου* λόγον ἀκούων ἐκείνος οὐ μόνον ἄπαξ ἤκουσεν,
ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐπαναλαμβάνων ἐκέλευεν οἱ λέγειν· ὁ δὲ
ἐπέπιθετο προθύμως. τῷ δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἦν ἱκανά, ἀλλὰ
τελευταίων παραλαβὼν τὸ βιβλίον ἃ μάλιστα ἐπεθύμει
ἐπεσκόπει. καὶ τοῦτο δρῶν, ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ καθήμενος, ἀπει-
πὼν εἰς περίπατον ἦει, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, νῆ τὸν κύνα,
ἐξεπιστάμενος τὸν λόγον, εἰ μὴ πάνυ τις ἦν μακρός.
ἐπορεύετο δ' ἐκτὸς τείχους, ἵνα μελετήῃ. ἀπαντήσας δέ
τω νοσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν, ἰδὼν μὲν ἰδὼν ἦσθη ὅτι
ἔξοι τὸν συγκορυβαίνοντα, καὶ προάγειν ἐκέλευε· δεο-
μένου δὲ λέγειν τοῦ τῶν λόγων ἔραστοῦ, ἐθρύπτετο ὡς δὴ
οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶν λέγειν· τελευταίων δὲ ἔμελλε, καὶ εἰ μὴ τις
ἐκὼν ἀκούοι, βία ἐρεῖν. σὺ οὖν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αὐτοῦ δεηθῇτι,
ὅπερ τάχα πάντως ποιήσῃ, νῦν ἤδη ποιεῖν.

ΦΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολὺν κράτιστόν ἐστιν οὕτως
ὅπως δύναμαι λέγειν· ὥς μοι δοκεῖς σὺ οὐδαμῶς με
ἀφήσῃν πρὶν ἂν εἴπω ἀμῶς γέ πως.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ γάρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκῶ.

mode of treatment is satirically charac-
terized in Rep. iii. 406 A. There was
also an Herodius of Leontini, a brother
of Gorgias, a physician, like his name-
sake in the text. Gorg. 448 B.

228. ἀλλὰ γὰρ—εὖ οἶδα] ἀλλὰ γὰρ are
here equivalent to ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ, as in Eur.
Phoen. 1307, 'Ἀλλὰ γὰρ Κρέοντα λεύσσω
τάνδε δεῦρο συννεφῇ πρὸς δόμους στεί-
χοντα, παῖσιν τοὺς παρεστῶτας γόους,
and in other passages quoted by Elmsley
on Heracl. 481. The ἐπαναλαμβάνων
which follows is an instance of a parti-
ciple used adverbially; 'repeatedly,' 'over
and over again,' as τελευτῶν is presently
used for εἰς τέλος.

B. For the ellipse in the clause ἃ μάλ-
ιστα ἐπεθύμει ἐπεσκόπει comp. Symp.
192 E, οἶοι' ἂν ἀκηκοέναι τοῦτο ὃ πάλαι
ἔρα ἐπεθύμει, συνελθόν· . . τῷ ἐρωμένῳ
ἐκ δευτέρου εἰς γενέσθαι. Badham, ἐτεθαν-
μάκει, and in Symp. ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ, οὐ
πάλαι ἄρ' ἐπεθύμει. Both conjectures
seem to me unnecessary.

ἀπαντήσας δέ τῳ] I have adopted the
suggestion of Stephanus, notwithstand-

ing Stallb.'s defence of the vulg. τῷ
νοσοῦντι as equiv. to ἐμοί. His explana-
tion of the repeated ἰδὼν is ingenious and
probably right. ἰδὼν, ἰδὼν! may be
supposed to have been the inward ejacu-
lation of Phaedrus on meeting one who
'shared his enthusiasm' for literature.
At any rate this is better than to sup-
pose with Steph. that Plato wrote ἰδὼν
μὲν ἰόντα, which is frigid in the extreme.
Synesius, Encom. Calv., εἶδον γὰρ εἶδον
εἰκόνας: p. 56, ed. Turneb.

C. ἐθρύπτετο] Comp. Xen. Symp. viii.
4, καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπισκώψας ὡς δὴ θρυπ-
τόμενος, εἶπε, Μὴ νῦν μοι ἐν τῇ παρόντι
ὄχλον παρέχε' ὡς σὺ γὰρ ὄρεῖς, ἄλλα
πράττω: and transl. 'he coyly hung
back,' like a prudish beauty. Slightly
different is the meaning of διαθρύπτεται
in Theocr. xv. 99, Φθεγγεῖται τι, σάφ'
οἶδα, καλὸν, διαθρύπτεται ἤδη.

σὺ οὖν] 'entreat him therefore your-
self to do at once that which he will pre-
sently do whether or not.'

δοκῶ] For δοκεῖ, as Rep. 567 D quoted
by Heind.

ΦΑΙ. Οὕτωςι τοίνυν ποιήσω. τῷ ὄντι γάρ, ὦ Σώ- D
κρατες, παντὸς μᾶλλον τά γε ῥήματα οὐκ ἐξέμαθον· τὴν
μέντοι διάνοιαν σχεδὸν ἀπάντων, οἷς ἔφη διαφέρειν τὰ
τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἢ τὰ τοῦ μή, ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἐφεξῆς δίειμι,
ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου.

ΣΩ. Δείξας γε πρῶτον, ὦ φιλότης, τί ἄρα ἐν τῇ
ἀριστερᾷ ἔχεις ὑπὸ τῷ ἱματίῳ. τοπάξω γάρ σε ἔχειν τὸν
λόγον αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν, οὕτωςι διανοοῦ περὶ
ἐμοῦ, ὥς ἐγὼ σε πάνν μὲν φιλῶ, παρόντος δὲ καὶ Λυσίου
ἐμαυτὸν σοι ἐμμελετᾶν παρέχειν οὐ πάνν δέδοκται. ἀλλ' E
ἴθι, δείκνυ.

ΦΑΙ. Παῦε. ἐκκέκρουκας με ἐλπίδος, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ἣν εἶχον ἐν σοὶ ὥς ἐγγυμνασόμενος. ἀλλὰ ποῦ δὴ βούλει
καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνῶμεν; MT 772

| ΣΩ. Δεῦρ' ἐκτραπόμενοι κατὰ τὸν Ἰλισσὸν ἴωμεν, 229
εἴτα ὅπου ἂν δόξῃ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καθιζησόμεθα.

ΦΑΙ. Εἰς καιρόν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἀνυπόδητος ὢν ἔτυχον
σὺ μὲν γὰρ δὴ αἰεὶ. ῥᾶστον οὖν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ ὑδάτιον
βρέχουσι τοὺς πόδας ἰέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἀηδές, ἄλλως τε καὶ
τῇνδε τὴν ὥραν τοῦ ἔτους τε καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας.

D. διαφέρειν—ἦ] Comp. Rep. v. 455 c, ταῦτα τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος διαφερόντως ἔχει ἢ τὰ τῶν γυναικῶν. So with other quasi-comparatives, as ἐναντίον, ἐμπάνιν, and the like. See Madvig, Gr. Gr. § 91.

Δείξας—αὐτόν] 'yes, but first let me see what you are holding in your left hand beneath your cloak; I strongly suspect it is the very speech in question.' Hirschli alters πρῶτον into πρότερον, following Hermias, but comp. Rep. 338 c, ἐὰν μάθω γε πρῶτον τί λέγεις. Phaedrus held the volume in his left hand, employing his right in holding together the folds of the himation which were slung over his left shoulder (ἀναβαλόμενος ἐπιδείξας ἰλευθέρως, according to the phrase in Theaet. 175 e).

φιλότης] For φίλε, or φίλη κεφαλῇ, abstr. pro concreto—a formula adopted by Plato's imitators, as Lucian, &c., but occurring nowhere else in extant Attic writers. Eustathius however has ἀνὴρ Ἀττικὸς ἐροῖ ἂν καὶ σὺ φιλότης, p. 1469, 58.

ἐμαυτὸν—δέδοκται] 'I have no intention of hearing you rehearse your lesson.'—ἐμμελετᾶν = to practise upon or at the expense of another. Theor. iii. 36, ἐπεὶ τὸ μοι ἐνδιαβρόπτη.

E. δέικνυ V. δέικνυε. I have followed Hirsch. in restoring the Attic form, though with some hesitation. The Hellenic δεικνύειν is used by Alexis, a poet of the middle comedy and Plato's contemporary. Hence Cobet goes too far in saying that these forms "sub Menandri aetatem propullularunt." Vv. Lectt. p. 317.

Παῦε] 'have done,' act., not middle, according to Attic usage. On the other hand παύσαι in the aor. not παύσω. See Cobet, ibid. pp. 264, 5, who observes, "Semel mihi παύου apud antiquiores lectum est, apud Ephippium Athen. viii. p. 347 v: ψυχρὸν τοῦτ'· παύου φουσῶν, Μακεδῶν ἀρχῶν, cui reddiderim παύ' οὐν." 229, καθιζήσόμεθα] Antiant. Bekk. p. 104, 2, καθιζησόμεθα ἀντὶ τοῦ καθεδούμεθα. Πλάτων Φαίδρῳ.

11th
n. 10. p. 337

MT 267, 770

Fatherly
Bubv.

but Hippoc.

ph. 104. 2734

ΣΩ. Πρόαγε δὴ, καὶ σκόπει ἅμα ὅπου καθιζήσόμεθα.

ΦΑΙ. Ὅρας οὖν ἐκείνην τὴν ὑψηλοτάτην πλάτανον; *Thphr. H V*

ΣΩ. Τί μὴν;

B ΦΑΙ. Ἐκεῖ σκιά τ' ἐστὶ καὶ πνεῦμα μέτριον, καὶ πόα καθίζεσθαι ἢ, ἂν βουλώμεθα, κατακλιθῆναι.

ΣΩ. Προάγοις ἄν.

ΦΑΙ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἐνθένδε μέντοι ποθὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισσοῦ λέγεται ὁ Βορέας τὴν Ὠρεΐθυιαν ἀρπάσαι;

ΣΩ. Λέγεται γάρ.

ΦΑΙ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐνθένδε; χαρίεντα γοῦν καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ διαφανῆ τὰ ὑδάτια φαίνεται, καὶ ἐπιτήδεια κόραις παίζειν παρ' αὐτά.

C ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ κάτωθεν ὅσον δὺ ἢ τρία στάδια, ἥ *Erbsc F. 20* πρὸς τὸ τῆς Ἀγρας διαβαίνομεν καὶ πού τίς ἐστὶ βωμὸς αὐτόθι Βορέου.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ νενόηκα· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες· σὺ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθει ἀληθὲς εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ ἀπιστοῖν, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοί, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἶην· εἴτα σοφίζόμενος φαίην αὐτὴν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίον πετρῶν σὺν Φαρμακείᾳ παίζουσιν ὄσαι, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λεχθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀνάρπαστον γεγονέναι. ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγον· λέγεται

B. κατακλιθῆναι] So the Codd., κατακλινῆναι being the only form allowed by the stricter Atticists. See Cobet, N. Lectt. p. 340. 1800 C

C. διαβαίνομεν] Perhaps διεβαίνομεν. They are ascending the stream, which they probably crossed near the temple of Agra or Artemis Agrotera. Comp. the reply of Phaedr., οὐ πάνυ νενόηκα.

ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοί] There is much of this rationalizing vein in Euripides, derived perhaps from his contemporary Metrodorus, a friend and disciple of Anaxagoras, who had himself expressed an opinion that Homer's poetry was in a great measure allegorical. This view was carried by Metrodorus to extravagant lengths: he explained, for instance, Zeus, Hera, and Pallas as symbols

of certain "physical substances or elemental arrangements" (φύσεις ὑποστάσεις καὶ στοιχείων διακοσμήσεις). Diog. Laert. B. ii. c. 3, § 11. This he did, ἐν τῷ περὶ Ὁμήρου—a book in which *λαν* εὐθὺς διελέκεται, πάντα εἰς ἀλληγορίαν μετὰ γων. It is probable that the sarcastic epithets in the text, *λαν* δεινοῦ, κ.τ.λ., refer either to this author, or to some imitator who made the Attic myths his specialty. The explanation of the fable of Boreas is evidently a tempting one to a rationalist of this school.

D. ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου—ἡρπασθῆ] This clause is not noticed by Hermias in his paraphrase, and seems to Heindorf misplaced. Ast defends it on the ground that Plato meant to ridicule the arbitrary character of the rationalizing interpreta-

gloss?

γὰρ αὖ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἐκέιθεν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνθένδε
 ἡρπάσθη. ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χα-
 ρίετα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ
πάνυ εὐτυχούς ἀνδρός, κατ' ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δ' αὐτῷ
ἀνάγκη μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῶν Ἱπποκενταύρων εἶδος ἐπανορ-
θοῦσθαι, καὶ αὖθις τὸ τῆς Χιμαίρας. καὶ ἐπὶ ῥεῖ δὲ
ὄχλος τοιούτων Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων, καὶ ἄλλων ἀμη-
χάνων πλήθει τε καὶ ἀτοπία τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων E
αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον, ἅτε
ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφία χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει.
ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶ σχολή. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον, ὦ
φίλε, τούτου τόδε. οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικόν
γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτὸν γελοῖον δὴ μοι φαίνεται | τοῦτο 230
ἐτι ἀγνοοῦντα [τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν.] ὅθεν δὴ χαίρειν
έασας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν,
ὁ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλὰ ἐμαυτὸν, εἴτε τι

tions. This however is no interpreta-
 tion, but another version of the myth.
 The words seem to me to be Plato's,
 whatever his object in introducing them;
 and I cannot think with Heind. that they
 would stand better after the speech of
 Phaedrus (B, supra) beginning Εἰπέ μοι.

ἐπανορθοῦσθαι] The office of the my-
 thologist is humorously said to be to
 'rectify,' or 'integrate' by restoring to
 their proper shape the monsters he has to
 do with. In the seq. I have preferred
 the dat. sing. to the vulg. πλήθει τε καὶ
 ἀτοπία, which stand in most MSS. The
 change is in reality no change as re-
 gards the letters, and relieves the other-
 wise cumbrous sentence. πλήθει ἀμήχα-
 ρον occurs Theat. 184 A; Tim. 39 D.

E. προσβιβάζειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς = to
 force into agreement with probability,
 προσβιβᾷ being of course fut.

ἀγροίκος σοφία seems to mean an
 untutored, ill-regulated ingenuity, like
 that of certain modern interpreters of
 prophecy, hieroglyphics, Sinaitic inscrip-
 tions, &c. &c.

οὐ δύναμαί πω] "Pour les sages de
 l'antiquité le γνῶθι σεαυτὸν n'était guère
 qu'une maxime morale, une règle de
 conduite, un moyen de fonder et d'en-
 tretenir dans l'âme la justice et la tem-
 pérance: ce n'était pas une méthode,
 dans l'acception philosophique du mot.

Ce n'est que dans les temps modernes que
 le 'Connais toi toi-même' a été compris
 dans toute la portée de sa signification à
 la fois spéculative et pratique." C. Wad-
 dington, Essais de Logique, p. 310. This
 remark goes a little too far; for it can
 hardly be said that the author of the
 Theaetetus and the Republic was un-
 aware of the speculative importance of
 a scientific psychology. The self-know-
 ledge of Socrates consisted in the rigor-
 ous examination of the notions of his
 own mind rather than of its operations
 and faculties, and chiefly of those notions
 which relate to moral distinctions;
 "primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa na-
 tura involutis . . . avocavit philosophiam
 et ad vitam communem adduxit." Cic.
 Acad. i. 4. 15.

230. πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ]
 'acquiescing in the popular belief,' or,
 as Bp. Thirlwall suggests, "complying
 with the common usage about them."
 Theologians have pointed to this passage
 as false and jesuitical, while others have
 gravely applauded it, as implying a pious
 preference of authority to reason in re-
 ligions matters. So true is it "que le
 sens commun n'est pas chose si com-
 mune qu'on le pense." The mythical
 matter in question is harmless; hence
 there is no inconsistency between this
 passage and those in the Republic and

θηρίον τυγχάνω Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον, εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν τε καὶ ἀπλούστερον ζῶον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον. Ἀτάρ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων, ἄρ' οὐ τόδε ἦν τὸ δένδρον ἐφ' ὃπερ ἦγες ἡμᾶς ;

B ΦΑΙ. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτό.

ΣΩ. Νῆ τὴν Ἑραν, καλὴ γε ἡ καταγωγὴ. ἥ τε γὰρ

elsewhere in which immoral myths are condemned.

πολυπλοκώτερον] With this compare Repub. ix. 588 c, where the lower part of man's nature is compared to a "motley and many-headed monster, some of whose heads resemble those of tame, others those of wild creatures." Aesch. Prom. 353, ἑκατογκάρανον πρὸς βίαν χειρῶν μείον Τυφῶνα θυῖον.

ἐπιτεθυμμένον—ἀτύφον] Plato's etymologizing vein breaks out here for the first time in the dialogue. As ἐπιτ. means inflamed, 'burning with pride or passion' (Ar. Lys. 222, ὅπως ἂν ἀνὴρ ἐπιτυφῇ μάλιστα μου), so ἀτύφος denotes modesty, unassuming simplicity, as in Plut. Mor. i. 43 b, οἰήματος καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἀπολυθείς, εἰς βίον ἀτυφον καὶ ὑγιαίνοντα καταστήσεις σαυτὸν. Id. de Genio Socr. c. 12, Σωκράτους, ἀνδρὸς ἀτυφία καὶ ἀφελεία φιλοσοφίαν ἐξανθρωπίσαντος. Menander also uses the subst. ἀτυφία, explained by a grammarian as = ταπεινοφροσύνη.

μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων] "Gallorum à pro-
pos," Ast. Angl., 'by-the-bye.' Ast
illustrates the formula from Lucian, with whom it is frequent: Dial. Mort. x. 912, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ λόγων τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ πολεμοῦντες ἐκεῖνοι ;

B. καταγωγὴ] Called καταγωγίον 259 A. Both words are explained by the Greek Lexicographers in the same terms, κατάλυμα, πανδοκεῖον, ἀναπαύλη. Herod. i. 181, speaks of the landing-places (stazioni) in the tower of Belus, as καταγωγαί τε καὶ θῶκοι ἀμπανστήριοι. The spot in question is easily discovered by the visitor at the present day; there is indeed but one place answering the conditions, and it answers them perfectly. On the left side, as one ascends the stream, the steep but not high banks retire and form an oval recess girt by rocks, in which are still visible certain small square niches, where doubtless stood the ἀγάλματα, little images of Pan and the Nymphs, like

those which adorned one face of the rock of the Acropolis. The area thus enclosed is crossed by a thread of water issuing from a now nearly choked source (the πηγὴ of the text). A tree of by no means ample dimensions grows there. It is, if I mistake not, the only tree in the neighbourhood; and though the green turf has disappeared from the 'gentle slope,' the rocks still yield a grateful shelter from the sun. The Ilissus, in May 1856, contained quite sufficient water to 'wet the feet' of the pedestrian; in fact in this part of its course it was nowhere quite dry, though the season had been one of unusual drouth. Its rills (ὕδατια) still answered to the description in the text: they were χαρίεντα καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ διαφανῆ, καὶ ἐπιτήδεια κόραις παίξιν παρ' αὐτὰ (sup. 229 B). Col. Leake, who does not notice this precise spot, remarks that "the most popular part of the worship of the terrene gods was that of Pan and the Nymphs, who presided over rivers, fountains, and caverns, and appear to have had many sanctuaries on the banks of the Ilissus." Athens i. p. 483. A temple of the Musae Ilissides stood some half-mile lower down the stream. The plane (represented now by a sorry poplar) seems to have disappeared in Cicero's time; as I understand him, he doubts its ever having existed; "mihi videtur non tam ipsa aquila quae describitur quam Platonis oratione crevisse:" de Orat. i. § 28. This, one hopes, was an unreasonable sally of Academic scepticism; for no tree was more prized by the Athenians than the plane, which was planted even in the Agora, and magnificent specimens of which are still found in other parts of Greece, though the tree has ceased to exist in the neighbourhood of modern Athens. It usually grows near fountains and at river-heads, the huge roots being often laid bare by the gushing water which seems to issue from them, καλῇ ὑπὸ πλατανίστῳ ὄθεν ῥέει

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πλατάμος αὕτη μάλ' ἀμφιλαφής τε καὶ ὑψηλή, τοῦ τε ἄγνου τὸ ὕψος καὶ τὸ σύσκιον πάγκαλον, καὶ ὥς ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἀνθης, ὥς ἂν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τὸν τόπον. ἢ τε αὖ πηγὴ χαριεστάτη ὑπὸ τῆς πλατάνου ρεῖ μάλα ψυχροῦ ὕδατος, ὥς γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι. Νυμφῶν τέ τινων καὶ Ἀχελώου ἱερὸν ἀπὸ τῶν κορῶν τε καὶ

ἄγλαον ὕδωρ. The epithet ἀμφιλαφής answers to the "patulis diffusa ramis" of Cicero l. 1.

τοῦ τε ἄγνου τὸ ὕψος] Suidas in v. ἄγνος, τοῦ τε ἄγνου δὲ τὸ ὕ., κ.τ.λ., quoting this passage. He cites two lines of a comic poet (Chionides):

καὶ μὴν μὰ τὸν Δ' οὐδὲν ἔτι γέ μοι δοκῶ

ἄγνου διαφέρειν ἐν χαράδρᾳ πεφυκότος.

On which Meineke observes: "Recte ἐν χαράδρᾳ. Dioscor. i. 136: ἄγνος ἢ λύγος παρὰ ποταμοῖς τραχέει τε τόποις καὶ χαράδραις φυόμενος." The agnus castus or vitex is usually described as a *φυτόν*, not a *δένδρον*. But Pliny distinguishes two kinds. "Major in arborem salicis modo assurgit." "Non multum a salice . . . distat vitex, foliorum quoque aspectu, nisi odore gratior esset. Prima album florem mittit cum purpureo, quae et candida vocatur; nigra quae tantum purpureum. Nascuntur in palustribus campis." "Graeci lygon vocant, alii agnon, quoniam matronae Thesmophoriis Atheniensium castitatem custodientes his foliis cubitus sibi sternunt." N. H. xxiv. 38. The plant would thus seem to owe its reputation to a false etymology.

καὶ ὥς ἀκμὴν—ὥς ἂν εὐωδέστατον] Commentators are at issue about the force of ὥς in each clause. The second ὥς, it is agreed, must be understood in the sense of 'quomodo,' as preceding παρέχοι ἂν, a potential, not a conjunctive. The first ὥς is regarded by Stallb. as exclamatory, by Ast as relative. The former translates thus: "und wie steht er eben in der schönsten Blüthe in einer Weise, wie er den Ort im höchsten Grade mit Wohlgeruch zu erfüllen vermag." Ast, on the contrary, has the following: "Verba ita sunt intelligenda: τοῦ τε ἄγνου τὸ ὕψος καὶ τὸ σύσκιον πάγκαλον καὶ (int. τοῦτο πάγκαλόν ἐστιν) ὥς (i. e. οὔτε οὕτως) ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἀνθης: Germ., und (suppl. gar schön ist auch dieses) dass es so in der höchsten Blüthe steht, dass es den Ort zum wohlduftend-

sten macht." In the latter case ὥς ἂν παρέχοι must = ὥστε παρέχειν, which is hardly possible. παρέχοι ἂν commonly means 'it will make'—'it cannot fail to make'—'it may well make;' and the clause in which it stands seems to form the *apodosis* to the former. In this there would be no difficulty, if the first ὥς could be understood as causal, or quasi-causal, like the Lat. *ut* followed by *ita*. 'And being (or, as it is) at the height of its flowering (ἀνθη Att. for ἀνθῆσις), it cannot fail to make the spot the most fragrant imaginable' (ὥς εὐωδέστατον). On the whole perhaps Stallb.'s rendering, cumbersome as it seems, and untranslatable as it is, will seem to most persons to give the true construction: though I confess I should be glad to see an analogous instance of an exclamatory followed by a relative ὥς. Heind.'s proposed emendations, ὥς ἀκμὴν . . . ὥς ἂν, *ut* . . . *ita*, or, καὶ οὕτως ἀκμὴν . . . ὥς ἂν . . . seem to me equally inelegant. He however seems to think that the first ὥς may mean *ut*, and in that case there can be no great harshness in the suppression of the corresponding *ita*; which is all that is required in my version. Those who are still dissatisfied may if they please consult Ast's gigantic note, Comm. p. 242.

ὥς γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι] 'judging by the foot' I dip into it. Most of the copies have *ὥστε γε*, but *ὥς γε* is given by one MS., and by Aristaeetus, in his almost literal citation of the entire passage, Ep. i. 3, p. 8, as quoted by Heind. Comp. Herod. ii. 135, *μεγάλα ἐκτέησάτο χρήματα, ὥς ἂν εἶναι ῥοδῶπιν, ἀπὰρ οὐκ ὥς γε ἐς πυραμίδα τοιαύτην ἐξιένεσθαι* and Rep. v. 475 D, *ἀποπώτατόν εἰσιν ὥς γ' ἐν φιλοσόφοις τιθέναι*. Cicero refers to this passage in describing the coldness of a tributary of the river Liris: "Nec enim ullum hoc frigidius flumen autigi . . . ut *vix pede tentare id possim, quod in Phaedro Platonis facit Socrates.*" Legg. ii. c. 3.

Ἀχελώου] The personification of fresh

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ο ἀγαλμάτων ἔοικεν εἶναι. εἰ δ' αὖ βούλει, τὸ εὖπνον τοῦ τόπου ὡς ἀγαπητὸν καὶ σφόδρα ἡδύ· θερινόν τε καὶ λιγυρὸν ὑπηχεῖ τῷ τῶν τεττίγων χορῷ. πάντων δὲ κομψότατον τὸ τῆς πόας, ὅτι ἐν ἡρέμα προσάντει ἱκανὴ πέφυκε κατακλινέντι τὴν κεφαλὴν παγκάλως ἔχειν. ὥστε ἄριστά σοι ἐξενάγεται, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε.

ΦΑΙ. Σὺ δέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἀτοπώτατός τις φαίνει. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ, ὃ λέγεις, ξεναγουμένῳ τινὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἔοικας· οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος οὐτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὐτ' ἐξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξίεναι.

ΣΩ. Συγγίγνωσκέ μοι, ὦ ἄριστε. φιλομαθὴς γὰρ εἰμι. τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδέν μ' ἐθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἄνθρωποι. σὺ μέντοι δοκεῖς μοι τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξόδου τὸ φάρμακον εὐρηκέναι. ὥσπερ γὰρ

water according to Herm., διὰ γὰρ τοῦ μεγίστου τούτου ποταμοῦ δηλοῦσι τὴν ἔφορον θεὸν τοῦ ποτίμου ὕδατος. So frequently in the poets.

ἀπὸ τῶν κορῶν τε καὶ ἀγαλμάτων] 'to judge by the puppets and the images,' "κόρας Attici dicunt pupas ex cera argillave fictas, plangunculas." Ruhnken. ad Tim. I. P. v. κοροπλάθοι. These puppets or dolls (old Eng. babies) were doubtless votive offerings; the ἀγάλματα were probably images of marble, like the small Pan which was brought from a shrine in the rock of the Acropolis, and now stands in the Fitzwilliam Museum at Cambridge.

c. ὑπηχεῖ] 'it answers' (either ὁ τόπος or impers.) 'summerlike and shrill to the quire of cicades.' Eur. Supp. 710, ἔρρηξε δ' αὐδὴν ὥσθ' ὑπηχῆσαι χθόνα. Plut. Men. 64 D, σαθρὸν ὑπηχεῖ καὶ ἀγεννές. Comp. Theat. 179 D, σαθρὸν φθέγγεται. So in Lat., "sincerus sonore," Lucr. iii. 886 and elsewhere. Juv. xiv. 295, "aestivum tonat," not "sonat," as quoted by Stallb.

ἀτεχνῶς—ἔοικας] 'as you say, you are exactly like some stranger in the hands of a guide,' or 'cicerone.' Ast quotes Lucian, Scyth. § 4, σύ με παραλαβὼν ξενάγησον καὶ δείξον τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν.

οὕτως, κ.τ.λ.] Lat. 'adeo.' Eng. 'this comes of your never absenting yourself, &c.' That Socrates never set foot with-

out the walls was not literally true, as the Lyceum, his favourite haunt, lay outside the city. He also occasionally frequented the Academy, as we find from Lysis, init. But these were exceptions which 'proved the rule.' In the Crito he is said to have once attended the Isthmian festival. His στρατεῖαι, being involuntary, were of course no exceptions.

D. τὰ μὲν οὖν—ἐθέλει διδάσκειν] 'the fields and trees you see won't teach me any thing'; that is, 'I can't get them to teach me'; as if they had the power of refusal. Soph. 252 E, τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει τὰ δὲ μὴ ξυμμίγνυσθαι, "some will blend, others refuse to blend," speaking of the εἶδη, a quasi-impersonation. This use of ἐθέλει is so common as hardly to need illustrating. It is frivolous to dispute whether it is or is not equivalent to δύνασθαι in such cases.

τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξόδου τὸ φάρμακον] 'the recipe which shall charm me out of town.' "Antiphanes ap. Stobaeum, ὃ δὲ λιμὸς ἐστιν ἀθανασίας φάρμακον: φάρμακόν τινος utroque modo usurpatur, ut sit medicamentum vel efficiendo bono destinatum, vel averiundo malo. . . τὰ γράμματα, Eurip., Pal. fr. 2, vocavit λήθης φ.: Plat. Phaedr. 274 E, μνήμης καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον." Wytttenbach ad Eumap. v. ii. p. 9, quoted by Dindorf on Steph. Thes. in v. φάρμακον.

ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ] If the οἱ is to stand, we

Thyrr. cP
1.13.8,
Str. 3.12.13

editions

cf.
Fr
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οἱ τὰ πεινῶντα θρέμματα θαλλὸν ἢ τινα καρπὸν προσεί-
οντες ἄγουσι, σὺ ἐμοὶ λόγους οὕτω προτείνων ἐν βιβλίῳ
τὴν τε Ἀττικὴν φαίνει περιάζειν ἅπασαν καὶ ὅποι ἂν
ἄλλοσε βούλῃ. νῦν οὖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῦρ' ἀφικόμενος
ἐγὼ μὲν μοι δοκῶ κατακέισεσθαι, σὺ δ' ἐν ὁποίῳ σχήματι
οἷε ῥᾶστα ἀναγνώσεσθαι, τοῦθ' ἐλόμενος ἀναγίγνωσκε.

ΦΑΙ. Ἄκουε δὴ.

Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς
νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν γενομένων τούτων ἀκήκοας· ἀξίῳ
δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχεῖναι | ὦν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστὴς 231
ᾧ σου τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὦν ἂν
εἶ ποιήσωσιν, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται· τοῖς
δὲ οὐκ ἔστι χρόνος ἐν ᾧ μεταγῶναι προσήκει. οὐ γὰρ
ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἀλλ' ἐκόντες, ὡς ἂν ἄριστα περὶ τῶν οἰκείων
βουλευσάιντο, πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τὴν αὐτῶν εὖ ποιοῦσιν.
Ἔτι δὲ οἱ μὲν ἐρῶντες σκοποῦσιν ἅ τε κακῶς διέθεντο
τῶν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα καὶ ἅ πεποιήκασιν εἶ, καὶ ὃν
εἶχον πόνον προστιθέντες ἡγοῦνται πάλαι τὴν ἀξίαν ἀπο- B
δεδωκέναι χάριν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις. τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν οὔτε
τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν διὰ τοῦτο ἔστι προφασίζεσθαι,
οὔτε τοὺς παρεληλυθότας πόνους ὑπολογίζεσθαι, οὔτε τὰς
πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας διαφορὰς αἰτιάσασθαι· ὥστε

Plut. 1186

Plut. 1186
have a confusion of constructions: ὥσπερ

οἱ τὰ πεινῶντα θρέμματα ἄγοντες θαλλὸν
... προσείοντες ἄγουσιν αὐτά. προ-
σεῖν τινί τι may mean either to tempt
or to scare by waving an object before
the eyes. Of the latter sense we have
an instance in Thuc. vi. 86, οὐκ ἄλλον
τινὰ προσείοντες φόβον, where however,
as here, the object is to allure (ἐπαγ-
αγέσθαι).

Γ. ἐγὼ μὲν μοι δοκῶ κατακέισεσθαι]
κατακέισθαι is the reading of the Bodl.
and some of the best MSS. Steph. gives
κατακέισσθαι, and so Hirsch. The pre-
sent used to be justified by Arist. Vesp.
177, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν μοι τὸν ὄνον ἐξάγειν
δοκῶ, "I have a mind to, &c.," as if
δοκεῖ μοι had been found. But this
reading was condemned by Elmsl., and
is now abandoned in consideration of
the context. In Menand. ap. Mein. iv.
p. 287, ἐλακείσθαι μοι δοκῶ τὸ δίκτυον,
ἐλακείσθαι is an Attic future. In Arist.

Plut. 1186, καταμενεῖν is now read for
καταμένειν.

Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν] Concerning this
speech or epistle see the Introd.

231. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν] Who the ἐκείνοι
were had perhaps been explained in a pre-
vious communication. They are of course
the ἐρῶντες, as contrasted with the writer,
who describes himself as οὐκ ἐραστὴς
ᾧν.

ὡς ἂν—βουλευσάιντο] 'in such sort
as they will best provide, &c.,' i. e. as the
best way they know of promoting their
own interests.

Β. αἰτιάσασθαι] There is no justifica-
tion for the change of tense here. Dr.
Badham proposes ἐπαιτιάσθαι, comparing
Ep. vii. p. 329, νῦν δ' ἄρα τὸ μήκος τῆς
πορείας . . . ἐπαιτιώμενος οἷε δόξαν κακίας
ἀποφευγεῖσθαι ποτε, and adding "ubi si
ὑπολογιζόμενος scripsisset perinde fuis-
set." But αἰτιάσθαι might stand—'to
allege,' i. e. in explanation of the neglect

περιηρημένων τοσούτων κακῶν οὐδὲν ὑπολείπεται ἀλλ' ἢ ποιεῖν προθύμως ὃ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς οἴωνται πράξαντες χαριεῖσθαι. *Ετι δὲ εἰ διὰ τοῦτο ἄξιον τοὺς ἐρῶντας περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ὅτι τούτους μάλιστα φασὶ φιλεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐρῶσι, καὶ ἔτοιμοί εἰσι καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπεχθανόμενοι τοῖς ἐρωμένοις χαρίζεσθαι, ῥάδιον γινῶναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν, ὅτι ὅσων ἂν ὕστερον ἐρασθῶσιν, ἐκείνους αὐτῶν περὶ πλείονος ποιήσονται, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἂν ἐκείνοις δοκῇ καὶ τούτους κακῶς ποιήσουσι. Καί τοι πῶς εἰκός ἐστι τοιοῦτον πρᾶγμα προέσθαι
 D τοιαύτην ἔχοντι συμφοράν, ἣν οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσειεν οὐδεὶς ἔμπειρος ὧν ἀποτρέπειν; καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν νοσεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι ὅτι κακῶς φρονοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύνασθαι αὐτῶν κρατεῖν. ὥστε πῶς ἂν εὖ φρονήσαντες ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχουν ἡγήσαιντο, περὶ ὧν οὕτω διακείμενοι †βούλονται†; Καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐρώντων τὸν βέλτιστον αἰροῖο, ἐξ ὀλίγων ἂν σοι ἢ ἐκλεξῖς εἶη· εἰ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν σαυτῷ ἐπιτηδεϊότατον, ἐκ
 E πολλῶν. ὥστε πολὺ πλείων ἐλπίς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὄντα τυχεῖν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς σῆς φιλίας. Εἰ τοίνυν τὸν νόμον τὸν καθεστηκότα δέδοικας, μὴ πυθομένων τῶν ἀνθρώ-

of which they are guilty after their passion has cooled (ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται). On the frequent confusion of infinitives in -ᾶσθαι with the aor. in -σᾶσθαι, see Cobet, *N. L.* p. 629, who also suggests αἰτιάσθαι here. Ast calls attention to the δημοσιτέλευτα, προφασίζεσθαι — ὑπολογίζεσθαι — αἰτιάσασθαι. This artifice of style recurs frequently in the present speech. It is very common in Isocrates, and in the speeches of Thucydides, and Xenophon is somewhat too fond of it also.

C. ἐκείνους — ποιήσονται] 'they will prize the new love more than the old.' The 'new love,' being less familiar to the apprehension, is denoted by the pronoun which implies distance. On the same principle, in 232 D, οὐκ ἂν τοῖς συνοῦσι φθονοῖεν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὴ ἐθέλοντας (συνεῖναι) μισοῖεν, ἡγοῦμενοι ὑπ' ἐκείνων μὲν ἐπεροῦσθαι, ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων δὲ ὠφελεῖσθαι, — ἐκείνων refers to the last-mentioned τοῖς μὴ ἐθέλοντας, as being less

known than the former, οἱ συνόντες.

D. εὖ φρονήσαντες] 'when they have returned to their right mind.' Either βούλονται at the end of the sentence is corrupt, or some lost infinitive went before it. "Patet loci sensum esse qui vel insania laborantes de amore tam inique judicant." Badh. Βούλεσθαι περὶ τίνος is scarcely Greek, and yields no sense. I had thought of ἀπολογοῦνται (supra αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦσι νοσεῖν), but this is too violent a change. Perhaps Heind.'s βεβούλευνται might stand, 'how in their sinner mind can they approve of a course they have adopted in such a state as the one supposed,' i. e. in moments of aberration. Stallb.'s defence of βούλονται is inconclusive, and his translation "quae ita affecti animo cupiunt" would require & . . . βούλονται.

E. τὸν νόμον τὸν καθεστηκότα] 'public opinion,' 'the established maxims of society.' Germ. tr., "die herrschende Meinung." Hermeias, who also under-

βούλονται Steph. B. 1115

πων ὄνειδός σοι γένηται, εἰκός ἐστι τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας, οὕτως ἂν οἰομένους | καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζηλοῦσθαι ὥσπερ 232 αὐτοὺς ὑφ' αὐτῶν, ἐπαρθῆναι τῷ λέγειν καὶ φιλοτιμουμένους ἐπιδείκνυσθαι πρὸς ἅπαντας ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πεπόνηται τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶντας, κρείττους αὐτῶν ὄντας, τὸ βέλτιστον ἀντὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἰρεῖσθαι. Ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας πολλοὺς ἀνάγκη πυθέσθαι καὶ ἰδεῖν ἀκολουθοῦντας τοῖς ἐρωμένοις καὶ ἔργον τοῦτο ποιομένους, ὥστε ὅταν ὀφθῶσι διαλεγόμενοι ἢ ἀλλήλοις, τότε αὐτοὺς οἶονται ἢ γεγενημένης ἢ μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας συνεῖναι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶντας οὐδ' αἰτιάσθαι διὰ τὴν συνουσίαν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἰδότες ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἢ διὰ φιλίαν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἢ δι' ἄλλην τινὰ ἡδονήν. Καὶ μὲν δὴ εἴ σοι δέος παρέστηκεν ἡγουμένῳ χαλεπὸν εἶναι φιλίαν συμμένειν, καὶ ἄλλῳ μὲν τρόπῳ διαφορᾶς γενομένης κοινὴν ἀμφοτέροις καταστῆναι τὴν συμφοράν, προεμένου δέ σου ἅ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖ μεγάλην ἂν σοι βλάβην γενέσθαι, εἰκότως ἂν τοὺς ἐρῶν- C τας μᾶλλον ἂν φοβοῖο. πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐστι τὰ λυποῦντα, καὶ πάντ' ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῶν βλάβῃ νομίζουσι γίγνεσθαι. διόπερ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν ἐρωμένων συνουσίας ἀποτρέπουσι, φοβούμενοι τοὺς μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένους, μὴ χρήμασι αὐτοὺς ὑπερβάλωνται, τοὺς δὲ πεπαιδευμένους, μὴ συνέσει κρείττους γένωνται· τῶν δ'

stands νόμος to mean τὸ νενομισμένον, denies that any disgrace attached in public opinion to the relation in question, quoting Aesch. c. Tim. in proof that mercenary annours were alone infamous at Athens: ὁ δὲ Σόλων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις . . τοῖς λευθέροις τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα τετήρηκε, δοῦλον κωλύσας ἔραν. The speech of Aeschines alluded to is one of the foulest chapters in the record of Athenian depravity.

232. ἐπαρθῆναι τῷ λέγειν] τὸ is found in a few MSS. and approved by Buttmann and C. F. Hermann. Badh. with great ingenuity conj. ἐ. τῷ ἔχειν, 'is elated by possession.' Winckelmann's ὥστε λέγειν, though defensible in point of construction, does not commend itself

to the ear, and λέγειν is itself flat. Stallm.'s int. "eo quod dicunt" is sufficient rigid, and can scarcely be got from any Greek. ἐπαρθῆναι τῷ λέγειν; I apprehend, could only mean 'are excited by speaking' (dat. instrum.). The verb ἔχειν in *re amatoria* is common enough, and this is in my judgment the best reading hitherto proposed.

καὶ φιλοτιμουμένους—πεπόνηται] 'and in the vanity of their hearts give all men to know that their labour has not been spent in vain.'

B. προεμένου δέ σου] 'when you have sacrificed or surrendered all you most prize.' Sup. 231 c, τοιοῦτον πρᾶγμα προέσθαι, i. e. honour.

- 1) ἄλλο τι κεκτημένων ἀγαθὸν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκάστου φυλάττονται. πείσαντες μὲν οὖν ἀπέχθεσθαι σε τούτοις εἰς ἑρμίαν φίλων καθιστᾶσιν· ἂν δὲ τὸ σεαυτοῦ σκοπῶν ἄμεινον ἐκείνων φρονῆς, ἥξεις αὐτοῖς εἰς διαφοράν. ὅσοι δὲ μὴ ἐρώντες ἔτυχον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν ἔπραξαν ὧν ἐδέοντο, οὐκ ἂν τοῖς συνούσι φθονοῖεν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὴ ἐθέλοντας μισοῖεν, ἡγούμενοι ὑπ' ἐκείνων μὲν ὑπερορᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων δὲ ὠφελεῖσθαι. ὥστε πολὺ πλείων ἐλπίς
- 1) φιλίαν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ ἔχθραν γενήσεσθαι. 147 54
Καὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἐρώντων πολλοὶ πρότερον τοῦ σώματος ἐπεθύμησαν ἢ τὸν τρόπον ἔγνωσαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων ἔμπειροι ἐγένοντο, ὥστε ἄδηλον αὐτοῖς εἰ ἔτι τότε βουλήσονται φίλοι εἶναι, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται· | τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρώσιν, οἳ καὶ πρότερον ἀλλήλοις φίλοι ὄντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν εὖ πάθωσι ταῦτα εἰκὸς ἐλάττω τὴν φιλίαν αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μνημεῖα καταλειφθῆναι τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι. Καὶ μὲν δὴ βελτίονί σοι προσήκει γενέσθαι ἐμοὶ πειθομένῳ ἢ ἐραστῇ. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ πραττόμενα ἐπαινοῦσι, τὰ μὲν δεδιότες μὴ ἀπέχθωνται, τὰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ χεῖρον διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν
- 2) γιγνώσκοντες. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδείκνυται· δυστυ-

D. πείσαντες, κ.τ.λ.] 'thus if they prevail with you to break with all these, you are left without a friend in the world; whereas if you are alive to your own interest, and have more sense than your advisers, you will have to quarrel with them.'

ὅσοι δὲ — ὠφελεῖσθαι] Those who never loved, but are indebted to their own merits for the success of their suit, so far from being jealous of those who seek the society of their favourite, will rather dislike those who shun it, deeming themselves slighted by these last, but benefited by the attentions of the former. See note on 231 D. The repeated use of ἐκεῖνοι in this refined sense, as in 231 A, 233 B, and elsewhere in this speech, savours of affectation.

Ε. τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων] This use of ἄλλων is familiar enough, 'Before they were acquainted with your disposition

and that of your connexions as well.'

233. ταῦτα ἔπραξαν] So ἔπραξαν ὧν ἐδέοντο, 232 D. (In 234 A, διαπραξάμενοι is used in the same sense.) In the next clause ταῦτα is the antecedent to ἐξ ὧν.

μνημεῖα] 'pledges, earnest.' "Μνημεῖον monumentum non solum refertur ad praeteritum tempus cuius memoriam conservat, sed etiam ad futurum, in quod memoria rei conservatur." So Ast, in reply to Heind., who conj. σημεία. He quotes Lys. de Rep. Ath. init., ἐνομιζομεν . . τὰς γεγενημένας συμφορὰς ἰκανὰ μνημεῖα τῇ πόλει καταλελειφθαι ὥστε μηδ' ἂν τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους ἐτέρας πολιτείας ἐπιθυμῇν. The memory of past happiness is supposed to operate as an assurance of enjoyment to come.

Β. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδείκνυται] 'the following are some of Love's feats, performances by which he exhibits his power; the true sense of ἐπιδείκνυσθαι,

χοῦντας μὲν, ἃ μὴ λύπην τοῖς ἄλλοις παρέχει, ἀνιὰρὰ ποιεῖ νομίζειν· εὐτυχοῦντας δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἡδονῆς ἄξια παρ' ἐκείνων ἐπαίνου ἀναγκάζει τυγχάνειν. ὥστε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἔλεειν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις ἢ ζηλοῦν αὐτοὺς προσήκει. ἔὰν δ' ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ τὴν παροῦσαν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύων συνέσομαι σοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν ὠφέλειαν ἔσσεσθαι, οὐχ ὑπ' ἔρωτος ἡττώμενος ἀλλ' ἐμαντοῦ C κρατῶν, οὐδὲ διὰ σμικρὰ ἰσχυρὰν ἔχθραν ἀναιρούμενος ἀλλὰ διὰ μεγάλα βραδέως ὀλίγην ὀργὴν ποιούμενος, τῶν μὲν ἀκουσίων συγγνώμην ἔχων, τὰ δὲ ἐκούσια πειρώμενος ἀποτρέπειν· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι φιλίας πολὺν χρόνον ἔσομένης τεκμήρια. Εἰ δ' ἄρα σοι τοῦτο παρέστηκεν, ὥς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἰσχυρὰν φιλίαν γενέσθαι, ἔὰν μὴ τις ἐρῶν τυγχάνῃ, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι χρὴ ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν τοὺς νείεις περὶ πολλοῦ D ἐποιούμεθα οὐτ' ἂν τοὺς πατέρας καὶ τὰς μητέρας, οὐτ' ἂν πιστοὺς φίλους ἐκεκτήμεθα, οἳ οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιθυμίας τοιαύτης γεγόνασιν ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐτέρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. Ἔτι δὲ εἰ χρὴ τοῖς δεομένοις μάλιστα χαρίζεσθαι, προσήκει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μὴ τοὺς βελτίστους ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους εὖ ποιεῖν· μεγίστων γὰρ ἀπαλλαγέντες κακῶν πλείστην χάριν αὐτοῖς εἰσονται. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις δα-

but missed by the interpreters. Presently *εὐτυχοῦντας* is put absolutely. 'When Fortune smiles, Lovemakes things unpleasing in themselves to be approved by the objects of her favour: *ἐκείνων* = τῶν εὐτυχοῦντων, the persons last named, and therefore newer to the apprehension than the *δυστυχοῦντες*, whose case has been already considered.

ὥστε πολὺ μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ.] *ἐλεειν* with a dat. is unheard of, though Hirsch. interprets "quapropter miserari amasios magis oportet quam iis invidere." On the other hand, *ἐρωμένους*, the reading of Steph., has next to no MS. authority. There seems, therefore, no alternative to Stallb.'s interpretation, "Quocirca in eos qui amantur multo potius convenit, ut eorum miserearis, quam ut iis invidias," unless we accept Ast's hypothesis, that τοῖς ἐρωμένοις is a gloss. This is not very probable, though Ficinus omits the two words in his version. It is also remarkable that for αὐτοῖς

some MSS. have αὐτοῖς, a vacillation which seems to Ast to prove that the text is not intact. Dr. Badham suggests τοῦ ἐρωμένου, which he constructs with *ἐλεειν* and *ζηλοῦν*. But this would make the *lover* the object 'of compassion rather than of envy,' whereas it is evidently the beloved who suffers from the folly of his admirer, however the vulgar may 'envy' his supposed good fortune.

C. διὰ σμικρὰ ἰσχυράν, κ.τ.λ.] Stallb. draws attention to the imperfect balance of this and the following clause. The balance was apparently intended to be perfect; I suspect therefore that ταχέως originally stood in the text between σμικρὰ and ἰσχυράν, corresponding to μεγάλα βραδέως in the following clause.

D. Ἔτι δὲ εἰ χρὴ—πλησμονῆς] Observe the *reductio ad absurdum*—to Pagan apprehension doubtless a complete one.

καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ] These particles occur in company Gorg. 458 D, and elsewhere.

μὲν ἢ positive certainty Hobbes
1746.

Ε πάναις οὐ τοὺς φίλους ἄξιον παρακαλεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς προσ-
 αιτοῦντας καὶ τοὺς δεομένους πλησμονῆς· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ
 καὶ ἀγαπήσουσι καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας
ἤξουσιν καὶ μάλιστα ἡσθήσονται καὶ οὐκ ἐλαχίστην χάριν
 εἶσονται καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς εὔξονται. ἀλλ' ἴσως
 προσήκει οὐ τοῖς σφόδρα δεομένοις χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς
 234 μάλιστα ἀποδοῦναι χάριν δυναμένοις· οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐρώσι
 σῆς ὥρας ἀπολαύονται, ἀλλ' οἱ τινες πρεσβυτέρῳ γενο-
 μένῳ τῶν σφετέρων ἀγαθῶν μεταδώσουσιν· οὐδὲ οἱ δια-
 πραξάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοτιμήσονται, ἀλλ' οἱ
 τινες αἰσχυνόμενοι πρὸς ἅπαντας σιωπήσονται· οὐδὲ τοῖς
 ὀλίγον χρόνον σπουδάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὁμοίως διὰ παν-
 τὸς τοῦ βίου φίλοις ἐσομένοις· οὐδὲ οἱ τινες παυόμενοι
 τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχθρας πρόφασιν ζητήσουσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ παυ-
 1) σάμενοι τῆς ὥρας, τότε τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν ἐπιδείξονται.
 Σὺ οὖν τῶν τε εἰρημένων μέμνησο, καὶ ἐκείνο ἐνθυμοῦ,
 ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἐρώντας οἱ φίλοι νουθετοῦσιν ὡς ὄντος κακοῦ

Ε. ἀγαπήσουσι.] Hom. Od. xxi. 289,
 Οὐκ ἀγαπᾷς ὃ ἐκῆλος ὑπερφιάλοισι μεθ'
 ἡμῖν Δαίνυσσαι.

ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἤξουσιν.] This phrase,
 a frequent one in Plato, is used of
 those who seek advice, relief, or hospi-
 tality. Rep. 489 c, ἐπὶ ἰατρῶν θύ-
 ρας ἵεναι. Ib. B, οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν. .
 τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας
 ἵεναι. Legg. xii. p. 953 D, ἴτω μὲν νῦν
 πᾶς ἀκέλευστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν
 πλουσίων καὶ σοφῶν θύρας, τοιοῦτος ἕτερος
 αὐτὸς ὢν. It denotes simple begging in
 Symp. 203 B, προσαιτήσουσα, οἷον δὴ
 εὐωχίας οὐσης, ἀφίκετο, καὶ ἦν περὶ τὰς
 θύρας. In Rep. 364 B, the religious
 quacks of the day—the ἀγύρται καὶ μάν-
 τεις—are said ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἵεναι.
 As an example of the custom at εὐωχίαι,
 we may take the case of Philippus the
 professed buffoon, who presents himself
 unbidden at the door of the men's apart-
 ment in the house of the rich Callias,
 νομίσας γελοϊότερον εἶναι τὸ ἀκλήτων ἢ
 τὸ κεκλημένων ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον. Xen.
 Conv. i. 13. An organized clientele, like
 that of the 'mane salutantes' at Rome,
 had no existence in Athens.

234. οὐδὲ οἱ τινες—ἐπιδείξονται.] 'nor
 (will you grant favours) to those who,

when their passion begins to abate, will
 seek to pick a quarrel, but rather to
 those who, when they have ceased to
 enjoy your charms will then display the
 virtue that is in them.' Such must be
 the sense if πανσάμενοι is retained. The
 ὥρα can only be that of the ἐρώμενος, the
 ἐραστής having long ceased to be ἐν ὥρᾳ.
 Comp. Plut. Ages. 34, ὥρα ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἥδιον
 ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώποι παριόντες εἰς ἄνδρας ἐκ
 παίδων. The difficulty of the passage
 consists in this unusual phrase πανσά-
 μενοι τῆς ὥρας, as if he had said πανσά-
 μενοι τῆς ἀπολαύσεως τῆς σῆς ὥρας.
 But is this more strange than to say
πανομένης τῆς ὥρας for ληγούσης, which
 Stallb. has admitted into his text on
 the authority of one MS. and Fici-
 nus? The conjectures πασάμενοι, ἐπαυ-
 ράμενοι, γευσάμενοι, ἀπολαυσάμενοι do
 not give the required sense. The time
 referred to is not that succeeding fruition,
 but that which comes after fruition has
 entirely ceased. Godfrey Hermann, in
 the margin of his copy of Heind., pro-
 poses πανσαμένου, a conjecture (if any is
 required) better than the foregoing. Mr.
 Shilleto suggests πανομένου, which gives
 nearly the same sense, as does another
 conj. πανομένοις.

τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρώσιν οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν οἰκείων ἐμέμψατο ὥς διὰ τοῦτο κακῶς βουλευομένοις περὶ ἐαυτῶν.

Ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἂν ἔροίό με εἰ ἅπασί σοι παραινῶ τοῖς μὴ ἐρώσι χαρίζεσθαι. ἐγὼ δὲ οἶμαι οὐδ' ἂν τὸν ἐρῶντα πρὸς ἅπαντάς σε κελεύειν τοὺς ἐρῶντας ταύτην ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ λαμβάνοντι χάριτος ἴσης ἅξιον, οὔτε σοὶ βουλομένῳ τοὺς ἄλλους λανθάνειν ὁμοίως δυνατόν· δεῖ δὲ βλάβην μὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ μηδεμίαν, ὠφέλειαν δὲ ἀμφοῖν γίνεσθαι.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἱκανά μοι νομίζω τὰ εἰρημένα· εἰ δέ τι σὺ ποθεῖς, ἡγούμενος παραλελειφθαι, ἐρώτα.

Τί σοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ λόγος; οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἰρῆσθαι; 1)

ΣΩ. Δαιμονίως μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ὥς τέ με ἐκπλαγῆναι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐγὼ ἔπαθον διὰ σέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, πρὸς σέ ἀποβλέπων, ὅτι ἐμοὶ ἐδόκεις γάνυσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου μεταξὺ ἀναγινώσκων. ἡγούμενος γὰρ σέ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμέ ἐπαίνειν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοὶ εἰπόμεν, καὶ ἐπόμενος συνεβάκχευσα μετὰ σοῦ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς.

ΦΑΙ. Εἶεν· οὕτω δὴ δοκεῖ παίζειν;

ΣΩ. Δοκῶ γάρ σοι παίζειν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐσπουδακέναι;

ΦΑΙ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὥς ἀληθῶς εἰπέ· πρὸς Διὸς φίλιον, οἷοι ἂν τινα ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἄλλον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἕτερα τούτων μείζω καὶ πλείω περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; καὶ ταύτῃ δεῖ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ τὸν

c. τῷ λόγῳ λαμβάνοντι] This is the reading of the Bodl. and several other MSS. Vulg., τῷ λαμβάνοντι. λόγῳ λαμβάνειν is of frequent occurrence in Plato: *laegg.* i. 638 c, οἱ λόγῳ τι λαβόντες ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ προθέμενοι ψέγειν ἢ ἐπαίνειν. *Ib.* 653 B, μήπω δυναμένον λόγῳ λαμβάνειν – said of children incapable as yet of reasoning. Here the words may mean, 'to him who takes a rational view of the matter.' Comp. *Thuc.* iii. 38, τὸ ἔργον ὅφει λαβόντες. *ix.* 17, λάθετε τοὺς λόγους μὴ πολέμους. *Plut.* *Alcib.*

c. 18, ὀργῇ καὶ φόβῳ τὸ γεγονὸς λαμβάνοντες. *Badh.*'s conj., τῷ γ' οὕτω λαμβάνοντι has much to recommend it; οὕτω implying, 'as one among many.' τῷ λαμβάνοντι, 'to the recipient,' gives however all the sense absolutely required by the context.

E. Διὸς φίλιον] *Schol.* *Herm.*, φίλιος ὁ Ζεὺς λέγεται καὶ Ξένιος καὶ Κτήσιος (add *Ἐρκείος*, *Soph.* *Ant.* 487). More frequently Διὸς is omitted from the adjuration, as in *Gorg.* 500 B, καὶ πρὸς Φίλιον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. *For all cults*

λόγον ἐπαινεθῆναι, ὡς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκέυη μόνον, ὅτι σαφῇ καὶ στρογγύλῃ καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποτετόρνευται; εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, συγχωρητέον χάριν σῇ, ἐπεὶ ἐμέ γε ἔλαθεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς οὐδενίας· | τῷ γὰρ ῥητορικῷ αὐτοῦ μόνῳ τὸν νοῦν προσεῖχον· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτὸν ὥμην Λυσίαν οἶεσθαι ἱκανὸν εἶναι. καὶ δὴ οὖν μοι ἔδοξεν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, δις καὶ τρίς τὰ αὐτὰ εἰρηκέναι, ὡς οὐ πάννυτορῶν τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιούτου· καὶ ἐφαίνετο δὴ μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐπιδεικνύμενος, ὡς οἷός τε ὦν ταῦτα ἑτέρως τε καὶ ἑτέρως λέγων ἀμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἄριστα.

B ΦΑΙ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκратες. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ

τοῦ ποιητοῦ] Herm. ποιητὴν κοινότερον λέγει τὸν ῥήτορα, ποιεῖ γὰρ καὶ οὗτος λόγους. Inf. 236 D, παρ' ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχιδιάζων.

ὅτι σαφῇ καὶ στρογγύλῃ καὶ ἀκριβῶς —ἀποτετόρνευται] 'every word comes off his lathe clear and round and nicely polished.' Arist. Thesm. v. 59, speaking of the poet Agathon, τὰ δὲ τορνεύει, τὰ δὲ κολλομελεῖ. Hor. Ep. ad Pis. 411, male *tornatos* incudi reddere versus. Propert. iii. 32. 43, Incipe jam angusto versus includere *torno*. Ast brackets the words καὶ ἀκριβῶς, on the ground that they are absent in Hermeias, and in the text quoted by Plutarch, de recta aud. rat. 45 A, (ὁ Πλάτων) τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν αὐτοῦ (Λυσίου) ἐπαινεῖ, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ὀνομάτων σαφῶς καὶ στρογγύλως ἕκαστον ἀποτετόρνευται. Heind. also objects to the adv. as coming somewhat flatly after two adjectives. Badh.'s conj. ἀποτετορνευμένα is supported by Hermeias, who has διὰ δὲ τὸ εἰπεῖν σαφῇ καὶ στρογγύλῃ καὶ ἀποτετορνευμένα δηλοῖ, κ.τ.λ. I agree, however, with Stallb. in preferring the text as it stands. Plato probably thought the ἀκριβεία of Lysias excessive and pedantic. In the Theaet. 184 b, he seems to apologize for the comparative negligence, as it may have seemed to his contemporaries, of his own style: τὸ δ' εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξετάζομεν τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μάλλον τὸ τοῦτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεῦθερον.

235. τῷ γὰρ ῥητορικῷ] "Ad eloqui-

tionem tantum s. orationis formam (τὸ σαφῇ καὶ στρογγύλῃ, κ.τ.λ.) attendi, non ad sententiam. τοῦτο refertur ad superiora, τὸ τὰ δέοντα λέγειν." Ast. "My attention," says Soer., "was fixed on his style; the matter I did not suppose that Lysias himself deemed satisfactory." Perhaps *ἂν* should be inserted between αὐτὸν and ὥμην. Before and after such words as νομίζω, οἶμαι, and the like, *ἂν* is frequently omitted by the scribes, unconscious, it would seem, that the particle belongs not to the verbs in question, but to the infinitive which depends upon them.

καὶ δὴ οὖν] 'nay, and by your leave, Phaedrus, he seemed to me to have said the same thing two or three times over, like one too barren of matter to be able to say many things on one subject.' The reading καὶ δὴ οὖν is extracted from δικαιῶν, δίκαιον οὖν, and other vagaries of the MSS. Stallb.'s καὶ δὴ καὶ οὖν is nearer to the orig. But query as to the second καί. δὴ οὖν come together not unfrequently, as inf. p. 259 D, πολλῶν δὴ οὖν ἕνεκα λεκτέον. The formula of deprecation or apology εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις occurs Gorg. 462 B; 513 C.

νεανιεύεσθαι—ἄριστα] 'to make an ostentatious display of his skill by saying the same thing in two different ways, both equally excellent, as he flattered himself.' I am unable to appreciate Stallb.'s preference of the vulg. ταῦτα to the ταῦτα of Heind. adopted by the Zur. and Hirschlig.

B. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ μάλιστα, κ.τ.λ.]

μάλιστα ὁ λόγος ἔχει. τῶν γὰρ ἐνόντων ἀξίως ῥηθῆναι ἐν τῷ πράγματι οὐδὲν παραλέλοιπεν, ὥστε παρὰ τὰ ἐκείνῳ εἰρημένα μηδὲν ἂν ποτε δύνασθαι εἰπεῖν ἄλλα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο ἐγὼ σοι οὐκέτι οἷός τε ἔσομαι πείθεσθαι. παλαιοὶ γὰρ καὶ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τε καὶ γυναῖκες περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρηκότες καὶ γεγραφότες ἐξελέγξουσί με, εἴαν σοι χαρίζομενος συγχωρῶ.

ΦΑΙ. Τίνες οὗτοι; καὶ ποῦ σὺ βελτίω τούτων ἀκήκοας;

ΣΩ. Νῦν μὲν οὕτως οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τινῶν ἀκήκοα, ἣν που Σαπφοῦς τῆς καλῆς ἢ Ἀνακρέοντος τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν. πόθεν δὲ τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω; πλήρῆς πῶς, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τὸ στήθος ἔχων αἰσθάνομαι παρὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χεῖρω. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παρὰ γε ἑμαντοῦ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐννεόηκα, εἰ οἶδα, συνειδὼς ἑμαντῷ ἀμαθίαν.λείπεται δὴ, οἶμαι, ἐξ ἄλλοτριῶν ποθὲν ναμάτων διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς πεπληρῶσθαι με δίκην ἀγγείου· ὑπὸ δὲ νωθείας αὖ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπιλέλθουμαι ὅπως τε καὶ ὧν τινῶν ἤκουσα.

'if the speech has a merit, it is precisely that which you deny it: of the topics implied in (naturally suggested by) the subject-matter, and capable of worthy treatment, there is not one which he has omitted.' The latter clause may be analyzed thus: ἃ τ' ἐνῆν τῷ πράγματι καὶ οἷς ἐνῆν ἀξίως ῥηθῆναι. So in effect Ast, who quotes Thuc. iv. 59, τί ἂν τις πᾶν τὸ ἐνὸν ἐκλέγων ἐν εἰδόσι μακρηγοροίη; Aesch. F. L. p. 122, ὥσως γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ἐνόντων εἰπεῖν, ὥς γ' οἶμαι, παρέλιπον.

παλαιοὶ γὰρ καὶ σοφοί, κ.τ.λ.] Gray has a good note on this passage. "It is observable," he says, "that Socr. whenever he would discourse affirmatively on any subject, or when he thought proper to raise or adorn his style, does it not in his own person, but assumes the character of another. Thus, for instance, he relates the beautiful fable [of the choice] between Virtue and Pleasure, after Prodicus" (Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 21); "he treats of the miseries of human life in the

words of the same Sophist; he describes the state of souls after death from the information of Gobryas, one of the Magi" (Axioch. 371); "he makes a panegyric on Wine in the style of Gorgias" (Xen. Symp. ii. 26?); "and here he does not venture to display his eloquence till the Nymphs and Muses have inspired him. This is consistent with that character of simplicity and humility which he assumed." Works, ed. Matth. ii. p. 310. Add, among other instances, Crat. 396 D, where Socr., wondering at his unwonted skill in etymology, pretends it has come to him from some mysterious source: ἐξαίφνης νῦν οὕτως προσέπτωκεν ἄρτι, οὐκ οἶδ' ὁπόθεν.

C. Νῦν μὲν οὕτως] 'without further consideration.' The use of οὕτως with another adv. as νῦν, ἀπλῶς, ἀπρέμα, ἐξαίφνης, is familiar to readers of Plato, who will find exx. in Ast's Lex. Pl. ii. p. 195.

ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν] 'or it may be from some prose writers.'

ΦΑΙ. 'Αλλ', ὦ γενναιότατε, κάλλιστα εἶρηκας. σὺ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ὦν τιῶν μὲν καὶ ὅπως ἤκουσας, μηδ' ἂν κελεύω εἶπης, τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεις ποιήσον· τῶν ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ βελτίω τε καὶ μὴ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ὑπόσχες [εἰπεῖν,] τούτων ἀπεχόμενος. καὶ σοι ἐγώ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες, ὑπὲρ σחנוῦμαι χρυσῇν εἰκόνα ἰσομέτρητον εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀναθήσειν, οὐ μόνον ἐμαντοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σῆν.

D. μηδ' ἂν κελεύω εἶπης] Pherecr. ap. Athen. p. 335 A, μηδέποτε ἰχθύν, ὃ Δευκαλίον, μηδ' ἦν αὐτῷ παραβῆς μοι. R. S.

ἕτερα ὑπόσχες] Bekk. after the Bodl., ἐτέρα ὑποσχέσει εἰπεῖν, which is mere gibberish; others have ἕτερα. I have adopted Badh.'s suggestion, "quum verbum ὑπόσχες non intelligeret scriba, εἰπεῖν de suo adjecit." The final εἰ in ὑποχέσει all admit to be a duplication of the initial syllable of εἰπεῖν. Stallb. imagines a *duplex lectio*, ὑπόσχηθι (whence, he supposes, the ὑποσχηθι of one or two MSS.) and ὑπόσχες εἰπεῖν, thinking it indifferent which we adopt. But ὑπόσχες εἰπεῖν cannot mean 'sustine dicere,' for which we should undoubtedly require the mid. ὑπόσχω. The active ὑπόσχες may mean 'submit to me as to a judge,' or simply, 'produce,' 'present us with, a better speech,' as if he had said πρότεινον. Arist. Pac. 874, ἀλλ' εὖρον ἂν σ' ὑπέχοντα τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν. The phrases ὑπέχειν λόγον, εὐθύνας, αἰτίαν, δίκην are familiar. In Gorg. 497 B, ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐλέγξαι, ὑπ. = promise. Except in this last sense, it would be difficult to find an instance of ὑπόσχες without an accus. following. Wex, in a long note on Soph. Antig. (ii. p. 77 seq.) seems first to have suggested ὑπόσχες εἰπεῖν, which he improperly translates, "sustine dicere, in te recipie dicere," in which Stallb. follows him. The barbarism ὑποσχέθητι of the vulg. is probably an old *interpretamentum* of ὑπόσχες which the scribe misunderstood for ὑπόσχω. The duplication of the εἰ may be compared with that of οὐ in 246 c, where for the vulg. πλαττομένου οὔτε Bekk. rightly reads πλαττομένον οὔτε.

καὶ σοι ἐγώ—ἀναθήσειν] The oath of the nine archons, to which Phaedrus alludes, has perplexed writers on Attic antiquities. According to Plutarch (Solon, c. 25) every archon, before admission to office, took oath, εἰ τι παρα-

βαίη τῶν θεσμῶν, ἀνδρίαντα χρυσοῦν ἰσομέτρητον ἀναθήσειν ἐν Δελφοῖς. This statement can only mean that the slightest violation of law on the part of any of the archons was to be expiated by the erection of a statue of gold at Delphi of life size. Even this is improved upon by Suid., who makes the statues three instead of one, and represents them as portrait-statues of the delinquent (χρυσῇ εἰκῶν. ὦμνον οἱ Ἀθηναῖον ἄρχοντες, ἂν τι παρέλθωσιν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν ἄρχωσιν, χρυσῇν εἰκόνα αὐτῶν ἀναθήσειν ἐν ἅστει, ἐν Πυθοῖ, ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ). Better accounts however are given by J. Pollux, viii. 86, and by Heraclides in his excerpts from the πολιτεῖαι of Aristotle; from whom it appears that only in the case of bribery was such punishment exacted—δῶρα μὴ λήψεσθαι, ἢ ἀνδρίαντα χρυσοῦν ἀναθήσειν—where the omission of ἰσομέτρητον and αὐτοῦ is significant. It is not certain that in the passage before us either the word ἰσομέτρητον or αὐτοῦ is to be understood as quoted from the archon's oath. For besides that portrait-statues were not in use in the time of Solon (see the passage from Pliny quoted in the note next but one to this), it is very unlikely that the Delphians would have allowed their sacred peribolus to be defiled by the statue of a detected criminal. And if the penalty was intended to be enforced, the offering must needs have been of much more limited dimensions. It is therefore conceivable that both ἰσομέτρητον and αὐτοῦ were introduced by late writers into the text of the original oath, in order to make it conformable to the supposed meaning of Plato. If we assume the image to have been of definite but small size, which is all that the statements of Pollux and Heraclides necessitate, it is not impossible that it may also have been of solid gold. In a recent number of the Rhenish Museum (xiii. p. 447), to which

ΣΩ. Φίλτατος εἶ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσοῦς, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἴ με οἶε λέγειν ὡς Λυσίας τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκε, καὶ οἶόν τε δὴ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἄλλα εἰπεῖν. τοῦτο δὲ οἶμαι οὐδ' ἂν τὸν φαυλότατον παθεῖν συγγραφέα. αὐτίκα περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, τίνα οἶε λέγοντα ὡς χρὴ μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶντι χαρίζεσθαι, παρέντα τοῦ μὲν | τὸ φρόνιμον ²³⁶ ἐγκωμιάζειν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἄφρον ψέγειν, ἀναγκαῖα γοῦν ὄντα, εἴτ' ἄλλ' ἅττα ἔξειν λέγειν; ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἑατέα καὶ συγγνωστέα λέγοντι καὶ τῶν μὲν τοιούτων οὐ

I am indebted for some of the above remarks, we are presented with a new solution of the difficulty, professing greater completeness than any that have preceded it. The eminent scholar whose name is appended to the paper in question, contends that, the oath having originally had a bona fide purpose, it is necessary to suppose that the penalty was one within the power of an ex-archon to raise. The dimensions of the statue were to equal, not those of the offender, but of the bribe received by him. We know from Dinarchus (adv. Demosth. 60) that the punishment of bribery was a fine exceeding tenfold the money received by the offender: the relative value of gold to silver at Athens in the time of Solon appears to have been as 10:1; hence the archon was required to set up an image of gold equalling in weight the sum supposed to have been received in silver. In this case we must suppose *ἰσοστάσιον* to have originally stood in the text of the oath, and *ἰσομέτρητον* to have been substituted, apparently by Plato, in whose time the sanction had become a dead letter. To me, I confess, the ingenuity of this hypothesis appears to exceed its credibility, but others may form a different opinion.

E. *αὐτίκα περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος*] 'to begin with his thesis.' So Gorg. 472 D, *αὐτίκα περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστί.*

τίνα οἶε λέγοντα, κ.τ.λ.] 'who,' asks Socr., 'could argue that the cool is to be preferred to the impassioned suitor, without lauding the good sense of the former and censuring the absurdities of the latter; or if he *did* overlook topics so trite and obvious, what else could he find to say?' Of such commonplaces the less said the better. They require no invention, but only the power of arrangement. If a speaker would earn

the praise of invention he must have something to say more recondite than platitudes like these.' Struck by the justice of this criticism, Phaedr. will allow Socr. to take for granted the truism that a man who is in love is in a less healthy state of mind than one who is free from that passion; 'but,' says he, 'produce arguments more and better than those contained in the remainder of the speech, and you shall stand in wrought gold at Olympia by the side of the great image set up by the Cypselidae.' Of this image Hermeias says that it was actually erected by the sons of Periander, the son of Cypselus, on the occasion of recovering the tyranny of Corinth. Better authorities, as Aristotle and Strabo, attribute the offering to Cypselus himself, who, it is added, made his subjects pay a tax for ten years towards defraying the enormous expense. The "golden statue" of Gorgias, at Delphi, Pausanias found to be a gilt one, though Pliny gravely assures us that "*Hominum primus et auream statuum et solidam Gorgias Leontinus Delphis in templo sibi posuit lxx. circiter Olympiade. Tantus erat decendae artis oratoriae quaestus!*" N. H. xxxiii. 24. Still more fabulous is the account in Valerius Max., viii. ad fin., "Gorgiae Leontino . . . universa Graecia . . . statuum solido in auro posuit: eum cacterorum ad id tempus auratas collocasset." The word *σφυρήλατος* (distinguished from *χοανευτός*, cast) does not necessarily imply more than a statue covered with plates of beaten gold; though we read of *δλόσφυρα* or *δλόσφύρητα* ἀγάλματα composed entirely of the precious metal, "nulla inanitate," as Pliny, l. l. expresses it. Compare Müller, Handb. der Archäol. §§ 240. 2; 307.

τὴν εὖρεσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν διάθεσιν ἐπαινετέον, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίων τε καὶ χαλεπῶν εὐρεῖν πρὸς τῇ διαθέσει καὶ τὴν εὖρεσιν.

ΦΑΙ. Συγχωρῶ ὃ λέγεις· μετρίως γάρ μοι δοκεῖς εἰρηκεῖναι. ποιήσω οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ οὕτως· τὸ μὲν τὸν ἐρῶντα τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος μᾶλλον νοσεῖν δώσω σοι ὑποτίθεσθαι, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἕτερα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια εἰπὼν τῶν Δυσίου παρὰ τὸ Κυψελιδῶν ἀνάθημα σφυρήλατος ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ ἔσταθι.

ΣΩ. Ἐσπούδακας, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὅτι σου τῶν παιδικῶν ἐπελαβόμην ἐρεσχηλῶν σε, καὶ οἶμι δὴ με ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιχειρήσειν εἰπεῖν παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου σοφίαν ἕτερόν τι ποικιλότερον.

ΦΑΙ. Περὶ μὲν τούτου, ὦ φίλε, εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας λαβὰς ἐλήλυθας. ρητέον μὲν γάρ σοι παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ὅπως οἴός τε εἶ, ἵνα μὴ τὸ τῶν κωμῶδων φορτικὸν πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαζόμεθα ποιεῖν, ἀνταποδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις, καὶ μὴ

236 B. ἔσταθι.] Vulg. στάθητι. The true reading was restored by Cobet, Vv. Ll. p. 196, from a Scholium on this passage quoted in Photius's Lex., σφυρήλατος ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ ἐστάθη. "Herod. ii. 141, καὶ νῦν ἔστηκε ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ λίθινος, sic et χρυσοῖς ἔστηκε dicitur et ἔστη et στήσεται, non item σταθῆναι et σταθήσεται quae sunt Graecitatis languescentis et labentis." This, however, is saying too much. Dinarch. p. 103—13, ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ χαλκοῦν σταθέντα. Cf. Virgil, Catal. vi. 9,

(xiv)

Marmoreusque tibi, Dea, versicoloribus alis

In morem pietatis stabit Amor pharetra.

So Horace, Stabis marmoreus, sub trabe citrea. C. 4.1. 20 (xv 15 ημοτευ)

Ἐσπούδακας] 'you are seriously annoyed.' Ar. Ran. 812, ὡς ὅταν γ' οἱ διαπτόται Ἐσπούδακας, κλαίει· ἡμῶν γίγνεται.

ἐρεσχηλῶν σε] 'by way of teasing you.' "Iudificans, joco irritans." Steph. Bachmann, Anecd. Gr. ii. p. 323. 11: "ἐπὶ τῶν φίλων διαλεγόμενων ἐρεσχηλεῖν. Nostr. necken." Ast. ἐρεσχελοῦντες, φλυαροῦντες. ἐρεσχελεῖ, . . . ἐρεθίζει, ἀδολεσχεῖ, χλευάζει, παίζει, σκώπτει, διαμάχεται. Hesych. Hence

perhaps corr. ἐπὶ τῶν φίλων διαμαχομένων in the Schol. quoted by Ast. The long penult was adopted by Bekker from the Bodl. and other MSS. Vulg. ἐρεσχηλῶν.

εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας λαβὰς ἐλήλυθας] 'you have laid yourself open to a like retort.' The metaphor in the Gr. is "taken from the palaestra," as the Comm. observe. We say in like manner, 'You have given me a hold upon you.' Phaedr. might also have said τ. ὁ λ. ἐνδεδωκας as Arist. Eq. 847, or δέδωκας, as ib. 841.

C. ἵνα μή] So the Bodl. and the best MSS. Vulg. ἵνα δὲ μή, with a full stop after εἶ. After ἀλλήλοις stood εὐλαβήθητι, a senseless interpolation, as Cobet observes, l. 1.: "magistello qui adscripsit reddendum, ut ἵνα μή pendeat a verbis ρητέον παντὸς μᾶλλον."

τὸ τῶν κωμῶδων φορτικὸν πρᾶγμα] As a specimen of the kind of low wit in question, see Arist. Eq. 286 seq. and 361 seq. This ἀνταπόδοσις, or interchange of pleasantries, answers nearly to the 'tu quoque' of English school-boys, and the 'Retour-kuttsche' of German students. Socr. had said, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαντοῦ ἐπιλέλυσμαι, p. 228, and Phaedr. here threatens to 'pay him back' in his own coin.

βούλου με ἀναγκάσαι λέγειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἰ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, Σωκράτην ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἑμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλυσμαι, καὶ ὅτι ἐπεθύμει μὲν λέγειν, ἐθρύπτετο δέ· ἀλλὰ διανοήθητι ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν οὐκ ἄπιμεν, πρὶν ἂν σὺ εἴπῃς ἃ ἔφησθα ἐν τῷ στήθει ἔχειν. ἐσμὲν δὲ μόνω ἐν ἐρημία, ἰσχυρότερος δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ νεώτερος, ἐκ δ' ἀπάντων τούτων ξύνες ὃ σοὶ λέγω, D καὶ μηδαμῶς πρὸς βίαν βουλευθῆς μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκὼν λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὦ μακάριε Φαῖδρε, γελοῖος ἔσομαι παρ' ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΦΑΙ. Οἶσθ' ὡς ἔχει; παῦσαι πρὸς με καλλωπιζόμενος· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἔχω ὃ εἰπὼν ἀναγκάσω σε λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Μηδαμῶς τοῖνυν εἴπῃς.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ λέγω. ὁ δέ μοι λόγος ὅρκος ἔσται. ὅμνυμι γάρ σοι—τίνα μέντοι, τίνα θεῶν; ἢ βούλει τὴν πλάτανον ταυτηνί; ἢ μήν, ἐάν μοι μὴ εἴπῃς τὸν λόγον E ἐναντίον αὐτῆς ταύτης, μηδέποτε σοὶ ἕτερον λόγον μηδένα μηδεὶνός μὴτ' ἐπιδείξειν μὴτ' ἐξαγγελεῖν.

ΣΩ. Βαβαί, ὦ μιαρέ, ὡς εὖ ἀνεῦρες τὴν ἀνάγκην ἀνδρὶ φιλολόγῳ ποιεῖν ὃ ἂν κελεύῃς.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφει;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἐπειδὴ σύ γε ταῦτα ὁμώμοκας. πῶς γὰρ ἂν οἷός τ' εἶην τοιαύτης θοίνης ἀπέχεσθαι;

| ΦΑΙ. Λέγε δῆ.

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D. ξύνες ὃ σοὶ λέγω] A quotation with the change of τοὶ into σοὶ from a well-known frag. of Pindar, Boeckh, No. 71, which is parodied by Arist. Av. 941. In Menon 76 D we have ὃ τοὶ λέγω or ὅτι λέγω in the MSS.

Ἄλλ', ὦ μακάριε] Socr. affects reluctance (θρύπτεται, καλλωπίζεται), and on two grounds. He is an ἰδιώτης, a plain man, whereas Lysias is a great author; moreover, the speech of Lysias had been composed at leisure, he, Socrates, being called upon to extemporize a discourse on the same thesis. On ἰδιώτης see the note on 258 D.

σχεδὸν γάρ] 'methinks I have that to say, &c.,' nearly as ἴσως, 233 E.

Ὅχι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ λέγω] 'nay, but say it I must, and here you have it.' This seems the force of the particles, καὶ δὴ en tibi, as freq., a sense bordering on,

but not to be confounded with, the hypothetical use of these particles. For the use of the negative, comp. Gorg. 453 D, πείθει ἢ οὐ; Οὐ δῆτα ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθομαι.

ὁ δέ μοι λόγος] Hom. Il. i. 239, ὁ δέ μοι μέγας ἔσσεται ὅρκος.

E. ἐπιδείξειν] Not ἐπιδείξεσθαι, the speech not being his own, but another's. Eng., 'let you see,' as ἐξαγγελεῖν = 'let you hear.'

Τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφει] 'then why all this shuffling?' For ἔχων comp. Gorg. 490 E, ποῖα ὑποδήματα φλυαρεῖς ἔχων; for στρέφει, Ar. Ach. 385, τί ταῦτα στρέφει, τεχνάζεις τε καὶ πορίζεις τριβάς; and Iaches 196 D, ἀλλὰ στρέφεται ἕνω καὶ κάτω ἐπικυρπτόμενος τὴν αὐτοῦ σοφίαν, quoted by Ast in ann., who indulges in a lengthy speculation upon the origin of the idiomatic ἔχων.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθ' οὖν ὡς ποιήσω ;

ΦΑΙ. Τοῦ πέρι ;

ΣΩ. Ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἔρῳ, ἢ ὃ τι τάχιστα διαδράμω τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ, βλέπων πρὸς σέ, ὑπ' αἰσχύνης διαπορῶμαι.

ΦΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὅπως βούλει ποίει.

ΣΩ. Ἄγετε δὴ, ὦ Μοῦσαι, εἴτε δι' ᾧδῆς εἶδος λίγειαί, εἴτε διὰ γένος μουσικὸν τὸ Λιγύων ταύτην ἔσχετ' ἐπωνυμίαν, ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε τοῦ μύθου, ὃν με ἀναγκάζει ὁ βέλτιστος οὕτοσὶ λέγειν, ἢ ὁ ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρότερον δοκῶν τούτῳ σοφὸς εἶναι, νῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον δόξη.

Ἦν οὕτω δὴ παῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μεираκίσκος, μάλα καλός. τούτῳ δὲ ἦσαν ἐρασταὶ πάνυ πολλοί. εἰς δέ τις αὐτῶν αἰμύλος ἦν, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἦττον ἔρῳν ἐπεπείκει τὸν παῖδα ὡς οὐκ ἔρώη. καί ποτε αὐτὸν αἰτῶν ἔπειθε τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὡς μὴ ἔρῳντι πρὸ τοῦ ἔρῳντος δέοι χαρίζεσθαι. ἔλεγέ τε ᾧδε·

Περὶ παντός, ὦ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς

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237. διαπορῶμαι] A deponent, not distinguishable in sense from διαπορῶ or the simple ἀπορῶ, for which ἀπορούμαι is sometimes found. We have also the true passives ἀπορούμενον in Soph. 243 B, and διηπορημένον, ib. 250 E, denoting the subject of a controversy or difficult investigation, τὸ περὶ οὗ ἀπορεῖ τις.

Ἄγετε δὴ, ὦ Μοῦσαι] The motive of this 'dithyrambic' invocation (inf. 238 B) is of course to give a colour of probability to the artificial and stilted style of the prooem of the first speech of Socr., and still more to that of the second speech, the μυθικὸς ὕμνος, so alien from the ordinary simplicity of the speaker. It is to this part of the dialogue that Aristotle alludes, Rhet. iii. 7. 11, where he says that a high-flown poetical diction is admissible in prose, 1. when the feelings of the audience have been wrought to a high pitch by the speaker, or, 2. when such style is adopted μετ' εἰρωνείας, ὅπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει, καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ. This criticism, for its taste and discernment, stands in favourable contrast with that of Dionysius of Halic., who is sorely scandalized by the "turbid

and obscure, and disagreeably poetical style" which, as he thinks, is a grievous change for the worse from the gracefulness of the introductory scene.

λίγειαί] A stereotyped epithet of the Muses. Socr. affects to doubt whether it was derived from the shrillness of their notes, or from the name of a race devoted to their service. Herm. ἔθνος . . . τῶν Λιγύων . . . οὕτως ἀγαν μουσικώτατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε μὴδ' ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις πανστρατία μάχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τι τοῦ στρατεύματος ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἄδειν, πολεμούντος τοῦ λοιποῦ,—a reputation, it is hardly necessary to say, which the Ligurians owe to the ingenuity of Greek etymologists. The tmesis ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε is of course a designed poeticism.

B. Ἦν οὕτω δὴ] The conventional mode of beginning a fable, answering to our 'once upon a time.' Aristoph. Vesp. 1182, οὕτω ποτ' ἦν αἰὶν καὶ γὰρ, where see the Schol. Germ., 'Es war also einmal.' Lysis 216 C, τὸ μὴτ' ἀγαθὸν μῆτε κακὸν φίλον οὕτω ποτὲ γιγνόμενον τὰγαθοῦ, 'that that which is neither good nor bad may *once in a way* become endeared to the good.'

Περὶ παντός, κ.τ.λ.] This is the prooem

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βουλευέσθαι· εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾗ ἡ βουλή, ἣ παν-
 τὸς ἀμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη. τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς λέληθεν ὅτι οὐκ
 ἴσασι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκάστων. ὥς οὖν εἰδότες οὐ διομολο-
 γοῦνται ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς σκέψεως, προελθόντες δὲ τὸ εἰκὸς
 ἀποδιδόασιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογοῦσιν.
 ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ σὺ μὴ πάθωμεν ὃ ἄλλοις ἐπιτιμῶμεν, ἀλλ'
 ἐπειδὴ σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὁ λόγος πρόκειται, πότερον ἐρώντι
 ἢ μὴ μᾶλλον εἰς φιλίαν ἰτέον, περὶ ἔρωτος, οἷόν τε ἔστι
 καὶ ἣν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὁμολογία· θέμενοι ὄρον, εἰς τοῦτο
 ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιῶμεθα,
 εἴτε ὠφέλειαν εἴτε βλάβην παρέχει. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν δὴ ἐπι-

to a speech which professes, like that of Lysias, to uphold the thesis *ὡς μὴ ἐρώντι πρὸ τοῦ ἐρώντος δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι*. Instead of plunging in medias res, as Lysias had done, Socr. seeks in the first instance to define the terms of the question. What is *ἔρως*? All allow that it is an *ἐπιθυμία*—an appetite or desire. But this is an insufficient though a true description, for there are many *ἐπιθυμῖαι*. Neither is it enough to add that Love is an *ἐπιθυμία τῶν καλῶν*, a desire of beautiful objects, for many desire beautiful objects who are not in love. How then are we to distinguish *ἔρως* from other *ἐπιθυμῖαι τῶν καλῶν*, and what is its true differentia? Socr. sets about the inquiry thus. There are two principles of action in man, the desire of pleasure and the desire of excellence. Of these the first is innate, the second acquired; the second a rational, the first an unreasoning principle. When the rational principle predominates, the result is that state of mind which we call *σωφροσύνη*—temperance, or moderation, or self-government; when the appetite bears sway, its usurpation is branded with the name *ὑβρις*—licence or excess. But as *ὑβρις* is only *ἐπιθυμία* magnified, there are many *ὑβρις* as there are many *ἐπιθυμῖαι*, differing in nature or in name, according to the name and nature of their several objects. Thus the desire of food, when it becomes excessive, is styled *γαστριμαργία*, gluttony; the desire of drink under the same circumstances becomes a vice which all know. Love, it is assumed, is one of these forms of excess: it is the Excess which corre-

sponds to the Desire of the Beautiful. Not however of *all* that is beautiful: but especially of corporeal beauty. It is therefore the desire of beauty combined with carnal appetite, existing in such intensity as to triumph over all the restraints imposed by the antagonist principle. Its name corresponds to its nature: for the word *ἔρως* is near of kin to *ῥώμη*, *ῥόομαι*, and *ἐρρωμένως*,—one proof among many that names were given by those who saw deep into the nature of things. (Crat. 401 B.) Such seems the purport of this dialectico-dithyrambic *σκέψις*, in which jest and earnest are oddly but not inharmoniously blended. It is characteristic of Plato both in this particular and in the psychological distinction of the two *ιδεαί* or forms of mental being, upon which the definition is made to rest. Of this conception of *ἔρως*, we shall see hereafter what its author really thought: but meanwhile it answers its purpose: it is a true account of that passion against which Socr. is about to inveigh; and it is something less vile than the cold calculating desire, the 'passionless prudence,' recommended by the unloving suitor of Lysias.

C. τὸ εἰκὸς ἀποδιδόασιν] The verb *ἀποδοῦναι* signifies to 'give back,' hence to 'pay,' i. e. to give in consideration of a previous gift. In phrases like the present it denotes the relation between cause and consequence, a result answering to a foregone cause. 'They pay the natural penalty;' or, more generally, 'the natural result follows.' Cousin: "*Il en résulte ce qui était inévitable.*" Theact. 175 D, *πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσι* = 'the tables are turned.'

θυμία τις ὁ ἔρωρ, ἅπαντι δῆλον· ὅτι δ' αὖ καὶ μὴ ἐρώντες ἐπιθυμοῦσι τῶν καλῶν, ἴσμεν. τῷ δὴ τὸν ἐρώντά τε καὶ μὴ κρινοῦμεν; δεῖ αὖ νοῆσαι ὅτι ἡμῶν ἐν ἐκάστῳ δύο τινεῖ ἐστων ἰδέα ἄρχοντε καὶ ἄγοντε, οἷν ἐπόμεθα ἢ ἂν ἄγητον, ἢ μὲν ἔμφυτος οὔσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, ἄλλη δὲ ἐπικτήτος δόξα, ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου. τούτῳ δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν τοτὲ μὲν ὁμονοεῖτον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε στασιάζετον· καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἢ ἐτέρα, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἢ ἐτέρα κρατεῖ. δόξης μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄριστον λόγῳ ἀγούσης καὶ κρατούσης τῷ
 238 κράτει σωφροσύνη ὄνομα· | ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἀλόγως ἐλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀρξάσης ἐν ἡμῖν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὕβρις ἐπωνομάσθη. ὕβρις δὲ δὴ πολυώνυμον. πολυμελὲς γὰρ καὶ πολυειδές. καὶ τούτων τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐκπρεπὴς ἢ ἂν τύχῃ γενομένη, τὴν αὐτῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ὀνομαζόμενον τὸν ἔχοντα παρέχεται, οὗ τέ τινα καλὴν οὔτε ἐπαξίαν κεκτήσθαι. περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐδωδὴν κρατοῦσα τοῦ τε λόγου τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπιθυμία γαστριμαργία τε, καὶ
 B αὖ μέθας τυραννεύσασα, τὸν κεκτημένον ταύτῃ ἄγουσα, δῆλον οὐ τεύξεται προσρήματος· καὶ τὰλλα δὴ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ ἀδελφῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀνόματα, τῆς αἰὶ δυναστευούσης, ἣ προσήκει καλεῖσθαι πρόδηλον. ἥς δ'

D. ἐπικτήτος δόξα, ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου] Cous. "Le goût réfléchi du bien." In 253 D the better horse is styled ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἐταῖρος.

E. στασιάζετον] The comparison of a mental struggle to a sedition or civil war is frequent in Plato: as in Rep. iv. 412 E, (φαμέν τὸ θυμοειδές) ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα πρὸς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ.

238. πολυμελές] Vulg. πολυμερές, πολυμελές, which is the reading of the Bodl. and others, is found also in Stobaeus, Flor. ii. p. 489 Gaisf. The difference in sense is but slight. Comp. Politic. 287 C, κατὰ μέλη τοίνυν αὐτὰς οἶον ἱερεῖον διαιρώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ δίχα ἀδυνατοῦμεν, where the speaker alludes to a classification similar to that which follows here.

καὶ τούτων—ἐκπρεπής, κ.τ.λ.] "Celle de ces formes qui se trouve le plus en évidence sert à qualifier la personne

chez qui elle se manifeste." Cous.

ἐπαξίαν κεκτήσθαι] Rep. 367 C, τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν, ἃ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων . . . ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἕνεκα ἕξια κεκτήσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν. Here tr. 'no very valuable possession.' In the next clause τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν means, of course, the appetites different from the 'ruling passion' which 'swallows all the rest.' The 'reason of the best' nearly answers to the 'moral reason' of the moderns.

B. τῆς αἰὶ δυναστευούσης] "Videtur requiri praepositio, ut ordo sit: πρόδηλον τὰ ὀνόματα καλεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς αἰὶ δυναστευούσης ἢ προσήκει." Badh. Stallb., who adopts δ for ἦ from a single MS. of Stob., considers the order to be, πρόδηλον δ τῆς αἰὶ δυναστευούσης (ὄνομα) προσήκει (τινὰ) καλεῖσθαι, treating the former clause καὶ τὰλλα δὴ τὰ τούτων . . . ὀνόματα as "absolute." If ἦ καλεῖσθαι can be understood as δ καλεῖσθαι or

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ἔνεκα πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, σχεδὸν μὲν ἤδη φανερόν, λεχθὲν δὲ ἡ μὴ λεχθὲν πᾶν πως σαφέστερον. ἡ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν ὁρμώσης κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία, πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀχθεῖσα κάλλους, καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἑαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ σωματῶν κάλλος, ἐρρώμενως ῥωσθεῖσα νικήσασα ἀγωγῇ, ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ῥώμης ἐπωγνίαν λαβοῦσα, ἔρως ἐκλήθη.

Ἀτάρ, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, δοκῶ τι σοί, ὥσπερ ἐμαυτῷ, θεῖον πάθος πεπονθέναι;

ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς εὐροιά τίς σε εἴληφεν.

ΣΩ. Σιγῇ τοῖνυν μου ἄκουε. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ θεῖος ἔοικεν ὁ τόπος εἶναι. ὥστε ἐὰν ἄρα πολλαίς νυμφόληπτος προῖον-
τος τοῦ λόγου γένωμαι, μὴ θαυμάσης· τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόρρῳ διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι σὺ αἴτιος. ἀλλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄκουε. ἴσως γὰρ καὶ ἀποτράποιτο τὸ ἐπιόν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς τὸν παῖδα πάλιν τῷ λόγῳ ἵτεον.

ἢ καλεῖσθαι, perhaps τῆς αἰ δυν. may be taken as exexegetic or liminary of the preceding ἐπιθυμιῶν, and equivalent to ἡ ἀν αἰ δυναστεύη. The sense will thus be, 'there can be as little doubt as to the other names of the same class belonging to appetites akin to the two just mentioned, whichever of these may for the time be dominant; there can be no doubt, I say, how such names ought to be called,' "*quomodo nomina appellanda, h. e. ponenda sint*," as Ast renders it.

c. ἐρρώμενως ῥωσθεῖσα, κ.τ.λ.] "In Trinav. Stob. abest ἐρρώμενως. Verba ἐρρώμενως νικήσασα (nam νικήσασα vitiisum est) interpretatio fuit participii ῥωσθεῖσα. Hesych. ῥώνοντο ὠρουν, ἐρρώμενως ἐκινούοντο." G. Hermann, MS. in mg. This is ingenious but not convincing. Hermias reads nearly as in the text, but seems to have omitted ὑπ' αὐτῶν and construed ἐπὶ σ. κάλλος with ἐρρώμενως ῥωσθεῖσα. For the sense see the paraphrase in note on 237 n.

d. εἰ δὲν ἄρα πολλαίς] 'if haply.' πολλαίς is frequently so used by Plato, with εἰ, εἰ ἄρα, ἢ, καὶ, &c. So Thucyd.

ii. 13, ὑποτοπήσας (ὁ Περικλῆς) μὴ πολλαίς ('*Ἀρχίδαμος*) ἢ αὐτὸς ἰδία βουλόμενος χαρίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγροὺς αὐτοῦ παραλίπῃ, κ.τ.λ.

νυμφόληπτος] On this and similar superstitions Lobeck remarks (Aglaoph. p. 641): "Horror quem vasti montes sylvaeque impenetrabiles, et solitudo ipsa errantibus offundere solent, in causa fuit, cur agrestia numina oecursu suo obviam factos lymphae crederentur." He quotes J. Pollux i. 19, θεόληπτος, φοιβόληπτος, νυμφόληπτος, μουσόληπτος, ἐκ Πανὸς ἢ ἄλλου θεοῦ κάτοχος ἢ κατεχόμενος. Also Eur. Hipp. 141, σὺ τὰρ' ἐνθεός, ὦ κόουρα, εἴτ' ἐκ Πανός, κ.τ.λ. Festus identifies the νυμφόληπτοι with the Latin Lymphiati, considering Lympha and Nympha to be the same. Hesych., in accordance with the present passage, has the gloss: Νυμφόληπτοι, οἱ κατεχόμενοι Νύμφαις, μάντις δὲ εἰσι καὶ ἐπιθειαστικοί. The Nymphs and Muses seem originally to have been the same. Hence the temple of the Musae *Ilissides* near the scene of this dialogue. Comp. infra, p. 278 B, and note.

ἀποτράποιτο] It is more proper to

Εἶεν, ὦ φέριστε. ὁ μὲν δὴ τυγχάνει ὄν περι ὧ δου-
λευτέον, εἴρηται τε καὶ ὤριστα. βλέποντες δὲ δὴ πρὸς
Ε αὐτὸ τὰ λοιπὰ λέγωμεν, τίς ὠφέλεια ἢ βλάβη ἀπὸ τε
ἐρώωντος καὶ μὴ τῷ χαριζομένῳ ἐξ εἰκότος συμβήσεται.

Τῷ δὴ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένῳ δουλεύοντί τε ἡδονῇ
ἀνάγκη που τὸ ἐρώμενον ὡς ἡδιστον ἑαυτῷ παρασκευά-
ζειν. νοσοῦντι δὲ πᾶν ἡδὺ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτείνον, κρείττον δὲ
239 καὶ ἴσον ἐχθρόν. οὔτε δὴ κρείττω | οὔτε ἰσούμενον ἐκὼν
ἐραστῆς παιδικὰ ἀνέξεται, ἥττω δὲ καὶ ὑποδεέστερον αἰεὶ
ἀπεργάζεται. ἥττων δὲ ἀμαθὴς σοφοῦ, δειλὸς ἀνδρείου,
ἀδύνατος εἰπεῖν ῥητορικοῦ, βραδὺς ἀγχίνου. τοσούτων
κακῶν καὶ ἔτι πλείονων κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐραστὴν
ἐρωμένῳ ἀνάγκη γιγνομένων τε καὶ φύσει ἐόντων, τῶν
μὲν ἡδεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάζειν, ἢ στέρεσθαι τοῦ
B παραυτίκα ἡδέος. φθονερὸν δὲ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ πολλῶν
μὲν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν ἀπείργοντα καὶ ὠφελίμων, ὅθεν ἂν
μάλιστ' ἀνὴρ γίγνοιτο, μεγάλης αἰτίον εἶναι βλάβης, μεγί-
στης δὲ τῆς ὅθεν ἂν φρονιμώτατος εἴη. τοῦτο δὲ ἡ θεία
φιλοσοφία τυγχάνει ὄν, ἥς ἐραστὴν παιδικὰ ἀνάγκη πόρ-

call this aor. passive than middle. Crat. 395 B, ἡ πατρὶς αὐτοῦ ὅλη ἀνετράπετο. So ἐσχόμην and its compounds are constantly used in strictly passive sense. The general meaning is: 'perhaps the madness with which I am threatened may even be averted,' as if by the agency of an ἀποτροπαῖος.

Εἶεν, ὦ φέριστε] Soer. having settled with Phaedr. to their mutual liking a definition of Love, proceeds to speculate on the probable results of such a passion to its object. The Lover, according to the definition, is 'overmastered by lust and the bondsman of pleasure.' A person in this morbid condition will first try to extirpate all those nobler qualities and accomplishments which would be likely to indispose the beloved from hearkening to his suit. He will tolerate no superiority, no equality even, in the object of his passion. He will rather see him a dunce than a sage, a coward than a hero; a stammerer rather than eloquent, slow rather than quick-witted. 'So many and more besides are the mental defects which a lover must needs regard with pleasure if

he see them implanted by nature in the beloved, and which, if acquired (γιγνομένων), he must seek to foster, or else forfeit the hope of present enjoyment.'

239. τῶν μὲν ἡδεσθαι] So Soph. Phil. 715, ὅς μὴδ' οἶνοχύτου πάματος ἥσθη δέκεται χρόνῳ, where Ellendt: "Omnium optima interpretatio videtur ἀπέλυσεν ὥστε ἡδεσθαι," which perhaps may be the force of the unusual construction here. I agree with Stallb. in rejecting both the τοῖς μὲν of Heind. and the κήδεσθαι of Hirschig. G. Herm. thinks that Plato meant to have written ἐρώων ἡδεσθαι, and that τῶν μὲν was introduced on second thoughts to balance τὰ δὲ παρασκευάζειν. Not. in mg.

B. μεγίστης δέ, κ.τ.λ.] An elliptical construction which may be thus supplied: μεγίστης δέ (αἰτίον εἶναι βλάβης ἀπείργοντα) τῆς (συνουσίας) ὅθεν ἂν φρονιμώτατος εἴη. The ἂν with εἴη is, as Stallb. observes, indispensable: 'that philosophic converse which will make him most intelligent.' So βλαβερώτατος ἂν εἴη, 'he will be most mischievous,' i. e. if the conditions named be complied with.

ῥωθεν εἶργειν, περίφοβον ὄντα τοῦ καταφρονηθῆναι· τά τε ἄλλα μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως ἂν ᾗ πάντ' ἀγνοῶν καὶ πάντ' ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸν ἐραστήν, οἷος ὢν τῷ μὲν ἡδιστος, ἑαυτῷ δὲ βλαβερώτατος ἂν εἴη. Τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐπίτροπός τε καὶ κοινωνός οὐδαμῇ λυσιτελὴς ἀνὴρ ἔχων ἔρωτα.

Τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἕξις τε καὶ θεραπείαν οἶαν τε καὶ ὡς θεραπεύσει οὗ ἂν γένηται κύριος, ὃς ἡδὺ πρὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἠνάγκασται διώκειν, δεῖ μετὰ ταῦτα ἰδεῖν. ὁφθῆσεται δὲ μαλθακόν τινα καὶ οὐ στερεὸν διώκων, οὐδ' ἐν ἡλίῳ καθαρῷ τεθραμμένον ἀλλ' ὑπὸ συμμιγεί σκιᾷ, πόρων μὲν ἀνδρείων καὶ ἰδρώτων ξηρῶν ἄπειρον, ἔμπειρον δὲ ἀπαλῆς καὶ ἀνάνδρου διαίτης, ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμασι καὶ κόσμοις χίττει οἰκείων κοσμούμενον, ὅσα τε ἄλλα τούτοις ἔπεται, πάντα ἐπιτηδεύοντα. ἃ δῆλα· καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον περαιοτέρῳ προβαίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐν κεφάλαιον ὀρισαμένους ἐπ' ἄλλο ἰέναι. τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον σῶμα ἐν πολέμῳ τε καὶ ἄλλαις χρείαις ὅσαι μεγάλαί οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ θαρρόουσιν, οἱ δὲ φίλοι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ φοβοῦνται. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ὡς δῆλον ἔατέον.

c. Τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ διάνοιαν] 'thus we see that in respect of his mental culture he can hardly have a less desirable guardian or companion (compare δουλίᾳ τε καὶ ἐπιτροπῇ inf. D) than a lover.' Having proved this, Socr. proceeds to show that the influence of a lover will be equally baneful as regards, 1. the physical condition; 2. the estate of the παιδικά. As regards the first, the lover will prefer an effeminate weakling to a manly and robust person—one bred in the chequered shade to a youth hardened by exposure to the clear sunshine, &c. Observe that the mark of effeminacy among the Greeks is intolerance of heat, not, as in more northern climates, of cold. Eur. Bacch. 456, Λευκὴν δὲ χροίαν ἐς παρασκευὴν ἔχεις Οὗχ ἡλίου βολαῖσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ σκιάς, Τὴν Ἀφροδίτην καλλοίῃ θηρώμενος. Ast quotes Rep. viii. 556 D, ὅταν . . . ἰσχυρὸς ἀνὴρ πένης, ἡλιωμένος, παραταχθεὶς ἐν μάχῃ πλουσίῳ ἀσθενέστερον ᾖ. πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας, ἴδη ἀσθματός τε καὶ ἀπαρίας μεστόν, κτ.λ.: and for συμμιγεί σκιᾷ, Pers. Sat. v. 60, Tunc crassos trans-

isse dies, lucemque palustrem, which however is hardly to the point. The modern Italians have a proverb, 'Dove non entra il sole, entra il medico.' On συμμιγεί σκιᾷ G. Herm. remarks, "oppo-
nitur ἡλίῳ καθαρῷ, ut solis lux commixta cum umbra intelligatur." MS. ubi supra.

ιδρώτων ξηρῶν] Herm. ιδρώτας ξηρὸς λέγει τοὺς ἀπὸ γυμνασίων . . . εἶεν δ' ἂν ὕγροι ιδρώτες οἱ ἀπὸ λουτρῶν. Hence the compound ξηραλοφείν explained by Harpocrat. τὸ χωρὶς λουτρῶν ἀλείφεισθαι.

D. ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμασι] 'with false or artificial colours and ornaments, for lack of such as are native.' Comp. Gorg. 465 B, σχήμασι καὶ χρώμασι καὶ λειότησι καὶ ἐσθήσιν ἀπατώσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριοι καλλὸς ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. χίττει (used only in the dative sing.) is a Homeric word first introduced into prose by Plato. Hesych., χίττει, στερήσει, ἐνδεῖα, σπάνει. Plutarch (Mor. 51 D) quotes this passage from the Phaedr., substituting however σχήμασιν for the κόσμοις of the received text, apparently by a slip of memory.

Τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς ῥητέον, τίνα ἡμῖν ὠφέλειαν ἢ τίνα βλάβην
 E περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν ἢ τοῦ ἐρῶντος ὁμιλία τε καὶ ἐπιτροπεία
 παρέξεται. σαφές δὴ τοῦτό γε παντὶ μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ τῷ
 ἐραστῇ, ὅτι τῶν φιλτάτων τε καὶ εὐνουστάτων καὶ θειοτά-
 των κτημάτων ὀρφανὸν πρὸ παντὸς εὖζαιτ' ἂν εἶναι τὸν
 ἐρώμενον. πατρὸς γὰρ καὶ μητρὸς καὶ ξυγγενῶν καὶ φίλων
 στέρεσθαι ἂν αὐτὸν δέξαιτο, διακωλυτὰς καὶ ἐπιτιμητὰς
 240 ἡγούμενος τῆς ἡδίστης | πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμιλίας. ἀλλὰ μὴν
 οὐσίαν γ' ἔχοντα χρυσοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλης κτήσεως οὐτ'
 εὐάλωτον ὁμοίως οὔτε ἀλόντα εὐμεταχείριστον ἡγήσεται.
 ἐξ ὧν πᾶσ' ἀνάγκη ἐραστὴν παιδικοῖς φθονεῖν μὲν οὐσίαν
 κεκτημένοις, ἀπολλυμένης δὲ χαίρειν. ἔτι τοίνυν ἄγαμον,
 ἄπαιδα, ἄοικον ὃ τι πλεῖστον χρόνον παιδικὰ ἐραστῆς
 εὖζαιτ' ἂν γενέσθαι, τὸ αὐτοῦ γλυκὺ ὥς πλεῖστον χρόνον
 καρποῦσθαι ἐπιθυμῶν.

B Ἔστι μὲν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἀλλὰ τις δαίμων ἔμιξε
 τοῖς πλείστοις ἐν τῷ παραντίκα ἡδονήν. οἷον κόλακι,
 δεινῷ θηρίῳ καὶ βλάβῃ μεγάλῃ, ὅμως ἐπέμιξεν ἢ φύσις
 ἡδονήν τινα οὐκ ἄμουσον. καὶ τις ἐταίραν ὥς βλαβερόν
 ψέξειεν ἂν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιοῦτοτρόπων θρεμμά-
 των τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων, οἷς τό γε καθ' ἡμέραν ἡδί-
 C στοισιν εἶναι ὑπάρχει. παιδικοῖς δὲ ἐραστῆς πρὸς τῷ βλα-
 βερῷ καὶ εἰς τὸ συνημερεύειν πάντων ἀηδέστατον. ἥλικα
 γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος [τέρπειν τὸν ἥλικα] ἢ γάρ, οἶμαι,
 χρόνου ἰσότης ἐπ' ἴσας ἡδονὰς ἄγουσα δι' ὁμοιότητα φι-
 λίαν παρέχεται· ἀλλ' ὅμως κόρον γε καὶ ἢ τούτων συνου-

240. B. Ἔστι μὲν δὴ, κ.τ.λ.] Having shown that the relation of ἐραστῆς and παιδικὰ is injurious to the latter both in mind, body, and estate, Socr. proceeds to show that it is attended with no compensating pleasures, like those which a κόλαξ or ἐταῖρα may be supposed to offer. An ἐραστῆς is in fact the most disgusting of all companions, &c.

οἷον κόλακι, δεινῷ θηρίῳ καὶ βλάβῃ μεγάλῃ] Athen. vi. 254 c, (οἱ κόλακες) ζῶντας ἔτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν κατεσθίουσι· φησὶ γοῦν Ἀναξίλας· Οἱ κόλακες εἰσι τῶν ἐχόντων οὐσίας Σκώληκες, κ.τ.λ. The κόλαξ of the old and middle comedy is identical with the

παράσιτος of later times. One of his qualifications was the possession of a ready wit. So Eupolis (Κόλακες, ap. Athen. l. l. 236 E), δεῖ χαρίεντα πολλὰ τὸν κόλακ' εὐδῶς λέγειν, ἢ φέρεται θύραζε. This is probably the ἡδονὴ οὐκ ἄμουσος to which Plato alludes.

ἡδίστοισιν] This Ionic or old Attic dat. occurs repeatedly in Plato: as inf. p. 276, ἐν ἡμέραισιν ὀκτώ: 278, ἔλλαισιν. Inferior MSS. frequently give the common form instead.

ο. ἥλικα γάρ] Schol. τὸ τέλειον ἔχει· Ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπε, γέρων δὲ τε τέρπε γέροντα. After γὰρ Stob. inserts δὴ, and is followed by G. Hermann.

GP 34

D. i. v. 1
 C. i. v. 1
 P. 253

ἡδονῶν Hsch.

σία ἔχει. καὶ μὴν τό γε ἀναγκαῖον αὖ βαρὺ παντὶ περὶ
 πᾶν λέγεται· ὁ δὲ πρὸς τῇ ἀνομοιότητι μάλιστ' ἐραστῆς
 πρὸς παιδικὰ ἔχει. νεωτέρῳ γὰρ πρεσβύτερος συνὼν οὐθ'
 ἡμέρας οὔτε νυκτὸς ἐκὼν ἀπολείπεται, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνάγκης
 τε καὶ οἴστρου ἐλαύνεται, ὃς ἐκείνῳ μὲν ἡδονὰς αἰεὶ διδοὺς D
 ἄγει, ὀρῶντι, ἀκούοντι, ἀπτομένῳ καὶ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν
 αἰσθανομένῳ τοῦ ἐρωμένου, ὥστε μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀραρότως
 αὐτῷ ὑπηρετεῖν· τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐρωμένῳ ποῖον παραμύθιον ἢ
 τίνας ἡδονὰς διδοὺς ποιήσῃ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον συνόντα μὴ
 οὐχὶ ἐπ' ἔσχατον ἐλθεῖν ἀηδίας; ὀρῶντι μὲν ὅψιν πρεσβυ-
 τέραν καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὥρᾳ, ἐπομένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ταύτῃ,
 αἱ καὶ λόγῳ ἐστὶν ἀκούειν οὐκ ἐπιτερπές, μὴ ὅτι δὴ ἔργῳ E
 ἀνάγκης αἰεὶ προσκειμένης μεταχειρίζεσθαι· φυλακάς τε δὴ
 καχυποτόπους φυλαττομένῳ διὰ παντὸς καὶ πρὸς ἅπαν-
 τας, ἀκαίρους τε ἐπαίνους καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντας ἀκούοντι,
 ὥς δ' αὐτῶς ψόγους νήφοντος μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτοὺς, εἰς δὲ
 μέθην ἰόντος, πρὸς τῷ μὴ ἀνεκτῷ ἐπαισχεῖς, παρῤῥησία
 κατακορεῖ καὶ ἀναπεπταμένη χρωμένου.

D. μὴ οὐχί] 'These particles occur together in an interrogative sentence Phaed. 72 D, τίς μηχανῇ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; and Symp. 197 A, τίς ἐναντιώσεται μὴ οὐχὶ Ἔρωτος εἶναι σοφίαν; In all such cases the sentence is virtually negative.

E. φυλακάς τε δὴ καχυποτόπους] 'being ever watched with the most jealous vigilance.' καχυπότους is preferred by Ast, who cites Rep. iii. 509 c. But the Bodd. and the majority of MSS. support the reading in the text, which is further confirmed by the Lexicographers. In Aristoph. Ran. 958, on the other hand, there can be little doubt that κάχ' υποτοπεῖσθαι is the true reading, not καχυποτοπεῖσθαι, as generally given, and as quoted here by Stallb.

ἀκαίρους τε ἐπαίνους] Bodd. ἀκαίρους τε καὶ ἐπαίνους καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντας, which Stallb., strange to say, admits into his text, not perceiving that the καὶ is a remnant of another reading ἀκαίρους τε καὶ ἐγκαίρους ἐπαίνους, found in five MSS. With equal want of tact he rejects the excellent emendation of Heind., ἐπαισχεῖς for the vulg. ἐπ' αἰσχει, which means next to nothing. In this, however, he is supported by his own coun-

trymen, and even by Hirschig. The symmetry of the sentence is evidently incomplete without an epithet to answer to οὐκ ἀνεκτοὺς, and though ἐπαισχεῖς is not found in any other extant Attic writer, it is acknowledged by Suid., who has the gloss, ἐπαισχές, αἰσχύνης παραλίτιον. Κάμοι μὲν ἐπαισχές ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶγμα καὶ βλαβερόν, κάκῃν πολὺ αἰσχίον καὶ βλαβερώτερον, κ. τ. λ. The clause may be thus rendered: 'He will likewise have to listen to taunts hard to bear even when the lover is sober, but when he gets drunk as indelicate as they are intolerable.'

κατακορεῖ] 'fastidium movente,' like the "fastidiosa copia" of Horace. Suid. ἀπλήστα.

ἀναπεπταμένη] 'broad,' 'undisguised,' frequently used in this sense by Plutarch and other imitators of Plato. "παρῤῥησία δicitur ἀναπεπταμένη quae nihil non aperiens ipsa clandestina amoris gaudia effluit. Hinc τὰ ἀναπεπτάμενα in universum modestiae decoraeque temperantiae opponuntur, ut Xenoph. Mem. ii. 1. 22, de muliere voluptaria: τὰ δὲ ὕμματα ἔχειν ἀναπεπτάμενα." Ast. Comp. Plut. Sympos. 712, ἢ τε πρὸς τὰ σκώμματα καὶ βωμολοχίας εὐχέρεια, δεινῶς κατὰ κορος

Καὶ ἐρῶν μὲν βλαβερὸς τε καὶ ἀηδής, λήξας δὲ τοῦ
 ἔρωτος εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄπιστος, εἰς ὃν πολλὰ καὶ
 μετὰ πολλῶν ὀρκῶν τε καὶ δεήσεων ὑπισχνούμενος, μόγις
 241 κατεῖχε τὴν ἐν τῷ τότε | ξυνοουσίαν ἐπίπονον οὔσαν φέρειν
 δι' ἐλπίδα ἀγαθῶν. τότε δὴ δέον ἐκτίνειν, μεταλαβὼν
 ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ προστάτην, νοῦν καὶ σωφρο-
 σύνην ἀντ' ἔρωτος καὶ ματίας, ἄλλος γεγωνὼς λέληθε τὰ
 παιδικά. καὶ ὁ μὲν αὐτὸν χάριν ἀπαιτεῖ τῶν τότε, ὑπο-
 μιμνήσκων τὰ πραχθέντα καὶ λεχθέντα, ὡς τῷ αὐτῷ δια-
 λεγόμενος· ὁ δὲ ὑπ' αἰσχύνης οὔτε εἰπεῖν τολμᾷ ὅτι ἄλλος
 γέγονεν, οὔθ' ὅπως τὰ τῆς προτέρας ἀνοήτου ἀρχῆς ὀρ-
 B κωμόσιά τε καὶ ὑποσχέσεις ἐμπεδώσει ἔχει, νοῦν ἤδη
 ἐσχηκῶς καὶ σεσωφρονηκῶς, ἵνα μὴ πράττων ταῦτα τῷ
 πρόσθεν ὁμοίος τε ἐκείνῳ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πάλιν γένηται. φυγὰς
 δὴ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ἀπεστερηκῶς ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ὁ
 πρὶν ἐραστής, ὁστράκου μεταπεσόντος, ἔεται φυγῇ μετα-

καὶ ἀναπεπταμένη, καὶ γέμονσα ρημά-
 των ἀκόσμων καὶ ἀκολάστων ὀνομάτων.

Καὶ ἐρῶν μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] Socr. puts the
 finishing strokes to the picture, by de-
 scribing the bad faith and ingratitude
 of the ἐραστής when his passion cools.

εἰς ὃν] 'for which (time) he had to
 make many a fair promise &c., and even
 so could with difficulty maintain an
 intimacy which even in those days was
 as much as the beloved could support, in
 consideration of future benefit.'

241. μεταλαβὼν] The MSS. vary be-
 tween μεταλαβὼν and μεταβαλὼν, as they
 very frequently do in the case of λαβεῖν,
 βαλεῖν, and their compounds. μετα-
 λαβὼν, the reading of Bekk. and Ast, is
 abundantly defended by such passages
 as Thuc. i. 120, πόλεμον ἀντ' εἰρήνης
 μεταλαμβάνειν: Rep. iv. 434 B, ὅταν τὰ
 ἀλλήλων ὄργανα μεταλαμβάνωσι: Theaet.
 172 D, λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν.
 On the other hand, μεταβαλὼν may be
 defended by Rep. iv. 424 C, εἶδος καινὸν
 μουσικῆς μεταβάλλειν, &c., quoted by
 Stallb., who draws a distinction without
 much practical difference between the
 two verbs and their signification. The
 analogy of the Latin *muto* seems to
 extend to both.

οὔθ' ὅπως, κ.τ.λ.] 'nor can he find
 the means of ratifying (redeeming) the
 solemn protestations and promises made

under the old irrational régime,' "*sous
 l'empire de sa folle passion.*" Cous.
 Comp. supr. μεταλαβὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα
 ἀντ' ἔρωτος καὶ ματίας. For ἐμπεδώσει
 the Bodd. and others have ἐμπεδώσῃ,
 which Stallb. is inclined to adopt. But
 comp. Soph. O. C. 1739, ὅπως μολοῦμεθ'
 ἐς δόμους οὐκ ἔχω: Arist. Plut. 18, ἐγὼ
 μὲν οὐν οὐκ ἐστ' ὅπως συγῆσθαι. These
 two passages are also sufficient to refute
 the arbitrary canon of Cobet, Vv. Ll. p.
 105, "*ὅπως, ὅστις, ὅτι, et sim. habent con-*
junctionum ubi praecessit negatio," &c.

B. ἀπεστερηκῶς ὑπ' ἀνάγκης] 'a con-
 strained defaulter,' 'a traitor to his en-
 gagements,' 'a repudiator.' So Isocr.
 Panath. 283 D, τοὺς ἀποστεροῦντας τὰ
 συμβόλαια. ὁ πρὶν ἐραστής — he, the
 sometime lover. Hirsch's alteration
 ἀπεστυνηκῶς seems uncalled for, though
 it was anticipated by G. Hermann.

ὁστράκου μεταπεσόντος] The allusion
 is to the game called ὁστρακισμός, de-
 scribed by Plato Comicus in the follow-
 ing fragm. quoted by Hermias: Εἰξασιν
 γὰρ τοῖς παιδαρίοις τοῦτοισι οἱ ἐκαστοτε
 γραμμὴν Ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς διαγράψαντες
 διανεμιάμενοι δίχ' ἑαυτοὺς Ἑστᾶσ', αὐτῶν
 οἱ μὲν ἐκείθεν τῆς γραμμῆς, οἱ δ' ἀρ'
 ἐκεῖθεν. Εἰς δ' ἀμφοτέρων ὁστρακον
 αὐτοῖς εἰς μέσον ἐστᾶς ἀνίστην, Κἂν μὲν
 πῖπτη τᾶλλεν, ἑπᾶν, φεύγειν ταχὺ
 τοὺς ἐτέρους δεῖ, τοὺς δὲ διώκειν. (1

βαλών· ὁ δὲ ἀναγκάζεται διώκειν ἀγανακτῶν καὶ ἐπιθεάζων, ἡγνοηκῶς τὸ ἅπαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα ἔδει ποτὲ ἐρῶντι καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἀνοήτῳ χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον μὴ ἐρῶντι καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀναγκαῖον εἶη ἐνδοῦναι ἑαυτὸν ἀπίστῳ, δυσκόλῳ, φθονερῷ, ἀηδεῖ, βλαβερῷ μὲν πρὸς οὐσίαν, βλαβερῷ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν, πολὺ δὲ βλαβερωτάτῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς παιδευσιν, ἧς οὔτε ἀνθρώποις οὔτε θεοῖς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμιώτερον οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ποτὲ ἔσται. Ταῦτά τε οὖν χρή, ὦ παῖ, ξυννοεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι τὴν ἐραστοῦ φιλίαν, ὅτι οὐ μετ' εὐνοίας γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ σιτίου τρόπον, χάριν πλησμονῆς,

‘Ὡς λύκοι ἄρ’ ἀγαπῶσ’, ὥς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί.

D

Τοῦτ’ ἐκείνο, ὦ Φαῖδρε, οὐκέτ’ ἂν τὸ ^{ἀν.}πέρα ἀκούσαιο ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀλλ’ ἤδη σοι τέλος ἔχτω ὁ λόγος.

ΦΑΙ. Καίτοι ὄμην γε μεσοῦν αὐτόν, καὶ ἐρεῖν τὰ ἴσα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος, ὥς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον, λέγων ὅσ’ αὖ ἔχει ἀγαθά. νῦν δὲ δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἀποπαύει;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἦσθου, ὦ μακάριε, ὅτι ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι, Ἐ ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους, καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; ἐὰν δ’ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἕτερον ἄρξωμαι, τί με οἶει ποιήσῃν; ἄρ’ οἶσθ’ ὅτι

15 have given τᾶλλευκ', sc. τὰ ἔλλευκα, for the τὰ λευκά of Herm. See L. Dindorf in Steph. Lex. v. ἔλλευκος. Meineke gives πίπτῃσι τὰ λευκ'.)

ἐπιθεάζων] So Bekk. The Bodl. and several others have ἐπιθειάζων, adopted by Stallb. But ἐπιθειάζων is the true Attic form, as appears from Pherecrates, Com. ap. Suid., ὕστερον ἀράται κάπιθεάζει τῷ πατρί, as now read, instead of the unmetrical κάπιθειάζει. Hesych. too and the Gramm. are generally in favour of this form. See Blouf. ad Choeph. 813. Hesych.: ἐπιθειάζει θεοὺς ἐπικαλεῖται.

C. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.] 'else must he needs surrender himself to one as false as he is morose jealous and disagreeable,' &c. εἶναι is in the *sermo obligans* dependent on the foregoing ὅτι.

ἀλλὰ σιτίου τρόπον, χάριν πλησμονῆς] These words, as Stallb. explains, are not

to be taken with γίγνεται, but with the φιλοῦσιν of the following line. The same sentiment occurs Xen. Conv. viii. 15, ἅπερ πρὸς τὰ σιτία διὰ πλησμονὴν ἀνάγκη καὶ πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ πάσχειν. The hexameter line is doubtless Plato's, as appears from the exclamation of Socr., τοῦτ' ἐκείνο! 'I told you so,' viz. that I was in danger of an access of νυμφοληψία: 'and behold already, not content with dithyrambs, I have got into heroics.' For τοῦτ' ἐκείνο comp. Ar. Ach. 41, τοῦτ' ἐκείν' οὐγὼ λέγον.

D. 'Ὡς λύκοι ἄρ' ἀγαπῶσ'] Hence the happy compound λυκοφιλία, by which the intercourse of Plato with Dionysius II. is characterized, Epist. iii. p. 318 E: τὴν ζῆμιν καὶ σὴν λυκοφιλίαν καὶ ἀκοινωσίαν.

E. ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι, κ.τ.λ.] See Hom. II. xxii. 262, 3.

ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν, αἷς με σὺ προὔβαλες ἐκ προνοίας, σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάσω; λέγω οὖν ἐνὶ λόγῳ ὅτι, ὅσα τὸν ἕτερον λελοιδορήκαμεν, τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὰναντία τούτων ἀγαθὰ πρόσσεστι. καὶ τί δεῖ μακροῦ λόγου; περὶ γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὁ μῦθος, ὃ τι πάσχειν προσή-
 242 κει αὐτῷ, τοῦτο πείσεται· κἀγὼ τὸν ποταμὸν | τοῦτον MT 64
 διαβὰς ἀπέρχομαι, πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τι μείζον ἀναγκασθῆναι.

ΦΑΙ. Μήπω γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὶν ἂν τὸ καῦμα παρέλθῃ. ἢ οὐχ ὀρᾷς ὥς σχεδὸν ἤδη μεσημβρία ἴσταται ἢ δὴ καλουμένη σταθερά; ἀλλὰ περιμέναντες, καὶ ἅμα περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων διαλεχθέντες, τάχ' ἐπειδὰν ἀποψυχῇ ἴμεν.

ΣΩ. Θεῖός γ' εἰ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς θαυμάσιος. οἶμαι γὰρ ἐγὼ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σοῦ βίου
 B γεγονότων μηδένα πλείους ἢ σέ πεποίηκεναι γεγενῆσθαι
 ἥτοι αὐτὸν λέγοντα ἢ ἄλλους ἐνὶ γέ τῳ τρόπῳ προσαναγκάζοντα. Σιμμίαν Θηβαῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγον τῶν δὲ ἄλλων

σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάζω] Crat. 396 D, καὶ μὲν δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτεχνῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξαίφνης χρησιμδεῖν. The verb προβάλλειν, p. sup. occurs in much the same sense in Eur. Rhes. 183, ψυχὴν προβάλλων ἐν κύβοισι δαίμονος: Soph. Oed. T. 754, ἔοικ' ἔμαντὸν εἰς ἀρὰς Δεινὰς προβάλλων ἀρτίως οὐκ εἰδέναι.

242. μεσημβρία ἴσταται ἢ δὴ καλουμένη σταθερά] The adj. σταθερός being derived from ἵστασθαι, Heind. is offended by the tautology, and ejects the words ἢ δὴ καλουμένη στ. as a "Grammatici aditamentum." To this Stallb. replies (not without naïveté) that it is very common to find clauses in the text of Plato which have all the appearance of glosses. I confess that Heind.'s suspicion appears to me but too probable, though I have not ventured, in the face of the testimonies appealed to by Ast, to bracket the questionable words. ἤδη μεσημβρία ἴσταται means already, 'it is now high noon,' and σταθερά adds nothing to the idea. Unless indeed we suppose that Plato fancies that σταθερός is derived from σταθεῖν, a supposition not perhaps altogether inadmissible, considering the general character of his etymologies. The word occurs Aesch.

fr. ψυχαγωγ., quoted by Phot. and Suid., σταθεροῦ χεύματος, which Phot. exp. by στασίμου, adding καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ἐν προαγῶνι. Σταθερά δὲ κάλυξ νεαρὰς ἥβης, where it must mean 'full-blown,' rather than 'abiding,' μονίμου, as Phot. interprets. In Antimachus, as quoted *ibid.*, we have θέρεος σταθεροῦ for 'midsummer,' or the 'summer solstice.' "Græci omnia quae nondum ad finem vel senectutem vergunt ἵστασθαι dicunt. Hinc σταθερός firmus, ἡρεῖος, ἐτ' χρόνος ἵσταμενος. Nic. Theriac., ἡλιοιο θερειτάτη ἴσταται ἄκτις." Rulink. ad Tim. in v. σταθερά, q. v. Dind. (in Steph. Lex. vii. p. 611) agrees with Rulink. and Heind. in ejecting the obnoxious word.

τάχ' ἐπειδὰν ἀποψυχῇ ἴμεν] Bekk. Anecd. i. p. 26, quoted by Ast, ὅταν τὸ καῦμα λήγῃ καὶ εἰς ψυχὸς τρέπηται. Πλάτων ἐν Φαίδρῳ ἐπειδὰν ἀποψυχῇ ἄπιμεν. Some MSS. have ἀποψύξῃ, and so Hirschig. But ἀποψυχῇ, the 2nd aor. conj., is the true reading. Hesych. ἀπεψύχῃ. ἀπεπνευστίστη. Αἰσχ. Κερκύωνι sat. Arist. Nub. 151, ψυχὴν περιέφυσαν Περσικά, vulg. ψυγίστη. τάχ' ἐπειδὰν is equivalent to ἐπειδὰν τάχιστα.

B. Σιμμίαν Θηβαῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγον] 'I strike out of the account,' i. e. make an

πάμπολυ κρατεῖς. καὶ νῦν αὖ δοκεῖς αἰτίος μοι γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθῆναι.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἀγγέλλεις. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνι τούτῳ ;

ΣΩ. Ἡνίκ' ἔμελλον, ὦ ἄγαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο — αἰὲ δέ με ἐπίσχει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν —, καὶ τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἥ με οὐκ ἔᾶ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὥς τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν μάντις μὲν, οὐ πάνυ δὲ σπονδαῖος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαῦλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἐμαυτῷ μόνον ἱκανός. σαφῶς οὖν ἤδη μαθάνω τὸ ἀμάρτημα,

exception in favour of, 'Simmius of Thebes.' Theact. 162 D, (τοὺς θεούς) ἐκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὥς εἰσιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσιν, ἐξαιρῶ. The φιλολογία of Simmius is avowed by himself, Phaed. 85 C, τὸ μέντοι τὰ λεγόμενα μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν, καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός. In the Crito he is said to have offered a sum sufficient to procure the liberation of Socr., p. 45 B. He and his inseparable friend Cebes are mentioned in the 13th Platonic Epistle, p. 363. They are both called νεάνισκοι in the Phaedo. The mention of Simmius in the Phaedrus may therefore be thought an argument against its early composition, for we can hardly suppose that he and Cebes visited Athens and became known to Socr. before the termination of the Peloponnesian War, intercourse between Athens and Thebes being inconceivable during the continuance of hostilities.

γεγενῆσθαι] Badh. ej. γενήσεσθαι. For the dat. λόγῳ τινὶ comp. Crat. 416 D.

τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον] It is clear from this passage that the δαιμόνιον of Socr. was a thing and not a person. The φωνή which he 'thought he heard' came αὐτόθεν, 'from the source in question,' viz. a supernatural source, *divinitus exorta*, as Apuleius, de Deo Socratis, expresses it. All the Platonic passages relating to the δαιμόνιον restrict it to the merely prohibitory action implied in the passage before us. Apol. 31 D, φωνή τις γίγνο-

μένη, ἢ ὅταν γένηται, αἰὲ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. So Cic. de Divin. i. 54, "divinum quiddam quod daemionum appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit, nunquam impellenti, saepe revocanti." The clause αἰὲ δέ μ' ἐπίσχει ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, if taken literally, implies much more than this, and Heind. and Hirsch. would expel it accordingly. αἰὲ may however have the sense of ἐκάστοτε, so that ὅταν γένηται shall be implied. 'Every time (it occurs) it restrains me from the thing, whatever it be, that I intend doing.' On the other hand, there seems no sufficient motive for this voluntary piece of information, and we may easily comprehend how the clause might be introduced by a copyist, mindful of the passage in the Apology from which the fabricator of the spurious Theages apparently took his circumstantial statement (Theag. 128 D). There is some difficulty in reconciling the testimony of Plato and Xenophon on the subject of this δαιμόνιον. Those interested in the question will do well to consult Külmner's preface to his edition of the Memorabilia, p. 18 seq. On the confusion of δαιμόνιον and δαίμων by later writers, the reader is referred to a note on A. Butler's Lectures on Philosophy, vol. i. p. 375.

ο. ἢ με οὐκ ἔᾶ] The voice, he says, forbade him to depart before he had made his peace with heaven. His own power of divination, though limited, was sufficient to reveal to him the nature of this offence. Herm., ἀφωσίωσις, δσιότητος παραλελειμένης ἀποπλήρωσις.

ὡς δὴ τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μαντικόν γέ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχή. ἐμέ
 γὰρ ἔθραξε μὲν τι καὶ πάλαι λέγοντα τὸν λόγον, καὶ πῶς
 D ἔδυσωπούμην κατ' Ἰβυκον, μή τι παρὰ θεοῖς ἀμβλακὸν ^{just out of}
 τιμὰν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀμεΐψω. νῦν δ' ἤσθημαι τὸ ^{- he trou}
 ἀμάρτημα.

ΦΑΙ. Λέγεις δὲ δὴ τί;

ΣΩ. Δεινόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δεινὸν λόγον αὐτός τε ἐκόμισας
 ἐμέ τε ἡνάγκασας εἰπεῖν.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩ. Εὐνήθη καὶ ὑπό τι ἀσεβῆ· οὐ τίς ἂν εἴη δει- ^{in a d}
 νότερος;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐδεῖς, εἴ γε σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἔρωτα οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ θεόν
 τινα ἡγεί;

ΦΑΙ. Λέγεται γε δὴ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τι ὑπό γε Λυσίου, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου,
 E ὅς διὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ στόματος καταφάρμακευθέντος ὑπὸ σοῦ
 ἐλέχθη. εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ὥσπερ οὖν ἔστι, θεὸς ἢ τι θεῖον ὃ
 Ἔρωσ, οὐδὲν ἂν κακὸν εἴη· τὸ δὲ λόγῳ τὸ νῦν δὴ περὶ
 αὐτοῦ εἰπέτην ὡς τοιούτου ὄντος. ταύτῃ τε οὖν ἡμαρτα-
 νέτην περὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα, ἔτι τε ἡ εὐθέεια αὐτοῖν πάνν
 ἀστεία, τὸ μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγοντε μηδὲ ἀληθεῖς σεμνύνεσθαι
 243 ὥς τι ὄντε, εἰ ἄρα | ἀνθρωπίσκους τινὰς ἐξαπατήσαντε

ὡς δὴ τοι, κ.τ.λ.] 'for, in point of fact, the soul herself is a creature endowed with the gift of prophecy.' Comp. Tim. 71 E, οἱ ξυστήσαντες ἡμᾶς . . . κατέστησαν ἐν τούτῳ (sc. τῷ ἡπατι) τὸ μαντεῖον.

καὶ πῶς ἔδυσωπούμην] 'I had a kind of misgiving.' Hesych.: δυσωπεῖσθαι· ἐφορᾶσθαι, φοβεῖσθαι. The line of Ibycus is quoted with slight variations in Suid. under the words ἀμπλάκημα, Ἰβύκειον, ῥησεῖδιον, and μὴ τοι. παρ' θεοῖς probably stood in the original, and so Bergk, frag. Ibyci 51. Socr. fears 'lest he should purchase honour from men at the price of offending heaven.' His speech had gratified Phaedr., but had given offence to Eros, by misrepresenting his character.

E. σεμνύνεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντε] Cous.:

"de se donner l'air d'être quelque chose parcequ'ils imposeraient peut-être aux esprits frivoles et déroberaient leurs suffrages." For this folly and impiety combined Socr. knows of but one form of expiation: he must compose a palinode, as Stesichorus did in a parallel case. The first of the two poems of Stesichorus is usually cited under the title Ἰάλου πέποις. The longest surviving fragment is that found in the Schol. to Eur. Orest. 243. In it Stesichorus asserts that Tyndareus the father of Helen having neglected to sacrifice to Aphrodite, the goddess wreaked her displeasure on his daughters Helen and Clytaemnestra, whom she caused to be διγάμους τε καὶ τριγάμους καὶ λιπεσάνορας. It was in these epithets, seemingly, that the offence lay: as we may

εὐδοκιμήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, καθήρα-
σθαι ἀνάγκη. ἔστι δὲ τοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσι περὶ μυθολογίαν
καθαρμὸς ἀρχαῖος, ὃν Ὅμηρος μὲν οὐκ ᾔσθητο, Στησί-
χορος δέ. τῶν γὰρ ὁμμάτων στερηθεὶς διὰ τὴν Ἑλένης
κακηγορίαν, οὐκ ᾔγνόησεν ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος, ἀλλ' ἄτε μου-
σικὸς ὢν ἔγνω τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐθὺς Οὐκ ἔστ'
ἔτυμος λόγος οὗτος, οὐδ' ἔβας ἐν νηυσὶν εὐσέλ-
μοις, οὐδ' ἴκεο Πέργαμα Τροίας. καὶ ποιήσας δὴ 11
πᾶσαν τὴν καλουμένην παλινωδίαν, παραχρῆμα ἀνέβλεψεν.
ἐγὼ οὖν σοφώτερος ἐκείνων γενήσομαι κατ' αὐτό γε τοῦτο.
πρὶν γάρ τι παθεῖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἑρωτος κακηγορίαν πει-
ράσομαι αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι τὴν παλινωδίαν, γυμνῇ τῇ κε-
φαλῇ, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τότε ὑπ' αἰσχύνης ἐγκεκαλυμμένος.

ΦΑΙ. Τουτωνί, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄττ' ἂν ἐμοὶ
εἶπες ἡδίω.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄγαθὲ Φαῖδρε, ἐννοεῖς ὡς ἀναιδῶς 12
εἴρησθον τῷ λόγῳ, οὗτός τε καὶ ὁ ἐκ τοῦ βιβλίου ῥηθείς.
εἰ γὰρ ἀκούων τις τύχοι ἡμῶν γεννάδας καὶ πρᾶος τὸ
ἦθος, ἐτέρου δὲ τοιούτου ἐρῶν ἢ καὶ πρότερόν ποτε ἐρα-
σθείς, λεγόντων ὡς διὰ σμικρὰ μεγάλας ἔχθρας οἱ ἐρασταὶ
ἀναιροῦνται καὶ ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ φθονερῶς τε καὶ
βλαβερῶς, πῶς οὐκ ἂν οἶε αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀκούειν ἐν
ναύταις που τεθραμμένων καὶ οὐδένα ἐλεύθερον ἔρωτα

conjecture by comparing Isocr. Encom. Hel. p. 218 (§ 731 Bekk.): ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἀρχόμενος τῆς φθῆς ἐβλασφήμησέ τι περὶ αὐτῆς, ἀνέστη (f. ἀπέστη) τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἑστερημένος, ἐπειδὴ δὲ γνούς τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς συμφορᾶς τὴν καλουμένην παλινωδίαν ἐποίησε, πάλιν αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν κατέστησε. This 'palinode' is otherwise quoted as Ἑλένη or ἡ ὕστερον ᾠδή. The version of Helen's story adopted by Euripides in the *Helena* was borrowed from this second ode of Stesichorus. Comp. Rep. ix. 586 c, τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης εἶδωλον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Τροίᾳ ποταμῶν φέρεται περιμάχεται ἀγροῖα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. According to Herodotus (ii. 112, 113) this story was adopted by the priests at Memphis, who had doubtless learnt it from their Greek visitors. Other references may be found collected by Bergk, Poet. Lyr. p. 641,

Stesich. fr. 29. The whole story is allegorized by Hermias in the most edifying strain of Neoplatonic piety. It is critically examined by Geel in an Epistle to Welcker, Rh. Museum, 1839, p. 1.

243. ἄτε μουσικὸς ὢν] Socr. in this playful passage takes advantage of the wide signification of *μουσικός*, which includes the lyric poet and the man of high mental culture, especially in philosophy. He pretends that Stesichorus was more sagacious than Homer, who knew not either the cause or the remedy of his blindness. A different turn is given to the relation between Helen and the *Iliad* by Isocrates in the *Encom.* Hel. § 74.

C. ἐν ναύταις που τεθραμμένων] The character of the *ναυτικὸς ὄχλος* (Arist. Pol. v. 5) is well known. Heind. quotes

ἢ ἑορακότων, πολλοῦ δ' ἂν δεῖν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν ἃ ψέγομεν
τὸν Ἐρωτα ;

ΦΑΙ. Ἴσως νῆ Δί, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτόν γε τοίνυν ἔγωγε αἰσχυρόμενος, καὶ αὐτὸν
τὸν Ἐρωτα δεδιώς, ἐπιθυμῶ ποτίμῳ λόγῳ οἶον ἀλμυρὰν
ἀκοὴν ἀποκλύσασθαι. συμβουλευώ δὲ καὶ Λυσία ὃ τι
τάχιστα γράψαι ὡς χρὴ ἐραστῇ μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐρῶντι ἐκ
τῶν ὁμοίων χαρίζεσθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Ἄλλ' εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔξει τοῦθ' οὕτως· σοῦ γὰρ
εἰπόντος τὸν τοῦ ἐραστοῦ ἔπαινον, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη Λυσίαν
ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀναγκασθῆναι γράψαι αὐτὸ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγον.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν πιστεύω, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἦς ὃς εἶ.

cf. Soph. Ai.

ΦΑΙ. Λέγε τοίνυν θαρρῶν.

ΣΩ. Ποῦ δὴ μοι ὁ παῖς πρὸς ὃν ἔλεγον ; ἵνα καὶ
τοῦτο ἀκούσῃ, καὶ μὴ, ἀνήκοος ὢν, φθάσῃ χαρισάμενος
τῷ μὴ ἐρῶντι.

ΦΑΙ. Οὗτος παρά σοι μάλα πλησίον ἀεὶ πάρεστιν,
ὅταν σὺ βούλῃ.

ΣΩ. Οὕτωςι τοίνυν, ὦ παῖ καλέ, ἐννόησον, ὡς ὁ μὲν
244 πρότερος ἦν | λόγος Φαίδρου τοῦ Πυθοκλέους, Μυρρί-
νουσίου ἀνδρός· ὃν δὲ μέλλω λέγειν, Στησιχόρου τοῦ
Εὐφήμου, Ἱμεραίου. λεκτέος δὲ ᾧδε, ὅτι Οὐκ ἔστ' ἔτυμος

Isocr. de Pace, p. 335, εἰ τριήρεις πλη-
ροῖεν, τοὺς μὲν ξένους καὶ τοὺς δούλους
εἰσεβίβασον, τοὺς δὲ πολίτας μεθ' ὕπλων
ἐξέπεμπον. Also Plat. Legg. iv. 707,
and Juv. viii. 174, "Permixtum nautis
et furibus et fugitivis."

Δ. ποτίμῳ λόγῳ—ἀποκλύσασθαι] Pro-
bably suggested by Eur. Hipp. 653, ἃ
ῥῶ ῥυτοῖς νασμοῖσιν ἐξομρῶμαι Εἰς ὧτα
κλύων. Socr. in like manner would
fain purge his ears of the pestilent stuff
he had heard by the infusion of more
wholesome doctrine. Presently ἐκ τῶν
δμοίων answers to our 'caeteris paribus?'

Ε. ἕωσπερ ἂν ἦς ὃς εἶ] "Pro ὃς cave
corrigas oīos. Theaet. 197 A, ὡν γε ὅς
εἶμι." Heind. "A moins que tu ne cesses
d'être Phèdre." Cous.

Οὗτος παρά σοι—πάρεστιν] Cobet, Vv.
Il. p. 119, somewhat rashly observes in
reference to this passage: "*Graecum*
est *páreimi* σοι, non *páreimi* *παρά* σοι.

Scribe *πάρα* σοι, et apparebit quid sit
verbo *páreστιν* faciendum." But in
Soph. Phil. 1057 we find: *ἐπεὶ páρεστι*
μὲν Τεύκρος παρ' ἡμῖν. *πάρα* for *páρεστι*
is hardly to be obtruded on an Attic
prose writer on the strength of a (doubt-
ful) reading of Lucian, as by Cobet, l. l.

244. Φαίδρου τοῦ Πυθοκλέους] All the
proper names in this section are treated
as significant. Φαῖδρος is the 'bright
showy one;' Πυθοκλῆς perhaps = ὃς
κλέους ἐπύθετο, a hearer to vulgar
rumour or popular fallacy; Μυρρίνουσιος
quasi ἐν μυρρίναις κατακλινεῖς (Rep. ii.
372 n), a lover of festivity; Στησιχόρος,
Ἱμεραῖος, and Εὐφήμος explain them-
selves. Accounts vary with respect to
the name of the father of Stesichorus,
no less than five names being mentioned
by Suid., of which Socr. has selected the
most poetical.

Οὐκ ἔστ' ἔτυμος, κ.τ.λ.] It is a fallacy,

λόγος ὃς ἂν παρόντος ἐραστοῦ τῷ μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον φῆ
 δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, διότι δὴ ὁ μὲν μαίνεται, ὁ δὲ σωφρονεῖ.
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ἂν
 ἐλέγετο· νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται
 διὰ μανίας, θεία μέντοι δόσει διδομένης. Ἡ τε γὰρ δὴ
 ἐν Δελφοῖς προφητὴς αἶ τ' ἐν Δωδώνῃ ἰέρεαι μανεῖσαι
 μὲν πολλὰ δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἰδία τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα
 εἰργάσαντο, σωφρονοῦσαι δὲ βραχέα ἢ οὐδέν. καὶ ἐὰν δὴ
 λέγωμεν Σίβυλλάν τε καὶ ἄλλους, ὅσοι μαντικῇ χρώμενοι
 ἐνθέω πολλὰ δὴ πολλοῖς προλέγοντες εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὤρ-
 θωσαν, μηκύνουμεν ἂν δῆλα παντὶ λέγοντες. τόδε μὲν
 ἄξιον ἐπιμαρτύρασθαι, ὅτι καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ τὰ ὀνό-
 ματα τιθέμενοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦντο οὐδὲ ὄνειδος μανίαν.
 οὐ γὰρ ἂν τῇ καλλίστῃ τέχνῃ, ἣ τὸ μέλλον κρίνεται, αὐτὸ ο
 τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἐμπλέκοντες μανικὴν ἐκάλεσαν· ἀλλ' ὥς

says Soer., to argue that *because* the lover is mad, therefore the non-lover should have the preference. It might be so, were madness *per se* an evil; but this is not so. There is a divine as well as a human madness; and the divine madness is the choicest gift of heaven to man. Its kinds, or some of them, are then enumerated.

εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀπλοῦν, κ.τ.λ.] 'had it been a simple proposition,' i. e. true without qualification, as Aristotle uses ἀπλῶς. So Symp. 206 A, ἀρ' οὖν οὕτως ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ λέγειν ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐρῶσιν.—νῦν δέ, 'but so far from that being the case,' &c. The entire passage from εἰ μὲν τὸ καλὰ ἔργα, 245 B, is quoted by Aristides Rhetor, ed. Dind. vol. ii. p. 15 (13 ed. Jebb).

II. αἶ τ' ἐν Δωδώνῃ ἰέρεαι] No priestesses are mentioned by Homer as existing either at Delphi or Dodona. The latter oracle is tended by the Sellē—ἀνιπτόποδες χαμαιεῖναι, II. xvi. 235. He is equally ignorant of Sibylla, who is first named by Heraclitus, afterwards by Aristophanes and Plato, but always in the singular number. The 'Sibyls' were multiplied by later writers first to three and then to ten. The story of the Dodonæan ἱερεῖαι, in Herod. ii. 54, is well known.

τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι] Ar. Rhet., τιθεμένοι. This notion that

all names were originally significant (διδασκαλικά ὄργανα καὶ διακριτικά τῆς οὐσίας, Crat. p. 388) is developed at great length in the Cratylus. The etymological speculations in that dialogue present a singular mixture of acuteness and extravagance, sometimes bona fide, but sometimes with the design of parodying the ill-regulated ingenuity of Plato's predecessors in the same line, of whom Euthyphron is named, though others are doubtless intended. Perhaps the derivation of μαντικὴ may have been seriously meant. It was at any rate sufficiently plausible to have found favour with the Greeks of that day, as we know from Eustathius that it did in much later times. It also seems to have satisfied Cicero, Div. i. 1. If any refutation were necessary it would be found in the fact that the word μάντις is used by Homer, who was quite ignorant of the connexion between frenzy and the prophetic art. Yet Heind. censures Plato for not perceiving its connexion with μέναι! The bad taste (ἀπειροκαλία) of those who inserted the ταῦ, is paralleled by the ἀτοπία of disguising the true origin of κάτοπτρον by encumbering the final syllable with a ῥῶ! Crat. 414 c. The subsequent derivation of οἰωνιστική (οἴσις, νοῦς, ἰστορία) is in Plato's broadest style of banter.

καλοῦ ὄντος, ὅταν θεία μοῖρα γίγνηται, οὕτω νομίσαντες
 ἔθεντο. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἀπειροκάλως τὸ ταῦ ἐπεμβάλλοντες
 μαντικὴν ἐκάλεσαν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων, ζήτη-
 σιν τοῦ μέλλοντος διὰ τε ὀρνίθων ποιουμένων καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων σημείων, ἅτ' ἐκ διανοίας ποριζομένων ἀνθρωπίνῃ
 οἰήσῃ νουν τε καὶ ἱστορίαν, οἰονοιστικὴν ἐπωνόμασαν· ἢ
 1) νῦν οἰωνιστικὴν τῷ ᾧ σεμνύνοντες οἱ νέοι καλοῦσιν. ὅσῳ
 δὴ οὖν τελεώτερον καὶ ἐντιμότερον μαντικὴ οἰωνιστικῆς,
 τό τε ὄνομα τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔργον τ' ἔργου, τόσῳ κάλλιον
 μαρτυροῦσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ μανίαν σωφροσύνης τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ
 τῆς παρ' ἀνθρώπων γιγνομένης. Ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσων γε καὶ
 πόνων τῶν μεγίστων, ἃ δὴ παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων ποθὲν
 2) ἔν τισι τῶν γενῶν, ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα
 οἷς ἔδει, ἀπαλλαγὴν εὔρετο, καταφυγοῦσα πρὸς θεῶν
 εὐχάς τε καὶ λατρείας, ὅθεν δὴ καθαρμῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν
 τυχοῦσα ἐξάντη ἐποίησε τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἔχοντα πρὸς τε τὸν
 παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, λύσιν τῷ ὀρθῶς μανέντι
 245 τε καὶ κατασχομένῳ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν εὐρομένη. | Τρίτῃ

C. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων] “Te-
 nuissen veterem lectionem ποιουμένων, ad
 quod liquet repetendum esse ex ante-
 gressis τὴν (ῥήσιν, ita ut idem sit quod
 ζητούντων.” Stallb. The reading ποιου-
 μένην is now displaced by ποιουμένων in
 the text of Ar. Rhet. But I confess that
 the construction appears to me clumsy
 and inelegant. If we might venture on
 the change of a single letter, I should pro-
 pose to read the passage as follows: ἐπεὶ
 καὶ τὴν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων (sc. τέχνην οἰ-
 ποσὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος διὰ τε ὀρνίθων ποιου-
 μένων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σημείων, ἅτ' ἐκ
 διανοίας ποριζομένην ἀνθρ. οἰήσῃ, κ.τ.λ.
 ‘For even the art of the sane, who make
 research into futurity by the way of
 augury and the other well-known signs,
 forasmuch as it is an art which derives
 insight and information from the reason-
 ing faculty, by an effort of unaided human
 thought, they, the name-givers, have de-
 nominated οἰονοιστική.

D. τῷ ᾧ σεμνύνοντες] Comp. Crat. 410
 C, ᾧραι Ἀττικιστὶ ὡς τὸ παλαιὸν ὕραι.
 When the ᾧ was introduced into general
 use at Athens is uncertain. It is found
 in no inscription previous to the archon-

ship of Euclides (B.C. 403), but was prob-
 ably used in literary compositions con-
 siderably earlier, perhaps soon after its
 reputed invention by Simonides. This
 seems to follow from the τὸ παλαιὸν in
 the Cratylus l. l., where the word Ἀττι-
 κιστὶ also countenances the tradition of
 the Ionian origin of the letter. The
 participle σεμνύνοντες is illustrated by
 the τραγωδεῖν of Crat. 414 c, τὰ πρῶτα
 ὀνόματα τῶνθάνα κατακέχωσται ἤδη ὑπὸ
 τῶν βουλομένων τραγωδεῖν αὐτά, κ.τ.λ.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν—εὐρομένη] This curious
 and difficult passage has been ingen-
 iously and on the whole satisfactorily ex-
 plained by Lobeck, whose words I sub-
 join: “Quia nonnunquam fit ubi morbus
 gravior exarserit, ut abstractus a corpore
 animus furoris afflatu occultas insidentis
 mali causas persentiscat, hinc Plato alterum
 genus divini furoris constituit ex
 praesagiis aegrotantium: ἀλλὰ μὴν . . .
 ἔχοντα, Phaedr. 244 E, cuius loci inter-
 pretes sequi non possum. Astius nomine
 τῶν γενῶν familias sacerdotales signifi-
 cari putat, quales Eumolpidae fuerunt aut
 Acestoridae. Sed hi nunquam prophet-
 andi et medicandi munere functi sunt,
 neque omnino γένῃ illa sunt eorum qui

μικταρισμὸν δὲ

δὲ ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχή τε καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἀπα-
λὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχὴν, ἐγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατὰ
τε ὁδὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν, μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν
ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους παιδεύει. ὅς δ' ἂν

aegrotantibus opitulatur, sed aegroti ipsi piacularium hominum posteris, quos nullius proprii delicti conscientia sed vis tacita avitae noxae exagitat. Haec autem non omnes ejusdem generis homines aequaliter affectat, sed modo intermittit, modo recrudescit, ut v. c. τῶν Ἑρινύων τοῦ Λαῶν καὶ Οἰδίοδος Τισαμενῶ μὲν οὐκ ἐγένετο μήνιμα, Αὐτεσίῳνι δὲ τῷ Τισαμενοῦ, Paus. ix. 5. Ita vis illa hereditarii mali ἐν τισι τῶν γενῶν erumpit in apertum furorem, quo, ceu spiritu divino, tuctus aliquis hujus funestae familiae et causas domesticae labis et remedia praesagit, adhibitisque piacularibus noxam a parentibus acceptam in omne tempus abolet. Illa παλαιὰ μηνίματα sunt dirae ultrices sive parentum sive aliorum nefarie occisorum furiae temeratam domum caeca tabe urgentes, ἡ μῆνις τῶν τετελευτηκότων." Aglaophamus, p. 636 seq. What was the nature of the lustral rites (καθαρμοί) revealed to the favoured eye of madness, we learn generally from a passage of the Cratylus (405 A), in which are enumerated περιθειώσεις (fumigations), λουτρά, and περιβράσεις, as the most efficacious means of moral as well as physical purification. Compare a very curious passage in Aristides Rhetor, ἱερῶν λόγος Β', i. p. 475, Dind. The opinion that the maniac possessed a special insight into the causes and remedies of disease is paralleled in our own times by the belief in clairvoyance. Among special difficulties presented by the passage, we may note—1. the clause ἂ δὲ παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων ποθὲν ἐν τισι τῶν γενῶν, where C. F. Hermann, offended by the absence of the verb, conjectures ἐν τισι τῶν γενῶν ᾗ, μανία, κ.τ.λ. This however is but κακὸν κακῷ ἰᾶσθαι, for there is evidently no place for the conjunctive ᾗ. If any alteration were necessary, it would be safer to substitute ἐνι (sc. ἐνεστι) for ἐν. But the clause is suggested by a line of the Phoenissae quoted by Ast: Κάδμου παλαιῶν ἄριστος ἐκ μηνιμάτων, l. 921, and the omission of the copula is a parallelism. 2. ἐξάντη is commonly but absurdly derived from ἐξω ἅτης. Compare rather προσάντης, κατάντης with Passow. The word means originally

'out of the way of,' 'exempt from,' hence 'safe and sound,' frequently used with a gen., as in a line quoted in the Etym., ὃ Ζεὺ γενέσθαι τῇσδε μ' ἐξάντη νόσου. Hesych., ἐξάντες, ἐξ ἐναντίας ὅτε δὲ τὸ θυμῆς. So Hippocrates de Morbis, B. 1 (Op. ed. Kühn, vol. ii. p. 181), ἐξάντης τῆς τοιῆσδε νόσου γίνεται: and without a case, ib. B. 3, p. 295, ἦν δὲ ἄρα (ἐς τὰ ἐπτά) ἀφίκηται, ἐξάντης γίνεται, 'he gets well.' Synesius περὶ ἐνυπν. p. 101, ed. Turneb., καὶ ὅσοις ὕπνος ἰατρὸς ἐξάντη τὴν νόσον ἐποίησε, where ἐξάντης is transferred from the patient to the malady. 3. τὸν ἐαυτῆς ἔχοντα: I have retained this, the reading of by far the greater number of MSS., for which Ar. Rhet. has τὸν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα. An attempt has been made to defend the reading of the MSS. by Soph. Oed. R. 709, βρότειον οὐδὲν μαντικῆς ἔχον τέχνης. But this passage, besides offering a solitary instance of ἔχειν with gen., is not really in point. Its true meaning, as Hermann pointed out, is not, 'nemo mortalium particeps est divinationis,' but rather 'nihil rerum humanarum ex ratum arte pendet.' Nor are the analogies given in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 324, to which Ast and Stallb. appeal, to be relied on. It is indeed just possible that this may be an affected poeticism, suggested to Plato by the line in the Oedipus, as he quotes παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων in a sense somewhat different from that which the words bear in the original. Even so, why the reflexive pronoun? I think there is much to be said in favour of the suggestion of Dr. Badham, who observes, "Postremam vocem (ἔχοντα) libenter eximam, utpote a dittographia ortam, τὸν ἐαυτῆς," 4.

κατασχόμενῃ: this epic use of the aor. 2. mid. for the passive is universally adopted by the Attics in the case of ἐσχόμεν and its compounds. See note to 238 D.

245. κατοκωχή] Ar. Rhet. and vulg. κατοχή. But four or five MSS. give the true form.

ὅς δ' ἂν — ἡφανίσθη] 'whoso,' says Soer., 'knocks at the doors of Poesy untouched with the Muses' frenzy—

ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελὴς αὐτὸς τε καὶ ἡ πόλῃσις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἢ τοῦ σωφρονούντος ἡφανίσθη.

- B Τοσαῦτα μὲν σοι καὶ ἔτι πλείω ἔχω μανίας γιγνομένης ἀπὸ θεῶν λέγειν καλὰ ἔργα. ὥστε τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ μὴ φοβόμεθα, μηδέ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θορυβεῖτω δεδιπτόμενος, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ κεκινήμενου τὸν σῶφρονα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι φίλον· ἀλλὰ τόδε πρὸς ἐκείνῳ δείξας φερέσθω τὰ νικητήρια, ὡς οὐκ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ὁ ἔρως τῷ ἐρῶντι καὶ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐκ θεῶν ἐπιπέμπεται. ἡμῖν δὲ ἀποδεικτέον αὖ τὸυναντίον, ὡς ἐπ' εὐτυχίᾳ τῇ μεγίστῃ παρὰ θεῶν ἢ C τοιαύτῃ μανία δίδοται. ἡ δὲ δὴ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή. δεῖ οὖν πρῶτον ψυχῆς φύσεως

fondly persuading himself that art alone will make him a thorough poet,—neither he nor his works will ever attain perfection, but are destined, for all their cold propriety, to be eclipsed by the effusions of the inspired madman.' Compare Proclus, Polit. p. 365, l. 16, ὅς γὰρ ἂν, φησὶν, ἄνευ μουσῶν καλλιὰς ἐπὶ ποιητικῆς θύρας ἀφίκηται, καὶ αὐτὸς ἀτελὴς ἐστί καὶ πόλῃσις αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ. This more intelligible reading ποιητικῆς is patronized by Ast and by Badli., who also quotes Synesius in defence of it. But the MSS. are unanimous in favour of ποιητικὰς, which is also the reading of Ar. Rhet., and Seneca has "*frustra poeticas fores compos sui populit.*" de Tranquill. An. c. 16. It is a question whether Plato borrowed from Democritus this now sufficiently trite sentiment. Cic. Div. i. 37, "*negat sine furore Democritus quemquam poetam magnum esse posse, quod idem dicit Plato.*" Hor. A. P. 265, "*excludit sanos Pelicōne poetas Democritus.*" Aristotle means much the same thing, Probl. xxx.1, when he asks, διὰ τί οἱ εὐφρεῖς μελαγχολικοί; a passage referred to by Cic. Tusc. i. 33. 80, "*Aristoteles ait omnes ingeniosos melancholicos esse.*" In the proverb ἔφθονοι Μουσῶν θύραι the metaphor is preserved though the sentiment differs. In illustration of ἀτελὴς compare inf. 248 B, ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὕψους θεᾶς ἀπέρχονται, and especially the fragm. of Pind., ἀτελεῖ σοφίας καρπὸν δρέπει, quoted in Rep. v. 457 B, Boeckh, fr. 227. Of the poetic fury Plato elsewhere speaks dis-

respectfully enough, when he has not, as here, his singing garments on. Compare the Ion, esp. p. 533 E seq., and Meno 99 C, ὁρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν θεῖους τε οὓς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας, κ.τ.λ.

πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα—ἐσόμενος] So Rep. 560 D, μετριότητα δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν διαπύην ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὐσαν πεύθοντες.

B. δεδιπτόμενος, ὥς] Stallb. appositely quotes Demosth. contra Symm. 185. 5, εἰ πάντες οἱ ἐνταυθὶ λέγοντες φοβοῦν ὡς ἕξει βασιλεὺς, κ.τ.λ. The deponent verb δεδιπτομαι is borrowed by Plato and the Attics from the Homeric δειδίσσομαι. They never use it in the sense of δεδιέναι, as Homer and after him Hippocrates sometimes do, but always transitively. See Lobeck, Phryn. p. 320.

τῷ ἐρῶντι] Ar. Rhet. τῷ ποθοῦντι.

C. δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή] The σοφοί are those trained to high speculation, as in the Pythagorean and Academic schools; the δεινοί may include the litigants of the courts and agora, as well as the Eristic and empirical sects. The latter will see no cogency in the argument, as they will reject or fail to comprehend the theory of the soul on which it is based. This theory Socr. proceeds to expound, borrowing, in the early part of his exposition, the dogmatic and oracular tone of the earlier speculators, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and the Pythagoreans.

περί θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης, ἰδόντα πάθη τε καὶ ἔργα, τάληθές νοῆσαι. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἦδε.

3.17 Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον τὸ δ' ἄλλο κινεῖν καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῦλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς. μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπολείπον ἑαυτό, οὐ ποτε λήγει κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινή- D σεως. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μηδ' ἐξ ἐνός· εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του ἀρχῇ γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγένητόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀδιάφθορον αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ἀρχῆς γὰρ δὴ ἀπολομένης οὔτε αὐτὴ ποτε ἔκ του οὔτε ἄλλο ἐξ ἐκείνης γενήσεται, εἴπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι. οὕτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν. τοῦτο δὲ οὐτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι καὶ μή- E ποτε αὖθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινήθέντα γενήσεται. ἀθανάτου

Ψυχὴ πᾶσα] Not 'every soul,' but rather 'all soul,' i. e. the vital principle in general. The argument amounts to this, that organization depends on soul, not soul on organization, as will be shown more at length in the excursus on the Erotic Discourses of Socrates.

D. εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του ἀρχῇ γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο] "Recte monui splendunt esse tout'" (sc. post γίγνοιτο). "Sic enim ratiocinatur: 'Si principium ab aliqua re oritur, res ea non poterit oriri ex principio; alqui jam concessum erat omnem rem a principio oriri oportere.'" Badh. Praef. p. vi. Acutely, as usual: but is not the same thing implied in the text as it stands, and as Fic. renders it, "ex principio utique non oriretur," i. e. a first principle must in that case derive its existence from something which is not a first principle; as if he had said, ἐξ οὐκ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο ἂν, a perfect reductio ad absurdum? G. Herm. explains differently: "Hoc ipsum, πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ex praecedentibus repetendum est. Id, si principium aliunde gigneretur, ock ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνεσθαι dicat." Ann. in mg. Cicero, who translates this proof in the 6th book of his *Repub.* c. 25, and repeats his translation in *Tusc. Disp.* i. 23, seems by his

rendering of this passage to have read ἀρχῇ for ἐξ ἀρχῆς. His words are: "Ipsum (principium) nulla ex re alia nasci potest, nec enim esset id principium quod gigneretur aliunde." Schleiermacher, I observe, has anticipated Badh.'s tout': "Hinter dem ersten oder zweiten γίγνοιτο sehr leicht kann τοῦτο ausgefallen sein, da man denn übersetzen muss: 'dem wenn der Anfang aus etwas entstünde, so entstünde dies nicht aus dem Anfange.'" But I confess that the comparative difficulty of the MS. reading is with me an argument of its genuineness; and in the second ἀρχῇ, if it ever existed, I can see only a conjecture of some ingenious glossator. The passage in Theodoret, *Therap.* ii. p. 36, 42 Sylb. (Gaisf. p. 100) is a quotation from the pseudo-Timaeus, not from the Phaedrus directly, as Stallb. seems to imagine. From that source probably came the ἀρχή, which would entail the further change of γίγνοιτο into εἶναι, or ἦν as in *Tim. Locr.* i. 1., εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἐτι ἀρχά, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ἧς ἀρχὰ ἐγένετο.

τοῦτο δὲ οὐτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι—γενήσεται] In like strain, *mutatis mutandis*, argues a great physicist of our own day: "To admit that force may be destructible, or

δὲ πεφασμένον τοῦ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινουμένου, ψυχῆς οὐσίαν
 τε καὶ λόγον τοῦτον αὐτόν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται.
 πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα ᾧ μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι, αἴψυχον, ᾧ
 δὲ ἔνδοθεν αὐτῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἔμψυχον, ὡς ταύτης οὕσης
 φύσεως ψυχῆς. εἰ δ' ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, μὴ ἄλλο τι
 246 εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν | ἢ ψυχὴν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγένη-
 τόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν ἂν εἴη. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀθα-
 νασίας αὐτῆς ἰκανῶς.

Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἰδέας αὐτῆς ᾧδε λεκτέον· οἷον μὲν ἐστι,
 πάντα πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρὰς διηγήσεως, ᾧ δὲ

can altogether disappear, would be to admit that matter could be uncreated, for we know matter only by its forces." Faraday, on the Conservation of Force. After *σῆναι* we must understand, not *δυνατόν*, but some other word, as *δεῖ* or *ἀναγκαῖον*. 'Else must all heaven and all created nature collapse and become fixed, having no source of fresh movement or growth remaining.'

E. *ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον*] Comp. Legg. x. 895 E, ᾧ δὲ ψυχὴ τοῦνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος; ἔχομεν ἄλλον πλὴν τὴν νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα, τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν; *ibid.* supra, ἅρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἑκάστον τρία νοεῖν—ἐν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἐν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἐν δὲ ὄνομα; where *λόγος*, as here, is equivalent to *ἔπος* or *ῥιζμός*, of which *οὐσία* is the objective counterpart. Socr. had shown that motion or change must have an *ἀρχή*, and that this *ἀρχή* must have the source of its motion in itself, &c. He now proceeds to show that soul only is such an *ἀρχή*, and that, being such, it is uncreated and immortal, *αἰκίνητος* being implied in *αὐτοκίνητος*.—*τοῦτον αὐτόν* is used by an ordinary attraction for *τοῦτ' αὐτό*, namely τὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον.

246. Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἰδέας] 'concerning its form,' or 'type,' or generally, 'concerning its nature,' *ἰδέα* being frequently equivalent to *φύσις*. The *θεία καὶ μακρὰ διήγησις* which Socr. declines is developed in the Republic and Timæus; the views which are there reasoned out being here presented in the form of an allegory. For nothing can be more true than Stallb.'s remark: "*Philosophus quo tempore Phaedrum scripsit, iam eandem de animi humani natura sen-*

tentiam animo suo informatam tenuit quam in libris de Republica copiosius illustravit." All commentators, ancient and modern, have recognized in the Charioteer and his pair of steeds the well-known triple division of the soul into the reasoning, the passionate, and the appetent principles (*λογιστικόν, θυμικόν, ἐπιθυμητικόν*), which lies at the root of Plato's ethical doctrine. See Galen de Hippocrate et Plat. (Opp. v. 5, p. 302, ed. Kühn): *ὃν γὰρ ἵππεὺς πρὸς ἵππον, ἢ κυνηγέτης πρὸς κύνα λόγον ἔχουσιν, τοῦτον δ' λογισμὸς πρὸς θυμὸν . . . συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ αἰεὶ νόμῳ φύσεως διοικεῖσθαι τὴν συζυγίαν, ἀλλ' ἵππος μὲν ἐνίοτε δυσπειθὴς οὐ κατὰ κόσμον ἐκφερόμενος συναπτήνκεν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀναβάτην, κ.τ.λ.* And again, p. 495, *ὅτι τὸ θυμαινόμενον ἕτερον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θυμαινόμενον οὐδέποτε συμμαχεῖ τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ, δι' ἐνὸς ἐνεδείξατο (ὁ Πλάτων) τοῦδε τοῦ προειρημένου παραδείγματος, alluding to the anecdote of Leontius in Rep. iv. 439 E.* Observe, Plato asserts only that where the reason and the appetites are at variance, the *θυμὸς* naturally takes part with the former (*ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει ὕπλα τίθεται πρὸς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ*). He nowhere denies that a feud may spring up between the *θυμὸς* and the reason. The *θυμὸς* is in itself good and of heavenly extraction, but in excess it may disturb the equipoise of the soul, and so produce evil. Whereas the natural tendency of the lower appetites is evil and degrading to human nature, and they are therefore figured here by the low-bred and ill-conditioned steed, as the *θυμὸς* is said to be 'noble and good and of noble and good parentage.'

ἔοικει, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος. ταύτη οὖν λέγω-
μεν. Ἐοικέτω δὴ ξυμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους
τε καὶ ἡνίοχου. θεῶν μὲν οὖν ἵπποι τε καὶ ἡνίοχοι πάν-
τες αὐτοὶ τε ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων
μέμικται. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ ἄρχων ξυνωρίδος B
ἡνιοχεῖ, εἴτα τῶν ἵππων ὁ μὲν αὐτῷ καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός
καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων, ὁ δὲ ἐξ ἐναντίων τε καὶ ἐναντίος. χα-
λεπὴ δὴ καὶ δύσκολος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἡνίοχησις.
Πῇ δὴ οὖν θνητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ζῶον ἐκλήθη, πει-
ρατέον εἰπεῖν. πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύ-
χου, πάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλοις εἶδεσι
γιγνομένη. τελέα μὲν οὖν οὔσα καὶ ἐπτερωμένη μετεωρο- C
πορεῖ τε καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον διοικεῖ ^{Λουίς 296 E} ἡ δὲ πτερορ-
ρήσασα φέρεται, ἕως ἂν στερεοῦ τινὸς ἀντιλάβηται, οὗ
κατοικισθεῖσα, σῶμα γήινον λαβοῦσα, αὐτὸ αὐτὸ δοκοῦν
κινεῖν διὰ τὴν ἐκείνης δύναμιν, ζῶον τὸ ξύμπαν ἐκλήθη,
ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα παγέν, θνητόν τ' ἔσχεν ἐπωνυμίαν· ἀθά-
νατον δὲ οὐδ' ἐξ ἐνὸς λόγου λελογισμένου, ἀλλὰ πλάττο-
μεν οὔτε ἰδοίτες οὔτε ἱκανῶς νοήσαντες θεοῖν, ἀθάνατόν

B. Πῇ δὴ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] Soer. now en-
deavours to explain the meaning of the
terms 'mortal' and 'immortal animal'
respectively. Stallb. unnecessarily sup-
plies ψυχὴ to be the understood subject
of ἐκλήθη.

πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ] Soul in its entirety, the
soul of the universe, which is also a
providence (ἐπιμελεῖται), regulating mat-
ter and animating its various forms.
This soul is not to be regarded as a per-
sonality excluding all finite personalities,
but rather as including them, as forming
the sum total of the separate intelli-
gences. "Alles Geistige wird hier offen-
bar als eins betrachtet, ohne Unterschied
des Ranges und der Persönlichkeit."
Schleierm., Ann. Hermias, Comm. p.
130, λέγει ὅτι πᾶν μῦσιον τοῦ παντὸς
πάντως ὑπὸ τίνος ψυχῆς ἐπιτροπεύεται,
ὥστε πᾶν ὑπὸ πασῶν.

C. ἡ δὲ πτερορρήσασα, κ.τ.λ.] Certain
souls fall from their high estate, and be-
come incarnate upon the earth, when
they take to them an earthly body, earth
being the heaviest of the elements. The
heavenly bodies, according to the ancient
physicists, are composed of elements purer

and lighter than those which make up
our planet. Having stated the fact of
this *lapsus animarum*, Soer. proceeds
(mythically) to set forth its causes.

λελογισμένον] Badh. proposes λελο-
γισμεθα, on the ground that the perf. of
λογίζομαι is never used passively. Stallb.
makes no reply to the objection, but
translates λόγος λ. by "ratio apte con-
clusa." I apprehend that λελογισμένου
is not passive here, any more than in
Eur. Iph. A. 386, τὸ λελογισμένον
παρεῖς, where λελ. is much the same as
εὐλογον or as εὐ ἐντεθυνημένοι in Crat.
401, where see Heind. "Immortal it can-
not be called on any principle of sound
reason,"—ἔσχον ἐπωνυμίαν being supplied
from the foregoing clause. A similar
perfect is παρημελημένη (negligent, re-
miss), Ar. Eth. N. x. 4. 10. The only
tense of λογίζομαι which the Attics use
passively seems to be the aor. I, ἐλογί-
σθην.

ἀλλὰ πλάττομεν] 'but though we never
saw nor have adequately conceived him,
we figure a God as a kind of immortal
animal, possessing both a soul and a body
combined in a unity which is to last for

ἢ τι ζῶον, ἔχον μὲν ψυχὴν, ἔχον δὲ σῶμα, τὸν αἰεὶ δὲ χρόνον ταῦτα ξυμπεφυκότα. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δῆ, ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτῃ ἐχέτω τε καὶ λεγέσθω. τὴν δ' αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποβολῆς, δι' ἣν ψυχῆς ἀπορρέει, λάβωμεν. ἔστι δέ τις τοιάδε.

Πέφυκεν ἡ πτεροῦ δύναμις τὸ ἐμβριθὲς ἄγειν ἄνω μετεωρίζουσα, ἣ τὸ τῶν θεῶν γένος οἰκεῖ. κεκοινώνηκε δέ πῃ μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θεοῦ. τὸ δὲ θεῖον καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶν ὃ τι τοιοῦτον. τούτοις δὲ τρέφεται τε καὶ αὔξεται μάλιστα γὰρ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα, αἰσχυρῶ δὲ καὶ κακῶ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις φθίνει τε καὶ διόλλυται. ὁ μὲν δὲ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς, ἐλαύνων πτήνῳ ἄρμα, πρῶτος πορεύεται, διακοσμῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελούμενος· τῷ δ' ἔπεται στρατιὰ 247 θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων, κατὰ ἔνδεκα μέρη | κεκοσμημένη.

ever.' In the *Timaeus* the created gods are compounded of body and soul, which can only be put asunder by the will of the supreme Deity. In the *δαίμονες* or inferior divinities, the union is essentially dissoluble. In the tenth of the *Laws*, on the other hand, Plato inclines to the notion that even the created gods may be incorporeal (*Laws*, p. 899 A). Possibly the words in the text are to be understood as conveying an apology for his temerity in speculating upon the subject at all.

D. Πέφυκεν ἡ πτ.] It is the nature of all plumage to raise heavenward the body to which it is attached: so that of all bodily instruments it may be said to have most affinity with the divine; for we conceive the gods as dwelling on high. Hence the upward tendencies of the soul may be aptly symbolized by feathers. These tendencies which are the soul's plumage are fostered by all that is fair, wise, good—in a word, by that which is divine. Such is the obvious meaning of this passage, in which, for the purposes of the allegory, the sign and the thing signified are intentionally fused. Compare Plutarch, *Plat. Quaest. vi.*, οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου πτερὰ προσηγόρευσε (τὴν διανοητικὴν) ὡς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ταπεινῶν καὶ θνητῶν ἀναφέρουσιν. After τοῦ θεοῦ the MSS. give ψυχῇ, a gloss which Heind., on the authority of Plutarch l. 1., properly exterminated.

E. ὁ μὲν δὲ μέγας, κ.τ.λ.] The grand Miltonic pomp of this passage exceeded the comprehension of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whose criticisms on Plato and on Thucydides are of nearly equal frigidity (*De admirabili vi dicendi* in *Demosth.* p. 971, Reiske). The language was probably suggested by *Soph. Elect.* 175, ἔστι μέγας ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς ὅς ἐφορᾷ πάντα καὶ κρατύνει, but it seems hypercritical with Groen v. Prinsterer to object to ἡγεμὼν as an interpolation. See *inf.* 252 E, σκοποῦσιν (οἱ τοῦ Διὸς) εἰ . . . ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν. Zeus is here, as elsewhere, the impersonation of intelligence (*νοῦς, σοφία, φρόνησις*). Comp. *Phileb.* p. 30 D, οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν βασιλικὴν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι . . . ἐν δ' ἄλλοις (sc. θεοῖς) ἄλλα καλὰ, καθ' ὃ φίλον ἐκάστοις λέγεσθαι. Of the 'other gods,' three are enumerated *inf.* 252. The *δαίμονες* represent the as yet unfallen spirits, marshalled under their respective patron-deities (*ib.*). Plotinus, *Enn.* v. 8. c. 10, seems to distinguish between *δαίμονες* and *ψυχαι* in this passage, but this is a needless refinement.

τῷ δ' ἔπεται] G. Hermann's note on this is amusing: "Poetarum verba legere te putares: τῷ δ' ἔπεται στρατιὴ τε θεῶν καὶ δαίμονες ἄγνοί—"Ἠγεῦνται κατὰ τάξιν (κόσμον) ὅπως τάχθησαν ἕκαστοι. Εἰ trimetrum: μένει γὰρ 'Ἐστία' ὕψος οἴκῳ μόνῃ." (!)

cm. 50.

Dem. de 56

μένει γὰρ Ἑστία ἐν θεῶν οἴκῳ μόνῃ· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐν τῷ τῶν δώδεκα ἀριθμῷ τεταγμένοι θεοὶ ἄρχοντες, ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τάξιν ἣν ἕκαστος ἐτάχθη. πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ μακάριαι θέαι τε καὶ διέξοδοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, ἃς θεῶν γένος εὐδαιμόνων ἐπιστρέφεται, πρᾶττων ἕκαστος

247. μένει γὰρ Ἑστία—μόνη] In this clause Plato has availed himself of a Pythagorean philosophism. Aristotle tells us that "the Pythagoreans place a fire in the centre of the universe, round which they suppose the earth to revolve; as the other planets do." Among the planets they enumerate the Sun and Moon: this central fire is therefore distinct from the Sun, and there is no foundation for the opinion, repeated in a recent treatise on Egyptian Astronomy (Rawlinson's Herodotus, vol. ii. p. 330), that Pythagoras was acquainted with the true theory of the solar system. The Pythagoreans named this Central Fire Διὸς φυλακή, Διὸς πυργός, Διὸς οἶκος, and lastly ἑστία τοῦ παντός. Comp. Arist. de Caelo ii. 13, with Stob. Ecl. i. p. 488.

πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] It is true, says Plato, that *within* the circumference of the heavenly sphere there is no lack of glorious spectacles and goodly highways, which the gods traverse as they go about their every-day avocations; but besides these there is a route which they tread only on their high feast days—a route uphill from first to last, leading to the very apex of the arch which supports the vault of heaven, and there opening upon its outer circumference, whence they can feast their eyes upon the glories of the super-celestial region—θεωροῦσι τὰ ἐκτὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ—which far exceed the θέαι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ in beauty, as the road which leads to them exceeds in difficulty the beaten highways on which the gods ordinarily go to and fro. Such, after much consideration, I believe to be Plato's meaning in this grand but obscure passage. The sense I have given to διέξοδοι seems justified by Thuc. iii. 98, ἐς τὴν ὕλην ἐσφερομένους, ὅθεν οὐκ ἦσαν διέξοδοι, compared with Herod. i. 190, ἀσχυροτενέες δὲ διέξοδοι πάντα τρύπον δδων ἔχουσι διὰ τῶν γυναικῶν, δι' ὧν οἱ εἰναι διελόντες ἐκλέγονται. The word is sometimes used for the orbits described by the heavenly bodies, as in Epin. 977 B, στρέφων ἄστρα πάσας διέξόδους: sometimes also for the evolu-

tions of an army, as Legg. vii. 813 E. In this place however the διέξοδοι seem to be roads leading *through* and *out of* the spheres of the several planets, included in the great sphere of the fixed stars, which to the ancients formed the boundary of the κόσμος or οὐρανός. So a recent German translator, "gar manche den Himmel durchscheidende Bahn." ἀψίς, which I have rendered 'arch,' properly denotes the orbit of a wheel. Here I take it to mean a zone or 'rib,' supporting the vault of heaven. Proclus, Theol. iv. c. 4, gives the following explanation: ἔπειτα εἰς τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἀψίδα, προσεχῶς ὑπεζωκύναν τὸν οὐρανόν, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχομένην, καὶ μετὰ ταύτην εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νῶτον. The word ὑπεζωκύναν shows that he understands ἀψίς to mean the undermost of two or more coats or shells of which the heavenly sphere consists. Comp. Galen de Hipp. et Plat., p. 190, Kühn: εἰς τὸν ὑπεζωκῶτα τὰς πλευρὰς χιτῶνα, 'to the coat or membrane which lines the ribs.' If ἀψίς can mean a vault or spherical arch (fornix coeli, coeli convexa, as the interpr. render it), there is no objection to this view, which Stallb. adopts. Mine however is more in accordance with the classical use of ἀψίς, and it seems to me that the idea of such a zone may easily have been suggested by the phenomenon of the milky way. I suppose this ἀψίς to touch the under surface of the οὐρανός, as Procl. supposes his ὑπόζωμα to do: and both interpretations explain ὑπὸ and ὑπουράνιον, the readings supported by the best MSS. The position of ἄκραν in the sentence shows it to be a secondary predicate: 'up to its summit or vertex.' Comp. Arist. Av. 390, παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν χύτραν ἄκραν ὀρῶντες ἐγγύς. The variant ἐπὶ for ὑπὸ removes some difficulties, and so does οὐράνιον for ὑπουράνιον, but in an obscure passage like this it seems the safer course to hold to the reading for which there is preponderant authority. Proclus has much to say upon the inner meaning of the mythos, but nothing worth attending to.

αὐτῶν τὸ αὐτοῦ. ἔπεται δὲ ὁ αἰεὶ ἐθέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος. φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἴσταται. ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρὸς δαῖτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην ἴωσιν, ἄκραν ὑπὸ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἀψίδα πορεύονται πρὸς ἄναντες ἤδη. τὰ μὲν θεῶν ὀχήματα ἰσορρόπως εὐήνια ὄντα ῥαδίως πορεύεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα μόγισ· βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ἵππος μετέχων, ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ῥέπων τε καὶ βαρύνων ᾧ μὴ καλῶς ἢ τεθραμμένος τῶν ἡνιόχων. ἔνθα δὴ πόνος τε καὶ ἀγὼν ἔσχατος ψυχῇ πρόκειται. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατοι καλούμεναι, ἡνίκ' ἂν πρὸς ἄκρῳ γένωνται, ἔξω πορευθεῖσαι ἔστησαν ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νώτῳ, στάσας δὲ αὐτὰς περιάγει ἢ περιφορά, αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον οὗ τέ τις ὕμνησέ πω τῶν τῇδε ποιητῆς οὗ τέ ποθ' ὕμνησει κατ' ἀξίαν. ἔχει δὲ ᾧδε. τολμητέον γὰρ οὖν τό γε ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν,

φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἴσταται] A bye-blow at the vulgar notion, *ὅτι τὸ θεῖον πᾶν φθονερὸν*. Compare Arist. *Metaph.* i. 2. 13, εἰ δὴ λέγουσί τι οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ πέφυκε φθονεῖν τὸ θεῖον, ἐπὶ τούτῳ συμβαίνει μάλιστα εἰκὸς καὶ δυστυχεῖς εἶναι πάντας τοὺς περιττοὺς. ἀλλ' οὔτε τὸ θεῖον φθονερὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἄοιδοί, οὔτε τῆς τοιαύτης (ἐπιστήμης) ἄλλην χρὴ νομίζειν τιμωτέραν.

πρὸς δαῖτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην] The pleonasm is in harmony with the general grandiloquence of the passage. *Inf.* 250 B, ὅψιν τε καὶ θέαν. The incident is of course suggested by *Hom.* II. i. 423, Ζεὺς γὰρ ἐς Ὠκεανὸν μετ' ἀμύμονας Αἰθιοπῆας Χθίζος ἔβη κατὰ δαῖτα, θεοὶ δ' ἅμα πάντες ἐπὺντο, on which Ast observes: "Homerus poeta Jovem cum reliquis diis ad epulas facit proficiscentem, Plato philosophus ad rerum divinarum spectationes, quae animi sunt epulae. (Vid. *inf.* p. 247 A.)"

B. τὰ μὲν θεῶν, κ.τ.λ.] The asyndeton is harsh and scarcely defensible. To avoid it, Ast proposed the omission of *πορεύονται*, and the substitution of a comma for a fuller stop after *ἤδη*. Badli. takes the same view, objecting also to the "putida repetitio" of *πορεύεται* after *πορεύονται*. Some few MSS. have τὰ μὲν οὖν θ. ὀχ. I should rather incline

to the omission of *πορεύεται* and the retention of *πορεύονται*. The passage will in that case run thus: ἄκραν ὑπὸ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἀψίδα πορεύονται πρὸς ἄναντες ἤδη, τὰ μὲν θεῶν ὀχήματα, ἰσορρόπως εὐήνια ὄντα, ῥαδίως, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα μόγισ. 'The teams of the gods easily, being evenly poised and held well in hand, but those of the other spirits with difficulty, for the vicious steed goes heavily, by his earthward inclination depressing the driver, in case he have not thoroughly broken him.' Another expedient is that of G. Hermann, l. l., who, following Schneider, proposes to read πρὸς ἄναντες, ἢ δὴ τὰ θεῶν, κ.τ.λ.

ᾧ μὴ καλῶς ἢ] Lit. 'in the case of any driver who may have a steed not properly trained.' This is the reading of the best MSS., and is confirmed by Ficinus: "*cuiusque aurigarum equus non bonus*" (he read *καλῶς* with one MS.) "*nutritus fuerit*." Two MSS. give ἦν for ἢ, which Stallb. and Ast prefer, but the best are in favour of the text I have adopted, which is also found without variation in the Schol. on Synesius, *περὶ ἐνπνύων*, p. 105, Turneb. Heind. inserts ἂν after ᾧ, but perhaps the omission of the particle may be tolerated in a semi-poetical composition like the present.

C. τολμητέον γὰρ οὖν] We must dare to speak the truth, says Socr., above all

ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα. ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός
 τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφῆς οὐσία, ὄντως οὐσα,
 ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατῇ νῶ, περὶ ἣν τὸ τῆς ἀλη-
 θοῦς ἐπιστήμης γένος, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον. ἅτ' οὖν D
 θεοῦ διάνοια νῶ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀκηράτῳ τρεφομένη,
 καὶ ἀπάσης ψυχῆς, ὅση ἂν μέλλῃ τὸ προσῆκον δέξεσθαι,
 ἰδοῦσα διὰ χρόνου τὸ ὃν ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τὰληθῇ
 τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ, ἕως ἂν κύκλῳ ἡ περιφορὰ εἰς
 ταῦτον περιενέγκῃ. ἐν δὲ τῇ περιόδῳ καθορᾷ μὲν αὐτὴν
 δικαιοσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ σωφροσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ ἐπι-
 στήμην, οὐχ ἧ γένεσις πρόσσεστιν, οὐδ' ἧ ἐστί που ἑτέρα E
 ἐν ἑτέρῳ οὐσα ὣν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν
 ἐν τῷ ὃ ἐστὶν ὃν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὐσαν καὶ τᾶλλα

when truth itself is our theme. For the region in question is the abode of that Essence which is the subject-matter of science truly so called,—an Essence hueless, formless, intangible, in the strictest sense real, though visible only to the eye of pure intelligence. The text was formerly embarrassed by an interpolated χρῆται (θεατῇ νῶ χρῆται), a reading which Bekk. has unaccountably retained, though χρῆται is absent from the Bodd. and other MSS. of good repute. The text given above seems to me to be open to no objection, and is fully supported by MS. authority. For the sense compare Phileb. 62 E, ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ γιγνώμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα ἀποβλέπουσα, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μῆτε γιγνώμενα μῆτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταῦτ' ὃ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄντα ἀεί. ταύτην εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπισκοποῦμενοι, ἡγησάμεθα ἐκείνης ἀληθεστέραν εἶναι.

D. ἅτ' οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια, κ.τ.λ.] For ἡ οὖν θ. διάνοια, ἅτε. . . τρεφομένη. One might conj. with G. Herm. ἡ τ' οὖν, but ἅτε is so placed in Tim. 24 D, ἅτ' οὖν φιλοπόλεμος τε καὶ φιλόσοφος ἡ θεὸς οὐσα, κ.τ.λ., and elsewhere. For ἀκηράτῳ τρεφομένη Stallb., offended by the recurrence of τρέφεται, has restored the old reading ἀκήρατος στροφομένη, which is found in most MSS., and which he thus translates: "Utrique igitur dei ratio (Geist) propter mentem et scientiam sese vertens pura et intaminata," &c., an interpretation which greatly needs an interpreter. I think there can be no doubt that Heindl. was right in re-

ceiving τρεφομένη on the authority of a Vienna, supported by other MSS. Others have ἀκηράτως, which leads to ἀκηράτῳ. The mind of a god feeds, says Soer., on pure intelligence and pure science; so does every soul, though not divine, which is destined to receive what rightfully belongs to it (i.e. to enter on its rightful inheritance, the truth, in distinction from those less fortunate spirits which accident, or the headstrong violence of the unruly steed, prevents from reaching the ἀληθείας πεδίον presently named). Every such favoured soul welcomes, after long absence, the sight of the Essential; it feeds on and revels in the contemplation of the True, until the rotation of the great celestial sphere brings it round again to the point of its departure. εὐπαθεῖ is nearly equivalent to ἡδυναθεῖ, 'enjoys itself.'

ὅση ἂν μέλλῃ] Bodd. ὅση. G. Herm. conj. ὅση ἂν μέλλῃ.

οὐχ ἧ γένεσις πρόσσεστιν] The object of the highest science is not the phenomenal, but the real—not the concrete, but the abstract. This highest and truest science is, in Plato's view, Dialectic. Comp. Phileb. 57 E, ἡμᾶς ἀναλινεῖτ' ἂν ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιμεν. . . τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως, καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως ἔγωγε οἶμαι ἡγεῖσθαι ξύμπαντας, ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρηται, μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν.

E. ἐπιστήμην οὐσαν] This science is said to be real (οὐσαν) as the ὄν which

ὥσαύτως τὰ ὄντα ὄντως θεασαμένη καὶ ἐστιαθεῖσα, δῦσα
 πάλιν εἰς τὸ εἶσω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἶκαδε ἦλθεν. ἐλθούσης
 δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ ἡνίοχος πρὸς τὴν φάτιν τούτους ἵππους στήσας
 παρέβαλεν ἀμβροσίαν τε καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῇ νέκταρ ἐπότισε.
 248 καὶ οὗτος μὲν θεῶν βίος. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί, | ἡ μὲν ἄρι-
 στα θεῶ ἐπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη ὑπερῆρεν εἰς τὸν ἕξω
 τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡνιόχου κεφαλὴν, καὶ συμπερινηρέθη τὴν
 περιφοράν, θορυβουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἵππων καὶ μόγισ καθ-
 ορώσα τὰ ὄντα· ἡ δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἦρε, τοτὲ δ' ἔδυ, βια-
 ζομένων δὲ τῶν ἵππων τὰ μὲν εἶδε, τὰ δ' οὐ. αἱ δὲ δὴ
 ἄλλαι γλιχόμεναι μὲν ἄπασαι τοῦ ἄνω ἔπονται, ἀδυνα-
 τοῦσαι δὲ ὑποβρύχια ξυμπεριφέρονται, πατοῦσαι ἀλλήλας
 B καὶ ἐπιβάλλουσαι, ἐτέρα πρὸ τῆς ἐτέρας πειρωμένη γενέ-
 σθαι. θόρυβος οὖν καὶ ἄμιλλα καὶ ἰδρὼς ἔσχατος γίγνεται.
 οὐ δὴ κακία ἡνιόχων πολλαὶ μὲν χωλεύονται, πολλαὶ δὲ
 πολλὰ πτερὰ θραύονται· πᾶσαι δέ, πολλὴν ἔχουσα πόνον,
 ἀτρεχεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας ἀπέρχονται, καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι
 τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρῶνται. οὐ δ' ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ τὸ
 ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὐ ἐστίν, ἣ τε δὴ προσήκουσα

it contemplates. Other sciences have to do with the οὐσίας μετέχοντα, which are called ὄντα in virtue of this μέθεξις, but have no independent reality. They are ὄντα πη or κατὰ τι, but not ὄντως nor αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ὄντα. Compare Sophist. 241 D.

τοὺς ἵππους στήσας] Il. v. 368, "Ἐνθ' ἵππους ἕστησε ποδῆνεμος ὤκεια Ἴρις, Δύσαο' ἔξ ὀχέων, παρὰ δ' ἀμβρόσιον βάλεν εἶδαρ.

αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί] The gods, we have seen, stand on the outer surface (νώτω) of heaven: of the other souls, those which most resemble gods can only partially emerge into the outer region. Their heads being above water, or whatever be the element of which the great sphere is composed, they are able to view the Essences, though with some difficulty, for their steeds confuse and trouble them. A second order of souls is less favoured: they see but in part, for ever and anon the restiveness of their teams causes them to dip below the surface. The majority are unable to struggle up into the higher region

at all, but are carried round with the rest, immersed in the liquid element. Hom. Hymn. 33. *Ἢ, ἐπ' ἀκρωτήρια βάντες Πρύμνης· τὴν δ' ἀνεμός τε μέγας καὶ κύμα θαλάσσης Θῆκαν ὑποβρυχίην.* Apollodor. iii. 15. 8. 3 (ap. Steph. Lex.), *τὴν κόρην τῆς πρύμνης τῶν ποδῶν ἐκόδσας ὑποβρύχιον ἐποίησε.* Her. i. 189, *ὑποβρύχιον οἰχώκεε φέρων* (sc. ὁ ποταμὸς τὸν ἵππον).

248. B. ἀτελεῖς] "Quasi initiationis expertes," Ast. The mysteries were called τέλη, τελεταί, the adepts τετελεσμένοι, as is well known. Those who depart frustrated and disappointed of the wished-for spectacle, are fain to feed henceforth upon the chaff and husks of opinion, instead of the pure nectar and ambrosia of exact truth, as the steeds of the gods, and, we may suppose, their drivers also, were wont to do: sup.

247 E. οὐ δ' ἔνεχ'—ἥ τε δὴ, κ.τ.λ.] This reading restored by Bekk. after careful collation of MSS. (see his Vv. Ll.), is not, I think, to be disturbed. Badh. conjectures ὧν δ' ἔνεχ' . . . δὴ ἐστὸν, ἥ τε δὴ . . . ἥ τε τοῦ

E 2

with the rest of the text, as it is not to be disturbed. Badh. conjectures ὧν δ' ἔνεχ' . . . δὴ ἐστὸν, ἥ τε δὴ . . . ἥ τε τοῦ

ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομῇ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὔσα, ἣ τε τοῦ περοῦ φύσις, ᾧ ψυχὴ κουφίζεται, τούτῳ τρέφεται. θεσμός τε Ἀδραστέας ὅδε, ἥτις ἂν ψυχὴ θεῷ ξυνοπαδὸς γενομένη κατίδῃ τι τῶν ἀληθῶν, μέχρι τε τῆς ἐτέρας περιόδου εἶναι ἀπήμονα, κὰν αἰ τοῦτο δύνῃται ποιεῖν, αἰ ἀβλαβῇ εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀδυνατήσασα ἐπισπέσθαι μὴ ἴδῃ, καὶ τινι συντυχίᾳ χρησαμένη, λήθῃς τε καὶ κακίας πλησθεῖσα βαρυνθῇ, βαρυνθεῖσα δὲ πετρορρύησῃ τε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πέσῃ, τότε νόμος ταύτην μὴ φυτεῦσαι εἰς μηδεμίαν θηρείαν φύσιν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν πλείστα ἰδοῦσαν εἰς γονὴν ἀνδρὸς γε-

πτ., κ.τ.λ. The old reading was οὐ δὲ ἐνεχ', for which Ast plausibly suggested τοῦ (sc. τίνος) δὲ ἐνεχ' . . . οὐ ἐστίν; The reason, says Soer., why the souls exhibit this exceeding eagerness to behold the Fields of Truth, is that pasturage is found there suited to the pure intellect, the best and noblest part of the soul, and to the growth of the plumage from which the soul derives her lightness and buoyancy. Where, we may observe, the sign and thing signified are represented as two independent facts; for the 'plumage' of the soul is simply the same thing with τὸ ἄριστον τῆς ψυχῆς. This is one of many artifices by which Plato obliges his readers to keep in mind the inner meaning of his allegory. The ἀληθείας πεδῖον is a new feature in the scenery of the mythus. Possibly Plato found the phrase in some Orphic poet, possibly also in some Pythagorean book. It is used by the author of the Axiochus (371 n) to denote the place where Minos and Rhadamanthus hold their court. Analogous phrases are ἀρετῆς λείμων in Orph. Lith. 81; Ἀτῆς λείμων in Empedocles v. 23, Karst.; λήθης πεδῖον in Republ. x. 621. Plutarch, de Defect. Orae., uses ἀληθείας πεδῖον in a sense half mathematical half mystical, and savouring strongly of a Pythagorean source. The periphrasis ἡ τοῦ περοῦ φύσις is analogous to τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπιστήμης γένος, sup. 217 D.

C. θεσμός τε Ἀδραστέας ὅδε] Adrasteia, the Inevitable, is an epithet of Ἀνάγκη, and her mystical name in the Orphic theology (Lob. Aglaoph. p. 485). In Aesch. Prom. 972, Adrasteia is identified with Nemesis, and so she continued

to be in the popular creed. Auct. Rhesi 468, ξὺν δ' Ἀδραστέᾳ λέγω: Republ. 451 A, προσκυνῶ δὲ Ἀδράστειαν. On this occasion the mystical sense is adopted by Plato, who, according to Olympiodorus, πανταχοῦ παρῳδεῖ τὰ Ὀρφείως, and nowhere more than in this mythus. θεσμός Ἀδραστέας is simply the 'law of destiny,' according to which those spirits which in the course of the divine progress have seen somewhat, i. e. some considerable measure, of truth, shall remain unharmed until the next great revolution, and so on each time in succession. Those whose powers are unequal to the effort, and who, through mishap or fault of their own, shed their plumage and fall to the earth in consequence, are in their first earthly genesis incarnated as men, never as beasts; this last degradation being apparently the result of a perverse choice deliberately made by the soul itself at a subsequent period (inf. 249 n). Human destiny would seem therefore to be partly the result of choice, partly of necessity—and we have here a metaphysical problem clothed in a mythical dress.

D. τὴν μὲν πλείστα—τυραννικός] For this curious classification 'in order of merit' we are not obliged to seek any more occult motive than Plato's private predilections. Empedocles, in a passage relating to the Metempsychosis, had given the precedence to μάντις τε καὶ ὕμνοπόλοι καὶ ἱητροί, καὶ πρόμοι. 381, Karst. But in Plato's estimation the φιλόσοφος naturally holds the first rank, the 'lover of beauty' and 'the musical and erotic man' meaning much the same thing—ὡς φιλοσοφίας οὔσης

νησομένου φιλοσόφου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινὸς καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν εἰς βασιλέως ἐννόμου ἢ πολεμικοῦ καὶ ἀρχικοῦ, τρίτην εἰς πολιτικοῦ ἢ τινος οἰκονομικοῦ ἢ χρηματιστικοῦ, τετάρτην εἰς φιλοπόνου ἢ γυμναστικοῦ ἢ περὶ σώματος ἱασίν τινα ἐσομένου, πέμπτην μαντικὸν βίον ἢ τινα τελεστικὸν ἔξουσιν ἕκτη ποιητικὸς ἢ τῶν περὶ μίμησιν τις ἄλλος ἀρμόσει, ἐβδόμη δημιουργικὸς ἢ γεωργικὸς, ὀγδὴ σοφιστικὸς ἢ δημοτικὸς, ἐννάτη τυραννικὸς. ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἅπασιν ὅς μὲν ἂν δι-

μεγίστης μουσικῆς, Phaed. 61 A. In assigning a low position to the 'sooth-sayer or ritualist,' and also to the poetic or mimetic genius, he somewhat maliciously corrects Empedocles, and at the same time aims a blow at the superstitious pietism and literary sentimentalism of his own day. For Plato's view of *μίμησις* we may compare a curious passage in the tenth book of the *Repub.* init. to p. 608. His estimate of the *μαντικὸν γένος* may be gathered from a striking description *ibid.* ii. 364 C seq., fully explaining the *μαντικὸς βίος* ἢ *τελεστικὸς* of the text. The 'sophist and people's man' are placed where we should expect to find them, just above the worst and most irredeemable of monsters, the tyrant. So in the *Republic* the *δημοκρατικὸς* is raised but one step above the *τυραννικὸς*: *Rep.* 559 comp. with 562. Of the first four kinds we may remark that they represent some more or less dignified and useful employment, while of the four which follow, three denote, in Plato's view, some variety of imposture; the class of 'mechanics and tillers of the soil' being placed thus low in the scale partly for the purpose of depressing their associates. It may surprise us to find the *χρηματιστικὸς* placed so high, and the physician no higher in the scale, especially as a physician (*Hippocrates*) is almost the only one of his contemporaries, out of his own circle, of whom Plato speaks in terms of unqualified admiration. But *Hippocrates*, as we are told *inf.* 270 C, was one of the few who combined physic and physics, the study of the human frame with that of natural philosophy. He may therefore be classed with the *φιλόσοφοι*, and we do not find that Plato speaks with

much respect of any other member of the medical faculty. It may be observed that in the *Politicus*, 259 C, the *βασιλικὸς οἰκονομικὸς* καὶ *πολιτικὸς* are identified; a discrepancy which I mention for the benefit of those critics who maintain, on grounds hardly stronger than this, that the *Politicus* was the work of an anonymous opponent of Plato*. It will be observed that I have followed *Badh.* in inserting ἢ after *φιλοπόνου*. The members of this higher class being all arranged in triplets (for *μουσικὸς* καὶ *ἐρωτικὸς* form only one sub-genus), symmetry requires that the *φιλόσοφος* should be distinguished from his compeers.

E. *δημοτικὸς*] This is the reading of the *Bodl.* and other MSS. of good note. *Bekk.* retains the vulg. *δημοκοπικὸς*—'the life of the hunter for popularity,' the *captator popularis auræ*. This, however, in a description of recognized human professions is too vituperative, and blunts the edge of Plato's satire. Every public man in a democracy is *δημοτικὸς*, only the worst specimens of the class are *δημοκοπικοί*. Besides, the word *δημοκόπος* and its derivatives seem to have come into use at a much later period.

τυραννικὸς] Either one who has usurped or one who seeks to usurp the supreme power by unconstitutional means, or perhaps, more generally, the man who in his own sphere acts solely with a view to self, as the tyrant does in his. So the *τυραννικὸς ἀνὴρ* of the *Republic* denotes one under the sway of some one passion which tyrannizes over his whole being.

ἐν δὲ τούτοις, κ.τ.λ.] The destiny of

* In the *Republic* the *βασιλικὸς* is identified with the *φιλόσοφος*.

καίως διαγάγῃ, ἀμείνονος μοίρας μεταλαμβάνει, ὃς δ' ἂν ἀδίκως, χείρονος. εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄθεν ἦκει ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκάστη, οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων· οὐ γὰρ πτεροῦται πρὸ τοσούτου χρόνου, | πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαν- 249
τος ἀδόλως ἡ παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας. αὐταὶ δὲ τρίτῃ περιόδῳ τῇ χιλιετῇ, ἐὰν ἔλωνται τρίς ἐφεξῆς τὸν βίον τοῦτον, οὕτω πτερωθεῖσαι τρισχιλιοστῶ ἔτει ἀπέρχονται. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι, ὅταν τὸν πρῶτον βίον τελευτήσωσι, κρίσεως ἔτυχον. κριθεῖσαι δέ, αἱ μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ

the soul after death is determined solely by the life it had led on earth, without reference to the ante-natal state. How a σοφιστής or a τύραννος can be said δικαίως διαγίνειν we are not informed, and the τοῦτοις ἅπασιν must therefore probably be taken with a grain of allowance. It is however noteworthy, that in its first genesis, the soul's condition is fixed according to an intellectual standard (τὴν μὲν πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν), whereas its doom after leaving the body depends on moral considerations (ὃς ἂν δικαίως διαγαγῇ).

εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτό] i. e. εἰς τὴν τοῦ ξυννόμου οἰκήσιν ἄστρου: Tim. 42 v. Comp. Virg. G. iv. 226, "viva volare Sideris in numerum atque alto succedere coelo."

οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων] This 'genitive of time' is usually accompanied with πρὸ or ἐντός. But the prep. is frequently omitted, as in a Law ap. Dem. Mid. p. 529, οἱ δὲ θεομυθεῖται εἰσαγόντων εἰς τὴν ἡλιαίαν τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν ἀφ' ἧς ἂν ἡ γραφή. Herod. vi. 58, ἀγορὴ δέκα ἡμερῶν οὐκ ἴσταται σφι. Similarly in reference to past time, Arist. Plut. 98, πολλοῦ γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὐχ ἑώρακα πῶ χρόνον. It would be vain to inquire into Plato's reasons for fixing this precise number of years. An 'annus magnus,' at the end of which the planets recover the relative positions they occupied at its commencement, was a device of the Egyptian astronomers, but there is no proof that Plato thought of it here. Besides, the Egyptian cycle was fixed at 36,525 years. Other cycles are enumerated by Ideler, Chronol. i. 182 seq., none of which are of the length of a myriad years. It is more probable that Plato took the hint from Empedocles, who in the proem to his principal work

sings thus: 'Ἔστιν Ἀνάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν (comp. θεσμός Ἀδραστείας, p. sup.) Ἀἴδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὕρκιοις. Εὐτέ τις ἀμπλακίσει φόνω φίλα γυῖα μῆνην, (δαίμονες οἷτε βίοιο λελόγχασι μακραιῶνος,) Τρίς μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλλάσθαι Γεινόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρεὼ εἶδεα θνητῶν. Τῶν (f. τῶ) καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης: whereas in Plato the human soul, before its fall, is ranked among the δαίμονες. Krisehe (Phaedr. p. 66) will have it that by ὥρα Empedocles meant the third part of a year. If there be any truth in this notion, the μύρια ἔτη of Plato and the τρίς μυρία ὥραι of Empedocles will denote the same period of time. But this is probably a needless refinement; the numbers three and ten being both 'sacred' numbers, and therefore naturally suggesting themselves to a mind of a mystical turn like that of Empedocles, and indeed of Plato in his mythopoetic moods.

249.] The soul of the true philosopher is excused from seven of the ten millennial probations through which the rest have to pass. This is probably an Orphico-Pythagorean idea. Pindar, who borrows largely from such sources, has the well-known lines: ὅσοι δ' ἐτόλμασαν ἐς τρίς Ἐκατέρωθι μέιναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν Ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὀδὸν 1-2-3-4-5
παρὰ Κρόνον τύρην· ἔνθα μακάρων νῆσος κ.τ.λ. Ol. ii. 68. Compare also the curious statement of Herodotus (ii. 123), who speaks of a περίησις τρισχιλίων ἐτῶν as a feature in the Egyptian metempsychosis, which he accuses his own countrymen of plagiarizing: τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ εἰσι οἱ Ἕλληνων ἐχρήσαντο, οἱ μὲν πρότερον οἱ δὲ ὕστερον, ὡς ἰδίῳ ἑαυτῶν ἔοντι· τῶν ἐγώ, εἰδὼς τὰ οὐνόματα, οὐ γράφω. The αἵρεσις βίῳν, which takes place at the end of each millennial pe-

γῆς δικαιο^{μεναι}ωτήρια ἐλθοῦσαι δίκην ἐκτίνουσιν, αἱ δ' εἰς τοῦ-
 B ρανοῦ τινὰ τόπον ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης κουφισθεῖσαι διάγουσιν
 ἀξίως οὐ ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἶδει ἐβίωσαν βίου. τῷ δὲ χιλιο-
 στῷ ἀμφοτέραι ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπὶ κλήρῳσιν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν
 τοῦ δευτέρου βίου, αἰροῦνται ὃν ἂν ἐθέλῃ ἐκάστη. ἔνθα
 καὶ εἰς θηρίου βίον ἀνθρωπίνῃ ψυχῇ ἀφικνεῖται, καὶ ἐκ
 θηρίου, ὅς ποτε ἄνθρωπος ἦν, πάλιν εἰς ἄνθρωπον. οὐ
 γὰρ ἢ γε μή ποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ
 σχῆμα. δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ξυνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον,
 ἐκ πολλῶν ἰόντ' αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον.
 C τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἢ
 ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἅ νῦν εἶναι
 φαιμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὄν ὄντως. διὸ δὴ δικαίως

riod, is described circumstantially in the mythus, Rep. x. 617.

δικαιο^{μεναι}ωτήρια] βασανιστήρια, 'places of torment,' is Pollux's interpretation of the word. Comp. Gorg. 523 B, τὸ τῆς δίκης δεσμοωτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσι.

B. ἐπὶ κλήρῳσιν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν] These words are explained by Rep. x. 617 E, where the souls are made to draw lots for the first choice and then *πρῶτος ὁ λαχὼν πρῶτος αἰρεῖται βίον*—a mythical mode of reconciling freedom and necessity—choice being left free, but under limiting conditions.

ἔνθα καί] Where too,—at this stage in its history,—the human soul is permitted to migrate into a bestial state of existence, or vice versâ. It had before been stated that in its first *γένεσις* the soul invariably animates a human form (sup. 248 D). From the two passages compared, it would appear that every soul had caught at least some dim glimpse of the truth in its heavenly progress, as is stated below, 249 E: *πάντα ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ φύσει τεθέαται τὰ ὄντα*.

δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον—ξυναιρούμενον] It is a law of the human understanding that it can only act by the way of general notions, 'the form so called' ascending from the manifold impressions of sense to a unity collected by a process of reason or reflection. In other words, *sensibles are per se unintelligible*; we can only understand a thing by referring it to a class or general notion. This,

Plato goes on to say, is neither more nor less than an act of reminiscence (*ἀνάμνησις*); these general forms of the understanding reminding us of their transcendent prototypes—the ideas presented to the gaze of the unbodied soul in the ante-natal state. It will be observed that I have adopted for the vulg. *ἐν* Badh.'s correction *ἰόντ'*. This will be thought over bold, in face of a consensus of MSS. But to speak of the *εἶδος* itself as *ἰόν*—proceeding or advancing to a 'unity,' itself being that 'unity' which is the result of the process—is a licence of bad writing in which it is difficult to believe that Plato would indulge. Neither can we speak of an *εἶδος* as *ξυναιρούμενον εἰς ἐν*, which is equally tautological. It is evidently the man, the generalizing mind, which can alone be said *ἰέναι εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον*, or in other words, *ἐκ πολλῶν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν εἶδος*. Comp. Rep. x. 586 A, *εἶδος γάρ ποῦ τι ἐν ἑκάστων εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλὰ οἷς ταῦτ' ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν*. This generalizing process, the primary law of the human understanding, is briefly expressed in the Platonic formula *ἐν καὶ πολλὰ*. Phileb. 16 c is a 'locus classicus' on this subject.

C. διὸ δὴ δικαίως] The intellect of the philosopher obeys the same laws as other minds; it too can only arrive at truth by collecting generals from particulars: but the philosopher does that systematically and perseveringly, which

μόνη πτεροῦται ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ ἐκεί-
νοις αἰεὶ ἐστὶ μνήμη κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς
ὦν θεῖός ἐστι. τοῖς δὲ δὴ τοιούτοις ἀνὴρ ὑπομνήμασιν
ὀρθῶς χρώμενος, τελέους αἰεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος, τέλεος
ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται. ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων D
σπονδασμάτων, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θεῷ γιγνόμενος, νουθεύ-
ται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ
λέληθε τοὺς πολλοὺς.

† Ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρ-

ordinary men do in a purposeless and intermitting manner. Hence the soul of the sage alone recovers its lost plumage, the symbol and earnest of its divinity. 'For it is *always* dwelling in memory upon that Essence, by dwelling on which it is that even a god is divine,' i. e. to the contemplation of which a god owes his divinity, as if he had said θεὸς θεῖός ἐστι διότι πρὸς τοῖς οὐσίῳ ἐστι. For the phrase πρὸς τινι εἶναι comp. Phaed. 84 c, αὐτὸς πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης, 'delixus est in.' So paul. inf. we have, πρὸς τῷ θεῷ γιγνόμενος.

πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὦν θεῖός ἐστι] Hermias tells us that there were no less than four readings of this clause: ἢ πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὦν θεός ἐστιν, ἢ πάλιν θεῖός ἐστιν, ἢ μετὰ τοῦ ἄρθρου, πρὸς οἷσπερ ὁ θεὸς ὦν θεός ἐστιν, ἢ πάλιν θεῖός ἐστιν. The second of these is found in the Bodl. and Vat., and is much the best. ὁ θεὸς could only mean the supreme Deity, a meaning which would clash with the conventional theology of the Mythos. Θεὸς without the article denotes any one of the twelve gods, or rather of the eleven before alluded to; for we are left to conjecture what the spiritual nutriment of Hestia may have been, wings being evidently inappropriate to so sedentary a deity.

ὑπομνήμασιν] The εἶδος, it would seem, are not themselves ὄντα, but only 'memoranda' suggestive of ὄντα. This Ast has perceived, comm. p. 432: "hac veri comprehensio recordatio dicitur, quia ipsum verum quod in superiore vita spectavimus (h. e. ἰδέα, proprio sensu ita dicta, ut distinguitur ab eo quod εἶδος, h. e. notio universa vel genus, vocatur) hac comprehensione revocatur." In modern language, it is by meditating 'aright' on 'common notions' that the

philosopher arrives at exact scientific ideas. ὀρθῶς implies that this must be done methodically, i. e. according to the principles of a true dialectic. I think the distinction between εἶδος and ἰδέα is here not to be overlooked, though the two words are in most cases interchangeable. All men understand according to an εἶδος, more or less, according to their several capacities, the philosopher alone ascends to ὄντα or ἰδέαι,—τῇ τοῦ ὄντος αἰεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέᾳ (Soph. 254). The mysteries in which the sage is ever undergoing initiation are called τέλει, as presently we read of τῶν τελετῶν ἣν θέμις εἰπεῖν μακαριωτάτην (250 B). In Phileb. 67 the absolute Good is styled ἡ τοῦ ἱκανοῦ καὶ τελέου δύναμις, and distinguished by three predicates from the νοῦς which contemplates it. The philosopher is thus the subject of a true ἐνθουσιασμός, of which the emotions of the awe-stricken mystae at Eleusis are but a type. Compare also Rep. viii. 560 E, τελουμένου ψυχῇ μεγάλουσι τέλεσι.

D. ὡς παρακινῶν] Properly the compound means to 'move amiss,' as in Arist. Ran. 645, σκοπεῖ νῦν ἦν με παρακινήσαντ' ἴδης, where παρακ. is now substituted on MS. authority for the vulg. ὑποκινήσαντ'. The same correction seems to be required in Rep. ix. 573 c, μαινόμενος καὶ ὑποκεκινηκώς. As a synonym of μάλνεσθαι, the intransitive παρακινεῖν is usual, not παρακινεῖσθαι, which is first used by late writers. Com. ap. Harpoer. p. 23: συνέπινε παρακινουσί καὶ μεμνηόσιν. So an old dotard is called παρακεκινηκώς ὑφ' ἡλικίας by a comic poet ap. J. Poll. Mein. Com. Gr. iv. 680.

Ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο] Socr. in these words reminds Phaedr. of the drift of the brilliant episode just concluded. It

της μανίας, ἣν ὅταν τὸ τῇδέ τις ὁρῶν κάλλος, τοῦ ἀλη-
 θοῦς ἀναμιμνησκόμενος, πτερῶταί τε καὶ [ἀναπτερούμενος]
 προθυμούμενος ἀναπτέσθαι, ἀδυνατῶν δέ, ὄρνιθος δίκην
 E. βλέπων ἄνω, τῶν κάτω δέ ἀμελῶν, αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μα-
 νικῶς διακέίμενος, ὡς ἄρα αὕτη πασῶν τῶν ἐνθουσιάζσεων

was designed as a picture of the 'fourth Madness,' that of Love, or rather as a theory of the philosophic habit of mind of which Love is the symbol. The point really attained is, that the philosopher is the subject of an 'enthusiasm,' a rapt and passionate yearning after a truth higher and purer than either the senses or the understanding reflecting on the objects of sense can furnish. Why is this enthusiasm to be styled Love, and what have the two states of consciousness in common with each other? This is the question which is now to be attacked, and to which Plato proceeds with much skill and ingenuity to elaborate an answer. 'Beauty' furnishes the connecting link. Beauty, the object of Love, is one of the Ideas, and it is that one of which alone the world of sense presents a vivid and approximately adequate resemblance. The transition from ideal truth in general to this particular variety, in other words from τὸ ὄν to τὸ καλόν, had been prepared by the vivid imagery of the ὑπερουράνιος πορεία, and the speaker is able to slip in the word κάλλος at the very commencement of this portion of the discourse, as if it were synonymous with τὸ ὄν, and had formed the subject of the foregoing episode, when in fact it has never once been mentioned. With regard to the construction of the sentence, which is irregular in more respects than one, we may observe (1) That the apodosis to δεῦρο is contained in the words, ὡς ἄρα αὕτη . . . γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι . . . καλεῖται, the intervening clauses being parenthetical from ἦν to διακέίμενος incl. (2) This parenthetical sentence is itself anacoluthic, in two respects. The relative ἦν, sc. μανίαν (for which Ast conj. ἦ), is a 'pendent' accusative, referring to αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακέίμενος, though not grammatically constructed with it. In the next place ὅταν would naturally have been followed by a second subjunctive, instead of which we have the three participles ἀδυνατῶν, βλέπων, ἀμελῶν. We might have had ἀδυνατῇ δέ followed

by βλέπων and ἀμελῶν, or ἀδυνατῶν δέ . . . βλέπῃ . . . ἀμελῇ. The clause ὅταν . . . ἀμελῶν is in effect an epexegetis of ἦν, and serves as a *résumé* of the foregoing description of the philosophic enthusiasm. The difficulty of rendering this in English is skilfully surmounted in Mr. Wright's translation of Phaedr.

p. 40. ὄρνιθος δίκην βλέπων ἄνω] 'bird-like, casts many an upward glance, regardless of things below.' Ar. Av. 50: χῶ κολοῖς οὐτοσί' ἄνω κέχνηεν. Soer. alludes to the vulgar prejudice against philosophers as described Theet. 174 A. Compare the ludicrous incident in the Nubes, 171. The passage quoted by Ast from Plat. Epict. vii. 348, ἐγὼ μὲν βλέπων ἔξω, καθάπερ ὄρνις ποδῶν πόθεν ἀναπτέσθαι, illustrates, but may hardly be regarded as an imitation of, the present. Still less can I see that in the present passage "homines amoris corporei appetentes irridentur"! It would have been more correct to say 'homines amore divino instincti adumbrantur.' They expose themselves to the jeers of the vulgar by their habits of rapt abstraction, longing as they do, like caged birds, to escape from their fleshly incumbrances.

E. ὡς ἄρα αὕτη, κ.τ.λ.] This, the philosophic, is said to be the best of all the enthusiasms, or θεαίαι μανίαι, both in itself and in its origin and antecedents; it is best for its possessor, and for him who shares it with him; for the sage, that is, and for his youthful disciple whom he infects with his own sacred frenzy. The φιλόσοφος had already (218 D) been placed in the same category with the φιλόκαλος and ἐρωτικός, and (249) we read of the παιδεραστῶν μετὰ φιλοσοφίας. We were thus prepared for the identification, for the purposes of this discussion, of the sage and the lover which is effected in the next clause. The madman, it is said, of this philosophic type, who falls in love with a beautiful human being is under such circumstances called ἐραστής.

ἀρίστη τε καὶ ἐξ ἀρίστων τῷ τε ἔχοντι καὶ τῷ κοινω-
 νούντι αὐτῆς γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ταύτης μετέχων τῆς μα-
 νίας ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν ἐραστῆς καλεῖται. καθάπερ γὰρ
 εἴρηται, πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ φύσει τελέεται τὰ
 ὄντα, ἣ οὐκ ἂν ἦλθεν εἰς τόδε τὸ ζῶον, | ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι 250
 δ' ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκεῖνα οὐ ῥάδιον ἀπάσῃ, οὔτε ὅσαι βραχέως
 εἶδον τότε τάκει, οὔτε αἱ δεῦρο πεσοῦσαι ἐδυστύχησαν,
 ὥστε ὑπὸ τινων ὁμιλιῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδικον τραπόμεναι λήθην
 ὦν τότε εἶδον ἱερῶν ἔχειν. ὀλίγαι δὲ λείπονται αἷς τὸ
 τῆς μνήμης ἱκανῶς πάρεστιν. αὗται δέ, ὅταν τι τῶν
 ἐκεῖ ὁμοίωμα ἴδωσιν, ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέθ' αὐτῶν
 γίγνονται, ὃ δ' ἔστι τὸ πάθος ἀγνοοῦσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἱκα-
 νῶς διαισθάνεσθαι. δικαιοσύνης μὲν οὖν καὶ σωφροσύ- B

καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται] Sup. 248 D: comp. with 249 B.

ἣ οὐκ ἂν ἦλθεν, κ.τ.λ.] 'else had it never entered the animal called man.' ἢ, *alioquin*, as sup. 237 c. It would seem to follow from this that every man is potentially a philosopher, as the slave-boy in the Meno is shown to be an unconscious geometer. There are very few however who realize their own capacities, ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι δ' ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκεῖνα οὐ ῥάδιον ἀπάσῃ. This may be owing to their ill-luck either in the former or in the present state of existence. In the latter case evil associations may have turned them from the right path and clouded their memory, so that they quite forget the 'sacred objects' they beheld on the solemn occasion of their initiation. The force of ἱερὰ will appear more fully in the sequel.

250. αὗται δέ, κ.τ.λ.] As the ideas are παραδείγματα τῶν ἐνθάδε, so the phenomenal is ὁμοίωμα τῶν ἐκεῖ. Comp. Tim. 29 n; 48 E, ἐν μὲν ὡς παραδείγματος εἶδος ὑποθέν, νοητὸν καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτόν ὄν, μίμημα δὲ παραδείγματος δευτέρον, γένεσιν ἔχον καὶ δρατὸν: Parm. 132 D, καταφαίνεται . . . τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῖς ψαῖσι παραδείγματα ἵστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῖς τοῖς ἐκείναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα: καὶ ἡ μέεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς. The phraseology of the ideal theory is pretty fully illustrated by A. Butler, Leett. ii. 127 fol.

ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέθ' αὐτῶν γί-

γνονται] The latter of these phrases is hardly to be distinguished in sense from the former, ἐκπλήττεσθαι being equivalent to ἐξίστασθαι (Schol. Nub. 811, ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐξεστηκότες), and this again, with or without φρενῶν, to οὐκέθ' αὐτοῦ γίγνεσθαι. In Charm. 155 D we have the still more idiomatic phrase οὐκέτ' ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, answering to the Lat. *apud me*. So Ar. Vesp. 612, σκορδινάται κάστιν οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῦ. In Xen. Anab. i. 5. 17, we find ἀκούσας ταῦτα ὁ Κλέαρχος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐγένετο, 'recovered himself,' where probably ἑαυτοῦ was the original reading, as it seems to have been in Soph. Phil. 950, ἀλλὰ νῦν ἔτ' ἐν σαντοῦ γενοῦ, though both Herm. and Vind. adhere to the vulg. σαντῶ, the latter alleging that the idiom ἐν σαντοῦ is too familiar for the language of tragedy. It seems more likely that copyists have changed the forgotten Attic into the commoner form.

B. δικαιοσύνης μὲν οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] 'now of justice, of temperance, and of all the other ideas which to souls are precious, there is no lustre in the counterfeits here below; indeed, so dull are the organs through which men apprehend the copies of such ideas, that but few are able, and that with difficulty, to behold in the imitation the features of the original.' By ὅσα τιμια ψυχαῖς he seems to mean *moral* ideas (comp. inf. τὰλλα ὅσα ἐραστά), among which he afterwards proceeds to show that beauty alone has its clear antitype on earth.

νης, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τίμια ψυχαῖς, οὐκ ἔνστι φέγγος οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὁμοιώμασι, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀμυδρῶν ὀργάνων μόγισ αὐτῶν καὶ ὀλίγοι ἐπὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἰόντες θεῶνται τὸ τοῦ εἰκασθέντος γένος. κάλλος δὲ τότ' ἦν ἰδεῖν λαμπρόν, ὅτε σὺν εὐδαίμονι χορῷ μακαρίαν ὄψιν τε καὶ θέαν, ἐπόμενοι μετὰ μὲν Διὸς ἡμεῖς, ἄλλοι δὲ μετ' ἄλλου

In the words *μόγισ αὐτῶν καὶ ὀλίγοι*, *αὐτῶν* is to be construed with *εἰκόνας*, and referred to *δικαιοσύνης*, κ.τ.λ., as Stallb. observes. In that case there is no difficulty in the position of *μόγισ*.

μετὰ μὲν Διὸς ἡμεῖς] That is, *we philosophers*, of whom Zeus, the symbol of the highest reason, is the especial patron. Comp. Philob. 30 D. The passage which follows is full of phrases borrowed from the Eleusinian rites. From this we must not infer that Plato countenances the notion that a purer and more philosophic faith was communicated to the initiated at Eleusis, a fancy which still lingers in some minds even after the triumphant exposure of its baselessness effected by Lobeck in his greatest work. The contrary, in fact, follows from the language of Plato, for how could the mysteries have served the purpose of metaphorical illustration had they possessed a philosophic meaning of their own? When the figure and the thing figured are both *in eodem genere*, we have no metaphor but only confusion: and it were scarcely less absurd to argue from the image of the chariot and pair that the Olympic games had a philosophic meaning, than to use the passage before us in support of the Warburtonian theory. At the same time it is more than probable that this portion of the Phaedr., and others in which the same metaphor occurs, have helped to produce the opinion alluded to. So far as we can make out the nature of the *ἱερὰ μυστικά* or *μυστήρια* shown to the initiated in the *μυστοδόκος δόμος* (Ar. Nub. 303), or great hall of the Eleusinian temple, they consisted partly in images of Demeter and her *σύνναοι* Iacchus and Persephone, and partly in relics, 'præcæ religionis monumenta,' like those shown to the devout in Romish churches at the present day. These objects, *φάσματα*, were exhibited *ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ*, under the 'clear effulgence' of blazing torches,

and the *μύσις* or *ἐποπτεία* (for the distinction between the two words, as if they implied, the one an earlier, the other a more advanced stage of initiation, was a later refinement) consisted in the fruition of the dazzling scene presented to the eye of the worshipper. Comp. Plut. Mor. i. 312, Wyt., ὥς οἱ τελοῦμενοι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν θορύβῳ καὶ βοῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους συνίασι, δρωμένων δὲ καὶ δεικνυμένων τῶν ἱερῶν προσέχουσιν ἤδη μετὰ φρίκης (inf. p. 251) καὶ σιωπῆς, οὕτω καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐν ἀρχῇ . . . πολλὴν θόρυβον ὕψει . . . ὁ δὲ ἐντὸς γενόμενος καὶ φῶς μέγα ἰδὼν, οἶον ἀνακτόρων ἀνοιγομένων, κ.τ.λ. (ap. Lob. Aglaoph. p. 61). Also Arist. Ran. 340, ἔγειρε φλογέας λαμπάδας ἐν χειρὶ τινάσσαν; 'ἱακχ', ὦ 'ἱακχε, Νυκτερίου τελετῆς φωσφόρος ἀστήρ, where the Schol. observes, ἐν νυκτὶ ἄγεται τὰ μυστήρια. If we accept this view, which Lobeck supports with a profusion of learning and argument, the passage before us is perfectly intelligible. "Etenim Plato in Phædr. quum docere vellet quantum oblectationis habeat inquisitio et investigatio veri (ἡ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων θέα) exemplum sumit a mysteriis, contenditque animos e rerum superarum immutabilitiumque cognitione plus voluptatis capere, quam divinæ species initiatis asserant: *εἶδον* (animi a corporibus secreti et liberi) καὶ *ἐτελοῦντο* . . . *ἐποπτεύοντες*: quæ ab Eleusiniis translata esse recte judicat Hermeias." Lob. l. i. p. 57. The initiation of the philosophic soul is said to be *μακαριότης*, the most blissful of all initiations, not excepting that of Eleusis — 'so we may without impiety style it' (*θέμις λέγειν*). *μάκαρ* and *εὐδαίμων* were technical predicates of the initiated, *εὐδαίμονία* being the last stage—the consummation of the whole initiatory process. Theon. Math. p. 18. So Eurip. Bacch. 172, ὦ *μάκαρ ὅστις εὐδαίμων τελετὰς θεῶν εἰδώς*, κ.τ.λ. The *φάσματα* displayed to the soul in the *ὑπερουράνιος τόπος* are of course τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, the

θεῶν, εἰδόν τε καὶ ἐτελοῦντο τῶν τελετῶν ἣν θέμις λέγειν μακαριωτάτην, ἣν ὠργιάζομεν ὁλόκληροι μὲν αὐτοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀπαθείς κακῶν ὅσα ἡμᾶς ἐν ὑστέρω χρόνῳ ὑπέμενεν, ὁλόκληρα δὲ καὶ ἀπλᾶ καὶ ἀτρεμῇ καὶ εὐδαίμονα φάσματα μυούμεοί τε καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ, καθαροὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου ὃ νῦν σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν, ὅστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μνήμη κεχαρίσθω, δι' ἣν πόθῳ

ideas or archetypal forms. To these perhaps, rather than to the Eleusinian images, the epithets ὁλόκληρα καὶ ἀπλᾶ καὶ ἀτρεμῇ καὶ εὐδαίμονα properly belong; though it is probable that there is some reference to the serene beauty of the colossal statues which decorated the mystic temple. Witness the grandeur of the fragment preserved in our own University, which is certainly 'simple and full of repose,' though, alas! far from 'entire.' (See below 254 B, εἶδεν αὐτήν . . ἐν ἀγνῇ βάρθρ βεβῶσαν). The ideas are ὁλόκληρα καὶ ἀπλᾶ, because seen as they are in themselves, αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά, not in the concrete (κατακεκερματισμένα, διεσπαρμένα, Soph. 258 D, 260 B). They are also ἀτρεμῇ because αἱ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, μεταβολὴν μὴδ' ἡντινοῦν ἐνδεχόμενα (Phaed. 78 D). The word ὁλόκληρος occurs in Tim. 44 C, ὁλόκληρος ὑγιής τε παντελῶς, τὴν μεγίστην ἀποφυγὴν νοῦσον, γίγνεται, where it answers to our 'whole,' as opposed to 'sick.' For the epithet εὐδαίμονα (effect predicated of the cause, as μακαριωτάτη is transferred from the spectator to the θεῶν) compare the 'Beatific Vision' of Christian Theology. μυούμενοι καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες are not to be distinguished here, except in so far as the latter word defines the sense of the former. Properly speaking μύσις is the generic term for the entire process, including the ἐποπτεία, or state of the adept or adept, who after due previous instructions and the like is admitted into the adytum to behold the αὐοπτικὰ ἀγάλματα. (Jambh. Myst. ii. 10, 53.) So Symp. 209 E, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικά κἂν σὺ μνησθῇς· τὰ δὲ τέλεια καὶ ἐποπτικά ὧν ἐνεκα καὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν, εἰς τις ὁρθῶς μετρήσῃ οὐκ οἶδ'· εἰ οἶός τ' ἂν εἴης, where after εἴης we must supply μνησθῆναι, a sufficient proof that μύσις is not restricted to the preliminary

stage. A difficulty has been raised about the use of ὑπέμενεν, for which Hirsch ventures to substitute περιέμενεν. If he is right, it will be necessary also to alter Xen. Anab. iv. 1. 21, διὰ ταῦτά σε οὐχ ὑπέμενον, φθάσαι βουλόμενος, where the compound has the same sense which it bears here. Comp. also Polyb. i. 81. 3, quoted by Stallb., ἡ κόλασις ὑπομένει αὐτόν.

C. καθαρὸν ὄντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοι—δεδεσμευμένοι] Of the two epithets καθαρὸν has reference to the ceremonial and legal purity presupposed in the ἐποπτεία, as indeed in worshippers generally, "quum omnis praeſatio ſacrorum eos quibus non ſint purae manus, ſacris arceat" (Liv. xlv. 5, ap. Lob. l. 1. p. 17). ἀσήμαντοι has evidently a double meaning, which it is impossible to express by one word in English. It means (1) 'unmarked,' i. e. unpolluted; and (2) 'unentombed,' 'unimprisoned,' according to the two senses of σῆμα. Hence tr. 'free from the bondage and pollution of that which now we call σῶμα,' instead of σῆμα, which, there is reason to suppose, was the original name of the body; καὶ γὰρ σῆμά τινες φασιν αὐτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς (Crat. 400 C). Comp. Gorg. 493. The notion and etymology are both Orphic, as Plato states in the former of the passages quoted, in which other etyma are mentioned and discussed with laudable impartiality. This fleshly prison we 'bear about with us, bound in its chains as the oyster is fastened to his shell.' For the Pythagorean, as well as Orphic, theory of the penal incarceration of the soul in the body, see also Phaed. 62 B and the interpreters. Also ib. 82 E, τὴν ψυχὴν ἀτεχνῶς διαδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ὥσπερ δι' εἰργμοῦ, κ.τ.λ.

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μνήμη κεχαρίσθω] 'let this then serve by way of tribute to

τῶν τότε νῦν μακρότερα εἶρηται. περὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὥσπερ
 D εἶπομεν, μετ' ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπεν ὄν, δεῦρό τε ἐλθόντες
 κατελήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν
 ἡμετέρων στίλβον ἐναργέστατα. ὅψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη
 τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ἥ φρόνησις
 οὐχ ὁράται. δεινούς γὰρ ἂν παρέιχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοι-
 οῦτον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργές εἶδωλον παρέιχετο εἰς ὅψιν ἰόν,
 καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα ἐραστά. νῦν δὲ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε
 E μοῖραν, ὥστ' ἐκφανέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον. ὁ
 μὲν οὖν μὴ νεοτελὴς ἢ διεφθαρμένος οὐκ ὀξέως ἐνθένδε
 ἐκεῖσε φέρεται πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος, θεώμενος αὐτοῦ
 τὴν τῇδε ἐπωνυμίαν. ὥστε οὐ σέβεται προσορῶν, ἀλλ'
 ἡδονῇ παραδοὺς τετράποδος νόμον βαίνειν ἐπιχειρεῖ καὶ
 251 παιδοσπορεῖν, καὶ ὕβρει προσομιλῶν | οὐ δέδοικεν οὐδ'

memory, for she is the cause of this too long digression, which was prompted by a fond yearning for the glories of a past state of existence.' He then reverts to the subject of beauty and its relation to love, taking up the argument interrupted 249 E.

D. ὅψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη, κ.τ.λ.] This passage is thus translated by Cicero, *Finn. ii. 16. 52*: "*Oculorum, inquit Plato, est in nobis sensus acerrimus, quibus sapientiam non cernimus. Quam illa ardentem amorem excitaret sui, si rideretur!*" It is imitated *De Off. i. 5*: "*Formam honesti video . . . quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores excitaret.*" On the superiority of sight over the other senses see *Tim. 47*, ὅψις δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον αἰτία τῆς μεγίστης ὠφελείας γέγονεν ἡμῖν, κ.τ.λ. Here ὀξυτάτη may be rendered 'the most acute and penetrating,' though it might also bear the meaning 'swiftest,' ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀκουστὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ δρατοῦ πέφυκε φθάνεσθαι (*Pseud-Arist. de Mundo 4. 18*). After τοιοῦτον . . . παρέιχετο we must understand οἷον κάλλος παρέχεται. Before καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα ἐραστά Butt. supposes οἷον to have been dropped by the copyists, "absorbed" by ἰόν. But this is needless. τᾶλλα ὅσα ἐραστά are the τίμια ψυχαῖς before mentioned, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, &c. Tr. 'so, too, would the other forms which are fitted to inspire love,' if they, like beauty, had their visible counterparts.

νῦν δέ] 'as it is, however, Beauty alone is privileged to be at once most lustrous and most loveable.'

E. ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ νεοτελὴς, κ.τ.λ.] It is only minds fresh from the initiatory rite, or those which have not yet been spoilt, that pass rapidly from the visible to the invisible or ideal Beauty, when they 'behold her earthly namesake.' In *Parm. 133 D*, sensible phenomena, τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα, are said to be ὁμώνυμα ἐκείνοις, *homonymous with the corresponding ideas*. In the same sense *Socr. speaks in Phaed. 103 B*, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, sc. τὰ καθ' ἑκαστα τῇ τῶν εἰδῶν.

ἡδονῇ παραδοὺς] i. q. εἷζας. ἐνδι-δόναι is frequently used in this intransitive way, as *Rep. viii. 567*, ἐνδοὺς τοῖς πολεμίοις: frequently also with the reflexive pronoun, αὐτὸν or the like.

ὕβρει προσομιλῶν] A periphrasis for ὕβριζων. *Soph. Trach. 591*, περιᾶ δ' οὐ προσωμίλησά πο. *Tim. 88 C*, γυμναστικῇ προσομιλοῦντα. So *inf. 253 E*, the unruly steed is called ὕβρεως καὶ ἀλαστονείας ἐταῖρος. Here tr. 'addicting himself to excess,' ὕβρις being the ὑπερβολὴ of ἐπιθυμία, as explained, *sup. 238 A*. Rationalized, this whole passage may be taken to mean that to the pure only all things are pure: that the enthusiastic love of moral or ideal beauty can alone prevent corporeal beauty from becoming a snare and a source of defilement to those who are susceptible of its

αἰσχύνεται παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονὴν διώκων. ὁ δὲ ἀρτιτελής, ὁ τῶν τότε πολυθεάμων, ὅταν θεοειδὲς πρόσωπον ἴδῃ κάλλος εὖ μεμιμημένον, ἢ τινα σώματος ἰδέαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἔφριξε, καὶ τι τῶν τότε ὑπῆλθεν αὐτὸν δειμάτων, εἶτα προσορῶν ὡς θεὸν σέβεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐδεδίει τὴν τῆς σφόδρα μανίας δόξαν, θύοι ἂν ὡς ἀγάλματι καὶ θεῷ τοῖς παιδικοῖς. ἰδόντα δὲ αὐτόν, οἶον ἐκ τῆς φρίκης, μεταβολή τε καὶ ἰδρῶς καὶ θερμότης ἀήθης λαμβάνει. δεξάμενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροήν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων, ἐθερμάνθη ἢ ἢ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἄρδεται.

influence, as 'men of genius' usually are. The enthusiasm of the ἀρτιτελής is next described. Not mere poetical or artistic sensibility, but the possession of a poetico-philosophical temperament is implied in the description, which agrees with the epithets φιλόσοφος ἢ φιλόκαλος ἢ μουσικός τις καὶ ἐρωτικός, sup. 248 D. No better description could be given of Plato's own idiosyncrasy.

251. ἐδεδίει] Vulg. δεδίει. Bodl. δεδίει ἢ, supported by three others which give δεδίει. This form Bekk. has adopted into the text. The only objection to the reading in the text (which is but the vulg. with the necessary addition of the augment) is the questionable tense in the apodosis θύοι ἂν for ἔθουεν ἂν. To this however neither Cobet, nor Butt., a better syntactical authority, take exception. Both agree that δεδίει is repugnant to analogy. If we had a perf. opt. it would rather be δεδίοι, thinks Butt. "Indispensable analogy requires δεδίοι, like πεφeyγίοι, ἐληλυθοί, ἐδηδοκοί, πεποιοί." Butt. Irreg. Verbs, tr. p. 59, note. This δεδίοι calls forth from Cobet a shriek of horror, and it certainly seems as bad, if not worse than δεδίει.

οἶον ἐκ τῆς φρίκης] 'as is natural after his cold fit:' sup. πρῶτον μὲν ἔφριξε. The first effect of love on the highest natures is to abash and dismay, then to kindle the imagination and stimulate the intellectual faculties. Both φρικὴ and ῥίγος are used by Hippocrates to denote the cold fit of a fever.

ii. δεξάμενος — ἄρδεται] Socr. here passes into his service the well-known theory of Emanations, by which Empedocles supposed that he had solved the

problem of perception. γυνῶθ' ὅτι πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορροαὶ ὅσας ἐγένοντο, v. 267. Karst. coll. Plat. Menon 76 c, οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροὰς τινὰς τῶν ὄντων κατ' Ἐμπεδοκλέα; Σφόδρα γε. Καὶ πόρους εἰς οὓς καὶ δι' ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται; Πάνν γε. Καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δ' ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὕψιν καλεῖς τι; Ἐγώ γε. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ξύνες ὅ τοι λέγω, ἔφη Πίνδαρος. Ἔστι γὰρ χροὰ ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὅψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός, κ.τ.λ. These ἀπορροαὶ consisted of minute particles momentarily thrown off from all corporeal substances alike, which found their way through equally minute pores in the human body, whither Empedocles does not say, but according to Socr., to the soul, 'whereby (ἢ) her native plumage is watered.' By the twofold operation of heat and moisture 'the parts lying about the quill-sprouts are dissolved,' having previously been long parched and shut up, so as to prevent the feathers from shooting. Such is the evident meaning; whether the text is perfectly sound I hesitate to decide, as I cannot but feel with Ast that there is an awkwardness in the position of the clause ἢ ἢ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἄρδεται. We should have expected θερμανθέντος to have immediately followed ἐθερμάνθη, nor is the inelegance of the interposed clause diminished by translating ἢ by 'quaratione,' with Stallb. instead of referring it to ἀπορροήν with Ast. Still I do not see that the words can be dispensed with, and I have left them accordingly without any note of doubtfulness. A remedy however is proposed by Ast, who observes: "Verba haec tam importuno

θερμανθέντος δὲ ἐτάκη τὰ περὶ τὴν ἑκφυσιν, ἃ πάλαι ὑπὸ σκληρότητος συμμεμικτότα εἶργε μὴ βλαστάνειν. ἐπιρρύεισης δὲ τῆς τροφῆς ἄδησέ τε καὶ ὥρμησε φύεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ρίζης ὁ τοῦ πτεροῦ καυλὸς ὑπὸ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος· πᾶσα γὰρ ἦν τὸ πάλαι πτερωτή. ζεῖ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ὅλη καὶ ἀνακηκίει, καὶ ὅπερ τὸ τῶν ὀδοντοφυόντων πάθος περὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας γίγνεται ὅταν ἄρτι φύωσι, κνησίς τε καὶ ἀγανάκτησις περὶ τὰ οὖλα, ταύτων δὴ πέπονθεν ἢ τοῦ πτεροφυεῖν ἀρχομένου ψυχῇ· ζεῖ τε καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται φύουσα τὰ πτερά. ὅταν μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα πρὸς τὸ τοῦ παιδὸς κάλλος, ἐκείθεν

loco posita sunt ut pro insitivis haberi possint, quamquam egregie sensum adjuvant. Quocirca videndum an non verbis sic positis, τὴν ἀπορροὴν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων, ἥ ἢ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἄρδεται, ἐθερμάνθη, θερμανθέντος δέ, κ.τ.λ., locus egregius restituatur." He adds an illustrative quotation from Origen, c. Cels. vi. p. 666 C: μεταλαμβάνειν τοῦ ζώντος ἔρτου καὶ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ποτοῦ, ἀφ' ὧν τρεφόμενον καὶ ἀρδόμενον ἐπισκευάζεται τὸ πτερόν.

ἐπιρρύεισης δέ, κ.τ.λ.] 'no sooner does the fertilizing moisture descend upon the soul than over her entire surface the stump of each feather swells and strives to grow from the root upwards.' For ὑπὸ Gray conjectures ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος. Stallb. "subtler universam animi speciem." Ast, "intra universam, &c." But Ficin. "per animae speciem totam." ὅπδ seems to be used as in ὑποπλησθῆ, inf. 253 E. The aor. ἐπιρρύεισης is in accordance with the practice of Attic prose authors, who never write ἔρρευσα, but ἐρρύην, ρύηναι, ρυεῖς, and so in compounds also. Phot., προερρύην, οὐ προερρύευσε (ap. Loh. Pleron. 739, q. v.). So also ρυήσομαι in preference to ρεύσομαι.

ζεῖ οὖν—καὶ ἀνακηκίει] 'hence in this condition of things she (the soul) ferments and throbs (bubbles) all over.' ἀνακηκίει, ἀναπηδᾷ, Tim. Lex. Hom. II. vii. 262, ἀνεκήκειεν αἷμα: ib. xiii. 705, ἀνακηκίει ἰδρώς. Said of springing water in Apoll. Rhod. iii. 227 (ap. Ruhnck. ad Tim.), κολῆς ἀνεκήκειε πέτρης. κηκίς denotes any kind of exudation or moisture bursting forth. See the Lexx. in v. ἀνακηκίειν seems also to have been

used by Hippocrates and the medical writers (Steph. Lex. i. 2, p. 403). The penult. is long in Attic: Soph. Phil. 784, φοῖνιον τόδ' ἐκ βυθοῦ Κηκίων αἷμα.

c. φύωσι] Bekk. and Zur. φυῶσι. But the transitive present is preferable. ὅταν ἄρτι φύωσιν ὀδόντας οἱ ὀδοντοφυόντες: and so Ast and Stallb. With φυῶσι, ὀδόντες would have to be supplied, but the aorist does not suit the sense, though right in form, for though the Attics say ἐφυν, not ἐφύην, they borrow the conjunctive from the passive aorist. Tr. 'when they are just beginning to have teeth.'

ζεῖ τε καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ] 'is in a state of ferment and general irritability and titillation' (γαργαλ.). The two words occur in connexion, Plut. Symp. viii. 10. I, οὐ γὰρ τὸν οἶνον εἰκός ἐστι μόνον ζεῖν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν. We find ἀγανακτεῖν said of the intestines in Hippocrates (or Pseudo-Hippocrates?) de usu liquid., ἡ κοιλίη κρατουμένη ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ μάλιστ' ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ θανατοῖ (ii. 158, ed. Kühn). Compare also Phileb. 47 A, γαργαλίζει τε καὶ ἡρέμα ἀγανακτεῖν ποιεῖ.

ὅταν μὲν οὖν—γέγηθεν] We have here another of those fanciful etymologies with which Plato amused himself and readers. Ζεῖρος is supposed to be derived from ἰέναι μέ-ρη and ρεῖν, as in the Cratylus he pretends to get it from ἰέμενος ρεῖ . . . διὰ τὴν εἶναι τῆς ῥοῆς (p. 420). In the same vein he proceeds: ἔρως δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔρρειν ἐξωθεν . . . ἔσρος τὸ παλαιὸν ἐκαλεῖτο (ibid. B). Ast very improbably contends that the words μέρη . . . καλεῖται are interpolated. With more reason the Zur. Edd. bracket τὸν

μέρη ἐπιόντα καὶ ρέοντα, ἃ δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ἥμερος καλεῖται, δεχομένη [τὸν ἥμερον] ἄρδηταί τε καὶ θερμαίνηται, λωφᾶ τε τῆς ὀδύνης καὶ γέγηθεν· ὅταν δὲ χωρὶς γένηται ἢ καὶ αὐχμήσῃ, τὰ τῶν διεξόδων στόματα, ἢ τὸ πτερὸν

ἥμερον as unnecessary. Stallb. defends both. The words ἐπιόντα καὶ ρέοντα are found in the best MSS., but three give ἐπιρρέοντα καὶ ἰόντα, whence Badh. conj. ἰόντα καὶ ἐπιρρέοντα, and so, I suspect, Plato wrote. Krische conj. that the word λωφᾶν was suggested by Empedocl. Carm. 421, οὐποτε δειλαίων ἀχέων λωφῆσете θυμόν, but this seems idle, as λωφᾶν νόσου or ἀπὸ νόσου (Thuc. vi. 12) is found both in popular and medical Greek (Hippocr. ii. 517, Kühn, ποιεῖ λωφᾶν τῆς νόσου. So λ. χόλου, ζυμοφορᾶς, &c.). The popular etym. of λωφᾶν from λόφος is ridiculous, but it may possibly be connected with the Germ. *laben*, 'to refresh,' it being not very unfrequently used transitively, as in Emped. l. 1.; Aesch. Prom. 27, ὁ λωφῆσων γὰρ οὐ πέφυκέ πω; and by Apoll. Rhod.

D. ὅταν δὲ χωρὶς γένηται, κ.τ.λ.] 'when the soul is parted from her beloved, and her moisture fails, then the mouths of the passages, or pores, where the feather is shooting shrivel up, and so close and intercept the nascent germ. Every such germ, imprisoned thus below the surface, along with the infused desire (*ἥμερος*), throbs like a pulsing artery, and knocks at its proper outlet: so that the soul tingles and smarts all over, and is maddened with pain and anguish.' This description has all the gravity of a medical diagnosis, and some part at least of its phraseology is borrowed from medical authors: e. g. we find μύσας στόμα in Hippocr. i. 376, ed. K., συναναίνεται: ib. ii. 140, 207, 795, ζυμύει τὸ στόμα: ib. 794, ἀποκλεισθέντων: ib. σφύζειν: ib. iii. 461, οὐ ἂν ἡ φλέψ ἢ ἐν τῷ ἀγκῶνι σφύζῃ μαρικός, where Galen observes, ἐνδηλὸς ἐστὶ τὸ σφύζειν ἐπὶ τῇ μεγάλῃ οὐτῳ καὶ σφοδρᾷ κινήσει τῶν ἀρτηρίων ἐπιφέρειν. But σφύζειν is also said of any throbbing: σφυγμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἔλκεσιν, Hipp. Aph. 7. 21. Hence in this place τὰ σφύζοντα, sc. μέρη, may be rendered, 'those parts of the body which throb violently.' διεξοδοὶ and ἐγχερίαι are also medical terms, though I have no example *in promptu* where they occur in the senses they bear here. For διεξ. comp. Timaeus

84 c, where διεξόδους = air-passages. Hesych., ἐγχερίαι-τύπτει, ἐγκεντρίζει. Herm., ἐγχερίαι ἀντὶ τοῦ κεντεῖ καὶ ἐπιπίπτει. Comp. Ruhn. ~~Tim.~~ Tim. Lex. v. ἐγχερίπτει: Pors. ad Eur. Or. 909. So much for the phraseology of the passage, which might be much more copiously illustrated. The readings about which there is any dispute are three. I have written ἀποκλῆει for the vulg. ἀποκλείει—two MSS. giving ἀποκλύει. Similarly for ἀποκεκλημένη, — ἀποκεκλεισμένη, ἀποκεκλειμένη, ἀποκεκλιμένη are found. The Bodl. and a few others have ἀποκεκλημένη, whence Bekk. rightly restored ἀποκεκλημένη, and so subsequent edd., who however inconsistently retain ἀποκλείει. It is now pretty generally acknowledged that κλῆω, κλῆσω, κέκληκα, &c. are the true and only Attic forms. So Dind. (in Steph. Lex. v. κλείω) now admits, and he gives citations from the grammarians establishing the point, which is made yet clearer by Cobet, Vv. Ll. p. 159: "Antiquae scripturae quam grammaticorum auctoritas tuetur, passim in libris paulo melioribus aut certa exempla comparent, aut manifesta vestigia in antiquis corruptelis, quae proxime a vero abesse solent, ut in Eccles. 420, ἦν δ' ἀποκλείῃ τῇ θύρᾳ, Ravennas dedit ἀποκλίῃ levi errore pro ἀποκλήῃ (IN pro III), seq." So in Rep. viii. 560 E, κλῆσαιτες has been restored from the oldest Paris MS. for κλείσαντες. For the vulg. ἐκάστη I have given ἐκάστη, sc. βλάστη, in obedience to the suggestion of Ast. βλάστη is here = βλαστὸς rather than βλάστησις, — a sprout or germ, rather than a 'sprouting' (cf. sup. ὁ τοῦ πτεροῦ καυλός). Both senses are acknowledged by the Lexx., though the latter is the more common of the two. In the preceding clause one πτεροῦ βλάστη is put as a specimen of all, and afterwards *each* is said to graze, rub, or prick against its own orifice. The Zur. also gives ἐκάστη, but Stallb. adheres to the MSS., which vary so much in the matter of *i's* subscript, that their authority is of little weight in the present case.

ὄρμῃ, συναναιόμενα μύσαντα ἀποκλήγει τὴν βλάβστην τοῦ
 πτεροῦ. ἡ δ' ἐντὸς μετὰ τοῦ ἡμέρου ἀποκεκλημένη, πη-
 δῶσα οἶον τὰ σφύζοντα, τῇ διεξόδῳ ἐγχρίει ἐκάστη τῇ
 καθ' αὐτήν, ὥστε πᾶσα κεντουμένη κύκλῳ ἡ ψυχὴ οἰστρᾷ
 καὶ ὀδυνᾶται. μνήμην δ' αὖ ἔχουσα τοῦ καλοῦ γέγηθεν.
 ἐκ δ' ἀμφοτέρων μεμιγμένων ἀδημονεῖ τε τῇ ἀτοπία τοῦ
 πάθους καὶ ἀποροῦσα λυττᾷ, καὶ ἔμμανῆς οὔσα οὔτε
 E νυκτὸς δύναται καθεύδειν οὔτε μεθ' ἡμέραν οὐδ' ἂν ᾗ
 μένειν, θεῖ δὲ ποθοῦσα ὅπου ἂν οἴηται ὄψεσθαι τὸν
 ἔχοντα τὸ κάλλος. ἰδοῦσα δὲ καὶ ἐποχετευσασμένη ἡμερον
 ἔλυσεν μὲν τὰ τότε συμπεφραγμένα, ἀναπνοὴν δὲ λαβοῦσα
 κέντρων τε καὶ ὠδίνων ἔληξεν, ἡδονὴν δ' αὖ ταύτην
 252 γλυκυτάτην ἐν τῷ παρόντι καρποῦται. | ὅθεν δὴ ἐκοῦσα
 εἶναι οὐκ ἀπολείπεται, οὐδέ τινα τοῦ καλοῦ περὶ πλείονος
 ποιεῖται, ἀλλὰ μητέρων τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν καὶ ἐταίρων
 πάντων λέλησται, καὶ οὐσίας δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀπολλυμένης
 παρ' οὐδὲν τίθεται, νομίμων δὲ καὶ εὐσχημόνων, οἷς

ἐκ δ' ἀμφοτέρων μεμιγμένων] The states of feeling 'mixed of pleasure and pain' are described less poetically but with equal truth and vivacity in *Phileb.* 46 seq., a passage which the student should by all means compare with the present.

ἀδημονεῖ] She is sore troubled by the strangeness of her sensations. ἀδημονεῖν occurs in company with ἀπορεῖν, also in *Theaet.* 175 D, ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἀδημονῶν καὶ ἀπορῶν. The etymology and consequently the original meaning of the word are uncertain. Buttm. in *Lexil.* derives it from δῆμος, and compares the Germ. 'nicht daheim seyn,' 'unheimlich,' expressions to which we have the counterpart in English. But this is unlikely, in my opinion. Others comp. the Homeric ἀδδηκότες. The adj. ἀδήμων is supposed by Buttm. to be a figment, but ἀδημονέστερος is attested by *Suid.* *Phot.*, ἀδημονεῖν κυρίως τὸ ἀπορεῖν καὶ ἀμχανεῖν ἐν τινὶ δήμῳ ἢ χώρῃ. The latter part of the explanation may be dismissed, but the synonyms are rightly chosen. In *Demosth.* F. L. p. 402 the agitation of a modest female pressed to sing at a riotous party is described by this verb.

E. ἐποχετευσασμένη ἡμερον] 'having

refreshed (irrigated) herself with the love-shower,' or 'effluence of beauty,' before described, 251 B. One MS. has ἀποχετευσασμένη, which is also not amiss. But ἐποχ. occurs *Gorg.* 493 E; *Crit.* 117 B. Presently for ὠδίνων *Badh.* conj. ὀδυνῶν: cf. sup. κεντουμένη ὀδυνᾶται. The confusion of the two words is common. In *Tim.* 81 E, ὀδύνας is the reading of the *Bodl.*; *Bekk.* ὠδίνας, not so well. So too ib. 86 C, ὀδύνας ought not to have been disturbed, as it is the true antitheton to the foregoing ἡδόνas.

252. ὅθεν δὴ] 'and this, you will observe, is the reason why she never willingly quits the presence of the fair one.' *Symp.* 192 D, ὥστε καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν μὴ ἀπολείπεσθαι ἀλλήλων.

νομίμων δέ] 'she makes light too of the laws of custom and etiquette, on the observance of which she once piqued herself, and is prepared to resign her freedom, and to couch (slave-like) as near as they will let her to her love.' An allusion possibly to the custom of lodging servants in the vestibule of the house. *Comp.* *Symp.* 203 D, ἐπὶ θύραις καὶ ἐν ὁδοῖς ὑπαίθριος κοιμώμενος. πόθος is put 'abstract for concrete,' as Ἀφροδίτην for ἐρωμένην in *Eur. Ion* 1103. "Sic Bion,

χ. ε. π.
ν. 3

πρὸ τοῦ ἐκαλλωπίζετο, πάντων καταφρονήσασα δουλεύειν
ἐτοίμη καὶ κοιμᾶσθαι ὅπου ἂν ἐᾷ τις ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ πρό-
θου· πρὸς γὰρ τῷ σέβεσθαι τὸν τὸ κάλλος ἔχοντα ἱατρὸν
εὗρηκε μόνον τῶν μεγίστων πόνων. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πάθος, ἢ
ὦ παῖ καλέ, πρὸς ὃν δὴ μοι ὁ λόγος, ἄνθρωποι μὲν
Ἔρωτα ὀνομάζουσι, θεοὶ δὲ ὁ καλοῦσιν ἀκούσας εἰκότως

i. 53, πόθος δέ μοι ὡς ἕναρ ἔπη: Catull.
ii. 5, Quum desiderio meo nitenti Carum
nescio quid lubet jocari." Ast. Comp.
the use of ἔρωσ presently: τὸν τε οὖν
Ἔρωτα . . . ἐκλέγεται.

πρὸς γὰρ τῷ σέβεσθαι] 'not only does
she worship the possessor of the Beauty,
but in him she has found the sole phy-
sician of her exceeding woes.'

Β. πρὸς ὃν δὴ μοι ὁ λόγος] 'to whom
I am supposed to be speaking.' Sup.
213 E, ποῦ δὴ μοι ὁ παῖς πρὸς ὃν
ἔλεγον;

θεοὶ δὲ ὁ καλοῦσιν] Hom. II. xx. 74,
ὃν Ἐάνθον καλέουσι θεοὶ ἄνδρες δὲ Σκά-
μανδρον: i. 404, ὃν Βριάρεων καλέουσι
θεοὶ ἄνδρες δὲ τε πάντες Αἰγαίωv: xiv.
291, Χαλκίδα κυκλήσκουσι θεοὶ ἄνδρες δὲ
Κύμινδιν. In all these cases the more
significant name is said to be used by
the gods, the unmeaning one by men.
Crat. 391 D, δῆλον ὅτι ὃ γὰρ θεοὶ αὐτὰ
καλοῦσι πρὸς ὁρθότητα ἅπερ ἐστὶ φύσει
ὀνόματα. In this passage, as Lobeck ob-
serves, "Plato Amoris nomen signifi-
cantius manifesto diis tribuit, ita etiam
ceteris exx. apparet divina vocabula
tum ornatiore esse humanis, tum rebus
ipsis accommodatiora" (Aglaph. pp.
860—63). According to the same
authority the ἀπόθετα ἔπη are simply
"apocryphal" lines or poems known
to the few, but not found in the cur-
rent books or editions. Suid., Βιβλίων
σπουδαίων καὶ ἀνακεχωρηκότων, ἀντὶ
τοῦ ἀποκρύφωv (in v. ἀνακεχ.). Id.,
ἀπόθετον τὸ ἀποτεθησαυρισμένον.
Themist. Orat. iv. 60, στίφος ἀρχαίας
σοφίας οὐ κοινῆς οὐδὲ ἐν μέσῳ καλιν-
δομένης, ἀλλ. πανίου καὶ ἀποθέτου.
Such ἀπόθετα were frequently fathered
upon celebrated authors—were in fact
forgeries. Onomacritus, it will be re-
membered, was banished from Athens
for this offence (Herod. vii. 6). The
same Onomacritus had the credit of
being the composer of all—properly of
the more ancient—poems which bore
the pseudonyms of Orpheus and Mu-
saeus. To this apocryphal literature,

originating about the time of Pisis-
tratus, Plato frequently appeals with a
kind of mock solemnity, as if it contained
hidden treasures of ancient wisdom.
Comp. Gorg. 493 A D with Crat. 400 C.
To this Orphic school the two lines here
quoted may possibly have belonged:
"Hos versus non a Platone confictos
puto, qui quum a poetica minime alienus
et in omni genere dicendi potentissimus
esset, haud dubie meliores finxisset, sed
ex alio poeta sumtos, et leni quadam
mutatione ad praesentem causam ac-
commodatos. Nam quum ille (ut exem-
plum ponam) hoc modo scripsisset: Τὸν
δ' ἦτοι θνητοὶ μὲν Ἔρωτα καλοῦσι ποτη-
νόν, Ἀθάνατοι δ' ἀλαῶπα δι' ἡλεόφοιτον
ἀνάγκην, Plato, qui jam multa de alis
dixerat, πτέρωτα ἐτ' πτερόφοιτον substi-
tuit, distichumque ita a se concinnatum
ὑβριστικὸν καὶ οὐ σφόδρα ἔμμετρον vo-
cat, quorum prius de sententia valet,
alterum de modulatione versuum." Lob.
ibid. 861. The alternative supposition,
that Plato invented the lines which he
pretends to quote, is upheld by Ast, and
seems to me not so incredible: for Plato
could doubtless have written bad lines if
it had suited his purpose, and in the
harshness for which he apologizes may
lurk a sarcasm upon the spurious litera-
ture of which they are, on this hypo-
thesis, a parody. Herm., τοῖς ἀποθέτοις
Ὁμήρου ἐξεστὶ πείθεσθαι εἰ βούλοιτό
τις: τοῦτο δὲ εἶπεν, εἰπειδὴ δοκεῖ αὐτὸς
αὐτὰ πλάσαι. In calling the second line
ὑβριστικὸν πάνυ Plato does not refer to
any supposed lewd meaning, as Ast
and Stallb. dream, but simply to the
extravagance of the conception and the
words in which it is embodied, esp.
πτέρωτα,—just as we speak of 'licen-
tiousness' in style or expression. This
sense comes out clearly in the following
passages: Crat. 426 B, ἃ μὲν τοίνυν ἐγὼ
ᾗσθημαι περὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων πάνυ
μοι δοκεῖ ὑβριστικὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα,
'extravagant and ridiculous,' Longinus
ap. Theodoret. Therap. 74. 2, Ζήνωνι
μὲν γὰρ καὶ Κλεάνθει νεμεσῆσειεν ἂν τις

διὰ νεότητα γελάσει. λέγουσι δέ, οἶμαι, τινὲς Ὀμηριδῶν ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων ἐπῶν δύο ἔπη εἰς τὸν Ἑρωτα, ὧν τὸ ἕτερον ὑβριστικὸν πάνυ καὶ οὐ σφόδρα τι ἔμμετρον. ὑμνοῦσι δὲ ὧδε,

τὸν δ' ἦτοι θνητοὶ μὲν Ἑρωτα καλοῦσι ποτηνόν,
ἀθάνατοι δὲ Πτέρωτα, διὰ πτεροφύτον' ἀνάγκην.

τούτοις δὴ ἔξεστι μὲν πείθεσθαι, ἔξεστι δὲ μή· ὅμως δὲ ἢ γε αἰτία καὶ τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐρώντων τοῦτο ἐκείνο τυγχάνει ὄν. τῶν μὲν οὖν Διὸς ὑπαδῶν ὁ ληφθεὶς ἐμβριθεστερον δύναται φέρειν τὸ τοῦ πτερωνύμου ἄχθος· ὅσοι δὲ Ἀρεῶς τε θεραπευταί, καὶ μετ' ἐκείνου περιεπόλουν, ὅταν ὑπ' Ἑρωτος ἀλῶσι καὶ τι οἰηθῶσιν ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπὸ

δικαίως, οὕτω σφόδρα ὑβριστικῶς περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς διαλεχθεῖσιν. ἄμφω γὰρ τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἔφασαν. In the same sense Callias the versifying grammarian is said by Athenaeus to have written certain lines (which he quotes) ἀκολαστότερον κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, x. 454 A. Hermias understands ὑβριστικὸν in the same sense, but conceives the ὕβρις to lie solely in the audacious violation of metre: τὸ δὲ πάνυ ὑβριστικὸν ἡρμήνευσεν διὰ τοῦ εἰπεῖν οὐ σφόδρα τι ἔμμετρον· ἔμμετρον γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἔπος.

C. ἀθάνατοι—ἀνάγκη.] The ἀμετρία for which Plato apologizes consists in the shortening of the δὲ before two consonants, and in the lengthening of the ὕ in πτεροφύτορα. That πτεροφύτορ' and not πτερόφοιτον is the true reading, follows clearly from the context, in which the growth of the feathers and the attendant phenomena are dwelt upon. The reading is preserved in three MSS., also in Stob. Ecl. Phys. p. 23 [103 ed. Gaisf.], and is adopted by Bekker. This is corrupted into πτερόφυτον in the Bodl. and most others, whence the further corruption into πτερόφοιτον adopted by Stepl. from one MS. The 'tendency,' or 'necessity, which gives birth to plumage' is, according to the mythus, the cause of love and of its symptoms, ἢ γε αἰτία καὶ τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐρώντων τοῦτ' ἐκείνο τυγχάνει ὄν. Ast and Stallb., who retain πτερόφοιτον, revel in a licence of interpretation truly *hybristic*. The simple φύτωρ is acknow-

ledged by Hesych. and restored to the text of Soph. Trach. 1031 by Dind. in place of the vulg. φύσαντ'. See his comm. on Sophocles, ed. Oxon. p. 270, where he thus corrects the hitherto unmetrical text:

ὦ Παλλὰς, Παλλὰς, τόδε μ' αὐ λωβᾶται,
τὸν φύτορ' οἰκτεῖρας ἀνεπίφθονον εἵρυσον ἐγχοῖς.

To deny the short quantity of the penult. of φύτωρ is a paradox to me unaccountable, though maintained by Stallb. and apparently by Lobeck also.

ἐμβριθέστερον] 'with greater constancy or sedateness,' as becometh the followers of Zeus, compared with those of less intellectual deities. Ast compares Theæt. 144 B, οἱ ἐμβριθέστεροι νωθοὶ πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα (opposed to ὕξει sup.). Ep. vii. 328 B, τὸ δὲ Δίῳνος ἡπιστάμην τῆς ψυχῆς περὶ φύσει τε ἐμβριθεῖς ὃν ἡλικίας τε ἤδη μετρίως ἔχον. In Plut. Coriol. 220 D ἐμβριθεῖς is coupled with πρᾶον. Herm., κατεσταλμένον καὶ οὐ σφόδρα κεινημένον. Synonymous with βλοσυρὸς and βέβαιος, Rep. vii. 535 A B, where the legislator, in selecting the members of the ruling class, is directed to look out for τοὺς βεβαιοτάτους καὶ ἀνδρειοτάτους, and again, for youths, γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἦθη.

ὅσοι δὲ Ἀρεῶς τε, κ.τ.λ.] Herm., οἱ κάτοχοι τοῦ Διὸς σταθεροὶ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ τοῦ Ἀρεὸς φονικοὶ καὶ ζηλότυποι.

τοῦ ἐρωμένου, φονικοὶ καὶ ἔτοιμοι ^{καὶ ἐν τῇ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἀδελφείᾳ} καθιερεύειν αὐτοὺς
 τε καὶ τὰ παιδικά. καὶ οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον θεόν, οὗ ἕκα- D
 στος ἦν χορευτής, ἐκείνον τιμῶν τε καὶ μιμούμενος εἰς
 τὸ δυνατόν ζῆν, ἕως ἄν ἡ ἀδιάφθορος καὶ τὴν τῇδε
 πρώτην γένεσιν βιοτεύῃ, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ πρὸς τε
 τοὺς ἐρωμένους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὁμιλεῖ τε καὶ προσ-
φέρεται. τὸν τε οὖν Ἐρωτα τῶν καλῶν πρὸς τρόπον
 ἐκλέγεται ἕκαστος, καὶ ὥς θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνον ὄντα ἑαυτῷ,
 οἶον ἄγαλμα τεκταίνεται τε καὶ κατακοσμεῖ, ὥς τιμήσων
 τε καὶ ὀργιάσων. οἱ μὲν δὲ οὖν Διὸς Διόν τινα εἶναι E

D. ἕως ἄν ἡ ἀδιάφθορος] i.e. 'so long as he retains his pristine purity,' undebauched by evil associates, &c. Comp. sup. 250 E, ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ νεοτελής ἢ διεφθαρμένος. For βιοτεύῃ in the next clause the codd. give βιοτεύει, which Heind. corrected.

καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ, κ.τ.λ.] 'and in this wise (sc. κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ θεόν) he demeans himself in his intercourse both with the objects of his passion and with the rest of mankind.'

τὸν τε οὖν Ἐρωτα, κ.τ.λ.] 'hence each man in selecting his love from the ranks of beauty follows his own peculiar bent; his choice being determined by a kind of complexional necessity, the doctrine of 'temperaments' being thus early, it would seem, connected with the notion of a 'ruling deity.' πρὸς τρόπου is here equiv. to πρὸς τοῦ οἰκείου τρόπου. So Luggs, iv. 721 E, πρὸς τοῦ Λακωνικοῦ τρόπου. It is more usually adverbial, as Rep. v. 170 E, πρὸς τρόπον λέγω (rite), and opposed to ἀπὸ τρόπου, which occurs inf. 278 D. So πρὸς λόγῳ, (Gorg. 454) C, if the reading is correct. Presently τεκταίνεται, 'moulds or fashions,' is explained by ρυθμίζοντες, inf. 253 B.

τιμήσων τε καὶ ὀργιάσων] Equiv. to ὀργίλοις τιμήσων. ὀργιάζειν θεῷ is the usual construction, but in later writers we have also ὀργ. θεόν, 'to celebrate with mystic rites.'

E. οἱ μὲν δὲ οὖν Διὸς Διόν τινα, κ.τ.λ.] 'hence it comes that the followers of Love are curious that he they love shall be of the Jovial type of soul,' i.e. one in whom intellect is predominant. The reading Διόν is well supported by MS. authority, the Bodl. δι' ὃν being only a corruption of it. It is recognized by Hermias in comm., and by Proclus,

Alcib. i. (p. 310 Cousin, ὁ τοίνυν διός καὶ ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν), who elsewhere speaks of Δίος ζώῃ (Comm. in Tim. 45 E, 319 D), using also the adverbs δίως καὶ ἡράλιος, 'Jovialiter' and 'Junonice.' Suid., Δίος ὀργῇ καὶ Δίος βωμός. 'The-mist. Or. xiii. 165 c, ἀμφοῖν ἀγαθοῖν μὲν καὶ ἀτεχνῶς Δίῳιν (ap. Piers. ad Moerid. p. 186, q. v.). We have also Δίος as a proper name in Plut. Mor. 421 E. Stallb. and the Zur. Ed. give Διόν, which has but one considerable MS. in its favour. For the idea, which was afterwards adopted and improved upon by Neo-Platonists ancient and modern, compare Horace's Mercurialium custos virorum. Also Shakspeare, Cymbeline iv. 2, "His foot Mercurial; his Martial thigh: The brawns of Hercules: but his Jovial face?" ib. v. 4, "Our Jovial star reigned at his birth." Spenser, F. Q. ii. 12, st. 51, "Thereto the heavens always Jovial Lookt on them lovely:" explained by "under the aspect of the planet Jupiter." It is an interesting question how much of the 'occult science,' so popular at the time of the Renaissance, may be traced up to the Platonic myths. We have clear traces of the doctrine of planetary influence in Proclus, and in the Neo-platonic treatises which bear the name of Hermes Trismegistus, to which Cornelius Agrippa frequently appeals. The curious are referred to the Occulta Philosophia of the latter, B. ii. c. 59, De septem mundi Gubernatoribus planetis, ib. c. 60, fin., a passage which seems suggested by 253 A of this dialogue, read, of course, through Neo-platonic glasses. B. iii. c. 38, treats of the question "Quae divina dona homo desuper a singulis caelorum et intelligentiarum ordinibus accipiat." Compare

ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἐρώμενον. σκοποῦσιν οὖν εἰ φιλόσοφος τε καὶ ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ὅταν αὐτὸν εὐρόντες ἐρασθῶσι, πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὅπως τοιοῦτος ἔσται. ἐὰν οὖν μὴ πρότερον ἐμβεβῶσι τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι, τότε ἐπιχειρήσαντες μανθάνουσί τε ὅθεν ἂν τι δύνωνται καὶ αὐτοὶ μετέρχονται. ἰχνεύοντες δὲ παρ' ἑαυτῶν ἀνευ-
 253 ρίσκειν τὴν τοῦ σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν, | εὐποροῦσι διὰ τὸ συντόνως ἡναγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτοῦ τῇ μνήμῃ, ἐνθουσιῶντες, ἐξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθῃ καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ' ὅσον δυνατόν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν. καὶ τούτων δὴ τὸν ἐρώμενον

also ib. c. 46 seq. for the four kinds of 'furor divinus,' also Proclus in Timaeum, p. 45 E, 319 D,—both curious passages, as showing the astrological interpretation put by his Greek commentators upon Plato's mythical psychology. Among the εἶδη ζωῆς enumerated by Proclus, are the Κρόνιον (according to him the highest type of all), the Δίον, Ἡλιακόν, Σεληνιακόν, Ἀρεικόν, Ἀφροδισιακόν, Ἑρμαϊκόν, on each of which he spends a great deal of fanciful ingenuity. The following passage contains a résumé of the Neo-platonic theory of astral influence on human character: ὅθεν καὶ λέγειν τινὲς εἰώθασιν ὡς τὸ μὲν νοερὸν αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) τῇ ἀπλανεῖ (sc. σφαίρᾳ) τέτακται ἀνὰ λόγον, τοῦ δὲ λόγου τὸ μὲν θεωρητικὸν τῷ Κρόνῳ, τὸ δὲ πολιτικὸν τῷ Δίῳ, τοῦ δὲ ἀλόγου τὸ μὲν θυμοειδὲς Ἀρεῖ, τὸ δὲ φωνητικὸν Ἑρμῇ, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν Ἀφροδίτῃ, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικὸν Ἥλῳ, τὸ δὲ φυτικὸν Σελήνῃ, (ib. 348 A). This preference of the Saturnine temperament seems grounded on the dictum of Aristotle, ὅτι οἱ εὐφυεῖς μελαγχολικοί.

εἶναι [ζητοῦσι] Inf. 253 B, ζητοῦσι πεφυκέναι. Rep. ii. 375 E, οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ζητοῦμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα.

καὶ ὅταν αὐτὸν, κ.τ.λ.] The true ἐραστής, unlike the selfish lover described in the former Socratic speech, sup. 239 B, uses every effort to develop the faculties of the ἐρώμενος, and to make him φιλόσοφος τε καὶ ἡγεμονικός. The latter word is of course used in its esoteric sense, Zeus being the symbol of the universal Reason, the μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ. In the next sentence Plato seems to intimate that the 'follower of

Zeus' is in some cases unconscious of his high vocation until stimulated by the converse of a kindred spirit. If the lover have not previously been grounded in the study of philosophy, he sets about it now, and in addition to his own researches he has recourse to every accessible source of knowledge. τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι is equiv. to τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, as Heind. remarks.

ἰχνεύοντες δέ, κ.τ.λ.] The idea of 'tracking' is implied in the foregoing μετέρχονται (inf. 276 D, τῷ ταῦτον ἰχνοῦς μετιόντι). In endeavouring to detect by traces in his own nature the true character of the god to whom he belongs,—the Lover finds his search facilitated by the very necessity he feels of gazing intently upon that god. The obscurity of this passage escapes the comm. πρὸς τὸν θεὸν seems to refer both to Zeus, and to his incarnate image in the person of the beloved, which, mystically speaking, may be looked upon as one and the same. Comp. sup. καὶ ὡς θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνον ὄντα ἑαυτῷ. It is the Jovial element in the loved one, which produces an ἀνάμνησις of the archetypal Zeus: just as the contemplation of sensible beauty recalls the τὸ καλὸν itself. In other words, the philosophic genius of the beloved reminds the Lover of his own vocation, and makes him long to bring his manners and pursuits into conformity with the highest reason. To teach and to learn are, in the Socratic view, but parts of the same process,—master and pupil being συνθιασῶνται of the same god.

253. θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν] This μέθεξις is represented as an ὁμοίωσις in

αἰτιώμενοι ἔτι τε μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ἐκ Διὸς ἀρύτωςιν ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι, ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου ψυχὴν ἐπαν-
 τλοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ὡς δυνατόν ὁμοιότατον τῷ σφετέρῳ
 θεῷ. ὅσοι δ' αὖ μεθ' Ἡρας εἶποντο, βασιλικὸν ζητοῦσι, B
 καὶ εὐρόντες περὶ τοῦτον πάντα δρῶσι τὰ αὐτά. οἱ δὲ
 Ἀπόλλωνός τε καὶ ἐκάστου τῶν θεῶν οὕτω κατὰ τὸν
 θεὸν ἰόντες ζητοῦσι τὸν σφέτερον παῖδα πεφυκέναι, καὶ
 ὅταν κτήσωνται, μιμούμενοι αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ
 πείθοντες καὶ ῥυθμίζοντες εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ
 ἰδέαν ἄγουσιν, ὅση ἐκάστῳ δύναμις, οὐ φθόνῳ οὐδ' ἀνε-
 λευθέρῳ δυσμενείᾳ χρώμενοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά, ἀλλ' εἰς
 ὁμοιότητα αὐτοῖς καὶ τῷ θεῷ, ὃν ἂν τιμῶσι, πᾶσαν πάντως C
 ὅ τι μάλιστα πειρώμενοι ἄγειν οὕτω ποιοῦσι. προθυμία

Theact. 176 B, ὁμ. θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ὁμοίῳσι δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονή-
 σεως γενέσθαι. So created things are
 sometimes spoken of as μετέχοντα,
 sometimes as μιμήματα τῶν ὄντων.

καὶ ἐκ Διὸς ἀρύτωςιν ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι.]
 "Reason being the Zeus in man," says
 Krisehe, "Plato may have mythically
 denoted the act of pure thought as a
 drawing draughts from Zeus himself, a
 process which he happily compares with
 that of the Bacchic women," who are
 represented by Euripides as causing
 water to burst from the rock, and wine,
 honey, and milk from the dry ground.
 Bacch. 142, 701 seq. This entire passage
 is well illustrated by a fragment of
 Aeschines Socraticus, ap. Aristid. Rhet.
 ii. p. 23, Dind. (to which Stallb. also
 refers, as well as to Ion 532): ἐγὼ δὲ
 διὰ τὴν ἔρωτα ἂν ἐτύγχανον ἐρῶν Ἀλκι-
 βιάδου οὐδὲν διάφορον τῶν Βακχῶν ἐπε-
 πόνθειν. καὶ γὰρ αἱ βάκχαι ἐπειδὴν
 ἐρθεοὶ γένωνται, ὕδην οἱ ἄλλοι ἐκ τῶν
 ἀνάκτων οὐδὲ ὕδωρ δύνανται ὑδρεύσθαι,
 ἐκείναι μέλι καὶ γάλα ἀρύονται (l. ἀρύ-
 τονται). καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ οὐδὲν μάθημα
 ἐπιστάμενος ἢ διδάξαι ἀνθρώπων ὠφελή-
 σαιμ' ἂν, ὅμως ἄμην ξυνὼν ἂν ἐκείνῳ διὰ
 τὸ ἐρῶν βελτίῳ ποιῆσαι.

ὅσοι δ' αὖ μεθ' Ἡρας] Hera is the
 symbol of the practical as Zeus of the
 speculative intellect. Her votaries are
 not philosophers, but rather men born
 for empire: βασιλεῖς ἔθνημοι ἢ πολεμικοὶ
 καὶ ἀρχικοὶ (248 D). Eustath. p. 81,
 "Ἡρα γὰρ καὶ ἡ βασιλεία, καὶ ἡραία ζωὴ ἡ

βασιλική. The MSS. give the whim-
 sical variant μεθ' ἡμέρας.

B. οἱ δὲ Ἀπόλλωνος] It is not clear
 whether poets come under this category.
 Probably not all, but only the lyrical.
 It may also include the seer and the
 physician. Aesch. Eum. 62, ἱατρό-
 μαντις δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τερασκόπος καὶ τοῖσιν
 ἄλλοις δωμάτων καθάρσιος.

οὕτω κατὰ τὸν θεὸν ἰόντες] οὕτω be-
 longs here to πεφυκέναι, the next clause
 being expegetic, "dei sui exemplum
 sectantes" (Stallb.). The use of ἔρωσ
 as an engine of education was no new
 idea in Greece. Compare Eurip. Med.
 814 with Frag. inc. 889, Nauck, παλ-
 δευμα δ' ἔρωσ σοφίας ἀρετῆς Πλείστον
 ὑπάρχει: and Diety's, 342 (Frag. viii.
 Dind.).

καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείθοντες] Herm.,
 τέλος γὰρ τῆς ἑρωτικῆς τὸ ἀντέρωτα
 γεννήσαι. ῥυθμίζοντες, shaping or con-
 forming them to the mode of life and
 the moral standard proper to the god
 they serve.

οὐ φθόνῳ] This, as Hermias remarks,
 has reference to the φθόνος attributed to
 the ἐραστῆς in the Speech of Lysias: οὐ
 δυσμενοῦντες ὡς οἱ νόθοι ἐρασταί . . .
 ὃ γὰρ βούλονται ἑαυτοῖς, τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς
 ἐρωμένοισι: μία γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ζωὴ αὐτῶν
 τοιοῦτο δὲ ἦσαν καὶ οἱ Πυθαγορεῖοι:
 ὕδην καὶ φέρεται Πυθαγορείου τινος τοῦτο
 τὸ βῆμα τὸ τί ἐστι φίλος; ἄλλος
 ἐγὼ (p. 166, Ast).

C. οὕτω ποιοῦσι] A parallel collocation
 is found in Phaed. 67 D, παρασκευάζονθ'.

μὲν οὖν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐρώντων καὶ τελετή, εἴαν γε διαπράξωνται ὃ προθυμοῦνται, ἣν λέγω, οὕτω καλή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονικὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δι' ἔρωτα μανέντος φίλου τῷ φιληθέντι γίγνεται, εἰαν αἰρεθῇ. ἀλίσκεται δὲ δὴ ὁ αἰρεθεὶς τοιῶδε τρόπῳ.

Καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦδε τοῦ μύθου τριχῇ διείλομεν ψυχὴν ἐκάστην, ἵππομόρφῳ μὲν δύο τινὲ εἶδη, ἡνιοχικὸν δὲ εἶδος τρίτον, καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἡμῖν ταῦτα μενέτω. τῶν δὲ δὴ ἵππων ὁ μὲν, φαμέν, ἀγαθός, ὁ δ' οὐ. ἀρετὴ δὲ τίς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ κακία, οὐ διείπομεν, νῦν δὲ

ἐαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, as if he had said οὕτω ζῆν ὥστε παρασκευάζειν. Comp. Gorg. 507 D, πάντα . . . εἰς τοῦτο . . . ξυντείνοντα . . . οὕτω πράττειν.

προθυμία μὲν οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] Such, says Soer., is the high object the true lover strives after, so glorious and so fraught with bliss to the beloved the secret rites celebrated by his love-frenzied admirer if he be successful in his suit. ἣν λέγω is to be taken with οὕτω according to Ast, as if we had found οὕτως, ὡς λέγω, καλή. He quotes Gorg. 473 E, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς ἀ οὐδεὶς ἀν φήσειεν. But query? Stallb.'s ἢ λέγω, which he takes with διαπρ., is perhaps better than the vulg. The change had been recommended by Heind., with the remark "ipsum quoque admodum friget." The τελετή is the initiation into the mysteries of philosophy—the ἐπιτήδευμα δῖον—for though those of other deities have been mentioned, it is this study which Soer. has principally in view. For γε διαπραξ., the reading of most MSS. and Bekk. is γ' ἐνδιαπράσσονται. διαπράσσονται is adopted by Stallb. and the Zur., and is found also in Hermeias, who omits the γ'. The old reading will give the sense 'if they succeed in working in the beloved the effect they desire to produce.' But this seems more and less than the context requires. The force of γε is—'a τελετή, as in truth it is, if the lover achieve his object.' διαπράσσονται is here used in the spiritual as before, 234 A and elsewh., in the vulgar sense. εἰαν αἰρεθῇ is an explanatory repetition of εἰαν διαπράσσωνται ὃ προθυμοῦνται. For the use of the verb comp. Iys. 206 A, οὐκ ἐπαίει τὸν ἐρώμενον πρὶν

ἀν ἔλθ. Obs. that ἐάλω ἐάλωκα are the usual Attic passives of αἰρεῖν, ἡρέθην ἡρημαί being commonly the passives of αἰρεῖσθαι, *eligere*. But exceptions occur, as Phileb. 66, περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον . . . τὴν αἰδίων ἡρήσθαι φύσιν, where, if ἡρήσθαι be interpreted 'captain esse,' in allusion to the foregoing chase (τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεῖσαι, 64 E), there is no necessity for the emend. εὐρήσθαι suggested by Badh., and which I once approved.

Καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ] Soer. now proceeds to make the ends of his discourse meet, by showing (1) the relation between the doctrine of ἀνάνησις and that of the tripartite soul, sup. 216; and (2) the relation of both doctrines to the phenomena of Love.

διείλομεν] MSS. διειλόμην, corr. Heind. Later edd. perversely restore the evidently vicious reading of the MSS. Compare Soph. 220 v, where the same corruption occurs, διελοίμην for διείλομεν. Soer. has throughout spoken in the plural, and continues to do so both here and in the dialogue quoted. It is a part of his *ειρωνεία* to represent the mythus as a joint performance. Ast however defends διειλόμην by 215 v, τοσαῦτα μὲν σοι καὶ ἔτι πλείω ἔχω μαρίας γιγνομένης ἀπὸ θεῶν λέγειν καλὰ ἔργα: ὥστε τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ μὴ φοβώμεθα, μηδέ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θορυβεῖται. But here we must remember Soer. is engaged in a dialogue with an imaginary παῖς καλός, πρὸς ὃν δὴ ὁ λόγος—a personage of whom he has by this time lost sight. εἶδη is an Attic dual, for the common εἶδεε, as we have φύση in Rep. 410 E, and πόλῃ in Isocr. Paneg. 54.

λεκτέον. ὁ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτοῖν ἐν τῇ καλλίονι στάσει ὦν

D. ὁ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτοῖν ἐν τῇ καλλίονι στάσει ὦν] i.e. ὁ ἐν δεξιᾷ, the off-horse being usually the better, as the epith. *δεξιόσειρος* implies. In the description of the two steeds there is an evident parallelism: but in some of the details a certain liberty has been taken. Thus, while ὀρθός and σκόλιος, ἐπίγρυπος and σιμοπρόσωπος, λευκὸς ἰδεῖν and μελάγχρως answer literally to each other, the relation of the other contrasted features is rather essential than verbal. For instance, to διηρθρωμένος, 'clean-limbed,' 'with joints well defined,' respond two epithets, πολὺς (= *nimius*, lumbering, over-large, or, as our jockeys say, 'too much of a horse') and εἰκὴ συμπεφορμένος, ill-made, as if thrown together at hap-hazard. Again, μελανόμματος answers to γλαυκόμματος ὕφαιμος, 'with grey and bloodshot eyes.' J. Poll. 2. 62, ὕφαιμον βλέποντες ὀφθαλμοί. This is better than Stallb's "sanguineus," referring to the general temperament. For there is nothing to answer to this in the former catalogue, and the restive horse would scarcely have been called 'sanguine,' but rather 'phlegmatic,' or 'choleric.' The necessity for two epithets, κρατερὰν χῆν and βραχυτράχηλος, answering to the single ὕψυχῆν, is not so manifest; and the antithesis between τιμῆς ἐραστῆς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς on the one hand, and ὕβρεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος on the other, seems complete without the addition of the words καὶ ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἑταῖρος to the former. ἀληθινῆς δόξης is interpreted "verae opinionis:" but it may well be doubted whether this is possible. ἀληθὴς δόξα has a definite sense in Plato, but where does he use ἀληθινῇ in such connexion? 'Veritable opinion' would rather denote δόξα as distinguished from ἐπιστήμη, and in this case the epithet would be the reverse of laudatory. It is remarkable that Hermias takes no notice of this clause, and this aggravates its suspicious appearance. Lastly, in the description of the bad steed, the clauses περὶ ὧτα λάσιος, κωφός, answer to nothing very definite in the portrait of his yoke-fellow. If περὶ ὧτα λάσιος simply mean 'stupid,' 'senseless' (see Photius, quoted presently), and κωφός be taken with the succeeding clause, we have a kind of antithesis to ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἑταῖρος, supposing the common interpretation of

these words to stand. But I cannot consent to separate μετὰ σωφροσύνης καὶ αἰδοῦς from τιμῆς ἐραστῆς, as in that case the opposition to ὕβρ. καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος would be incomplete. As regards the text, it may be observed that besides βραχυτράχηλος for βραχυτρ. there is no considerable variant in the MS. readings as given by Bekk., with the remarkable exception λασιόκωφος, which the Bodl. and some others have. Porson, who examined the Bodl. before it went to Oxford, seems to have adopted this compound in lieu of the vulg. λάσιος, κωφός, and he is supported by Phot. in Lex.: λασιόκωφος ὁ λίαν κωφός, οἷον λάσια τὰ ὧτα ἔχων ὡς συγκεκωφῶσθαι καὶ ἀναισθητεῖν, evidently referring to this passage, to which the reference is still more explicit in Synesius, Encom. Calv. 67 D, εἰ δὲ καὶ Πλάτων τὸν ἄδικον ἵππον περὶ ὧτα λασιόκωφον λέγει. Add Hesych., λασιόκωφους τοὺς κωφούς. The reading is therefore not derived from the Bodl., as Stallb. thinks, but is of high antiquity, and the temptation to receive it would have been great, were it not that the still more ancient 'Homerical Allegories' of Heraclitus (hitherto called *Heraclides*) rather countenance the vulg. We there read περιωτάσιος ὑπόκωφος (comp. Ar. Eq. 43, γερόντιον ὑπόκωφον). The entire passage is quoted by Heraclitus, cap. xvii. p. 36, ed. Mehler. He gives besides the vv. ll. τό τ' εἶδος for the vulg. τότε: omits ἀληθινῆς before δόξης, as does the Cod. Vat., inspected by Cobet; for κελεύματι μόνον καὶ λόγῳ he gives κελεύσματος καὶ λόγῳ μόνῳ: for βραχυτράχηλος, πολυτράχηλος: for μελάγχρως, μελανόχρως: and for μόγις, μόλις. Amid this discrepancy of authorities I have not ventured to alter the received text, though by no means satisfied with it.—The description of the better horse is illustrated by Virg. Georg. iii. 79, Illi ardua cervix, Argutunque caput, brevis alvus, obesaque terga: Luxuriatque toris animosum pectus. Also by Shaksp., Venus and Adonis, "Round-hoofed, short-jointed, fetlocks shag and long: Broad breast, full eyes, small head and nostril wide: High crest, short ears, straight legs and passing strong: Thin mane, thick tail, broad buttock, tender hide." For ὕψυχῆν compare Xen. Eq. i. 8, ἀπὸ τοῦ στέγνου ὁ μὲν αὐχλὴν αὐτοῦ μὴ ὥσπερ καπροῦ προπετῆς πεφύκει (this seems to

τό τ' εἶδος ὀρθὸς καὶ διηρθρωμένος, ὑψαύχην, ἐπίγρυ-
πος, λευκὸς ἰδεῖν, μελανόματος, τιμῆς ἐραστῆς μετὰ
σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς, καὶ ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἐταῖρος,
ἄπληκτος, κελεύματι μόνον καὶ λόγῳ ἡνιοχεῖται ὁ δ'
E αὐτὸ σκολιός, πολὺς, εἰκῇ συμπεφορημένος, κρατεραύχην,
βραχυτράχηλος, σιμοπρόσωπος, μελάγχρως, γλαυκόμμα-
τος, ὕφαιμος, ὕβρεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἐταῖρος, περὶ ὧτα
λάσιος, κωφός, μάλιστα μετὰ κέντρων μόγις ὑπέικων. ὅταν
δ' οὖν ὁ ἡνίοχος ἰδὼν τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα, πᾶσαν αἰσθή-

countenance the v. l. *βαρυτράχηλος* in the second portrait) ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀλεκ-
τρυνός ὀρθὸς πρὸς τὴν κορυφὴν ἦκοι.

ἐπίγρυπος] 'hook-nosed,'—a feature of a serviceable though hardly of a handsome steed, but in a man a sign of dignity and good descent. Ast quotes Rep. 474 D, τοῦ δὲ τὸ γρυπὸν βασιλικὸν φατε εἶναι. J. Poll. ii. 73, βλν ἐπίγρυπος, ὅν καὶ βασιλικὸν οἰονταί.

λευκὸς ἰδεῖν] Virg. Georg. l. 1. color deterimus albis,—a difference of opinion which it is hardly necessary to discuss. Comp. Conington in loc. Probably Plato is thinking of the inward purity of which whiteness is the symbol, as in the following epithets, τιμῆς ἐραστῆς, κ.τ.λ. he speaks of human rather than equine qualities. In ἀπληκτος . . . ἡνιοχεῖται he mixes both natures in the description, λόγῳ being applicable only to men.

E. βραχυτράχηλος] The v. l. πολυ-
τράχηλος is supported by Xen. Eq. i. 8, λαγάρδ' δὲ εἶη (ὁ αὐχὴν) τὰ κατὰ τὴν συγκαμπήν, as βαρυτράχηλος is by the passage quoted sup. But a 'short throat,' combined with a thick neck, would cause a horse to be προπετής ὥσπερ καπρός, as Xen. expresses it. A fanciful etymologist might be inclined to connect the verb 'to bore,' used of a horse who carries his head low, with this phrase of Xenophon's, and to spell it accordingly.

σιμοπρόσωπος] This, in a stage-mask, was a physiognomy proper to menials. J. Poll. iv. 151, τὸ οἰκύνον γραῖδιον σιμόν. So Herm., εὐτελής, χαμαιπετής καὶ οὐχὶ βασιλικός. Others explain τὸ σιμόν as a sign of λαγνεία.

γλαυκόματος, ὕφαιμος] Ast suggests καὶ ὕφαιμος. I have already said that the latter word refers to the eyes, as γλαυκος alone sometimes means 'grey-

eyed,' Lat. *caesius*. In this there seems to me no difficulty, but Badh., more fastidious, leaves the meaning of the word in doubt, thinking that it is the antitheton of τιμῆς ἐραστῆς. I confess I do not see how this can be the case; unless we press into the service a phrase in the Physiognomonica attributed to Aristotle (c. 3, p. 807, Bekk.), where among the ἀναιδοῦς σημεία occurs τὸ χρῶμα ὕφαιμον. But in the same place we also read βλέφαρα ὕφαιμα καὶ παχέα. It is curious that the early Greek physiognomists found their art on a comparison between the bestial and human. Thus Aeschylus uses both ἵππογνώμων and προβοτογνώμων in reference to human affairs. It is not to be supposed that Plato was the first who speculated in this tempting field.

ὅταν δ' οὖν ὁ ἡνίοχος, κ.τ.λ.] The mind, in the first instance, through the channel of the senses, apprehends the beauty of the ἐρώμενος, but the effect of this perception is not confined to the rational, but extends to the entire soul, both in its emotive and concupiscent region. This is evidently Plato's meaning; allegorically it is the driver who 'espies the amatory (love-inspiring) spectacle, and by sense diffuses a glow through the whole soul,' whereby he is himself 'filled with titillation and the stings of desire.' The two horses, we find, are, each in his own way, affected with the passion of Love. So too is the rational soul, which from the aspect of sensible conceives an uneasy yearning for ideal beauty. Without the aid of the senses, which are the ministers of the understanding, neither the affections nor the appetites could be warmed and excited. The τοῦς therefore, in its wider sense, may justly be said πᾶσαν αἰσθῆσει

σει διαθερμίνας τὴν ψυχὴν, γαργαλισμοῦ τε καὶ πόθου
 κέντρων ὑποπλησθῇ, | ὁ μὲν εὐπειθὴς τῷ ἡνιόχῳ τῶν 254
 ἵππων, αἰεὶ τε καὶ τότε αἰδοῖ βιαζόμενος, ἑαυτὸν κατέχει
 μὴ ἐπιπηδᾶν τῷ ἔρωμένῳ· ὁ δὲ οὔτε κέντρων ἡνιοχικῶν
 οὔτε μᾶστιγος ἔτι ἐντρέπεται, σκιρτῶν δὲ βία φέρεται,
 καὶ πάντα πράγματα παρέχων τῷ σύζυγί τε καὶ ἡνιόχῳ
 ἀναγκάζει ἰέναι τε πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ μνείαν ποιεῖσθαι
 τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων χάριτος. τῷ δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀντι-
 τείνεται ἀγανακτοῦντε, ὡς δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα ἀναγκα- B
 ζομένῳ τελευτῶντε δέ, ὅταν μὴδὲν ἧ πέρας κακοῦ, πο-
 ρεύεσθον ἀγομένῳ, εἴξαντε καὶ ὁμολογήσαντε ποιήσιν τὸ
 κελευόμενον. καὶ πρὸς αὐτῷ τ' ἐγένοντο καὶ εἶδον τὴν
 ὄψιν τὴν τῶν παιδικῶν ἀστράπτουσαν. ἰδόντος δὲ τοῦ
 ἡνιόχου ἡ μνήμη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν ἠνέχθη,
 καὶ πάλιν εἶδεν αὐτὴν μετὰ σωφροσύνης ἐν ἀγνῷ βάθρῳ

διαθερμαίνειν τὴν ψυχὴν. Comp. inf. 255, τὸ βέβημα . . . διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων ἰόν, ἢ πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἰέναι. These considerations seem to remove the difficulty with regard to αἰσθήσει, and prevent us from yielding to Stallb.'s proposal of substituting διαθερμίναν for διαθερμίνας,—a change in every point of view undesirable. Presently, 254 c, the ἀγαθὸς ἵππος in his turn ἰδράτι πᾶσαν ἔβρεξε τὴν ψυχὴν. The psychology of the passage is Platonic, if not in all points unexceptionable. Particularly striking is the description of passionate love, as distinguished from mere lust. The 'obedient steed' is restrained by shame from violence; true passion being always united with sexual modesty, αἰεὶ τε καὶ τότε, 'then as always.' Compare with the entire passage 251 c, ὅταν μὲν σὺν, βλέπουσα πρὸς τὸ τοῦ παιδὸς κάλλος . . . θερμαίνεται, and *ibid.* b, δεξάμενος τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροήν διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων, ἐθέρμανθη, κ.τ.λ. The use of ὄμμα for ὄψιν is poetical, and frequent in tragedy. For ὑποπλησθῇ comp. Protag. init., πῶγανος ἤδη ὑποπιμπλάμενος: sup. 251 b, ὑπὲρ πάν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος.

254. τῷ σύζυγί τε καὶ ἡνιόχῳ] Observe that the article affects both nouns, though relating to different subjects. In such cases τε occurs usually before καί, but not always. Eur. *Herc. Fur.* 140, τὴν Ἡράκλειον πατέρα καὶ ξυνάορον, 'the sire and (the) spouse of Hercules.'

τῷ δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀντιτείνετον] The two are of course the λογικὸν and the θυμοειδὲς μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, which combine to resist the mere animal appetite. Presently we find that the driver 'brings both horses on their haunches:' but there is this difference, that the better horse makes no resistance. So in Rep. iv. 410 b, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτὸν (τὸν θυμὸν) κοινωήσαντα, αἰροῦντος λόγον μὴ δεῖν τι πράττειν, οἶμαι σε οὐκ ἂν φάναι γενομένου ποτὲ ἐν σεαυτῷ τοῦ τοιοῦτου αἰσθέσθαι, οἶμαι δ' οὐδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ.

b. τελευτῶντε δέ, κ.τ.λ.] Ultimately, when they are weary of resisting, the driver and his ally are fain to come to terms with the refractory steed. They yield for a while, but so soon as they come in presence of the beloved, the aspect of his beauty awakens the repugnance of the driver by reviving the memory of the absolutely Beautiful (αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ κάλλους μνήμην). Comp. with this passage one of Galen, de Hippocr. et Platone, vi. 510, Kühn., πολλάκις μὲν ἔπειτα τῷ θυμοειδεῖ τὰ λοιπὰ δύο, πολλάκις δὲ τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ, καθάπερ ἐλκόμενα καὶ συρόμενα παραπλήσιον τρόπον ὥσπερ καὶ ξυναρίδες ἵππων, κ.τ.λ.

ἐν ἀγνῷ βάθρῳ] 'on a holy pedestal,'—an allusion doubtless to the images in the adytum at Eleusis. Paus. iii. 19. 3, τοῦ δὲ ἀγάλματος τὸ βάθρον παρέχεται βωμοῦ σχῆμα. Etym. M., βάθρον· βῆμα ἢ βάσις τοῦ ἀνδριάντος. So also Hesych.

βεβῶσαν. ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἔδειςέ τε καὶ σεφθεῖσα ἀνέπεσεν
 C ὑπτία, καὶ ἅμα ἡμαγκάσθη εἰς τοῦπίσω ἐλκύσαι τὰς ἡνίας
 οὕτω σφόδρα, ὥστε ἐπὶ τὰ ἰσχία ἄμφω καθίσαι τῷ ἵππῳ,
 τὸν μὲν ἐκόντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτείνειν, τὸν δὲ ὑβριστὴν
 μάλα ἄκοντα. ἀπελθόντε δὲ ἀπωτέρω, ὁ μὲν ὑπ' αἰσχύ-
 νης τε καὶ θάμβους ἰδρῶτι πᾶσαν ἔβρεξε τὴν ψυχὴν, ὁ
 δέ, λήξας τῆς ὀδύνης ἦν ὑπὸ τοῦ χαλινοῦ τε ἔσχε καὶ
 τοῦ πτώματος, μόγις ἐξαναπνεύσας ἐλοιδόρησεν ὀργῇ,
 D πολλὰ κακίζων τὸν τε ἡνίοχον καὶ τὸν ὁμόζυγα ὡς δειλία
 τε καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ λιπόντε τὴν τάξιν καὶ ὁμολογίαν. καὶ
 πάλιν οὐκ ἐθέλοντας προσιέναι ἀναγκάζων μόγις συνε-
 χώρησε, δεομένων εἰσαῦθις ὑπερβαλέσθαι. ἐλθόντος δὲ
 τοῦ συντεθέντος χρόνου, [οὗ] ἀμνημονεῖν προσποιουμένῳ
 ἀναμνησκῶν, βιαζόμενος, χρεμετίζων, ἔλκων ἠνάγκασεν
 αὐτὸν προσελθεῖν τοῖς παιδικοῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους.
 καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ἦσαν, ἐγκύψας καὶ ἐκτείνας τὴν κέρκον,
 ἐνδακὼν τὸν χαλινόν, μετ' ἀναιδείας ἔλκει. ὁ δ' ἡνίοχος

σεφθεῖσα] Hesych., ἐσέφθην ἐσεβάσ-
 θην, ἡσυχάσας ἡσυχόσθην. Σοφοκλῆς Δαι-
 δάλλω (Frag. 175, Dind.). This deponent
 aor. formed contrary to analogy from
 σέβουαι, is noted by other grammarians
 as occurring only twice, here and in Soph.
 I. I. The MSS. have the variants στεφ-
 θεῖσα, στρεφθεῖσα, στραφείσα, ὀφθεῖσα.
 Comp. Ellendt, Lex. Soph. in v. σέβω.

C. ὡς—λιπόντε τὴν τάξιν καὶ ὁμο-
 λογίαν] As guilty of λιποτάξιον in
 breaking the terms of the agreement.
 The τε which Badh. would insert seems
 unnecessary. Hipp. Maj. 293 D, ἐλεήσας
 μου τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἀπαίδευσιν.

D. καὶ πάλιν, κ.τ.λ.] 'after one more
 attempt to force his unwilling companions
 to draw nigh to the beloved, he has to
 yield a reluctant assent to their prayer
 for further delay.' The aorists in this
 passage and the context are illustrated
 by Phaed. 73 D (quoted by Heind.),
 οὐκοῦν οἴσθα, ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταὶ ὕταν ἰῶσι
 λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ τι ἄλλο οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ
 αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο;
 ἐγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν, καὶ ἐν τῇ δια-
 νοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδός, οὗ ἦν
 ἡ λύρα. For ὑπερβαλέσθαι the Attic
 verb in use is ἀναβαλέσθαι. This is pos-

sibly one of the Ionicisms of which Plato,
 according to the grammarians, was fond.
 Herod. ix. 45, ἦν ὑπερβάλλεται τὴν συμ-
 βολὴν Μαρδόνιος. But Lucian, perhaps
 imitating Plato, has ἐς αὐρίον ὑπερβαλώ-
 μεθα τὴν συνουσίαν. Later writers fre-
 quently use ὑπερτίθεσθαι in the same
 sense. The gen. abs. δεομένων—'though
 they pray' or 'because they pray'—needs
 neither alteration nor apology, though
 Heind.'s conj. δεομένοις is not in itself
 improbable, the substitution of a plural
 for a dual being a common error in
 MSS. Presently οὗ is found in all the
 MSS. after χρόνου, evidently by an error
 of the scribes, who have repeated the
 last syllable of χρόνου. Heind. seems
 first to have called attention to this
 error.

καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ἦσαν—ἐλκει] The
 tense changes from past to present, as in
 the passage of the Phaedo just quoted it
 changes from present to past.

ἐγκύψας καὶ ἐκτείνας τὴν κέρκον] 'with
 head down, and tail stretched out.' Xen.
 Eq. i. 8, οὐ γὰρ ἐγκάμπτοντες, ἀλλ'
 ἐκτείναντες τὸν τράχηλον καὶ τὴν
 κεφαλὴν βιάζεσθαι οἱ ἵπποι ἐπιχειροῦσι.

on the
 : :
 inter

ἔτι μᾶλλον ταυτὸν πάθος παθών, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ ὕσπληγος Ἐ
ἀναπесών, ἔτι μᾶλλον τοῦ ὑβριστοῦ ἵππου ἐκ τῶν ὁδόν-
των βία ὀπίσω σπάσας τὸν χαλινόν, τήν τε κακηγόρον
γλῶτταν καὶ τὰς γνάθους καθήμαξε καὶ τὰ σκέλη τε καὶ
τὰ ἰσχία πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἐρείσας ὁδύναις ἔδωκεν. ὅταν δὲ
ταυτὸν πολλάκις πάσχων ὁ πονηρὸς τῆς ὑβρεως λήξῃ,
ταπεινωθεὶς ἔπεται ἤδη τῇ τοῦ ἡνιόχου προνοίᾳ, καὶ ὅταν
ἴδῃ τὸν καλόν, φόβῳ διόλλυται. ὥστε ξυμβαίνει τότε ἤδη
τὴν τοῦ ἐραστοῦ ψυχὴν τοῖς παιδικοῖς αἰδουμένην τε καὶ
δεδιυῖαν ἔπεσθαι. | ἄτ' οὖν πᾶσαν θεραπείαν ὡς ἰσόθεος 255
θεραπευόμενος οὐχ ὑπὸ σχηματιζομένου τοῦ ἐρῶντος, ἀλλ'
ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πεπονθότος, καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν φύσει φίλος [εἰς
ταυτὸν ἄγει τὴν φιλίαν] τῷ θεραπεύοντι, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐν

ταυτὸν πάθος παθών] i.e. δέσας καὶ
σεφθεῖς, paul. sup. The next clause is
epexegetic, and therefore the copula is
dispensed with.

E. ὥσπερ ἀπὸ ὕσπληγος] As racers
fall back at the barrier which their eager
team strives to force. ὕσπληξ, for which
the commoner form is ὕσπληγξ, is men-
tioned by J. Poll. (iii. 147), with its
synonyms ἀφesis, γραμμή, βαλβίς. It is
distinguished from the last term in the
Lex. Rhet. βαλβίς· ξύλα δύο τῶν δρο-
μέων, ἀφ' ὧν σχοίνιον τι διατίθεται. This
σχοίνιον seems to be the ὕσπληξ proper,
which is accordingly explained by Steph.
as "funis obtentus cursoribus, i.e. τοῖς
ἵπποδραμοῦσι, quo laxato dejectoque cur-
riculum ingrederentur." On the other
hand Pausanias seems to deny that the
ὕσπληξ was a rope. Speaking of the
hippodrome at Olympia, he says, διήκει
πρὸ αὐτῶν καλῶδιον ἀντὶ ὕσπληγγος
(vi. 20, § 7). The entire passage is thus
translated by Mr. Wright: "Backward
he falls like racers at the barrier, and with
a wrench still more violent than before
pulls back the bit from the teeth of the
restive horse, thereby drenching his jaws
and riotous tongue with blood, and bruising
against the ground his legs and
haunches, consigns him to anguish."
ὁδύναις ἔδωκεν is a poeticism found else-
where in Plato. The comm. quote Hom.
Oll. xvii. 567, ὁδύνῃσιν ἔδωκεν: ib. xix.
167, ἀχέεσσι γε δώσεις: also Rep. ix.
574 C, πλῆγαῖς δοῦναι. So Ovid, Exitio
terras quum dabit una dies. But the

passage which suggested the phrase to
Plato was probably Eurip. frag. Antig.,
Τίς γὰρ πετραῖον σκόπελον οὐτάζων δροῖ
'Ὀδύναισι δώσει; (No. 176, Nauck.)

φόβῳ διόλλυται] The extinction of
gross appetite by the actual presence of
beauty coveted in absence, is a remark-
able feature in the psychology of this
passage.

255. ἄτ' οὖν—ὁμιλίαν] The construc-
tion of this sentence presents no diffi-
culty, if the bracketed words be ejected.
They are absent from the Bodl. and sever-
al other MSS. The δὲ after προῖόντος
is in *apodosis*. Though the ἐρῶμενος
have been induced by the prejudices early
imbibed from schoolmates or others to
repel the advances of the ἐραστής, yet as
time wears on, &c. διαβεβλημένος must
mean "deceptus," as Heind. interprets.
Arist. Av. 1618, διαβάλλεται σ' ὁ θεός,
ὦ πονηρὲ σύ: ib. Thesm. 1214, διέβαλέ
μ' ἄ γράψ. The more usual Attic sense
of διαβάλλω, 'to set at variance,' does
not apply to the present passage, in
which reference is made to prejudices
against the practice of keeping com-
pany with an ἐραστής, not to any re-
pugnance felt towards a particular ad-
mirer. προσέσθαι, 'to admit,' is the
emendation of Heind. for the vulg.
προέσθαι. The consent of the Bodl.
seems to be assumed by Bekk. and
subsequent edd., though no notice is
taken of the variant by Gaisford in his
collation of that codex with Steph.'s
text.

τῷ πρόσθεν ὑπὸ ξυμφοιτητῶν ἢ τινων ἄλλων διαβεβλημένος ἦ, λεγόντων ὡς αἰσχρὸν ἐρῶντι πλησιάζειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπωθῇ τὸν ἐρῶντα προΐόντος δὲ ἤδη τοῦ χρόνου ἢ θ' ἡλικία καὶ τὸ χρεὼν ἤγαγεν εἰς τὸ προσέσθαι αὐτὸν
 B εἰς ὀμιλίαν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποθ' εἴμαρται κακὸν κακῷ φίλον οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν μὴ φίλον ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. προσεμένου δὲ καὶ λόγον καὶ ὀμιλίαν δεξαμένου, ἐγγύθεν ἢ εὖνοια γιγνομένη τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἐκπλήττει τὸν ἐρώμενον, διαισθάνομενον ὅτι οὐδ' οἱ ξύμπαντες ἄλλοι φίλοι τε καὶ οἰκέοι μοῖραν φιλίας οὐδεμίαν παρέχονται πρὸς τὸν ἔνθεον φίλον. ὅταν δὲ χρονίζῃ τοῦτο δρῶν καὶ πλησιάζῃ μετὰ τοῦ
 C ἄπτεσθαι ἐν τε γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ὀμιλίαις, τότε ἤδη ἢ τοῦ ρεύματος ἐκείνου πηγῇ, ὃν ἕμερον Ζεὺς Γανυμήδους ἐρῶν ὠνόμασε, πολλὴ φερομένη πρὸς τὸν ἐραστήν, ἢ μὲν εἰς αὐτὸν ἔδω, ἢ δ' ἀπομεστούμενον ἔξω ἀπορρεῖ καὶ οἶον πνεῦμα ἢ τις ἡχὼ ἀπὸ λείων τε καὶ

B. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποθ' εἴμαρται] 'for it cannot surely be in the order of destiny.' I have followed Hirsch. in writing δὴ ποθ' as one word in place of the received δὴ ποτε. The particle has no temporal significance here, but is equivalent to δὴ ποτε, as in Soph. Trach. 876, οὐ δὴ ποθ' ὡς θανούσα; εἴμαρται is an echo of the foregoing χρεὼν.

προσεμένου] Vulg. προεμένου. Corr. Heindl.

διαισθάνομενον] 'clearly as he discerns that all others his friends and kindred taken together have no affection to offer comparable in degree to that felt for him by his heaven-inspired friend.' Comp. the speech of Lysias, p. 233 c, where the contrary view is upheld.

τοῦτο δρῶν] Apparently we must understand ὀμιλῶν, implied in ὀμιλίαν δεξαμένου, paul. sup.

C. ἢ τοῦ ρεύματος—πηγῇ] i. e. ἢ τοῦ κάλλους ἀπορροή, sup. 251 n.

ὃν ἕμερον Ζεὺς—ὠνόμασε] Plato here attributes to the highest authority the whimsical etymology of ἕμερος given above (p. 252 c), ἐκείθεν μέρη ἐπιδόντα καὶ ρέοντα, & δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ἕμερος καλεῖται, where see the note. There is an equally fanciful etymology of the name Γανυμήδης in the Symposium of Xenophon (viii. 30). In the Laws Plato attributes the inven-

tion of the fable of Ganymede to the Cretans: Κρητῶν τὸν περὶ τὸν Γανυμήδην μῦθον καταγοροῦμεν . . . τοῦτον δὲ τὸν μῦθον προστεθεικέναι κατὰ τοῦ Διός, ἵνα ἐπόμενοι δὴ τῷ θεῷ καρπῶνται καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἡδονήν (p. 636 D). If Plato is in earnest, his accusation is disproved by Hom. Il. xx. 232, a version of the story entirely free from impurity. But perhaps it is only meant that the Cretans gave a vile meaning to the more ancient tradition. Eusebius, Praep. Evang. xiii. 709 c, quotes this entire passage of the Phaedrus from ὅταν δὲ χρονίζῃ το εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔχει, and again from ἐπιθυμῇ δὲ το κόσμιοι ὄντες, p. 256, and from ἐὰν δὲ δὴ διαίτη φορτικωτέρα το ἢ παρ' ἐραστοῦ φίλα, ib. E. He proceeds to quote Levit. xx. 13 to show the greater strictness and purity of the Mosaic institutes.

ἀπομεστούμενον] 'as he fills up and brims over.'

καὶ οἶον πνεῦμα, κ.τ.λ.] 'and as a wind or a sound, rebounding from smooth and solid bodies, travels back to the point of its departure, so the stream of beauty returns through the eyes to its source, the beautiful youth, and when it has reached his soul through that the appointed channel of communication, and quickened and excited him, it waters the passages of the feathers and sets them sprouting.'

στερεῶν ἀλλομένη πάλιν ὅθεν ὠρμήθη φέρεται, οὕτω τὸ τοῦ κάλλους ρεῦμα πάλιν εἰς τὸν καλὸν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ἰόν, ἧ πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἰέναι ἀφικόμενον καὶ ἀναπτερῶσαν, τὰς διόδους τῶν πτερῶν ἄρδει τε καὶ ὠρμησε πτεροφυεῖν τε, καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου αὖ ψυχὴν D ἔρωτος ἐνέπλησεν. ἐρᾷ μὲν οὖν, ὅτου δέ, ἀπορεῖ καὶ οὐθ' ὅ τι πέπονθεν οἶδεν οὐδ' ἔχει φράσαι, ἀλλ' οἷον ἀπ' ἄλλου ὀφθαλμίας ἀπολελαυκῶς πρόφασιν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔχει, ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ [ἐν] τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθε. καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἐκεῖνος παρῇ, λήγει κατὰ ταῦτά ἐκείνῳ τῆς ὀδύνης· ὅταν δὲ ἀπῇ, κατὰ ταῦτά αὖ ποθεῖ καὶ ποθεῖται, εἶδωλον ἔρωτος ἀντέρωτα ἔχων· καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οἶεται οὐκ ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν εἶναι. ἐπιθυμεί δὲ ἐκείνῳ E παραπλησίως μὲν, ἀσθενεστέρως δέ, ὁρᾶν, ἄπτεσθαι,

Such seems to be the proper arrangement of this somewhat cumbrous sentence. With Ast I refer ἀναπτερῶσαν to αὐτόν, sc. τὸν καλόν. Others punctuate after ἀφικόμενον. Heind. conjectures ἀναπληρώσαν, Schneider in Lex. ἀναστομῶσαν, both referring the participle to τὰς διόδους.

D. ὀφθαλμίας ἀπολελαυκῶς] Herm., ἀναπίμπλαται ὀφθαλμίας. The accusative is more usual in such cases, but in Rep. iii. 395 c we find ἴνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν. "Credabant autem veteres lippitudinem per ipsam aspectum communicari" (Ast). The medical writers do not seem to have endorsed this superstition, in illustration of which Ast quotes Porphyry de Abstinence, i. 28.

ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ [ἐν] τῷ ἐρῶντι] Cobet, Vv. Ll. p. 165, insists on the omission of the second ἐν. So read, the passage is both more harmonious to the ear and more idiomatic. He quotes, among other passages, Protag. 337 E, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαίτητῶν ἡμῶν : Tim. 79 A, ρεῖν ὥσπερ δι' αὐλῶνος τοῦ σώματος; and in Rep. viii. 553 B we read πτασάντα ὥσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι τῇ πόλει for πρὸς τῇ πόλει. I add Eur. Cycl. 433, ὥσπερ πρὸς ἰξῶ τῇ κύλικι λελημμένος. It is highly probable that a construction of this kind would be tampered with by copyists; but there are passages in Plato where the second preposition can hardly be dispensed with, e.g. Phaed. 82 E, ὥσπερ δι' ἐργμοῦ διὰ

τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα: ib. 109, ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας.

κατὰ ταῦτά—ἔχων] Aesch. Ag. 544, τῶν ἀντερώτων ἱμέρῳ πεπληγμένος. K. Ποθεῖν ποθοῦντα τήνδε γῆν στρατὸν λέγεις. The word ἀντέρως, in the sense of 'love returned,' Germ. 'Gegenliebe,' occurs nowhere but in Plato or his imitators, though the passage quoted from Aesch. shows that the conception must have been familiar to the poets. The word too must have been in common use, for statues were erected to Eros and Anteros at Elis. Pausan. Eliac. c. 23, καὶ Ἐρωτος καὶ ὧν Ἡλείοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ ταῦτά Ἡλείοις Ἀντέρωτα ὀνομάζουσι: ib. inf., ἔχει δὲ ὁ μὲν φοίνικος ὁ Ἔρως κλάδον· ὁ δὲ ἀφελείσθαι πειράται τὸν φοίνικα ὁ Ἀντέρας. From another passage (Attic. c. 29) we learn that it was the province of Anteros to avenge as an ἀδαστωρ the wrongs of slighted lovers. This would follow, according to mythological etiquette, from his being the patron of mutual passion. There is therefore no such contradiction, as Ast supposes, between the popular idea of Anteros and that of Plato in the text. Here Anteros is called an 'image' or reflection of Eros, in accordance with the previous figure of a mirror. Herm., τὰ δευτέρα δὲ προσάπτει τῷ ἀντέρωτι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρωτοῦργον αἰτίον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀντέρωτος ὁ ἔρως.

φιλεῖν, συγκατακεῖσθαι. καὶ δὴ, οἷον εἰκός, ποιεῖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ταχὺ ταῦτα. ἐν οὖν τῇ συγκοιμήσει τοῦ μὲν ἔραστοῦ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἵππος ἔχει ὅ τι λέγῃ πρὸς τὸν ἡνίο-
 256 χον, καὶ ἀξιοῖ ἀντὶ πολλῶν πόνων σμικρὰ ἀπολαῦσαι | ὁ δὲ τῶν παιδικῶν ἔχει μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, σπαργῶν δ' καὶ ἀπορῶν περιβάλλει τὸν ἔραστὴν καὶ φιλεῖ, ὡς σφόδρ' εὖνουν ἀσπαζόμενος, ὅταν τε συγκατακέωνται, οἷός ἐστι μὴ ἂν ἀπαρνηθῆναι τὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος χαρίσασθαι τῷ ἑρώντι, εἰ δεηθείη τυχεῖν. ὁ δὲ ὁμόζυξ αὖ μετὰ τοῦ ἡνίοχου πρὸς ταῦτα μετ' αἰδοῦς καὶ λόγου ἀντιτείνει. ἐὰν μὲν δὴ οὖν εἰς τεταγμένην τε δίαιταν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν νικήσῃ τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας ἀγαρόντα, μακάριον μὲν
 B καὶ ὁμονοητικὸν τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον διάγουσιν, ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτῶν καὶ κόσμιοι ὄντες, δουλωσάμενοι μὲν ᾧ κακία ψυχῆς ἐνεγίγνετο, ἐλευθερώσαντες δὲ ᾧ ἀρετῇ· τελευτήσαντες δὲ δὴ, ὑπόπτεροι καὶ ἐλαφροὶ γεγονότες, τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν ἐν νενικήκασιν,

Ε. ἔχει ὅ τι λέγῃ] The MSS. as usual vary between λέγει, λέγοι, and λέγῃ, of which the last only is admissible. Ar. Vesp. 945, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχειν οὗτός γ' εἰκεν ὅτι λέγῃ. Isocr. Paneg. 49, ἀλλ' ἐκατέρους ἔχειν ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν. In the affirmative sentence the future indic. is more usual, but not more legitimate.

256. ὁ δὲ ὁμόζυξ] Herm., τουτέστι, τὸ θυμικόν.

ἐὰν μὲν δὴ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] If in this inward battle the two higher principles triumph over the lower, and bring the pair of lovers to submit to a strict and philosophic life, then are their days here on earth full of harmony and bliss, they are masters of self, orderly and tranquil: 'having brought into subjection that part of the soul which was the nursery of vice, and liberated that in which were the seeds of virtue.' For τεταγμένην comp. Gorg. 504, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἅπαν συστήσῃται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα. . . τοῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσσι τε καὶ κοσμήσεσι νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος (ὀνομαζέσθιν) ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίνονται καὶ κόσμιοι. . . ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. In Rep. iii. 404 we read of the τεταγμένη δίαιτα—the 'strict régime' to which athletes were confined by their trainers. With δουλωσάμενοι

comp. the still more energetic language of St. Paul, 1 Cor. ix. 27, ὑποπιάζω μου τὸ σῶμα καὶ δουλαγωγῶ.

Β. τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν] 'of the three rounds of a combat in the truest sense Olympian.' The victorious lovers are votaries of Zeus the Olympian, the patron of those who φιλοσοφοῦσιν ἀδόλως καὶ παιδεραστοῦσι μετὰ φιλοσοφίας (sup. 248 E), called διδς ὁπαδοὶ 252 c. These have but three periods of probation to pass through (τρίτῃ περιόδῳ τῇ χιλιετεί, ἐὰν ἔλανται τρεῖς ἐφεξῆς τὸν βίον τούτου, οὗτω πτερωθεῖσαι τρισχιλιοστῶ ἔτει ἀπέρχονται, p. 249), and in this respect they resemble the wrestlers at Olympia, who were crowned after three throwing their antagonists. The lovers who in this the first stage of their corporeal existence (τὴν τῇδε πρώτῃν γένεσιν βιοτεύοντες, — 252 D) remain true to their high philosophic vocation, until parted by death, are in the position of a combatant who has won one of the three παλαισμάτα required. To this Olympic usage allusions are frequent in Greek literature. See Aesch. Eum. 559, with Mr. Paley's note. Also Rep. ix. 583 B. The reward of the victorious soul consists in its perfect freedom, after death, from the en-

οὐ μείζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτε σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη οὔτε θεία
μανία δυνατὴ πορίσαι ἀνθρώπῳ. ἐὰν δὲ δὴ διαίτη φορ-
τικωτέρα τε καὶ ἀφιλοσόφῳ, φιλοτίμῳ δὲ χρήσωνται, τάχ'
ἂν που ἐν μέθαις ἢ τινι ἄλλῃ ἀμελείᾳ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ αὐ-
τοῖν ὑποζυγίῳ λαβόντε τὰς ψυχὰς ἀφρούρους, ξυναγα-
γόντε εἰς ταυτόν, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μακαριστὴν αἵρε-
σιν εἰλέτην τε καὶ διεπράξαντο· καὶ διαπραξαμένῳ τὸ

cumbrance of the lower appetites (*ἐλαφροὶ γεγονότες*), and in its power of soaring fully plumed to the highest regions of intellectual contemplation. Mere human or prudential virtue has no boon to confer which is comparable to this, the best result of god-given madness in its highest manifestation.

C. *ἐὰν δὲ δὴ διαίτη*] Having fixed the destiny of the philosophic lovers, Plato proceeds to discuss the case of the 'philotic' or those who, though actuated by a generous ambition and a love of glory, fall short of the refined standard of excellence aimed at by the *δῖοι* or votaries of Zeus, and of philosophic truth. Probably he has in his mind the character so vividly portrayed in the eighth book of the Republic—a man with the virtues and failings proper to what we should call the *aristocratic*, and what Plato styles the *timocratic* type (l. l. p. 549). In that passage as in this the *φιλότιμος* is put second in order of excellence to the *φιλόσοφος*. According to the Platonic psychology he is one in whom the *θυμικὸν* predominates; proud, high-spirited, and generous: a votary, we may suppose, of the queenly and imperious Περσά, πολεμικὸς καὶ ἀρχικὸς rather than *φιλόκαλος καὶ φιλόσοφος* (218 D). Such characters are naturally impulsive and unguarded: liable therefore to be surprised by the senses, and hurried into excesses which their better judgment disapproves. Doubtless many of Plato's near connexions and dearest friends would supply the materials for this typical class, a consideration not to be lost sight of in judging of a passage which is in many respects revolting to our moral taste. If we compare Plato's lenient view of these transgressors and their doom, with the hard measure which Dante metes out to his less guilty Paolo and Francesca, we shall obtain a not unfair gauge of the difference between the philosophic and

the theological standard of purity. The passage, it may be observed, is mentioned with grave reprobation by Theodoret (*Therap.* ix. 53), who, however, misrepresents Plato's meaning in more respects than one.

τάχ' ἂν] Here *τάχ' ἂν* has the force of a single particle, not communicating its conditional sense, as usually, to the leading verb. Comp. Arist. *Vesp.* 281, *τάχα δ' ἂν* διὰ τὸν χθίζινον ἀνθρώπον . . . διὰ τοῦτ' ὀδυνηθεῖς, εἴτ' ἴσως κείται πυρέττων. Soph. *Oed. C.* 965, θεοῖς γὰρ ἦν οὕτω φίλον Τάχ' ἂν τι μνηνίσουν εἰς γένος πάλαι. The *ἂν* in these cases affects the sense of the participle just as little as it does that of the leading verb: yet Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.*, says it is "added to the participle" in this and similar passages which he quotes. If this were so, *μνηνίσουν ἂν* would mean, 'who would be incensed against the race,' whereas the participle is evidently causal: 'it may be because they, the gods, harboured some old resentment,' &c. See inf. p. 265 B, ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινος ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι . . . προσεπαίσαμεν, κ.τ.λ. τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν—εἰλέτην τε καὶ διεπράξαντο] I cannot but wish that the reading in Eusebius, *εἰλέσθην* (which Heind. has adopted), were supported by some one of the Platonic MSS. But Eusebius also reads *διεπραξάσθην*, and this gives to both variants the air of a critical emendation. The received reading yields the following sense: 'They seize, and consummate a choice which the vulgar esteem the height of bliss'—'choice' being put *per euphemismum* for the thing chosen, the gratification of appetite. Herm., *τὴν αἰσχρὰν ἡδονὴν λέγει*. Of the coupling of duals and plurals in the same clause Stallb. gives many instances. One of these, *Phaedr.* 261 B, appears doubtful: though there can be no doubt as to others.

(*ἂν* in Pl. alternative ?)

ἀρετὴν τῇ φιλίᾳ ψυχῇ ἐντεκοῦσα, ἐννέα χιλιάδας ἐτῶν | περὶ 257
γῆν κυλινδουμένην αὐτὴν καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἄνου παρέξει.

καὶ Αὕτη σοι, ὦ φίλε Ἔρως, εἰς ἡμετέραν δύναμιν ὃ τι
καλλίστη καὶ ἀρίστη δέδοται τε καὶ ἐκτέτιστα παλινωδία,
τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἡναγκασμένη ποιητικοῖς
τισὶ διὰ Φαῖδρον εἰρήσθαι. ἀλλὰ τῶν προτέρων τε συγ-
γνώμην καὶ τῶνδε χάριν ἔχων, εὐμενὴς καὶ ἰλεως τὴν
ἐρωτικὴν μοι τέχνην, ἣν ἔδωκας, μήτε ἀφέλῃ μήτε πη-
ρώσης δι' ὀργήν, δίδου δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν παρὰ τοῖς
καλοῖς τίμιον εἶναι. τῷ πρόσθεν δ' εἴ τι λόγῳ σοι ἀπηνὲς B
εἵπομεν Φαῖδρός τε καὶ ἐγώ, Λυσίαν τὸν τοῦ λόγου πα-
τέρα αἰτιώμενος παῦε τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ἐπὶ φιλοσό-

trates the present passage. For κυλινδ., a word co-extensive in meaning with the Lat. *versari*, comp. Phaed. 81 c, ψυχὴ . . . περὶ τὰ μνήματα καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, where see Wyttenbach's note. In other passages of Plato the variant καλινδεῖσθαι is found in some of the MSS., as Theaet. 172 c, οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων καλινδούμενοι, or κυλινδ. The same variation of form exists in other writers, early and late. In illustration of the sentiment the comm. quote the well-known fragment of a Pindaric threne preserved by Clem. Alex., Ψυχὰ δ' ἀσεβέων ὑπουράνιοι Γαῖα πωτῶνται ἐν ἄλγεσι φονίῳς Ἐπὶ ζευγαῖς ἀφύκτοις κακῶν. Εὐσεβέων δ' ἐπουράνιοι νάοισι Μολπαῖς μάκαρ μάραν μέγαν αἰεῖδοντ' ἐν ὕμνοις (No. 97, Boeckh), where πωτῶνται answers to the κυλινδ. of the text.

257. Αὕτη σοι, ὦ φίλε Ἔρως] Soer. had offended the majesty of Eros in his former discourse, by confounding him with a baser power. The speech just concluded is to be understood as a palinode or recantation of the first. See above, pp. 212, 213. He adds an apology for the poetic diction, to which, he says, he was fain to resort 'on account of Phaedrus.' In a spirit of banter he repeats the words of Phaedrus, 243 c, τί σοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ λόγος (ὁ τοῦ Λυσίου); οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἰρήσθαι; Whether by the words διὰ Φαῖδρον we are to understand that the poetic grandiloquence referred to was adopted in accommodation to the youthful taste of his hearer, or whether we are to see in the words of

Soer. an affected disclaimer of poetic genius, like that in p. 238 c, is a question on which the comm. are not agreed. To the former view it is enough to reply, that the diction and spirit of the Socratic are in studied contrast to the prosaic trimness of the Lysiac discourse, with which Phaedrus had professed himself enraptured.

B. ἀπηνὲς] 'harsh and repulsive.' Legg. 950 B, ἄγριον καὶ ἀπηνὲς φαίνεται ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, sc. ἡ ξενηλασία. Hermias appears to have read ἀπηχέας, 'grating,' 'discordant,' and so two MSS. in Bekk. But there seems to be no classical authority for this word.

Λυσίαν τὸν τοῦ λόγου πατέρα, κ.τ.λ.] In this prayer for the conversion of Lysias those who adopt the tradition of the early composition of this dialogue seem to discover a strong confirmation of their opinion. How, it is urged, could Plato have hoped for so blessed a result, if, at the time he wrote, Lysias had been already a hoary offender? But this argument involves a confusion between the pretended date of the colloquy and the date of the actual composition of the dialogue. A prayer in behalf of the middle-aged orator may fairly be interpreted as a satire on the unclaimed offender of advanced years, between whom and Plato it is likely that no love was lost. Polemarchus, the brother of Lysias, was probably a member of the Socratic clique. He bears a part in the discussion with Soer. concerning Justice, in the First Book of the Republic (331 p.), and it was in his house that the discussion took place (ib. 328 B). Another

φίαν δέ, ὥσπερ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Πολέμαρχος τέτραπται, τρέψον, ἵνα καὶ ὁ ἐραστὴς ὅδε αὐτοῦ μηκέτι ἐπαμφοτερίζῃ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς πρὸς Ἑρωτα μετὰ φιλοσόφων λόγων τὸν βίον ποιῇται.

ΦΑΙ. Συνέχομαί σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ ἄμεινον ταῦθ' ἡμῖν εἶναι, ταῦτα γίνεσθαι. τὸν λόγον δέ σου MT 4
πάσαι θαυμάσας ἔχω, ὅσῳ καλλίῳ τοῦ προτέρου ἀπειργάσω. ὥστε ὁκνῶ μή μοι ὁ Λυσίας ταπεινὸς φανῇ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐθελήσῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄλλον ἀντιπαρατεῖναι. καὶ γάρ τις αὐτόν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐναγχοῦς τῶν πολιτικῶν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ λοιδορῶν ὠνείδιζε, καὶ διὰ πάσης τῆς λοιδορίας ἐκάλει λογογράφον. τάχ' οὖν ἂν ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας ἐπίσχοι ἡμῖν ἂν τοῦ γράφειν.

ΣΩ. Γελοῖόν γ', ὦ νεανία, τὸ δόγμα λέγεις, καὶ τοῦ ἐταίρου συχνὸν διαμαρτάνεις, εἰ αὐτὸν οὕτως ἡγείναι ψοφοδεᾷ. ἴσως δὲ καὶ τὸν λοιδορούμενον αὐτῷ οἶε νομίζοντα λέγειν ἃ ἔλεγεν.

brother, Euthydemus, is named ibid., who is not to be confounded with Euthydemus the Sophist, or with Euthydemus the son of Diocles, though he too is named among the Σωκράτους ἐρασταί, Symp. 222 B. Polemarchus ὁ φιλόσοφος is mentioned by Plutarch as having fallen a victim to the cruelty of the Thirty, with "Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and Theramenes the Strategus" (De Esu Carn. ii. c. 4). From his appearance in such company we may conclude that Polemarchus was a person of some consideration, at any rate in literary circles.

ἐραστῆς] Simply 'admirer,' i.e. τῆς τοῦ Λυσίου σοφίας. So Gorgias is said ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἰληφέναι Ἀλεξανδρῶν τοὺς πρῶτους (Meno, init.).

μηκέτι ἐπαμφοτερίζῃ] 'may no longer waver,' or 'halt between two courses.'

Συνέχομαί σοι] Phaedr. joins his prayers to those of Soer., professing to have found his second discourse much more beautiful than the former. He even fears that Lysias' may appear tame and prosaic in comparison,—if indeed he should consent to enter the lists against Soer., which Phaedr. doubts, for he has lately heard Lysias taunted by a man in

political life for addicting himself to a pursuit so mean as that of writing speeches. So that perhaps vanity may keep him from writing any more. Soer. answers that he is amused by his young friend's simplicity. Lysias is not so easily frightened as he supposes. Perhaps, he adds, you think that his assailant really meant all he said. To which Phaedr. rejoins, that the speaker was to all appearance thoroughly in earnest; in fact it was quite common for men high in political life to shrink from writing speeches, lest, if any of their literary productions survived them, they should become known to posterity by the dreaded name of Sophists or litérateurs. All very fine, replies Soer.; but there is a certain proverb, γλυκὺς ἀγκῶν, which Phaedr. is not aware of, and which imports that people frequently affect to like what they hate, and to hate what they secretly hanker after. The great men in question are in reality more fond of authorship than their inferiors; otherwise they would not be so extravagantly fond of seeing their own names and those of their admirers prefixed to documents of state.

ΦΑΙ. Ἐφαίνεται γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ σύνοισθά που καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον δυνάμενοί τε καὶ σεμνότατοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν αἰσχύνονται λόγους τε γράφειν καὶ καταλείπουν συγγράμματα ἑαυτῶν, δόξαν φοβούμενοι τοῦ ἔπειτα χρόνου, μὴ σοφισταὶ καλῶνται.

ΣΩ. Γλυκεὺς ἀγκῶν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, λέληθέ σε ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ μακροῦ ἀγκῶνος τοῦ κατὰ Νεῖλλον ἐκλήθη· καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἀγκῶνι λανθάνει σε ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον φρονούντες τῶν πολιτικῶν μάλιστα ἐρῶσι λογογραφίας τε καὶ καταλείψεως συγγραμμάτων, οἳ γε καὶ ἐπειδάν τινα γράφωσι λόγον,

D. Γλυκεὺς ἀγκῶν] This proverb is said by Meineke (Com. Gr. ii. 677) to be "unum omnium ad explicandum difficillimum." The text of Plato seems to offer an explanation: but it is only one amongst many. The nearest English equivalent appears to be the proverbial 'Sour grapes.' In Libanius, Epist. xlvii., it has evidently this meaning. An old man is there made to say, that ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰς τέρψιν ἔρχεται, τοῦτ' ἐμοὶ γλυκεὺς ἀγκῶν διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν, that youthful pleasures are to him but 'sour grapes,' by reason of his enfeebled powers. Accordingly, the Paroemiographers tell us that the phrase is used ἐπὶ τῶν κατειρανευμένων, or as the gloss in Hesych. runs, ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσχύρων τὴν δοκιμαζόντων, ἐπαυνοῦντων δὲ ὡς καλόν, ἢ τοῦ ἐναντίου, σπουδαῖον μὲν ἡγουμένων, χλευαζόντων δὲ ὡς φαῦλον. So, too, the Scholl. in loc. including Hermecias. The words have evidently this sense in Plato; and the interpretation he offers is found also in Hesych. and the Paroemiographers. The μακρός, or as some would read, πικρὸς ἀγκῶν in question appears to have been the same as that bend or 'elbow' of the Nile below Memphis, which Herodotus tells us the Persians dammed up, after cutting a new and shorter channel (ii. 99). Comp. Paroem. Gr. ii. 66, Deutsch., τόπος δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ Μεμφίδι Ἀγκῶν [leg. γλυκεὺς Ἀγκῶν] προσαναγορεύμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πλεόντων κατ' ἀντίφρασιν ἴσως, διὰ τὸ δυσχερές. A very different explanation is given in Athenæus (xii. 516) upon the authority of Clearchus, who asserts that the name γλυκεὺς ἀγκῶν or γυναικῶν ἀγκῶν (or ἀγκῶν?) was bestowed by the Lydians in mockery upon a certain secluded region of their city in which a deed of whole-

sale shame and wickedness had been perpetrated by the contrivance of their queen Omphale. The same Lydian story is repeated by Eustathius on the Iliad, p. 1082, and by Hesych. and others in connexion with γλυκεὺς ἀγκῶν. Eustath. adds that there was a place in Samos dedicated in like manner by Polyerates to purposes of shameful licentiousness. Hence, according to Plutarch, the similar εὐκορίσιμα or euphemism: Σαμίων ἄνθη or Σαμιακὴ λαύρα (Plut. Prov. lxi.). Comp. Lob. Aglaoph. p. 1022. A third explanation of the proverb, widely different from the foregoing, is given in Suidas, v. γλυκεὺς ἀγκῶν, from which we might infer that the phrase had a serious as well as an ironical meaning. The passage, however, adduced in Suid. from the Phæon of Plato Comicus, is too fragmentary to enable us to judge of the correctness of the interpretation put upon it. Heind. positively denies that the explanation in the text can have come from Plato's pen. He would therefore strike out the words ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ . . . ἐκλήθη, which, he says, "Grammatici esse possunt, Platonis esse non possunt." This appears to me too bold an expedient, though it does seem improbable that the ἀγκῶν in question should have become so familiar to the Greek sailors before the conquest of Egypt by Cambyses, as to have given occasion to a phrase of such general application as γλυκεὺς ἀγκῶν seems to have been. Neither is it quite in Plato's manner to interpret his own pleasantries. The true origin of the phrase, like those of many other proverbial expressions, we must be content to leave in ambiguo.

οὕτως ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς ἐπαινέτας, ὥστε προσπαραγράφουσι
πρώτους οἱ ἂν ἑκασταχοῦ ἐπαινῶσιν αὐτούς.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

258 ΣΩ. Οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι | ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀνδρὸς πολιτικοῦ
συγγραμμάτων πρώτος ὁ ἐπαινέτης γέγραπται;

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐδοξέ πού φησι τῇ βουλῇ ἢ τῷ δήμῳ ἢ
ἀμφοτέροις. καὶ ὃς εἶπε, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λέγων μάλα σεμνῶς
καὶ ἐγκωμιάζων ὁ συγγραφεὺς· ἔπειτα λέγει δὴ μετὰ
τοῦτο, ἐπιδεικνύμενος τοῖς ἐπαινέταις τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σοφίαν,
B ἐνίοτε πάννυ μακρὸν ποιησάμενος σύγγραμμα. ἢ σοι ἄλλο
τι φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ λόγος συγγεγραμμένος;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὲν οὗτος ἐμμένῃ, γεγηθὼς ἀπέρ-
39.2, 52.4; Pperr 3 p. 267 (I. IV)

Ε. προσπαραγράφουσι] Demosth. c. Boeot. 997, προσπαραγράφουσι νῆ Δία τὸν ἐκ Πλαγγόνος, ἐὰν σὲ ἐγγράφωσιν (οἱ ἄρχοντες sc.). The word is used specially in the case of public documents, as its cognate παράγραμμα, ibid. 'They add a clause containing the names of their approvers,' i.e. not content with the παράγραμμα, Δημοσθένους or ὁ δέινα εἶπε, they further name the senate and people, one or both, πρώτους, at the very commencement of the bill.

Οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ, κ.τ.λ.] 'are you not aware that in any work penned by a statesman the approver is first named in the opening clause?' σύγγραμμα means usually a work written for publication: but it has also a political application. See Gorg. 451 n. Soer. here takes advantage of the ambiguity.

258. Ἐδοξέ πού φησι] 'he' (the συγγραφεὺς presently mentioned) 'says, methinks, Resolved by the senate,' &c. πὺν is transposed from its proper place as an enclitic after φησί, as in Phileb. 34 B, διψῇ πὺν λέγομεν ἐκάστοτέ τι: 'we say, do we not, so and so is thirsty.' Other instances are given by Ast and Stallb. of the transposition of enclitic particles and pronouns.

καὶ ὃς εἶπε—συγγραφεὺς] "And he moved"—our author with all solemnity mentioning and lauding his worthy self.' With καὶ ὃς comp. Protag. 312 A, καὶ ὃς εἶπεν ἐρυθριάσας: Symp. 201 E,

καὶ ἢ, Οὐκ εὐφημήσεις; ἔφη. So in the formula ἦ δ' ὅς. Yet I rather incline to Winckelmann's conj. ὃς καὶ ὅς, 'so and so.' Herod. iv. 68, ὡς τὰς βασιλῆϊας ἰστίας ἐπιώρρηκεν ὃς καὶ ὅς.

τὸν αὐτόν] The article is not unfrequently prefixed to the personal pronouns, as in Sophist. 239 A, τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἔμεγε τί τις ἂν λέγοι; Theaet. 166 A, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ . . ἀπέδειξεν. Herm. τὸν ἑαυτὸν δὴ τὸ τὸν προέθηκε διὰ τὸ μέγα φρονεῖν αὐτοῦς. The irony is here increased by the added δὴ, *scilicet*. Probably Stallb. is right in supposing that ὁ συγγραφεὺς is a kind of iteration of the unexpressed subject of φησί,—'he, our author, I mean.' He punctuates after ἐγκωμιάζων to indicate this. So is to be explained Theocr. xiv. 56, οὔτε κάκιστος, οὔτε πρῶτος ἴσως ὁμαλὸς δέ τις ὁ στρατιώτας.

B. ἐὰν μὲν οὗτος ἐμμένῃ] Perhaps we may supply τῇσανδρί. See Aeschines c. Ctes. p. 59, § 39 Bekk., ἀναγεγραφὸτας ἐν σανίσιν, κ.τ.λ. It was the business of the thesmothetae to revise or codify the mass of Athenian legislation καθ' ἑκαστον ἐνιαυτόν, striking out (ἐξαλείφοντας, ἀναιροῦντας) contradictory or unconstitutional enactments. Comp. Aesch. l. l. with Andocides de Myst. p. 11. 'If the speech or motion in question stand, then the poet leaves the theatre in high glee.' "Coartata est more antiquorum non raro oratio in hanc sententiam: γεγηθὼς ἀπέρχεται ὁ συγ-

χεται ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου ὁ ποιητής· εἰ δὲ ἐξαλειφθῇ καὶ ἄμοιρος γένηται λογογραφίας τε καὶ τοῦ ἄξιος εἶναι συγγραφεῖν, πενθεῖ αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἐταῖροι.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Δῆλόν γε ὅτι οὐχ ὥς ὑπερφρονούντες τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, ἀλλ' ὥς τεθναυμάκοτες.

ΦΑΙ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ὅταν ἱκανὸς γένηται ῥήτωρ ἢ βασιλεύς, ὥστε λαβὼν τὴν Λυκούργου ἢ Σόλωνος ἢ Δαρείου δύναμιν ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι λογογράφος ἐν πόλει, ἂρ' οὐκ ἰσόθεον ἡγεῖται αὐτός τε αὐτὸν ἔτι ζῶν, καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα γιγνόμενοι ταῦτα ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ νομίζουσι, θεώμενοι αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα;

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Οἶει τινὰ οὖν τῶν τοιούτων, ὅστις καὶ ὅπως-τιοῦν δύνουσι Λυσία, ὀνειδίζειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι συγγραφεῖ;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐκ οὐν εἰκός γε ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὀνειδίζοι.

γραφεὺς ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ὡς περ ποιητῆς ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου" (Heind.), unless we suppose γεγηθὸς ἀπέρχεται ὁ ποιητής to have been a proverbial phrase to denote joy at success.

ἐξαλειφθῇ] I have restored the reading of the great majority of MSS. in place of ἐξαλιφῇ, which Bekk. and his successors have adopted on the authority of the Bodl. The 2 aor. occurs nowhere else, and is at best a doubtful form. 'If his discourse he rubbed out (his motion lost, or afterwards rescinded) and he thereby be excluded from the profession of a λογογράφος and the coveted dignity of an author, he puts on mourning, and all his friends with him.'

ἢ Δαρείου] Darius Hystaspes on his accession recast the Persian empire. He is therefore compared as a revolutionary legislator to Solon and Lycurgus. Plat. Legg. 695 c, Δαρεῖος γὰρ βασιλέως οὐκ ἦν υἱὸς παιδείᾳ τε οὐ διατροφῇ τετραμμένος, ἐλθὼν δ' εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ λαβὼν αὐτὴν ἰβδόμοις διαίλετο ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τετράμνος, ὧν καὶ νῦν ἔτι σμικρὰ ἀνείρατα λείπεται, καὶ νόμους ἡξίου θέμενος οἰκεῖν ἰσότητά τινα κοινὴν εἰσφέρων. . . φιλίαν

πορίζων καὶ κοινωνίαν πᾶσι Πέρσαις, χρήμασι καὶ δωρεαῖς τὸν Περσῶν δῆμον προσ-αγόμενος. In Epist. vii. 332 Darius is praised for the wisdom of his legislation: ἔδειξε παράδειγμα οἷον χρή τὸν νομοθέτην καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἀγαθὸν γίγνεσθαι νόμους γὰρ διασκεύσας, ἔτι καὶ νῦν διασέσωκε τὴν Περσῶν ἀρχήν. He was therefore ἀθάνατος λογογράφος ἐν πόλει, as the politician spoken of in the text would fain become.

C. Οἶει τινὰ οὖν—λόγους] The object of Plato in the foregoing argument has been to vindicate the dignity of literary pursuits against the sneers of professed politicians. He has shown, or seemed to show, that their disdain was hollow and affected, for that they too were in love with literary celebrity of a certain kind. In reproaching Lysias they were virtually censuring themselves, and holding up to contempt their own favourite pursuit. Authorship, *per se*, neither is nor is seriously believed by any one to be disgraceful. It is not to writing, but only to bad writing that disgrace really attaches.

1) ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν αὐτό γε τὸ γράφειν λόγους.

ΦΑΙ. Τί γάρ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐκείνο οἶμαι αἰσχρὸν ἤδη, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν ἄλλ' αἰσχροῦς τε καὶ κακῶς.

ΦΑΙ. Δῆλον δῆ.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος τοῦ καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν; δεόμεθά τι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, Λυσίαν τε περὶ τούτων ἐξετάσαι καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις πώποτε τι γέγραφεν ἢ γράψει, εἴτε πολιτικὸν σύγγραμμα εἴτε ιδιωτικόν, ἐν μέτρῳ [ὡς ποιητής], ἢ ἄνευ μέτρου [ὡς ιδιώτης];

D. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος τοῦ καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν] To this question the remainder of the dialogue supplies the answer. But before he proceeds to discuss the principles of rhetoric, Socr. sounds Phaedr., to ascertain whether he is inclined to enter on an inquiry which may occupy a considerable time and involve some effort. Phaedrus is indignant at the doubt implied in the question, and Socr. invents a myth by way of encouraging his philosophic ardour.

ἐν μέτρῳ [ὡς ποιητής], ἢ ἄνευ μέτρου [ὡς ιδιώτης] “ιδιώτης oppositum ποιητῇ pervulgati est usus. De Legg. p. 800 A, ταῦτ' ἐστίν. . . ἅπαντα ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν. . . ιδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν” (Heind.). Add Symp. 178 D, ὅπ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε ιδιωτοῦ οὔτε ποιητοῦ. ιδιώτης is the general antitheton to ὁ τέχνην ἔχων—whatever the τέχνη may be. Soph. 221 C, καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γ' ἦν τὸ ζήτημα πρῶτον, πότερον ιδιωτὴν ἢ τινα τέχνην ἔχοντα θετέον εἶναι τὸν ἀσπαλιευτήν. The English word which comes nearest in extent of application is ‘layman.’ See an apposite instance in Carew’s Poems:

“Thus while you deal your body ’mongst
your friends,
And fill their circling arms, my glad
soul sends
This her embrace: thus we of Delphi
greet—
As *laymen* clasp their hands, so we
our feet.”

Upon Master W. Montague
his return from travel.

So also Sir P. Sidney, Sonnet 74:

“The Muses scorn with vulgar brains
to dwell—

Poor *layman* I, for sacred rites unfit.”

The distinction between metrical and unmetrical compositions may seem at first sight out of place here. But in 277 E, a passage written with direct reference to the present, λόγοι ἐν μέτρῳ and λόγοι ἄνευ μέτρου are distinguished in the same manner. Comp. also 278 C, Λυσία τε καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος συντίθησι λόγους, καὶ Ὀμήρῳ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὐτοῖσι ψιλὴν ἢ ἐν ᾧδῃ συντίθεικε, τρίτον δὲ Σόλωνι καὶ ὅστις ἐν πολιτικοῖς λόγοις, νόμους ὀνομάζων, συγγράμματα ἔγραψεν. The remarkable feature in the passage before us is the use of ιδιωτικόν in one sense followed immediately by ιδιώτης in another. Certainly the words ὡς ποιητής, ὡς ιδιώτης are not indispensable to the sense, and it is strange to find Plato subdividing ιδιωτικὸν λόγοι into ιδιωτικοὶ and ποιητικοί. On referring to the Commentary of Hermias, we find no traces of ὡς ποιητής, ὡς ιδιώτης, either in the Lemmata or their interpretation, though he is careful to paraphrase the remainder of the sentence. ὅρα πῶς καθόλου ποιεῖται λόγον· οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τοῦ Λυσίου εἶπεν, ἀλλ' εἴτε πολιτικὸν εἴτε ιδιωτικόν, εἴτε μετὰ μέτρου εἴτε ἄνευ μέτρου. οὕτω δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι περὶ τῶν καθόλου λόγων καὶ συγγραμμάτων ὁ παρὼν ἔστι λόγος. . . πολιτικὸν λέγει τὸν νομοθετικὸν ἢ συμβουλευτικόν, ιδιωτικὸν δὲ τὸν δικαστικὸν ἢ δικαιοδικόν (Herm. Comm. p. 177, ed. Ast). For these reasons I have bracketed the words in question as doubtful, though

777 ΦΑΙ. Ἐρωτᾷς εἰ δεόμεθα; τίνος μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα καὶ Ε
τις ὡς εἰπεῖν ζῶν, ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν ἔνεκα;
οὐ γάρ που ἐκείνων γε ὧν πολυπηθῆναι δεῖ ἢ μηδὲ
ἡσθῆναι, ὃ δὴ ὀλίγου πᾶσαι αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ
ἔχουσιν διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἀνδραποδῶδεις κέκληνται.

ΣΩ. Σχολὴ μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε. καὶ ἅμα μοι δοκοῦσιν
 ὡς ἐν τῷ πνίγει ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἡμῶν οἱ τέττιγες ἄδοντες

the doubt does not appear to have occurred to any editor before Hirsch. and Badh., the latter of whom extends the query to the entire clause from ἐν τοῖς ἰδιώταις. This scepticism however goes too far, as the parallel passages abundantly prove.

E. οὐ γάρ που—πολυπηθῆναι δεῖ] This distinction between pure and mixed pleasures is developed in the Philebus with great force and clearness (Phileb. p. 31 to p. 55). The results of this long investigation seem to be taken for granted in the present passage.

Phaedr. assumes that intellectual pleasures are nearly the only pleasures which are unmixed with pain—almost (ὀλίγου) all corporeal pleasures imply a foregoing uneasiness. Phaedr. does not specify the excepted cases, which are however carefully enumerated in the Philebus (50 E to 52 E): κατὰ φύσιν τοῖνυν μετὰ τὰς μιχθείσας ἡδονὰς ὑπὸ δὴ τίνος ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμίκτους πορευοίμεθ' ἂν ἐν τῷ μέρει. . . Ἀληθεῖς δ' αὖ τινες, ὧς Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμβάνων ὁρθῶς τις διανοίτ' ἂν; Τὰς περὶ τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα, καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων, καὶ ὅσα, τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύτους, τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδέας καθαρὰς λυτῶν παραδίδωσιν. . . Ἐτι δὴ τοῖνυν τοῖτοισι προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡδονὰς, εἰ ἅρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὐταὶ πείνας μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν, μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀληθινὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενομένας. The dramatic propriety of putting so refined a sentiment in the mouth of Phaedr. has been questioned, very hypercritically, as I think, by Heind.: "Ex meo quidem sensu nihil hic inferri poterat languidus et jejuniis, nihil Phaedri persona dialogice tenore alienius, nihil denique magis ἀπροσδιόνυσον." He is obliged, however, as he well might be, to admit that he is unable to detect "the faintest

vestige of fraud" in the passage. It is indeed clear from the sequel of the dialogue that Phaedr. was by no means such a fool as Heind. supposes; his very vanity would impel him to parade the recent acquisition of a philosophical refinement known to few: and so far from conceding that Plato was half-asleep ("dormitasse") when he wrote this passage, I conceive that there is no part of the dialogue written with more entire propriety.

διὸ καὶ δικ. ἀνδραποδῶδεις κέκληνται] The pleasures 'justly called servile' are those of which even ἀνδράποδα are capable, whereas those of the intellect are proper to τοῖς ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραποδοῖς τραφεῖσιν, sc. τοῖς ἐλευθέροις (Theaet. 175 D). Comp. Phileb. 52 B, ταύτας τοῖνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμίκτους τε εἶναι λύταις ῥητέον, καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων. This oligarchic spirit reigns through the entire ethical philosophy of Plato, and in a less degree of Aristotle also. Heind. aptly compares Eth. N. iii. 10. 24, περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ ἀκολασία ἐστίν, ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῆα κοινῶν, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδῶδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται. Also Plat. Epist. vii. 335 A, τὴν ἀνδραποδῶδη καὶ ἀχάριστον ἀφροδίσιον λεγομένην οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἡδονήν.

Σχολὴ μὲν δὴ—καὶ ἅμα μοι δοκοῦσιν, κ.τ.λ.] The little episode which follows reminds the reader of the scenery of the dialogue, while it forms a natural transition from the mythic raptures of the second Socratic discourse to the lighter but still poetical style of the sequel. It also furnishes a dramatic motive to a discussion sustained under unfavourable circumstances, by persons one of whom at least may be supposed not to have been superior to the sleep-persuading influences of the place and time.

259 | καὶ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμενοι καθορᾶν. εἰ οὖν ἴδοιεν καὶ
 νῶ καθάπερ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν μεσημβρία μὴ διαλεγόμε-
 νους ἀλλὰ νυστάζοντας καὶ κηλουμένους ὑφ' αὐτῶν δι'
 ἀργίαν τῆς διανοίας, δικαίως ἂν καταγελῶεν, ἡγούμενοι
 ἀνδράποδ' ἅττα σφίσιν ἐλθόντα εἰς τὸ καταγώγιον ὥσπερ
 προβάτια μεσημβριάζοντα περὶ τὴν κρήνην εὐδειν. ἔαν
 δὲ ὁρῶσι διαλεγομένους καὶ παραπλέοντάς σφας ὥσπερ
 Σειρῆνας ἀκηλήτους, ὃ γέρας παρὰ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώποις
 B διδόναι, τάχ' ἂν δοίεν ἀγασθέντες.

ΦΑΙ. Ἐχουσι δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο ; ἀνήκοος γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε,
 τυγχάνω ὦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὲν δὴ πρέπει γε φιλόμουσον ἄνδρα τῶν
 τοιούτων ἀνήκοον εἶναι. λέγεται δ' ὡς ποτ' ἦσαν οὗτοι
 ἄνθρωποι τῶν πρὶν Μούσας γεγονέναι. γενομένων δὲ
 Μουσῶν καὶ φανείσης ὥδῃς, οὕτως ἄρα τινὲς τῶν τότε
 ἐξεπλάγησαν ὑφ' ἡδονῆς, ὥστε ἄδοντες ἡμέλησαν σίτων
 C τε καὶ ποτῶν, καὶ ἔλαθον τελευτήσαντες αὐτοὺς. ἐξ ὧν
 τὸ τεττίγων γένος μετ' ἐκείνο φύεται, γέρας τοῦτο παρὰ
 Μουσῶν λαβόν, μηδὲν τροφῆς δεῖσθαι γενόμενον, ἀλλ'
 ἄσιτόν τε καὶ ἄποτον εὐθὺς ἄδειν, ἕως ἂν τελευτήσῃ, καὶ
 μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλθὼν παρὰ Μούσας ἀπαγγέλλειν τίς τίνα
 αὐτῶν τιμᾷ τῶν ἐνθάδε. Τερψιχόρα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν
 τοῖς χοροῖς τετιμηκότας αὐτὴν ἀπαγγέλλοντες ποιούσι

259. καθορᾶν] Intrans., 'to look down.' Plato has here adopted a Homeric usage, of which I can find no other example in an Attic writer. Hom. II. xi. 336, Ἔνθα σφι κατὰ ἴσα μάχην ἐτά-
 νυσσε Κρονίων, Ἐξ Ἰδης καθορῶν. This and similar passages from Homer are brought forward by Stallb. as a triumphant reply to Badh.'s question, "Quis unquam verbum καθορᾶν sine casu usurpari vidit?" His triumph would have been more complete, had he been able to produce a parallel instance from a prose author of the Attic period. He is right, however, in rejecting Badh.'s ingenious suggestion, δοκοῦσι νῶ (for δοκοῦσιν ὥς), which is forbidden by the καὶ νῶ of the sentence following. ὥς ἐν τῷ πνίγει = ut solent 'sole sub ardentibus': a habit which Stallb. rather

unnecessarily demonstrates by a long array of authorities extending from Aristophanes to Themistius. This heavy artillery is levelled at Dr. Badham, whom Stallb. justly regards as an emissary of the archfiend of Leyden.

εἰς τὸ καταγώγιον] Above, 230 B, καλή γε ἡ καταγωγή.

B. τῶν πρὶν Μούσας γεγονέναι] An abbreviated construction for the usual τῶν ὅσοι ἐγένοντο πρὶν, κ.τ.λ. Protag. 320 D, τῶν ὅσα πύρι καὶ γῇ κεράννυται.

C. ἔλαθον τελευτήσαντες αὐτοὺς] 'died ere they felt themselves to be dying.'

γενόμενον] Badh. proposes a transposition: μηδὲν τροφῆς δεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἄσιτόν τε καὶ ἄποτον εὐθὺς γενόμενοι ἄδειν.

προσφιλεστέρους, τῇ δὲ Ἐρατοῖ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς, D καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις οὕτω, κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἐκάστης τιμῆς. τῇ δὲ πρεσβυτάτῃ Καλλιόπῃ καὶ τῇ μετ' αὐτὴν Οὐρανίᾳ τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάχοντάς τε καὶ τιμῶντας τὴν ἐκείνων μουσικὴν ἀγγέλλουσιν, αἱ δὲ μάλιστα τῶν Μουσῶν περί τε οὐρανὸν καὶ λόγους οὔσαι θεῖους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους ἰᾶσι καλλίστην φωνήν. πολλῶν δὲ οὖν ἔνεκεν λεκτέον τι καὶ οὐ καθευδητέον ἐν τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ.

ΦΑΙ. Λεκτέον γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ νῦν προϋθέμεθα, σκέψασθαι τὸν λόγον ὅπῃ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅπῃ μὴ, σκεπτέον.

τῇ δὲ Ἐρατοῖ] Ovid, *Ar. Amat.* ii. 15, *Nunc mihi, siquando, puer et Cytherea, favete, Nunc Erato, nam tu nomen amoris habes.*

D. κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἐκάστης τιμῆς] τοῦτέστι, κατὰ τὰ ιδιώματα ἐκάστης Θεοῦ. Herm.

Καλλιόπῃ] This is one of the Pythagorisms which Plato has scattered over the face of the present Dialogue. δεῖ δὲ ἄλλης Μούσης ἀνδρικωτέρας, ἣν Ὅμηρος μὲν Καλλιόπην ὀνομάζων χαίρει, ὁ Πυθαγόρας δὲ φιλοσοφίαν (*Max. Tyr., Diss.* vii. 2. 63, quoted by Ast). *Hermias* has the gloss, Καλλιόπῃ δὲ ἐκλήθη παρὰ τὴν ὕπα, τοὺς ἐν λόγοις οὖν αὐτὴν τετιμῆσθαι ἀπαγγέλλουσι· τῇ δὲ Οὐρανίᾳ τοὺς ἀστρονομήσαντας.

τὴν ἐκείνων μουσικὴν] *Phaed.* 61 A, ὥς φιλοσοφίας οὔσης τῆς μεγίστης μουσικῆς. *Comp. Legg.* iii. 689 D, ἡ καλλίστη καὶ μεγίστη τῶν ξυμφωνιῶν μεγίστη δικαιοτάτ' ἂν λέγοιτο μουσική, κ.τ.λ.

ἰᾶσι καλλίστην φωνήν] καὶ λέγεται (ᾧτι) ὁ Πυθαγόρας ᾗσθετο τῆς οὐρανίας φωνῆς καὶ τινες δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν χορδῶν ἐκ τῶν οὐρανίων σφαιρῶν ὠνόμασαν οἷον ὅτι Προσλαμβανομένη ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ Κρόνου σφαῖρα, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἄλλας χορδὰς εἶπον (*Herm.*). This, though not directly in point, is curious as being probably a genuine Pythagorism. προσλαμβανομένη or -ος is explained as "nomen soni musici, respondens ei quem hodierni A appellant." *Steph. Thes.* vi. 1959, Dind.

οὖν ἔνεκεν] So the Bodl. Bekk. has unaccountably adopted the poetic οὐνεκεν (without οὖν) of three MSS. In

Attic prose, the only legitimate forms of this prep. are ἔνεκα and ἔνεκεν. οὐνεκα is found in *Aristoph.*

E. Οὐκοῦν—σκεπτέον] I have retained the punctuation of Bekk. and Stallb. Ast places a comma after σκέψασθαι. But σκεπτέον may more naturally be taken with ὁ προϋθέμεθα, as if he had written, ποιητέον ὁ προϋθ. τοῦτέστι, τὸ σκέψασθαι, κ.τ.λ. So, in effect, Stallb. The redundancy is in Plato's manner.

ὅπῃ καλῶς ἔχει] *Soer.* now enters in earnest upon the investigation of a true Rhetoric. He begins by proposing the question, whether a really good speech does not presuppose on the part of the speaker an accurate knowledge of the subject he proposes to handle. *Phaedr.* replies to this with the well-known paradox of the rhetoricians, that a speaker has no need to know the actual right or wrong or the good or evil of the matter in hand, but only that which is likely to approve itself as right or wrong, good or evil, to his audience. The final cause of speaking is persuasion, and this is produced not by truth but by seeming truth. *Soer.* receives this answer with mock respect, and then proceeds to examine how much of truth it contains. *Comp. Gorg.* 454 E, ἡ ῥητορική, ὥς εἰκε, πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστι πιστευτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἄδικον . . . Na! . . . οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικός ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶ δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὕχλων δικάων τε περὶ καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πιστικός μόνον, κ.τ.λ.

ΦΑΙ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τοῖς εὖ γε καὶ καλῶς
 ῥηθησομένοις τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος διάνοιαν εἰδυῖαν τάληθες.
 ὦν ἂν ἐρεῖν περὶ μέλλῃ;

ΦΑΙ. Οὕτωςι περὶ τούτου ἀκήκοα, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες,
 260 οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην | τῷ μέλλοντι ῥήτορι ἔσσεσθαι τὰ τῷ
 ὄντι δίκαια μανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντα ἂν πλήθει οὔπερ
 δικάσουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλὰ, ἀλλ' ὅσα δό-
 ξειν ἐκ γὰρ τούτων εἶναι τὸ πείθειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῆς
 ἀληθείας.

ΣΩ. Οὔτοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος εἶναι δεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε,
 ὃ ἂν εἴπωσι σοφοί, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν μή τι λέγωσι. καὶ δὴ
 καὶ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν οὐκ ἀφετέον.

ΦΑΙ. Ὅρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὡδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν αὐτό.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς;

Β ΣΩ. Εἴ σε πείθοιμι ἐγὼ πολεμίους ἀμύνειν κτησά-
 μενον ἵππον, ἄμφω δὲ ἵππον ἀγνοοῖμεν, τοσόνδε μέντοι
 τυγχάνοιμι εἰδὼς περὶ σοῦ, ὅτι Φαῖδρος ἵππον ἡγείται τὸ
 τῶν ἡμέρων ζώων μέγιστα ἔχον ὧτα—

ΦΑΙ. Γελοῖόν γ' ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶη.

ΣΩ. Οὐπω γε ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ σπουδῇ σε πείθοιμι,
 συντιθεῖς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου, ἵππον ἐποιο-
 μάζων καὶ λέγων ὥς παντὸς ἄξιον τὸ θρέμμα οἴκοι
 τε κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ στρατείας, ἀποπολεμῖν τε χρήσιμον

260. Οὔτοι ἀπόβλητον II. ii. 361,
 οὔτοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος ἔσεται, ὅτι κε
 εἴπω. The ironical σοφοί probably in-
 cludes all the τεχνογράφοι from Corax
 and Tisias downwards.

μή τι λέγωσι] 'lest there should be
 truth in what they say,' or 'whether
 what they say may not be true.' Protag.
 339 c, ἐφοβούμην μή τι λέγοι. If the
 present λέγουσι had been used, it would
 have been correct to transl. 'whether
 what they say is true,' and this is rather
 what we should have expected here. But
 see Soph. 212 b, ἐπισκέψασθαι (ἀναγ-
 καῖον) μή πη τεταραγμένοι μὲν ᾤμεν περὶ
 ταῦτα, ραδίως δ' ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογῶμεν
 ὡς εὐκρινῶς ἔχοντες. Winckelm.'s conj.

εἴ πῃ τι λέγουσιν is perfectly gratuitous.

B. Εἴ σε πείθοιμι] Socr. here puts a
 particular case corresponding to the
 general formula under review. The for-
 mula, being found to break down when
 applied to a simple case, must be sur-
 rendered as untenable.

Οὐπω γε] The Bodl. and others have
 οὔποτε, which has no meaning. οὐπω γε
 = "not just yet," implying that Phaedr.
 is premature in saying that the case is
 absurd, the absurdity having yet to be
 developed.

ἀποπ. τε χρήσιμον] 'good to fight
 from,' i. e. to ride into battle. The next
 phrase, προσενεγκεῖν σκεύη, is inter-
 preted "apportare utensilia." But query

καὶ †προσενεγκεῖν† δυνατὸν σκεύη καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὠφέλιμον.

ΦΑΙ. Παγγέλοιόν γ' ἂν ἤδη εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κρεῖττον γελοῖον καὶ φίλον ἢ δεινόν τε καὶ ἐχθρόν [εἶναι];

ΦΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν οὖν ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀγνοῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, λαβὼν πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν πείθη, μὴ περὶ ὄνου σκιᾶς ὡς ἵππου τὸν ἔπαινον ποιούμενος, ἀλλὰ περὶ κακοῦ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ, δόξας δὲ πλῆθους μεμελετηκῶς πείσῃ κακὰ πράττειν αὐτ' ἀγαθῶν, ποῖόν τιν' ἂν οἶει μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν;

as to this use of προσφέρειν. I conj. καὶ πρὸς γ' ἐνεγκεῖν δυνατὸν σκεύη. Soph. 234 E, φημί, καὶ πρὸς γε θαλάττης (ποιητῆν) καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. προσφέρειν σκεύη would naturally mean 'to apply instruments to a purpose,' a matter beyond the powers of ass or horse. ἀχθυφορεῖν is the gloss of Hermeias. The illustration in the text was probably suggested by a current proverb, ἀφ' ἵππων ἐπ' ὄνον· ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπὸ σεμνῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄσεμνα ἡκόντων. Pseudoem. Gr. ii. p. 320, Leutsch.

C. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κρεῖττον γελοῖον καὶ φίλον, κ.τ.λ.] I have adopted this reading from a scholium of Hermeias, which has hitherto escaped the notice of the edd. It runs thus, with a slight but necessary change in the punctuation of Ast: Ἄρ' οὖν διαιρετικὸν διπλοῦν προσήνεγκεν· ἄρα, φησὶν, οὐ κρεῖττον γελοῖον καὶ φίλον ἢ δεινόν καὶ ἐχθρόν; αἰρετώτερον γάρ. τὸ γελοῖον καὶ φίλον τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄνου ὡς ἵππου· τὸ δὲ δεινὸν καὶ ἐχθρόν τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν ὡς ἀδίκων καὶ κακῶν (Herm. Comm. p. 182, Ast). If we retain the εἶναι, which Herm. does not notice, we obtain the sense, Is it not better to be ridiculous and a friend (as I am when I advise you in good faith [σπουδῇ], to ride an ass, &c.) than to be clever and a foe (as he is who for purposes of his own persuades an audience that right is wrong)? εἶναι however is not necessary to the sense, and perhaps the Greek is more idiomatic without it: but with this exception, I have no doubt about

the reading of a passage which, as given in the MSS., has been a stumbling-block to editors. The great majority of codices give, ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κρεῖττον γελοῖον ἢ δεινόν τε καὶ ἐχθρόν εἶναι ἢ φίλον; One Parisian cod. omits εἶναι ἢ φίλον, and three, according to Bekk., omit ἢ only. This last is the reading adopted by Heind. and the Zur. But it involves the harsh and here pointless oxymoron, ἐχθρόν φίλον,—much harsher than the κακὸς φίλος quoted from Soph. Oed. Tyr. 582.

μὴ περὶ ὄνου σκιᾶς] The word σκιᾶς is added *augendae invidiae gratiâ*, ὄνου σκιᾶ being a proverbial phrase denoting that which is beneath contempt. A comedy of Archippus was known indifferently by the titles Ὀνος and Ὀνου σκιᾶ. See Meineke, Com. Gr. i. 208, and comp. Arist. Vesp. 191, Περὶ τοῦ μαχεῖ νῆν δῆτα; Περὶ ὄνου σκιᾶς. Yet Hirsch., following Heind., brackets σκιᾶς, most unnecessarily, as I think. The argument is, How much worse to deceive in matters of the highest moment, than in mere trifles such as that in the case supposed, the mistake of one brute or its shadow for another.

δόξας—πλήθους μεμελετηκῶς] 'having made a special study of popular notions and prejudices.'

ποῖόν τιν' ἂν οἶει, κ.τ.λ.] 'what manner of harvest, think you, will Rhetoric thereafter reap from the evil seed she sowed?' I have not scrupled to adopt Hirsch's τιν' ἂν for the vulg. τινα. Nothing is more common than this throwing back of ἂν in sentences where

D ΦΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ γε ἐπιεικῇ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ ἡγαθέ, ἀγροικότερον τοῦ δέοντος λελοιδορήκαμεν τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην; ἢ δ' ἴσως ἂν εἶποι· Τί ποτ', ὦ θαυμάσιοι, ληρεῖτε; ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐδέν' ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ληθεῖς ἀναγκάζω μανθάνειν λέγειν, ἀλλ', εἴ τις ἐμὴ συμβουλή, κτησάμενος ἐκείνο, οὕτως ἐμὲ λαμβάνειν. τότε δ' οὖν μέγα λέγω, ὥς ἄνευ ἐμοῦ τῷ τὰ ὄντα εἰδότε οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἔσται πείθειν τέχνη.

E ΦΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν δίκαια ἐρεῖ, λέγουσα ταῦτα;

ΣΩ. Φημί, ἐὰν οἱ γ' ἐπιόντες αὐτῇ λόγοι μαρτυρῶσιν εἶναι τέχνη. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινῶν προσιόντων καὶ διαμαρτυρομένων λόγων ὅτι ψεύδεται καὶ οὐκ

οἶσθαι, ἡγεῖσθαι, νομίζειν, &c. are followed by an infinitive. See by all means Cobet, Novv. Lectt. p. 362. The copyists, not perceiving that the *ἂν* in such cases belongs to the infinitive, perpetually omit it in transcription. Even Stallb., in his note, acknowledges the necessity of the particle to the sense. For the sentiment comp. Aesch. Pers. 821, "Ἵβρις γὰρ ἐξανθοῦς" ἐκάρπωσε στάχυν Ἄτης, ὅθεν πάγκλαυτον ἐξαμὰ θέρος. Krische ingeniously suggests a direct reference to a dictum of Gorgias preserved Arist. Rhet. iii. 3. 4, οἷον Γοργίας "χλωρὰ καὶ ἔναιμα (i.e. ἔναιμα) τὰ πράγματα" σὺ δὲ ταῦτα αἰσχροῦς μὲν ἔσπειρας, κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας" ποιητικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν. But the phrase was proverbial, as we might infer from Aesch. l. c. Herm. p. 182: καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἀπὸ παροιμίας εἴρηται, ὅτι 'Ὁ κακὰ σπείρων κακὰ θερίσκει.

D. Οὐ πάνυ γε ἐπιεικῇ] 'a most indifferent (harvest).' Not satisfied with the easy assent of Phaedr., Socr. professes to be afraid that his attack on Rhetoric had been too coarse and sweeping. He accordingly produces her in person to make her own apology. *She* never used the language imputed to her professors, nor insisted on ignorance of truth as a qualification for successful oratory. What she does insist on is this: that knowledge is not sufficient of itself to work persuasion, unless it be united to accomplishments which she and she alone can impart. If her advice is to go for any thing (si quid valet meum consilium), the student will first furnish his mind with knowledge, and

then proceed to acquire the art of using it successfully. For ἐμὴ συμβουλή, the MSS. have ἐμῇ συμβουλή, after which Heind. inserts κρήται. Plato would rather have written εἴ τις ἐμοὶ συμβούλῃ. Hermias supplies πείθεται, not however as part of the text. For the vulg. εἴ τις the Bodl. has εἴ τι, 'if my advice is worth any thing.' Many of the edd. give λαμβάνει, for which we should expect λαμβανέτω. Godf. Herm. reads λαμβάνειν, referring to Phaed. 87. c, and Seidler ad Eur. El. 533. If this stands, the infinitive will depend formally on ἀναγκάζω, really on a verb suppressed. And this seems the best solution of the difficulty. This portion of the dialogue may be intended to qualify the sweeping denunciations of Rhetoric contained in the Gorgias, to which dial. there is a more undisguised allusion in the immediate sequel. Possibly Plato meant to answer the unfriendly criticisms of Isocrates or some other of his censors.

E. Φημί, ἐὰν οἱ γ' ἐπιόντες αὐτῇ λόγοι, κ.τ.λ.] 'yes! if only the on-coming arguments bear her witness that she is really an Art.' The 'arguments' or reasonings here personified, under the figure of a party of fresh witnesses in the cause, are doubtless those which triumphed over Gorgias and Polus: Gorg. 463 B, οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία τε καὶ τριβή: 501 A, κομιδὴ ἀτέχνως . . . ἔρχεται . . . ἀλογός τε παντάπασιν, ὥς ἐπος εἰπεῖν . . . τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία. Comp. inf. 270 B.

ἔστι τέχνη ἀλλ' ἄτεχνος τριβή. τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησὶν ὁ Λάκων, ἔτυμος τέχνη ἀνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἡφθαι οὐτ' ἔστιν οὔτε μή ποθ' ὕστερον γένηται.

| ΦΑΙ. Τούτων δεῖ τῶν λόγων, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ 261 δεῦρο αὐτοὺς παράγων, ἐξέταξε τί καὶ πῶς λέγουσιν.

ΣΩ. Πάριτε δὴ, θρέμματα γενναῖα, καλλίπαιδά τε Φαῖδρον πίθετε, ὥς ἐὰν μὴ ικανῶς φιλοσοφήσῃ, οὐδὲ ικανὸς ποτε λέγειν ἔσται περὶ οὐδενός. ἀποκρινέσθω δὴ ὁ Φαῖδρος.

ΦΑΙ. Ἐρωτᾶτε.

τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησὶν ὁ Λάκων] See Rep. ix. 575 E, *μητρίδα τε, Κρητὲς φασί, καὶ πατρίδα ἔξει τε καὶ θρέψει*: Epist. vii. 345, *ἴτω Ζεὺς, φησὶν ὁ Θηβαῖος*. These apophthegms are sometimes quoted in the original Doric, but sometimes, as in Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 18. 6, they are paraphrased in good Attic. In the present passage the poetic *ἔτυμος* is the only remnant of the original dictum, whatever it may have been. The passage has been much criticized, as by Schleierm., Voegelien (in Praef. ed. Tur. p. xii.), and by a writer in the *Ikenish Mus.* xii. p. 404. Some have recommended the mutilation, others the entire excision of the sentence: but the last-named writer's suggestion is more ingenious—*φησὶν ὁ λαχών*, i. e. *ὁ ἀγορεύειν λαχών*, "the spokesman of the party." But why this *λῆξις* here? Stallb. is said by its author to have approved of this clever, but, I think, uncalled for alteration. The passage quoted from the Rhetoric will be found sufficient to justify the present text. The collector of Laconian apophthegms, whether Plutarch or some other, gives the sentiment in nearly the same words, but with a prefatory *νῆ τῷ σιῷ*. Plut. Mor. p. 233 B, *Μεγαλυνομένου τινὸς ἐπὶ τῇ ρητορικῇ τέχνῃ, εἰπέ τις Λάκων, Ἄλλὰ, νῆ τῷ σιῷ, τέχνη ἀνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἡφθαι οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε μήποτε γένηται*. No one however regards this as an independent testimony. The phrase *ἀληθείας ἡφθαι* betrays Plato's hand (Phaed. 65 B; Theaet. 186 D, *οὐσίας καὶ ἀληθείας ἄβασθαι*; and elsewhere). *φησὶν ὁ Λάκων* seems to have been a usual formula of citation, when these *ῥηματισκία*, of which the Athenians seem to have been fond, were introduced

to season their discourse. For the Laconian dislike of rhetoric comp. Sext. Empir., Math. ii. § 21, *τὸν ἐπὶ ξένης ρητορικῇ ἐκπονήσαντα νεανίαν, ἐπανελθόντα ἐκόλασαν οἱ Ἐφοροί... προσθέντες... ὥς δολεροῦς λόγους ἐπὶ παρακρούσει τὰς Σπάρτας ἐμελέτησεν*. Perhaps the dictum in the text may have been connected with this story, which no comm. notices.

261. δεῖ] Vulg. δῆ. The δεῖ is but a makeshift reading, taken from a limited number of MSS. The alternative is to suppose that a verb has been dropped, such as *δεόμεθα* or perhaps *δεῖ* after *λόγων*.

Πάριτε δῆ] 'approach, ye gentle creatures, and try to convince the prolific Phaedrus that without a due tincture of philosophy he will never be able to speak on any subject as he ought to speak.' Hermias's interpretation of *θρέμματα* is a curiosity: *τοὺς λόγους θρέμματα καλεῖ· οἱ γὰρ λόγοι τῆς ψυχῆς θρέμματά εἰσιν, οἱ οὐ σιώδεις καὶ ἀληθεῖς ἀλλὰ ἀποδεικτικοί*. He is more successful in his gloss on *καλλίπαιδα*: *ἢ αὐτὸν τὸν Φ. καλὸν παῖδα, ἢ καλοὺς παῖδας τίκοντα, τοὺς λόγους*. The latter is the sense generally adopted, as by Plutarch, Mor. p. 1000, quoted by Heind., *τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων πατέρα Φαῖδρον ἐν Συμποσίῳ προσεῖπεν εἰσηγήτην αὐτὸν γενόμενον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὁμώνυμῳ διαλόγῳ καλλίπαιδα* (for the vulg. *καλλιπιδῆν*): Aesch. Ag. 761, *οἰκῶν εὐθυδίκων καλλιπαις πότμος ἀέ*. But we have it in the former sense in Eur. Or. 964, *ὃν ἔλαχ' ἀ κατὰ χθονὸς νερέων καλλιπαις θεά, sc. Persephone*. Socr. uses a poetic phrase to humour his companion's love of fine writing.

Ἐρωτᾶτε] Herm., *ὥς πρὸς τὰ θρέμματα εἶπε*.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰρ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη 904
 τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστη-
 ρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις,
 ἢ αὐτὴ σμικρῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων πέρι; καὶ οὐδὲν ἐντι-
 μότερον τό γε ὄρθον περὶ σπουδαῖα ἢ περὶ φαῦλα γιγνόμε-
 νον; ἢ πῶς σὺ ταῦτ' ἀκήκοας;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δι' οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ
 μάλιστα μὲν πῶς περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται
 τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας· ἐπὶ πλεον δὲ οὐκ
 ἀκήκοα.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἢ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὀδυσσεύς τέχνας

Ἐὰρ οὖν οὐ, κ.τ.λ.] As a step towards the proof of the position, that a philosophic training is necessary to the rhetor, the *Δόγοι* begin *secundum artem* by defining the art of Rhetoric. Rhetoric is 'a winning or working upon the soul by means of discourses,' and this description holds good whatever the matter in which Rhetoric works, or whatever the occasion on which she exerts her powers: for, in strictness, the dignity or meanness of the subject-matter does not affect her greatness as an art. For this broad view of the scope of Rhetoric Phaedr. is not prepared. The treatises he has read restrict her functions to the law-courts and the popular assemblies,—a restriction which Socr. proceeds to reason away by examples.

ψυχαγωγία τις] This definition puts in a more philosophical form the well-known Ῥητορικὴ πειθοῦς δημιουργός, attributed to Corax and Tisias. The verb ψυχαγωγεῖν is common. Arist. Poet. G. 17, τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ τραγῳδία τοῦ μύθου μέρη ἐστίν, αἳ τε περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις. Sext. Empir. adv. Gramm. 297, οἱ μὲν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς στοχάζονται, οἱ δὲ ἐκ παντὸς ψυχαγωγεῖν ἐθέλουσι· ψυχαγωγεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ψεύδος ἢ τὸ ἀληθές. Also in the orators, Lycurg. c. Leocr. 933, τίνας δὲ δυνατόν εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς λόγοις ψυχαγωγῆσαι, καὶ τὴν ἰσχύοντα αὐτῶν τοῦ ἥθους τοῖς δακρύοις εἰς ἔλεον προσαγέσθαι; τοὺς δικαστάς. Cic. de Orat. ii. c. 24, Tantum vim habet illa quae recte a bono poeta dicta est, *Flexanima atque omnium regina rerum oratio*. It is uncertain whether Plato invented the substantive or found it ready to his hand.

ἐν ἰδίοις] The ἴδιοι σύλλογοι are private meetings or conversazioni for the purposes of eristic debate on abstract questions. They are more explicitly mentioned Soph. 232 C: ἐν γε ταῖς ἰδίοις ξυνουσίαις, ὁπόταν γενέσεως τε καὶ οὐσίας πέρι κατὰ πάντων λέγεται τι, ξύνισμεν ὥς αὐτοὶ τε ἀντειπεῖν δεινοὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους ποιοῦσιν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ δυνατόις. Socr. includes in his definition of Rhetoric the ἀντιλογικὴ τέχνη, as it is called in the same passage. This agrees with the assertion in the Gorgias, ὅτι σοφιστῆς καὶ ῥήτωρ ταῦτόν, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον. This will appear further in the sequel.

B. μάλιστα μὲν πῶς] Phaedr. replies that the technical lectures and treatises on Rhetoric relate chiefly to the forensic branch, some of the former including also the eloquence of the assembly. These two kinds were designated as *δικανικὸν* and *συμβουλευτικὸν λόγον*. Aristotle, too, makes it matter of complaint that the technographers preceding his time had confined their attention chiefly to the former. Rhet. i. 1. 10, διὰ τοῦτο τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσῆς μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικανικά, καὶ καλλίονος καὶ πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματέας οὐσῆς, περὶ μὲν ἐκείνης οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρώνται τεχνολογεῖν. He proceeds to explain the cause of this preference in a manner not complimentary to the professors of rhetoric. Isocrates enlarges on the same topic with his wonted querulousness (*Contra Sophistas*, § 22, p. 295).

Ἄλλ' ἢ τὰς Νέστορος, κ.τ.λ.] What, says Socr., is it possible that you have

μόνον [περὶ] λόγων ἀκήκοας, ἃς ἐν Ἰλίῳ σχολάζοντε συνε-
γραφάτην, τῶν δὲ Παλαμήδους ἀνήκοος γέγονας ;

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε τῶν Νέστορος, εἰ μὴ
Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἢ τινα Θρασύμαχόν
τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὀδυσσέα.

ΣΩ. Ἰσως. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτους ἐώμεν σὺ δ' εἰπέ, ἐν
δικαστηρίοις οἱ ἀντίδικοι τί δρῶσιν ; οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσι
μέντοι ; ἢ τί φήσομεν ;

ΦΑΙ. Τοῦτ' αὐτό.

only heard of the technical treatises of Nestor and Ulysses, and have never been informed of those of Palamedes ? By these heroic worthies it is afterwards hinted that Gorgias, Thrasymachus and Theodorus, one or both, and Zeno of Elea are respectively meant. The question is therefore equivalent to this: 'Have you heard only of the professed Rhetors, and not also of the people called Eristics, of whom Zeno is the father?' Gorgias is called Nestor partly on account of his great age, and partly because τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή. Of Thrasymachus and Theodorus we shall hear more anon. Zeno is well represented by Palamedes, the 'sophist' of the heroic times, distinguished for his inventive genius. Philostr. Heroicus x. 1: αὐτομαθῇ ἀφικέσθαι (τὸν Παλαμήδην) καὶ σοφίας ἥδη γεγυμνασμένον, καὶ πλεῖω γινώσκοντα ἢ ὁ Χείρων. His discoveries were ὦραι, μηνῶν κύκλος, ἐνιαυτός, νόμισμα, σταθμά, μέτρα, ἀριθμοί. In the text, περὶ before λόγων is probably interpolated.

c. εἰ μὴ—κατασκευάζεις, κ.τ.λ.] 'unless you are dressing up, let us say, a Gorgias in the garb of Nestor, or a Thrasymachus or Theodorus in that of Ulysses;' or, 'unless the mask of Nestor conceals a Gorgias,' &c. Aristotle, in his work De Sophisticis Elenchis, seems to imply that Gorgias wrote no technical treatise on Rhetoric, but lent his pupils model speeches (communes loci) to learn by heart instead. The first technographer, he says, was Tisias, then came Thrasy-
machus, and thirdly Theodorus. So in the Gorgias, p. 462 B, we read of a written τέχνη of Polus, but not of one by Gorgias. On the other hand, it is not to be supposed with Spengel (Artt.

Scriptt. p. 83) that Plato would cause Phaedr. to make a wrong guess, or that Γοργίαν τινὰ can possibly mean 'Gorgias or somebody else like him,' for who but Gorgias can be represented by Nestor, or what doubt can there be of Plato's meaning when he makes that hero as well as Ulysses employ his long leisure at Troy in composing (συνέγραψάτην) a τέχνη? Compare also 267 A, where Gorgias is coupled with the acknowledged technographer Tisias. Either Plato wrote carelessly in the present passage, or—what is more probable—Gorgias wrote a τέχνη, but found or thought it useless for educational purposes. That Aristotle's catalogue of the earliest technographers l. l. is not complete, follows from a passage of the *Rhetorice ad Alexandrum* (i. 17), in which a τέχνη of Corax, the predecessor of Tisias, is expressly mentioned. If, as many think, Anaximenes was the author of the work quoted, his testimony to a fact of literary history is not inferior to Aristotle's, who indeed himself speaks of a τέχνη of Corax, Rhet. ii. 24. 11. From another passage, ib. iii. 18. 7, it follows that Gorgias was at any rate the author of rhetorical precepts, and not a mere writer of speeches, as indeed Spengel admits. The by-name of Nestor, as we learn from Syrianus, ap. Spengel l. l. p. 113, was afterwards given to Isocrates.

οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσι μέντοι] Sup. 229 B, εἰπέ μοι, . . οὐκ ἐνθὺνδε μέντοι . . λέγεται ὁ Βορέας τὴν Ὀρειθυίαν ἀρπάσαι ; inf. 267 C. Socr. is now showing that the controversies of the law-court, the assembly, and the schools are all conducted on the same principles, and amenable to the same rules of art.

ΣΩ. Περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τε καὶ ἀδίκου ;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνη τοῦτο δρῶν ποιήσει φανῆναι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν δὲ βούληται, ἄδικον ;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μῆν ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν δημηγορίᾳ δὴ τῇ πόλει δοκεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ, τοτὲ δ' αὖ τὰναντία ;

ΦΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τὸν οὖν Ἑλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνην, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλά, μένοντά τε αὖ καὶ φερόμενα ;

ΦΑΙ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον περὶ δικαστήριά τέ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀντιλογικὴ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίαν, ἀλλ', ὥς ἔοικε, περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, εἴπερ ἔστιν, αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἥ τις οἶός τ' ἔσται πᾶν παντὶ ὁμοιοῦν τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ οἷς δυνατόν, καὶ ἄλλου ὁμοιοῦντος καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένου εἰς φῶς ἄγειν.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγεις ;

Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην, κ.τ.λ.] 'and he who conducts such a controversy (ὁ ἀντιλέγων περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου) scientifically will cause a given action to appear in either light—just, or, when he chooses, unjust—to the same jury at two different times, will he not ?'

D. τὸν οὖν Ἑλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην] Scholl., Ζήνωνα φησὶ τὸν Παρμενίδου ἐταῖρον. That the father of the Eristic sects is here meant, the context proves to demonstration. The various reading Ἑλεατήν, derived from Quintilian, Inst. iii. 1. 10 (meaning the rhetor Alcidas), is entitled to no consideration, as it destroys the point and purpose of the passage. Diog. l. ix. 25, ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ καὶ Ἑλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην αὐτόν (sc. τὸν Ζήνωνα) καλεῖ. Zeno's paradoxes on the subjects of the One and Many, of Rest and Motion, &c., which Socr. here alludes to, may be learned from any history of philosophy. The

dialogue called Sophista was written to overthrow this 'Antilogic' method, in order to make way for a rational Logic.

Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον, κ.τ.λ.] The art of controversy is therefore not confined to oratory forensic or popular, but, so far as appears, it must be an art, if art it really is, applicable to all kinds of discourse without exception—an art capable of making any thing appear like any thing else within the limits of possibility, also of exposing every attempt on the part of an adversary to perform the same feat without detection. Socr. proceeds to argue that a man who has this power must know whether one thing is like another or not: that in order to impose on others and to detect imposition in them, he must himself be undecieved. A science of truth (ὄντος) is consequently implied in the science of seeming (δοκοῦντος). Comp. Arist. Rhet. i. 1. 12, quoted p. 262 inf.

ΣΩ. Τῇδε δοκῶ ζητοῦσι φανεῖσθαι. ἀπάτη πότερον ἐν πολὺ διαφέρουσι γίγνεται μᾶλλον ἢ ὀλίγον;

| ΦΑΙ. Ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγον.

262

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά γε δὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν μεταβαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ κατὰ μέγα.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπατήσῃν μὲν ἄλλον, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπατήσεσθαι τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ἀκριβῶς διειδέναι.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν οἶός τ' ἔσται, ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοῶν ἐκάστου, τὴν τοῦ ἀγνοουμένου ὁμοιότητα σμικράν τε καὶ μεγάλην ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις διαγιγνώσκειν;

ΦΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

B

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζουσιν καὶ ἀπατωμένοις δῆλον ὡς τὸ πάθος τοῦτο δι' ὁμοιοτήτων τινῶν εἰσερρήνη.

ΦΑΙ. Γίγνεται γοῦν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως τεχνικὸς ἔσται μεταβιβάζειν κατὰ σμικρὸν διὰ τῶν ὁμοιοτήτων ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἐκάστοτε ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἀπάγων, ἢ αὐτὸς τοῦτο διαφεύγειν, ὁ μὴ ἐγνωρικῶς ὁ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ μὴ ποτε.

ΣΩ. Λόγων ἄρα τέχνην, ᾧ ἐταῖρε, ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ

262. Ἡ οὖν οἶός τ' ἔσται] 'suppose a man to be ignorant of the truth of any given thing, how is he, in other things, to detect a resemblance to that of which by the hypothesis he is ignorant, or to discern whether such resemblance is great or small?'

B. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα] 'consequently where people are deceived, and their notions are at variance with the realities, it is plain that such illusions slid into their minds by means of certain resemblances.' τὸ πάθος τοῦτο = τὸ ἀπατᾶσθαι.

Ἔστιν οὖν] Without a familiarity with truth, argues Soer., it is impossible for a speaker either to mislead his hearers in a thoroughly skillful manner,

or to avoid being himself misled. For μεταβιβάζειν the vulg. had μεταβιβάζων. The correction is supplied by Galen, Hipp. et Plat. p. 331 (v. p. 729, Kühn). Bodl., μεταβιβάζει. No further alteration seems necessary. The rhetor ἀπάγει ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος and μεταβιβάζει κατὰ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον, κ.τ.λ., leads his audience away from the truth, and brings them round insensibly to the opposite of the truth, effecting this by means of resemblances or artful counterfeits: as when, says Herm., τὸν ὑδρᾶρ-γυρον ἄργυρον (νομίσαι ποιῇ) ἢ τὸν χαλκὸν χρυσόν, καὶ ἐπὶ ζῴων τὴν φάτταν περιστεράν, ἐπὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων δὲ τὸν γόητα τελέσστην.

εἰδώς, δόξας δὲ πεθηρευκῶς γελοῖαν τινά, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄτεχνον παρέξεται.

ΦΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν, ἐν τῷ Δυσίου λόγῳ ὃν φέρεις καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν ἰδεῖν τι ὧν φασὲν ἀτέχνων τε καὶ ἐντέχνων εἶναι;

ΦΑΙ. Πάντων γέ που μάλιστα, ὡς νῦν γε ψιλῶς πως
λέγομεν, οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν κατὰ τύχην γέ τινα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρρή-
 D θήτην τὸ λόγῳ ἔχοντέ τι παράδειγμα, ὡς ἂν ὁ εἰδὼς τὸ
 ἀληθὲς προσπαίζων ἐν λόγοις παράγοι τοὺς ἀκούοντας.
 καὶ ἔγωγε, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αἰτιῶμαι τοὺς ἐντοπίους θεοὺς· ἴσως
 δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφήται οἱ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ᾧδοὶ
 ἐπιπεπνευκότες ἂν ἡμῖν εἶεν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας. οὐ γάρ ποῦ
 ἔγωγε τέχνης τινὸς τοῦ λέγειν μέτοχος.

ΦΑΙ. *Εστω ὡς λέγεις· μόνον δῆλωσον ὁ φής.

ΣΩ. Ἦτοι δὴ μοι ἀνάγνωθι τὴν τοῦ Αὐσίου λόγου ἀρχήν.

Γ. ΦΑΙ. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ
ὥς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων γενομένων, ἀκήκοας.
ἀξιῷ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὧν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ

C. δόξας—τεθρηνευκός] Angl., ‘a master of claptrap,’ Germ. Tr., “den Meinungen nachjagt.” τεθρηνευκός, Galen and Bodd. for the vulg. τεθρηνακός. Plato never uses θηρᾶν either literally or metaphorically, but always θηρπεύειν or θηρπεύεσθαι. Xenophon employs both forms.

ὃν φασιν ἀτέχον τε καὶ ἐτέχον
εἶναι. For the constr. comp. 247 D, ὃν
ῥησις νῦν ὄντων κακούμεν. The MSS.
give ἀτέχον, ἐτέχον: corr. Heind.
Soer. proposes to illustrate his principle
by reference to the discourse of Lysias,
and to his own two discourses. To this
Phaedr. gladly agrees, for, says he, we
are at present reasoning too abstractedly
—ψιλῶς. Comp. Theaet. 165 A, ἐκ τῶν
ψιλῶν λόγων περὶ τῆς γεωμετρίας—'we
had abstract dialectics for geometry',
which uses *prolēysis*. In 278 C σοφία
ψιλῆ = poetry unaccompanied with
music. Legg. ii. 669 D, λόγοι ψιλοί

denotes prose as distinguished from me-
trical composition.

Καὶ μὴν κατὰ τύχην] The connexion between the two main portions of the dialogue is here plainly indicated. The speeches are patterns—*παράδειγματα*—illustrative of the theoretical principles developed in the second half of the work. Soer. affects to believe that this advantage is accidental, if it be not rather due to the inspiration of the local divinities or the *Μουσῶν προφήται*, the sweet singers overhead.

D. ὡς ἂν—παράγοι] 'how one who knows the truth may play upon and mislead his hearers.' Euthyd. 278 B, φημι ἐγὼ σοὶ τούτους προσπαίζειν—'amuse themselves at your expense.'

Ἔστω ὡς λέγεις] Phædr. is impatient of the frequent allusions to these insects: a dramatic touch this of great delicacy. Socr. takes the hint, and introduces them no more.

ἐραστῆς ὦν σοῦ τυγχάνω. ὥς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει—

ΣΩ. Παῦσαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὗτος ἀμαρτάνει καὶ ἄτεχνον ποιεῖ; λεκτέον, | ἦ γάρ; 263

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ παντὶ δῆλον τό γε τοιόνδε, ὥς περὶ μὲν ἓνια τῶν ὄντων ὁμονοητικῶς ἔχομεν, περὶ δ' ἓνια στασιωτικῶς;

ΦΑΙ. Δοκῶ μὲν ὁ λέγεις μαθάνειν, ἔτι δ' εἰπὲ σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν τις ὄνομα εἴπῃ σιδήρου ἢ ἀργύρου, ἂρ' οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες διανοήθημεν;

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὅταν δικαίου ἢ ἀγαθοῦ; οὐκ ἄλλος ἄλλη φέρεται, καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;

ΦΑΙ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς συμφωνοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὐ. B

ΦΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ποτέρωθι οὖν εὐαπατητότεροί ἐσμεν, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐν ποτέροις μεῖζον δύναται;

ΦΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅτι ἐν οἷς πλανώμεθα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνην ῥητορικὴν μετιέναι

263. περὶ μὲν ἓνια τῶν ὄντων] Vulg. τοιούτων. The reading ὄντων is taken from Cod. Γ, and is certainly right, in my judgment.

ἀμφισβητοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις] This distinction of ἀμφισβητήσιμα καὶ μὴ is illustrated by Arist. Rhet. i. 1. 12: τὰναντία δὲ δύνασθαι πείθειν καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ ὕπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δὲ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν) ἀλλ' ἵνα μήτε λαμβάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὕπως ἄλλον χρωμένον τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τὰναντία συλλογίζεται, ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὁμοίως γάρ εἰσιν ἀμφότεραι τῶν ἐναντίων. Here τὸ δίκαιον is the special subject of the forensic, τὸ ἀγαθὸν of the deliberative rhetoric.

B. Οὐκοῦν τὸν μέλλοντα] Having shown that Rhetoric is chiefly conversant with debatable terms, Socr. pro-

ceeds to argue that a complete theory of Rhetoric presupposes a methodical division of the things which are and of those which are not debatable or ambiguous. The word ὁδῶ (via et arte, Cic.) excludes a mere popular (εἰκῇ), or verbal, as distinguished from a scientific and natural διαίρεσις. So Aristotle uses ὁδοποιεῖν, Rhet. init., in the sense 'to systematize,' or 'methodize' (for ὁδὸς = μέθοδος), and he begins his treatise by defining the object-matter of the art he is about to handle. It is remarkable that Lysias himself is not mentioned by Plato in the list of technographers, whom he treats so roughly in the sequel. Cicero indeed says, on the authority of Aristotle, Lysiam primo profiteri solitum artem esse dicendi, deinde quod Theodorus esset in arte subtilior, in orationibus vero jejuniior, orationes eum scribere aliis coepisse, artem removisse (Brut. 12.

πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ ταῦτα ὁδῷ διηρηῆσθαι, καὶ εἰληφέναι τινὰ χαρακτῆρα ἐκατέρου τοῦ εἶδους, ἐν ᾧ τε ἀνάγκη τὸ πλήθος πλανᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν ᾧ μή.

C) ΦΑΙ. Καλὸν γοῦν ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶδος εἶη κατα-
νενοηκὼς ὁ τοῦτο λαβών.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτά γε οἶμαι πρὸς ἐκάστῳ γιγνόμενον μὴ
λανθάνειν, ἀλλ' ὁξέως αἰσθάνεσθαι, περὶ οὗ ἂν μέλλῃ
ἐρεῖν, ποτέρου ὃν τυγχάνει τοῦ γένους.

ΦΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἐρωτα πότερον φῶμεν εἶναι τῶν
ἀμφισβητησίμων ἢ τῶν μή;

ΦΑΙ. Τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων δὴ πού. ἢ οἶε ἂν σοι
συγχωρῆσαι εἰπεῖν ἃ νῦν δὴ εἶπες περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὥς βλάβη

D) τέ ἐστι τῷ ἐρωμένῳ καὶ ἐρῶντι, καὶ αἰθίς ὥς μέγιστον
τῶν ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνει;

48). Quintilian attributes to Lysias the opinion that Rhetoric "observationem quandam esse non artem" (Inst. ii. c. 17). This was probably the judgment of his riper years, when the change in his practice alluded to by Cicero had taken place. It would be unsafe to conclude from such authorities as the pseudo-Plutarch and Suidas that his treatise, if he published one, survived him. Krüger's inference that the τέχνη of Lysias was written after the ἐρωτικός, which Plato here criticizes, is palpably unsound. It would be equally fair to argue that the work had disappeared from circulation before the Phaedrus was written, or that Plato had never seen it. But the words of Cicero by no means prove the existence of a written τέχνη by Lysias. His instruction in the art of Rhetoric may have been comprised in oral lectures, as must have been the case in other instances. Compare what Phaedr. says, sup. 261 B: λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας, and the note.

C. Καλὸν γοῦν ἂν] As we might say, 'a very pretty generalization this, if you can carry it out.' Herm., ὁ εἰδὼς τὴν διαρε-
τικὴν μέθοδον ἀρίστα ἔχει. This 'dialectic method' is further explained in the sequel, p. 265 c.

Ἐπειτά γε οἶμαι] In the second place, when he comes in contact with either of

the two classes, the Disputable or the Indisputable, he ought not to be baffled by it, but should be able to discern at a glance to whether of the two the matter he has to speak about does properly belong.

ἢ οἶε ἂν σοι συγχωρῆσαι] 'else do you suppose he would have let you say of him,' &c., τὸν Ἐρωτα being understood. I prefer this to Badh.'s ἐγχωρῆσαι. On the omission of ἂν with τυγχάνει, &c., see Lob. ad Phryn. p. 277, "Neque fas duco, etsi in proclivi emendatio, tot tamque gravia testimonia in dubitationem devocare: τυγχάνει καλῇ, Plato Hipp. i. 306," &c. Also Heind. on the present passage, who quotes Isocr. Archid. p. 256, μεθ' ὧν (sc. τῶν νόμων) οἰκοῦντες, εὐδαιμονεῖσθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐτύχανον. For the other side of the question, see Porson on Eur. Hec. 782, with Schölefield's note. Homer gives the first example of this construction, Od. x. 87, ὃν περὶ πέτρῃ Ἥλιβας τετύχηκε διαμπερὲς ἀμφοτέρωθεν. Porson allowed it in the tragedies, but doubted its admissibility in comedy or prose. But the passages from the Hippias and Isocrates are not easily altered. Hence I have not thought it right to meddle with the text here, though it would be easy to conjecture μέγιστον ὃν with Heind., or, with Hirsch., ἀγαθῶν ὃν τ. Of the passages adduced from Aristoph.

ΣΩ. Ἄριστα λέγεις. ἀλλ' εἰπὲ καὶ τόδε—ἐγὼ γάρ τοι διὰ τὸ ἐνθουσιαστικὸν οὐ πάννυ μέννημαι—εἰ ὠρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου.

ΦΑΙ. Νῆ Δί' ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα.

ΣΩ. Φεῦ, ὅσῳ λέγεις τεχνικωτέρας Νύμφας τὰς Ἀχελώου καὶ Πάνα τὸν Ἑρμοῦ Λυσίου τοῦ Κεφάλου πρὸς λόγους εἶναι. ἥ οὐδὲν λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Λυσίας ἀρχόμενος τοῦ ἐρωτικοῦ ἠνάγκασεν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν Ἑρωτα ἐν τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ αὐτὸς ἐβουλήθη, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἤδη συνταξάμενος πάντα τὸν ὕστερον λόγον διεπεράνατο ; Εἰ βούλει πάλιν ἀναγνῶμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ ;

ΦΑΙ. Εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ ὁ μέντοι ζητεῖς, οὐκ ἔστ' αὐτόθι.

ΣΩ. Λέγε, ἵν' ἀκούσω αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου.

ΦΑΙ. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων γενομένων, ἀκήκοας. ἀξιώ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχήσαι ὦν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστὴς ὦν σοῦ τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὦν ἂν εὖ ποιήσωσιν, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται.

ΣΩ. Ἡ πολλοῦ δεῖν ἔοικε ποιεῖν ὅδε γε ὁ ζητοῦμεν, ὅς οὐδὲ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐξ ὑπτίας ἀνάπαλιν

that from Av. 760 is ambiguous ; and of Eccles. 1137 Porson suggests the emendation *καὶ τῶν θεατῶν ὧν τις εὖνους τυγχάνει*, for *καλ. . . εἴ τις*.

ν. διὰ τὸ ἐνθουσιαστικόν] Sc. τῆς διανοίας. Transl. οὐ πάννυ μέννημαι, 'I have quite forgotten.'

ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα] Alluding to the elaborate definitions in 237 B seq. and 244 seq.

ἠνάγκασεν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν] 'did he force us to conceive of Love as some definite entity selected by himself? Did he, I say, compose the ensuing discourse from first to last in due subordination to this idea?'

261. Ἡ πολλοῦ δεῖν] Hence, says Hermias, later critics say of Lysias, ὅτι τίς τινος δυνατὸς ἐγένετο, τάξαι δὲ οὐ, διὰ τὸ εὐρετικὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄτακτον τοῦ λόγου. If Lysias could have been heard in reply, he would have said that his ἐραστὴς had the best of reasons for not defining too clearly the subject of his

address.

ὅς οὐδὲ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς] "Lysias," says Krische, "begins where he should have ended, inasmuch as he assumes as known the particulars concerning the person and personal relations of the suitor, and gives them precedence of that which is general" (περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, κ.τ.λ.). Plato is apparently aware that this was done of set purpose, and as a stroke of art, and he compares the trick to the feat of swimming on the back. For the expression comp. Rep. vii. 529 C, *κὰν ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ μανθάνῃ*, a curious passage, in which Plato ridicules the popular notion that the study of astrology has an elevating tendency. Comp. also Parmen. 137 A, *διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος λόγων*. Herm., οὕτως οὖν ἔγραψε τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων (πλέων, ed. Ast), *ἐπ' ἐξουσίας ἔχων καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ διατιθέμενος τὸν λόγον ὥστε παρὰ τοὺς χρόνους ἤρξατο καὶ παρὰ*

διακεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἄρχεται ἀφ' ὧν πεπαν-
μένος ἂν ἤδη ὁ ἔραστῆς λέγοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά. ἢ οὐδὲν
εἶπον, Φαῖδρε, φίλη κεφαλὴ;

B ΦΑΙ. Ἔστι γέ τοι δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τελευτή, περὶ οὗ
τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τᾶλλα; οὐ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβληῖσθαι τὰ τοῦ
λόγου; ἢ φαίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἰρημένον ἔκ τινος ἀνάγ-
κης δεύτερον δεῖν τεθῆναι, ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν ῥηθέντων;
ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔδοξεν, ὡς μηδὲν εἰδότι, οὐκ ἀγεννῶς τὸ
ἐπὶ οὐκ εἰρησθαι τῷ γράφοντι· σὺ δ' ἔχεις τινὰ ἀνάγκην
λογογραφικὴν, ἣ ταῦτα ἐκείνος οὕτως ἐφεξῆς παρ' ἄλληλα
ἔθηκεν;

C ΦΑΙ. Χρηστὸς εἶ, ὅτι με ἡγεί ικανὸν εἶναι τὰ ἐκείνου
οὕτως ἀκριβῶς διυδεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γε οἶμαί σε φάναι ἄν, δεῖν πάντα
λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐ-

φύσιν, ὡς οἱ κολυμβῶντες ὑπτιοί. Lysias doubtless plumed himself on his skill in plunging thus *in medias res*, instead of commencing *ab ovo*, as a novice might think it his duty to do. And even the confusion of which Plato complains he might justify on practical grounds: the entire speech being an example of rhetorical insinuation, where more is meant than meets or is fit to meet the ear. But it does not suit Plato's purpose to place himself on the 'Standpunkt' of his victim.

πεπανμένος] Sc. τοῦ λόγου.

Φαῖδρε, φίλη κεφαλὴ] An imitation of the Homeric Τεῦκερ, φίλη κεφαλὴ (Il. viii. 281), as Ast and Stallb. observe. One MS. gives ὦ Φαῖδρε, a reading which I am surprised to see that Hirsch. and Badh. patronize.

B. Ἔστι γέ τοι δῆ] 'That of which he speaks (in the exordium) is, I grant you, a termination' rather than a beginning.

χύδην] 'helter-skelter,' like rubbish shot from a cart.

ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ] 'I, who am but a novice, could not help being struck by the audacity of the writer, in blurting out the first thing that came into his head.' The phrases οὐκ ἀγεννῶς, πάνυ γενναῖως, πάνυ νεανικῶς are frequent in the ironi-

cal sense. Exactly in point is Gorg. 492 D, οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος.

σὺ δ' ἔχεις τινὰ ἀνάγκην] 'are you aware of any cogent literary or rhetorical reason which can have induced the writer to string his topics together thus?' To which Phaedr. replies: 'you do me too much honour in supposing that I am clever enough to penetrate his motives so exactly.' χρηστὸς εἶ, ἥδὺς εἶ are well-known ironical formulas, like our 'thank you,' 'you are very kind,' &c.

C. δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶον] This comparison of a well-arranged discourse to a living organism occurs again, Phileb. 61 B: ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθάπερ κόσμος τις ἀπώσπτος ἄρξιν καλῶς ἐμφύχον σαματός ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται. It is also implied inf. 268 D, καταγελῶν ἂν εἴ τις οἶται τραγωδίαν ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων σύστασιν, πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοισι καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνισταμένῃ. Comp. Politicus, p. 277 B, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν ὥσπερ ζῶον, κ.τ.λ., where, however, the ζῶον is γεγραμμένον. Aristotle borrows the illustration from Plato in his remarks on Epic poetry, Poet. 23. 1: περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς, ὅτι δὲ τοὺς μύθους καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδαῖς συνιστάναι δραματικούς.

τοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέπουτ' ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι τοῖνυν τὸν τοῦ ἐταίρου σου λόγον, εἴθ' οὕτως εἶτε ἄλλως ἔχει καὶ εὐρήσεις τοῦ ἐπιγράμματος οὐδὲν διαφέροντα, ὃ Μίδα τῷ Φρυγί φασί τινες ἐπιγεγράφθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Ποῖον τοῦτο, καὶ τί πεπονθός;

ΣΩ. Ἔστι μὲν τοῦτο τόδε,

χαλκῇ παρθένος εἰμί, Μίδα δ' ἐπὶ σήματι κείμεναι.
ὄφρ' ἂν ὕδωρ τε νάη καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ τεθήλη,
αὐτοῦ τῇδε μένουσα πολυκλαύτου ἐπὶ τύμβου,
ἀγγελέω παριούσι Μίδας ὅτι τῇδε τέθαιται.

ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρει αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ ὕστατόν τι λέγεσθαι, ἐννοεῖς πον, ὡς ἐγῶμαι.

καὶ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν ὅλην καὶ τελείαν, ἔχουσιν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τέλος, ὡς περὶ ζῶον ἐν ὅλῳ ποιῇ τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονήν, δῆλον. Otherwise, he says, we find the same defects of construction as the ordinary histories present, in which γίνεται θάτερον μετὰ θατέρου, ἐξ ὧν ἐν οὐδὲν γίνεται τέλος. This is in effect the application to literary criticism of the Platonic formula ἐν καὶ πολλά. Herm., ἐπειδὴ παντὶ πράγματι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐπιλαμβάνεται, . . . οὕτως καὶ τὸ κάλλος οὐκ ἔστι καλόν, εἰ μὴ ἔνωσις γένηται πάντων τῶν μορίων. It is for want of this natural coherence of parts that the Lysianic discourse resembles nothing so much as the celebrated epigram said to have been graven on the tomb of Midas, in which every line is independent of every other, both in sense and metre, so that the poem yields much the same meaning in whatever order the lines are read. This epigrammatic *jeu d'esprit* was attributed, as we learn from Diog. Laert., to Cleobulus of Lindus, one of the seven sages. It was censured by Simonides in an ode, of which Laertius favours us with a fragment (l. i. c. 6, § 2): τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τινες τὸ ἐπὶ Μίδα τοῦτον (Κλεόβουλον) φασὶ ποιῆσαι. Χαλκῇ παρθένος εἰμί, Μίδα δ' ἐπὶ σήματι κείμεναι Ἔστ' ἂν ὕδωρ τε νάη καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ τεθήλη Ἡελίδος

τ' ἀνιῶν λάμψη λαμπρά τε σελήνη, Καὶ ποταμοὶ γε ῥέωσιν, ἀνακλύζη τε θάλασσα, Αὐτοῦ τῇδε, κ.τ.λ. φέρουσι δὲ μαρτύριον Σιμωνίδου ἄσμα ὅπου φησί. Τίς κεν αἰνήσειε νόφ' πίπυνος Λίνδου ναέταν Κλεόβουλον, κ.τ.λ. (Bergk, Lyr. Gr., Simon. 6). The epigram, adds Diog., could not have been Homer's, for he preceded Midas by many years! The German translators compare the Monkish lines called 'versus canerini,' which will scan both backwards and forwards, as, "Otto tenet mappam madidam mappam tenet Otto." Plato, it will be observed, omits two of the lines quoted by Diog., as they would have interfered with his criticism of the epigram and its satirical application to Lysias. Simonides in his reply seems to forget that the "Maiden" was of bronze, and not of marble: λίθον δὲ Καὶ βρόττει παλάμαι θραύοντι (v. 5). It is also curious that Hermeias speaks of the epigram as consisting of three lines only, adding, ὅθεν τινες τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιγράμματα τρίγωνα καλοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ ὅθεν ἂν ἐθέλῃς δύνασαι ἔρξασθαι. Can the first line have been wanting in the older MSS.? It certainly interferes with the interchangeability of the lines. The reading ἔστ' ἂν for ὄφρ' ἂν is also found in Thom. Magist. Encom. Gregorii, p. 104.

ΦΑΙ. Σκώπτεις τὸν λόγον ἡμῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἵνα μὴ σὺ ἄχθῃ, εἰάσωμεν—καί τοι συχνά γε ἔχειν μοι δοκεῖ παραδείγματα, πρὸς ἅ τις βλέπων ὀνύναιτ' ἄν, μιμεῖσθαι αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν μὴ πάνν τι—εἰς δὲ τοὺς ἑτέρους λόγους ἴωμεν. ἦν γάρ τι ἐν
265 αὐτοῖς, ὡς δοκῶ, προσῆκον ἰδεῖν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ λόγων σκοπεῖν.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίω που ἦσθην· ὁ μὲν γάρ, ὡς τῷ ἐρῶντι, ὁ δ' ὡς τῷ μὴ δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐλεγέτην.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλ' ἀνδρικῶς. *Al. 599, V. 153 al.*

ΣΩ. Ὡμην σε τάληθές ἐρεῖν, ὅτι μανικῶς. ὁ μέντοι ἐξήτουν, ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τοῦτο. μανίαν γάρ τινα ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι τὸν Ἐρωτα. ἦ γάρ;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Μανίας δέ γε εἶδη δύο, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰω-
13 θότων νομίμων γιγνομένην.

Ε. παραδείγματα] Herm., ἀμαρτήματα λέγει.

μιμεῖσθαι αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν μὴ πάνν τι] We may supply ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φεύγειν. There are many things in the speech of Lysias, says Socr., which may serve as useful examples to the learner if he endeavours—I do not say to imitate them—far from that. The aposiopesis is adopted out of deference to Phaedr. The only difficulty in the passage is the position of the words μὴ πάνν τι. They seem however to be introduced παρ' ὑπόνοιαν, and certainly no proposed change is for the better. Ast suggests πρὸς ἅ τις βλέπων μὲν ὀνύναιτ' ἄν, μιμεῖσθαι δὲ ἐπιχειρῶν, μὴ πάνν τι (sc. ὀνύναιτ' ἄν), “in quae si quis intueatur inde proficiat aliquid; sin imitari ea conetur nihil proficiat.” But in that case we must have οὐ πάνν τι, which it is strange that Ast should not have perceived. Winckelm.'s μὴ πάνν τι ἀφύης ὦν hardly needs discussion. Herm., πρὸς ταῦτα τὰ παραδείγματα καὶ τὰ ἀμαρτήματα τοῦ Λυσίου λόγον βλέπων τις καὶ μὴ χρώμενος ὠφελοῖτο. Socr. then turns to his own discourses, which, as they were given him by inspiration, it is no

breach of modesty to prefer to that of Lysias. There was one feature in them, he thinks, which it concerns every speculator on rhetoric to give heed to.

265. ἦσθην] So all the MSS. and Hermeias. The form occurs frequently in Plato, as inf. 273 B, and twice or three times in Aristoph., as we include or not *Aves* 19, τῷ δ' οὐκ ἔρ' ἦσθην οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ πλὴν δάκνειν, where Porson prefers ἦσθην, Cobet ἦσθην.

Μανίας δέ γε] Socr. had pointed out a glaring omission in the speech of Lysias. The orator had discoursed fluently of Love, but had forgotten to explain what he meant by the term. His own speeches present a favourable contrast in this respect. Not only had he ‘compelled his hearers to conceive of Love’ under the more general idea of Madness, but by dividing and subdividing, he had determined the particular variety of Madness to which Love corresponds. In order to this, he had first adopted the obvious distinction of divine and human; showing that beside the ordinary morbid madness, there was one caused by a divine influence emancipating the soul from the yoke of usage

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ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν τέτταρα μέρη διελόμενοι, μαντικὴν μὲν ἐπίπνοϊαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικὴν, Μουσῶν δ' αὖ ποιητικὴν, τετάρτην δὲ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἔρωτος, ἐρωτικὴν μανίαν ἐφήσαμεν τε ἀρίστην εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος ἀπεικάζοντες, ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινὸς ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι, κεράσαντες οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπίθανον λόγον, μυθικὸν τινα ὕμνον προσεπαίσαμεν μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμως τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σὸν δεσπότην Ἔρωτα, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλῶν παίδων ἔφορον.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα ἔμοιγε οὐκ ἀηδῶς ἀκοῦσαι.

ΣΩ. Τόδε τοῖνυν αὐτόθεν λάβωμεν, ὥς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψέγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐπαινεῖν ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβῆναι.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν αὐτὸ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ ὄντι παιδιᾷ πεπαῖσθαι· τούτων δὲ τινων ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοῖν

and convention (sup. 252 Δ, νομῶν δὲ καὶ εὐσημῶν, κ.τ.λ.). This divine Madness he had parcelled into four, &c. Above, p. 214 seq.

Β. τάχα δ' ἂν] On this use of ἂν in coalition with τάχα, see the note on 257 c.

παραφερόμενοι] Herm., ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰς ἀποπτῶσεις τοῦ ἔρωτος εἶπε. This passage has evidently an apologetic purpose; though it is not quite clear whether Plato means to apologize for the dubious morality of portions of his ἐρωτικὸς λόγος, or only for its high flights of mythical speculation.

κεράσαντες] 'having mixed a not unpalatable discourse,' as men mix a κρατῆρ for libation.

μυθικὸν τινα ὕμνον προσεπ.] 'we chanted for the solace of Eros a mythic hymn in strain meet and pious.' "προσεπαίσαμεν per synesin dictum, idem est quod προσπαίζοντες ὑμνήσαμεν" (Stallb.). The verb is sometimes used in the same sense with a dative: Plut. Erot. c. 20, τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ ποιητὰ προσπαίζοντες εὐλοκασί τῷ θεῷ γράφειν περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄδειν ἐπικωμάζοντες, ὅλγισα δ' εἴρηται μετὰ σπουδῆς αὐτοῖς. παίζειν and its derivatives παιδιά, &c., are not unfrequently applied to religious hymns

or choral celebrations. Arist. Ran. 318, οἱ μεμνημένοι Ἐνταυθα πον παίζουσιν, οὓς ἔφραξε νῶν, Ἄιδουσι γοῶν τὸν Ἰακχον. Ib. Lysist. 700, ὥστε καχθὲς θηκάτη ποιοῦσα παιγνίαν ἐγὼ (where perhaps παιδίαν should be restored, the Attics usually writing παιγνιον, but not παιγνία. Later writers seem only to have used ἔπαια παιγνία, &c., and hence the freq. variations in MSS.). Plat. Crat. 406 c, φιλοπαίμονες οἱ θεοί. It is more important to observe that in the Timaeus Plato extends the term παιδιά to all mythical presentments of speculative ideas, especially in Physics, the region, in his view, of probability and plausible conjecture. Tim. 59 c, τὴν τῶν εἰκότων μύθων μεταδιώκοντα ἰδέαν, ἣν ὕταν τις ἀναπαύσεως ἕνεκα τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ καταθέμενος λόγους, τοὺς γενέσεως περὶ διαθεώμενος εἰκότας ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονὴν κτᾶται, μετρίαν ἂν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παιδίαν καὶ φρόνιμον ποιοῖτο. This explains Soer's meaning, when he declares presently that, ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ ὄντι παιδιᾷ πεπαῖσθαι.

c. παιδιᾷ πεπαῖσθαι] Galen gives the non-attic πεπαῖσθαι. τούτων δὲ τίνων] Equiv. to ἐν δὲ τούτοις τισὶν ἐκ τύχης ῥηθείσι δύο τιν'

ἢ εἰδοῖν, εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν τέχνη λαβεῖν δύναίτο τις, οὐκ ἄχαρι.

ΦΑΙ. Τίνων δὴ;

ΣΩ. Εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνωρῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ

εἶδη ἦτην, ὧν εἴ τις τὴν δύναμιν, κ.τ.λ. 'Among these, so to speak, chance utterances' (alluding to the two speeches) 'there were implied two forms of procedure, of which it were gratifying if one could obtain a clear technical description.' This is Ast's view of this somewhat difficult passage. He says: "Genitivi autem τούτων . . . ῥηθέντων δνοῖν εἰδοῖν non sunt *duae harum orationum casu quodam dictarum species*, sed objective, quod dicunt, accipiendi sunt: *duae species quas invenimus vel conspicimus in his orationibus*; sic enim genitivum a Graecis poni constat ut patrio eum sermone praepositione *an* vel *in* exprimere possimus" (Comm. maj. p. 515). The genitives τούτων . . . ῥηθέντων will thus depend on εἰδοῖν, which itself depends virtually on δύναμιν, αὐτοῖν being interpolated to prevent ambiguity. Those who think the interpretation too subtle, will perhaps be disposed to acquiesce in Ast's earlier view, as shown in his version: "horum autem fortuito memoratorum generum, si quis ipsam (αὐτὴν ut vulg. pro αὐτοῖν) vim arte percipere possit haud ingratum." And so Galen probably understood it, for he gives εἰδῶν and αὐτὴν. Plato had alluded to the two processes, without explaining them technically, but rather ἐκ τύχης, (paul. sup. *μάναν γὰρ τινα ἐφῆσαμεν εἶναι τὸν Ἑρωτα*, and, *μάναν δὲ γε εἶδη δύο*, the first being a generalization, the second a 'division'—the very two processes referred to here.) For *τίαναν* I had thought of *τοι νῶν*, but I lay no stress upon this conjecture. The 'two forms of procedure' are, according to Herm., the *ὀριστική* and *διαίρητική*, according to Galen, the *συνθετική* and *διαίρητική μέθοδος* respectively. *συναγωγική* and *διαίρητική* would better correspond to Plato's language. Modern interpreters, not very correctly, render *διαρ.* by "analytic," a term usually applied by the ancients (as pseudo-Periclyone, ap. Stob. Anth. i. p. 7, ὅστις ἂν ἀναλῶσαι οἶός ἐστι πάντα γένη ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχάν) to the former or generalizing process, which Aristotle denotes by *ἐπαγωγή*: Topie. viii. 1. 18, δι' ἐπαγωγῆς ἀπὸ

τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ καθόλου λαμβάνεται. 'Collection' and 'division' are the terms which answer most nearly to *συναγωγή* and *διαίρεσις*, and should be used in translating them. The 'divisive' definition is called by Sext. Emp. *ὁ ἐξ ἐπισυνθέσεως ὅρος* (adv. Math. ii. 2). The scholastic term is Division, and Abelard has left a treatise under the title of *Divisio Divisionum*, in which he shows in how many different ways the process may be effected. The Socratic definitions, it may be observed, were founded on a *συναγωγή*, or collection of particulars, the *ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι* of Aristotle. The method of division, on the other hand, is always attributed to Plato, as by Galen in his work *De Hippocrate et Platone*. It is in one point of view supplementary to the simpler Socratic process, being designed to fix the 'differentia' of the thing to be defined with the greatest possible exactitude. The emphasis with which it is here introduced favours the belief that it was a novelty in the Athenian schools at the time when the Phaedrus was written or published: though from Xen. Mem. iv. 5. 12 we should infer that it had presented itself in an elementary form to Soer. Galen insists particularly on the value of this 'diacritic method' in the classification of diseases, and professes to believe that it was first suggested by the works of Hippocrates, with which he rightly supposes that Plato was familiar. The "Practick" of the physician was "the mistress," according to Galen, to the philosopher's "Theorick." But probably he overrates the obligation of one of his favourite authors to the other.

D. *Eis μίαν τε ἰδέαν*] He here describes the process from the many to the one. Comp. sup. 249 n, *δεῖ γὰρ ἀνθρώπον ξυνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰόντ' αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμὸν ξυναιρούμενον*. The word *συνωρῶντα* is illustrated by Legg. xii. 965, *πρὸς τὸ ἐν συντάξασθαι πάντα συνωρῶντα*. The first method, says Soer., consists in taking a comprehensive view of the multitude of scattered particulars and bringing them

διεσπαρμένα, ἵν' ἕκαστον ὀριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ περὶ οὗ
 ἂν αἰεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ. ὥσπερ τὰ νῦν δὴ περὶ Ἑρωτος,
 ὃ ἔστιν, ὀρισθέν, εἴτ' εὖ εἴτε κακῶς ἐλέχθη. τὸ γοῦν
 σαφές καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ὁμολογούμενον διὰ ταῦτ' ἔσχεν
 εἰπεῖν ὁ λόγος.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ δ' ἕτερον δὴ εἶδος τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ; E

ΣΩ. Τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν, κατ' ἄρ-
 θρα, ἥ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μη-
 δέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄρτι

under one general form or notion, for the purpose of defining and so placing out of doubt the nature of the particular subject you wish to give instruction in. In the next clause τὰ νῦν δὴ is a 'pendent,' ὀρισθέν an 'absolute' nominative. The latter may be illustrated from Thuc. iv. 125, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν δοκοῦν ἀναχωρεῖν . . κυρωθέν δὲ οὐδὲν . . νυκτός τε ἐπιγενομένης, οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες . . ἐχώρουν ἐπ' οἴκου. (See Greg. Corinth. p. 38, Ἀττικὸν τὸ εὐθεῖαν ἀπὸ γενικῆς, κ.τ.λ.) Transl., 'as in our recent discourse on Love—it having been defined what Love is—whether correctly or not I do not say; but however that may be, it is certain that the discourse owed to such definition all that it possessed both of clearness and consistency.' For τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ὁμ. Hirsch. quite wrongly gives ταῦτὸν αὐτῷ.

E. Τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἶδη] On this concise description of the 'diaeretic method,' or way of passing from the One down to the Many, the best commentary is furnished by the dialogues called the Sophist and the Statesman, the former of which at least no student of Plato or of the Greek language should leave unread. The passage is quoted, as far as χρώμενον, by Galen, de Hippocr. et Plat. (v. 753, ed. Kühn; 334, ed. Basil.), with the context from ἐμοὶ δὲ φαίνεται incl. With the exception of διατέμνειν for τέμνειν (in which Stobaeus agrees, Eclog. ii. c. 2) his MSS. present no variant from those of Plato. τέμνειν is found in the Bodl. and Paris Δ.

κατ' ἄρθρα, ἥ πέφυκε, κ.τ.λ.] The importance of a natural and not merely arbitrary system of classification is insisted on by all men of science, modern as well as ancient, however little credit some of them may be disposed to allow

to Plato for the use he makes of his principle. The phrase ἥ πέφυκε is illustrated by Crat. 386 E, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι αὐτὰ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βέβαιόν ἐστι τὰ πράγματα, οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἐλκόμενα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαντάσματι, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἥπερ πέφυκε. And again 387, πότερον ἡμῖν τηρεῖν ἕκαστον ὥς ἂν ἡμεῖς βουλόμεθα καὶ ὃ ἂν βουληθῶμεν, ἢ ἔαν μὲν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν βουληθῶμεν ἕκαστον τέμνειν τοῦ τέμνειν τε καὶ τέμνεσθαι καὶ ὃ πέφυκε, τεμοῦμέν τε καὶ πλέον τι ἡμῖν ἔσται καὶ ὁρθῶς πράξομεν τοῦτο, ἔαν δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, ἐξ-αμαρτησόμεθ' τε καὶ οὐδὲν πράξομεν. These passages are important, as showing that the method owed its value in Plato's eyes not merely to the ingenuity it calls forth (though on that too he elsewhere insists, Polit. 286 D), but to its power as an engine of positive discovery, and as a means of revealing the thought or plan in Nature which underlies all her phenomena. If we remember this, we shall not wonder at the enthusiasm with which Socr. presently speaks of the able dialectician.

καταγνύναι] "Cic. de Finibus ii. 9. 26, Hoc est non dividere sed *frangere*. Sen. Epist. 89, § 2, Faciam ergo quod exigis, et philosophiam in partes non in *frusta* dividam: dividi enim illam non concedi utile est" (Ast). In Polit. 262 D, we have specimens of this chopping method held up for avoidance.

μαγείρου] The functions of the ancient μάγειρος seem to have been manifold, including those of the butcher and dissector, as well as those ordinarily assigned to the cook, plain or ornamental. So in the Cyclops of Euripides the κακὸς Αἰδου μάγειρος slaughters his victims before he roasts or boils them. And in Plutarch,

τὸ λόγῳ τὸ μὲν ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας ἐν τι κοινῇ εἶδος
 266 ἐλάβετην, | ὥσπερ δὲ σώματος ἐξ ἐνὸς διπλᾶ καὶ ὁμ- 1151
 ὄνυμα πέφυκε, σκαιά, τὰ δὲ δεξιὰ κληθέντα, οὕτω καὶ
 τὸ τῆς παρανοίας ὡς ἐν ἐν ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἶδος ἡγησα-
 μένω τὸ λόγῳ, ὁ μὲν τὸ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τεμνόμενος μέρος,
 πάλιν τοῦτο τέμνων οὐκ ἐπανῆκε, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐφευ-
 ρὼν ὀνομαζόμενον σκαιόν τινα ἔρωτα ἐλοιδόρησε μάλ'
 ἐν δίκη, ὁ δ' εἰς τὰ ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆςμανίας ἀγαγὼν ἡμᾶς,
 ὁμώνυμον μὲν ἐκείνῳ, θεῖον δ' αὖ τιν' ἔρωτα ἐφευρών,

Mor. 175 D, we read of *βοῦν σφαττόμενον ὑπὸ μαγείρου*.

ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄρτι τὰ λόγῳ] Understand *τέμνειν ὥσπερ ἄρτι*, κ.τ.λ. The two discourses presented each a specimen of diacresis. Each assumed the general idea denoted by madness or aberration of mind, but finding that the idea naturally divided itself into two, either discourse took a moiety for the purpose of further dissection. The λόγῳ are here personified as in 260 E.

266. σώματος ἐξ ἐνὸς διπλᾶ] Herm., ὥσπερ ἡ φύσις τισὶ δύο διαστήμασι διεῖλε τὰ ζῶα, τὰ μὲν δεξιὰ, τὰ δὲ ἀριστερὰ ποιήσασα, καὶ ἐκάτερον τῶν μορίων τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι καλεῖται, οἷον ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς, χεῖρ καὶ χεῖρ, πλὴν ὅτι ἡ μὲν δεξιὰ, ἡ δὲ ἀριστερά, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη (ἢ αὐτή) ἡ παραφροσύνη καὶ μανία διττὴ οὖσα, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀριστερὰ ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ ἐνευσεν. This pairwise arrangement in living organisms is alleged here in justification of the dichotomy on which Plato lays so much stress in other dialogues. But that τὸ δίχα τέμνειν, though in most cases the natural, is not the only legitimate form of diacresis, he fully admits in Phileb. 16 D, and indeed in the instance here alluded to he had dissected the right-hand moiety of *μανία*, not into two, but into four subdivisions of co-ordinate importance. Probably *Hermeis* is in the right when he says that Plato's dichotomies were suggested by the well-known *συστοιχίαι* or tables of contraries devised by the Pythagoreans: ἀπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων ὁ Πλάτων ὠφεληθεὶς τὰς συστοιχίας οὕτως ἐλάβεν ἐν ταῦτα.

σκαιά, τὰ δὲ δεξιὰ] So the Bodl. and Stob. Polit. 291 E, *δὴ παρεχομένην εἶδη δύοιν ὀνόμασι, τυραννίδι τὸ δὲ βασιλικῇ*—where, as in the present passage, we find

the variant τὸ μὲν τυραννίδι. In such cases it is nearly certain that the more idiomatic is the true reading. The vulg. σκαιά τὰ δὲ δεξιὰ proves that the idiom puzzled the copyists, and hence their efforts to emend or explain it. No doubt rests on the reading in Soph. 218, *γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρὶς που διελόμενοι λέγετε*. Inf. 270 D, *ἅπλουν ἢ πολυειδές ἐστι*, where some MSS. give *πότερον ἅπλουν*, doubtless *ex manu interpretis*.

τεμνόμενος] The middle is also found Legg. 695 C, *διείλετο (τὴν ἀρχήν) ἐπὶ μέρη τεμόμενος (ὁ Δαρεῖος)*. And we have the compound *ἀποτεμόμενος*, Phileb. 42 C. So *διελεῖν* and *διελέσθαι* seem to be used indiscriminately.

οὐκ ἐπανῆκε] The interpp. give "non prius destitit," or "remisit." *ἐπανίημι* is used both with and without a case. Xen. Cynege. vii. 1, *ἐπανίεντα τῶν πόνων*: ib. iv. 5, *διακέτωσαν (pot. διακόντων) ἐβρώμενως καὶ μὴ ἐπανιέσαι*. Stobaeus gives *ἀνῆκε*, which Hirsch. is inclined to adopt. But the change is needless, and besides mars the dactylic rhythm of the clause. The dissector's efforts were not relaxed until among the parts into which he had divided the left-hand moiety, he detected a left-hand or sinister species of Love, as it may be called, which he railed at in terms answering to its demerits. There seems to be no necessity for altering *ἐν αὐτοῖς*. "Referatur αὐτοῖς per synesin ad τὸ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ μέρος, in quo multitudinis notio comprehensa est" (Stallb.). The 'synesis' would be a little less harsh if we could read *τεμνόμενον μέρος*, but even so we should rather have expected *αὐτόθι*, 'in the portion in question.' The rhythm however is most favourable to the received reading.

[καὶ] προτεινόμενος ἐπήνεσεν ὡς μεγίστων αἴτιον ἡμῖν Β
ἀγαθῶν.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἑραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵν' οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· ἔάν τέ τιν' ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἐν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ' ὄραν, τοῦτον διώκω κατόπισθε μετ' ἔχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾶν εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς οἶδε, καλῶ δὲ οὖν μέχρι τοῦδε διαλεκτικούς. τὰ δὲ νῦν παρὰ σὺν τε καὶ Ἀνυσίου μαθόντας εἶπε τί χρὴ καλεῖν. ἢ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν ἢ λόγων τέχνη, ἢ Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι χρώμενοι σοφοὶ μὲν αὐτοὶ λέγειν γεγόνασιν, ἄλλους

В. *προτεινόμενος*] 'having held out to view,' 'exhibited,' as an anatomist to his pupils. So *ἐπιδείξει* is used Sophist. 264 E, *πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν, σχίζοντες διχῇ τὸ προτεθὲν γένος, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τοῦπλ δεξιὰ αἰ μέρος τοῦ τηθέντος ἐχόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας, ἕως ἂν αὐτοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πάντα περιελόντες, τὴν οἰκίαν λιπόντες φύσιν ἐπιδείξωμεν μάλιστα μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω γένει τῆς τοιαύτης μεθόδου πεφυκόσιν*,—a passage exactly parallel to the present. Ib. 247 D, *σκοπεῖ προτεινόμενων ἡμῶν ἄρ' ἐθέλοιεν ἂν δέχεσθαι καὶ ὁμολογεῖν τοιόνδ' εἶναι τὸ ὄν*. In the same dialogue, 235 B, we find *ἀποφῆναι τὴν ἄγρην*—another metaphor for the same thing. Before *προτεινόμενος* Badh. brackets *καί*, I think rightly. 'When he has found what he seeks, he holds it up to view, and,' &c.

Τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε—*φρονεῖν*] Socr. is not only greatly addicted to these 'divisions' and 'collections' in his own practice, and with a view to his improvement as a speaker and a thinker, but, &c. A like educational effect is attributed to these dialectical exercises in the *Politicus*, 285 D, 287, where their tediousness and seeming pedantry is justified on the ground that they make men *διαλεκτικώτεροι καὶ εὐρετικώτεροι*.

εἰς ἐν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ'] The best MSS. and Stob. have *πεφυκός*, a few *πεφυκότα* as in the vulg. Stallb. *πεφυκόθ'*, which I have adopted. *πεφυκός* may have arisen from the not unfrequent confusion of C and Θ.—He

whose view embraces both a One and a Many, as they exist in nature (comp. ἢ *πέφυκε* and *ἐν ἡμῖν πεφυκός*), has for Socr. the greatest attraction—he is prepared 'to follow close behind him as a god.' *κατόπισθε* and the foll. words are not quoted from any existing line of Homer: the nearest is *Od. v. 193, ὁ δ' ἔπειτα μετ' ἔχνια βαίνει θεοῖο*. Heind. aptly compares, for the sense, *Dion. Hal. Rhet. (p. 407, Reiske), ἢ γὰρ τέχνη τῆς διαιρέσεως, ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, διαιρέσεις καὶ συναγωγαί, δείξει τὰ εἶδη πόσα ἐστὶ καὶ πόσας ἔχει τομάς, καὶ πάντα συναγαγεῖν εἰς ταῦτό. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι διαιρέσεις τέχνη, ἐν πολλὰ, πολλὰ ἓν*.

C. *διαλεκτικούς*] In antithesis to *αντιλογικούς* or *ἑριστικούς*, who refuse to see the Many in the One. *Repub. v. 454, ἢ γενναῖα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, ἢ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης. τί δὴ; "Οτι, εἶπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν, καὶ οἴεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἐριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι*. This description applies to *Zeno* and his followers, and to some of the minor Socratic sects, especially the Megaric and Cynic.

τὰ δὲ νῦν] Socr. proceeds ironically to inquire whether the art of dialectic as he had described it was the art professed and taught by the rhetors, *Lysias* and *Thrasymachus*.

τε ποιοῦσιν, οἳ ἂν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεῦσιν ἐθέλωσιν;

ΦΑΙ. Βασιλικοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες, οὐ μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμονές γε ὦν ἐρωτᾷς. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ εἶδος ὀρθῶς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς καλεῖν, διαλεκτικὸν καλῶν· τὸ δὲ ῥητορικὸν δοκεῖ μοι διαφεύγειν ἔθ' ἡμᾶς.

1) ΣΩ. Πῶς φῆς; καλὸν πού τι ἂν εἴη ὃ τούτων ἀπολειφθὲν ὅμως τέχνη λαμβάνεται; πάντως δ' οὐκ ἀτιμαστέον αὐτὸ σοί τε καὶ ἐμοί. λεκτέον δὲ τί μέντοι καὶ ἔστι τὸ λειπόμενον τῆς ῥητορικῆς.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα που συχνά, ὦ Σώκρατες, τά γ' ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις.

ΣΩ. [Καὶ] καλῶς γ' ὑπέμνησας. προοίμιον μὲν οἶμαι πρῶτον ὡς δεῖ τοῦ λόγου λέγεσθαι ἐν ἀρχῇ. ταῦτα λέγεις

1) —ἧ γάρ; —τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δὲ δὴ διήγησίν τινα μαρτυρίας τ' ἐπ'

a. p.

Σωφ

δωροφορεῖν] Alluding of course to the mercenary character of the paid teachers of rhetoric.

ὡς βασιλεῦσιν] Hesiod, ap. Plat. Rep. 390 E, δῶρα θεοῖς πείθει, δῶρ' αἰδοίους βασιλῆας. Arist. An. 507, εἴ τις καὶ βασιλεῖς . . . Ἐπὶ τῶν σκήπτρων ἐκάθητ' ὕμνις, μετέχων ὅ τι δωροδοκοῖ. Some codd. have δωροφορεῖν, which would be good if δωροφορεῖν were not better.

Βασιλικοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες] The codd. all give ἄνδρες, which the Zur. retains. But in this and similar cases the MSS. carry no weight. Stallb. makes ἄνδρες the predicate, in which I cannot agree. The men are like kings, it is true, says Phaedr., but for all their grandeur they know nothing of the methods you have explained. To which Socr. rejoins that rhetoric must be a very fine thing indeed, if it can be taught as an art without any admixture of dialectic. What is rhetoric, what remains of it, when thus denuded? Phaedr. replies that there is a great deal indeed left, if we take into account all that is written about it in the current treatises or τέχναι.

D. [Καὶ] καλῶς γ' ὑπέμνησας] I have followed Stallb. and Hirsch. in bracketing καί, which has no particular force.

Socr. thanks Phaedr. for reminding him, and proceeds to give a list of the κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης—the niceties or subtleties (technicalities, we should say) of the Rhetorician, to which he presumes that Phaedr. alludes. Comp. Cic. Orat. 12. 39, Quo magis sunt Herodotus Thucydidesque admirabiles, quorum aetas, cum in eorum tempora, quos nominavi, incidisset, longissime tamen ipsi a talibus deliciis vel potius ineptiis afuerunt. He had mentioned Thrasymachus, Gorgias, and Theodorus, “quorum satis arguta multa, sed ut modo primumque nascentia, minuta.” These κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης are the ῥητορικὰ κεφάλαια of later technographers—the heads or main divisions of a speech.

E. διήγησίν τινα] A so-called enarration (statement of facts), supported by evidence. τεκμήρια is explained by the author of the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 10, τεκμήρια δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα ἂν ἐναντίας ἢ πεπραγμένα τῷ περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὅσα ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐναντιοῦται. τῶν γὰρ ἀκούοντων οἱ πλεῖστοι τοῖς συμβαλόντι περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ τὴν πράξιν ἐναντιώμασι τεκμαίρονται μηδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι μήτε τῶν λεγομένων μήτε τῶν πραττομένων. This kind of indirect evidence would take the

... + imper. unrim. et. - J.

αὐτῇ, τρίτον τεκμήρια, τέταρτον εἰκότα· καὶ πίστωσιν οἶμαι καὶ ἐπιπίστωσιν λέγειν τὸν γε βέλτιστον λογοδαίδαλον Βυζάντιον ἄνδρα.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸν χρηστὸν λέγεις Θεόδωρον;

ΣΩ. Τί μὴν; καὶ ἔλεγχόν γε καὶ | ἐπεξέλεγχον ὥς 267 ποιητέον ἐν κατηγορίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ. τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάριον Εὐνηνον εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν, ὃς ὑποδήλωσιν

(p. 127) form, ψεύδεται ὁ δεῖνα—τεκμήριον δέ— οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὰδε ἡ τὰδε ἐποίησεν ἢ εἶπεν. Ibid. 8. 3, εἰκὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, οὐ λεγομένον παραδείγματα ἐν ταῖς διανοαῖς ἔχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες, κ.τ.λ. εἰκότα are therefore arguments drawn from the general experience of mankind, τεκμήρια from the known antecedents of an individual. Whether this is the meaning of the term here it is impossible to say, but it seems probable that the author quoted has preserved in this, as in other instances, the traditions of the more ancient schools. A different explanation of τεκμήρια is suggested by Ammonius, p. 127, Valck. (quoted in Spengel, Artt. Scriptt. p. 117), σημείον καὶ τεκμήριον διαφέρει· Ἀντίφων ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, τὰ παρωχημένα σημείους πιστοῦσα, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντα τεκμηρίους.

πίστωσιν—καὶ ἐπιπίστωσιν] The distinction is explained Rhet. ad Alex. 8, εἰσὶ δὲ δύο τρόποι τῶν πίστewων γίνονται γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, αἱ δ' ἐπίθετοι τοῖς λεγομένοις ἢ πραττομένοις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰκότα καὶ παραδείγματα καὶ τεκμήρια καὶ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ γινώμει καὶ τὰ σημεία καὶ οἱ ἔλεγχοι πίστεως ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰσιν, ἐπίθετοι δὲ μαρτυραὶ ὅρκοι βάσανος. Here ἐπίθετοι πίστεως seem equivalent to the ἐπιπίστωσις of the text.

λογοδαίδαλον] Cicero refers to this expression in the Orator, l. 1., Theodorum Byzantium, multosque alios quos λογοδαϊδάλους appellat in Phaedro Socrates. It denotes a master of rhetorical artifice, a 'cunning speech-wright,' and refers doubtless to the multiplicity and subtlety of his rules of art. By ἔλεγχος καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχος a distinction analogous to that between πίστωσις and ἐπιπίστωσις is probably meant: 'proof or confutation primary and secondary,' or 'subsidiary.' What kind of πίστις is technically meant by ἔλεγχος is not

quite clear—probably a *reductio ad absurdum*. Comp. Arist. Rhet. ii. 22. 14, ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εἶδη δύο· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δεικτικά ἐστιν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἢ οὐκ ἐστὶν, τὰ δὲ ἐλεγκτικά· καὶ διαφέρει ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἔλεγχος καὶ συλλογισμός. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν δεικτικὸν ἐνθύμημα τὸ ἐξ ὁμολογουμένων συνάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἐλεγκτικὸν τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα συνάγειν, with the instances given in the Rhet. ad Alex. 14. 2, all of which involve inconsistency or contradiction. Thus to prove an alibi would, according to this author, be an ἔλεγχος, or in a case of alleged robbery, to show that the article said to have been carried away was too heavy for the thief to lift. The inventions of Theodorus are enumerated by Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 13. 5: ἔσται οὖν, ἂν τις ταῦτα διαίρη, ὅπερ ἐποιοῦν οἱ περὶ Θεόδωρον, διήγησις ἕτερον καὶ ἐπιδιήγησις καὶ προδιήγησις καὶ ἔλεγχος καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχος (al. ἐπέλεγχος). Aristotle himself distinguishes between διηγέσθαι and παραδιηγέσθαι, ib. 16. 5. A very singular technical term is attributed to a Theodorus (possibly him of Byzantium) by the author of the treatise περὶ ὕψους, § 5. 5: τούτῳ παράκειται τρίτον τι κακίας εἶδος ἐν τοῖς παθητικοῖς, ὅπερ ὁ Θεόδωρος παρένθυρσον ἐκάλει. ἔστι δὲ πάθος ἄκαιρον καὶ κενόν, ἔνθα μὴ δεῖ πάθος, κ.τ.λ.

267. Πάριον Εὐνηνον] This sophist-poet is named as living *temp. Socr.* in Phaed. 60 D; Apol. 20 B. His poetical fragments are collected in Bergk, Poet. Lyr. p. 436. The present is, I believe, the only passage in which he is mentioned among the technographers, though he is probably included tacitly by the author of the Rhet. ad Alex. (l. 16) in his sweeping censure of the 'Parian Sophists.' See Cope, Journal of Phil. iii. 258 seq. Plato's tone in speaking of Euenus is always one of mock-respect. Comp. σοφὸς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος with Apol. and Phaed. l. 1. His elegiac remains are not desti-

in iambicis et trochaicis — iambicis — I

τε πρῶτος εὔρε καὶ παρεπαίνους ; οἱ δ' αὐτὸν καὶ παραψόγους φασὶν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν, μνήμης χάριν· σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ. Τισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εὔδειν, οἱ πρὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὥς τιμητέα μᾶλλον, τὰ τε αὖ σμικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι διὰ ῥώμην λόγου, καινὰ τε ἀρχαίως τὰ τ' ἐναντία καινῶς, συνηγορίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνεύρου ; ταῦτα δὲ ἀκούων ποτέ μου Πρόδικος ἐγέλασε, p. 67 R

tute of point and neatness, and some of his γνῶμαι have been much quoted, c. g. a line, called "iambic" by Hermecias, **Ἡ δέος ἢ λύπη παῖς πατρὶ πάντα βίον.* — *ὑποδήλωσιν*, explained by the verb from which it comes: Arist. Thesm. 1011, ἀλλὰ μοι Σημεῖον ὑπέδηλωσε Περσεὺς ἐκδραμῶν, "Οτι δεῖ με γίγνεσθ' Ἀνδρομέδαν — 'telegraphed to me,' 'conveyed a secret intimation.' Hence the substantive may mean 'hint,' 'insinuation,' 'covert allusion,' as of one who "just hints a fault, and hesitates dislike." *παρέπαινος* and *παράφογος* may be varieties of *ὑποδήλωσις*, but as the words nowhere recur, it is impossible to be quite sure of this. 'Indirect compliment' or 'censure' seems to express what is meant by the terms. *παράφογος* answers to our 'side-thrust.' Mr. Cope doubts whether the metrical *παράφογοι* of the text were in the nature of precepts or examples. The latter would accord best with the words of Plato, and, I apprehend, with the practice of the schools; for, the metre apart, there was nothing new in furnishing learners with pattern instances of the different rhetorical σχήματα.

Τισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε, κ.τ.λ.] Gorgias was accompanied by his reputed master Tisias, on the occasion of his visit to Athens, A.B.P. 4. They are here made jointly responsible for the opinion that to the orator the Probable is of more value than the True; and also, it would seem, for the *σηματισμοί* which follow. A parallel passage is quoted from Isocrates, Paneg. p. 42 c (written B.C. 380). A comparison of the two illustrates the difference of style in the two authors. ἐπειδὴ δ' οἱ λόγοι τοιαύτην ἔχουσι τὴν φύσιν, ὥσθ' οἶόν τ' εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πολλὰ ὥς ἐξηγήσασθαι, καὶ τὰ τε μεγάλα ταπεινὰ ποιῆσαι καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς μέγεθος περιθεῖναι, καὶ τὰ παλαιὰ καινῶς διελθεῖν

καὶ περὶ τῶν νεωστὶ γεγενημένων ἀρχαίως εἰπεῖν, κ.τ.λ. Possibly some similar vaunt had occurred in one of the public ἐπιδείξεις of Gorgias, known both to Isocrates and Plato. In the Vitae X Rhet. (838 F) μικρὰ μεγάλα ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ μεγάλα μικρὰ is given as Isocrates' definition of Rhetoric. The words καινὰ τ' ἀρχαίως τὰ τ' ἐναντία καινῶς seem to stand in no regular constructional relation either to those which precede or to those which follow. Heind. supposes an ellipse of λέγουσι or some equivalent verb, but does not conceal his suspicion that the text is faulty. Ast, on the other hand, joins ἀρχαίως and καινῶς with φαίνεσθαι, adding "fit enim saepe numero ut adverbia loco adjectivorum ponantur." In his larger commentary this explanation is not repeated, nor is any other substituted for it. Stallb. would supply λέγειν διδάσκουσι, which may be Plato's meaning, though one sees not how these words can be "understood from the foregoing ποιῶσι διὰ ῥώμην λόγου." The governing verb, it seems to me, should rather be supplied from the sequel: for it is not to be supposed that the text is defective, no insertion being conceivable which would not spoil the rhythm of the passage. It is as if Plato had meant after καινῶς, to add *συντομωτάτῃ τε λέγειν καὶ εἰς μῆκος ἀνεύρου*, instead of the accusatives he actually uses. The meaning of the words is suggested by the quotation from Isocrates, who understands by καινὰ, τὰ νεωστὶ γεγενημένα (more properly, things strange and novel), which the orator was to dignify by the use of antique phrases and allusions, while τὰ παλαιὰ, i.e. τὰ ἀρχαῖα, things trite and stale, were to be enlivened by a novelty of treatment, the *καινολογία* with which Dion. Hal. tells us that Gorgias used to "astonish the vulgar" (De Iysia, p. 458, Reiske).

καὶ μόνος αὐτὸς εὐρήκεναι ἔφη ὦν δεῖ λόγων τέχνη·
δεῖν δὲ οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων, ἀλλὰ μετρίων.

ΦΑΙ. Σοφώτατά γε, ὦ Πρόδικε.

ΣΩ. Ἰππίαν δὲ οὐ λέγομεν; οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν σύμψηφον
αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν Ἥλείον ξένον γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ Πώλου πῶς φράσωμεν αὐτῷ μουσεῖα λό-

For συντομίαν τε λόγων, κ.τ.λ., comp. the boast of Gorgias in Gorg. 449 c with Protag. 334 E, where Socr. attributes similar accomplishments to the Abderite professor.

B. ὦν δεῖ λόγων τέχνη] The MSS. have τέχνην, but the sense seems to demand τέχνη, the reading of Steph. The meaning is not, 'those speeches which art wants,' but rather, 'what speeches, on principles of art, are right and desirable.' τέχνη is quasi-adverbial, as 261 B, γράφεται τέχνη; C, ὁ τέχνη τοῦτο δρῶν; D, λέγοντα οὐκ ἔσμεν τέχνη, and elsewhere.

Σοφώτατά γε, ὦ Πρόδικε] Phaedr. evidently perceives Socr.'s ironical drift, in repeating the platitudes of Prodicus. Ast, who represents Phaedrus as an idiot, supposes the exclamation to be uttered in good faith. Prodicus and Hippias probably agreed in jealousy of the Sicilian school and dislike of their meretricious ornaments; while Plato seems to have entertained an impartial contempt for the minute pedantry of Prodicus and the frothy magniloquence of Gorgias.

Τὰ δὲ Πώλου—εὐπέπια] Polus not only invented a number of technical terms, but borrowed others from his friend or master Licymnius. What these latter were, Aristotle tells us, Rhet. iii. 13. 5, where he condemns the use of unnecessary technical distinctions. δεῖ δὲ εἶδος τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφορὰν ὕψος τιθεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, γίνεται κενὸν καὶ ληρώδες, ὅσον Λικύμνιος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐπαύρασιν ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀποπλάνησιν καὶ ὕψους. The characteristic of this school seems to have been εὐπέπια—fine in contradistinction to accurate writing, the ὀρθοπέπια on which Protagoras prided himself; and it was in order to the creation of such an ornate style that these technicalities were devised. Such is the received view of the meaning of this passage, which however presents many difficulties when we de-

scend to particulars. First among these is the phrase μουσεῖα λόγων. This, Heind. thinks, was the title of a work by Polus; but he grounds his opinion on a misunderstood Schol. of Hermias on the words μ. λ. ἐκείνος γάρ (sc. Polus) λέξευρε τὰ πάρισα, διδὼ καὶ μουσεῖα λόγων ἐκάλεσεν (sc. Plato) ἐπειδὴ ἐδόκει τῇ καλλιλεξίᾳ πάνυ [κατακόρως?] κοσμεῖν τὸν λόγον. Had Herm. meant that Polus gave the name to his own figures of speech, ἐκάλει, not ἐκάλεσεν, would have been used. It is far more likely that the name is given in banter by Plato, but whether to the figures of speech enumerated, or to the book treating of them may fairly be doubted. The word μουσεῖον, originally a τέμενος of the Muses (inf. p. 278 B), seems already to have acquired secondary meanings. Aeschines, c. Timarch. p. 2, speaks of μουσεῖα, small chapels of the Muses, as existing in every public school; and hence μουσεῖον came to mean figuratively a haunt of learned or refined leisure, as when the comic poet called Athens the μουσεῖον Ἑλλάδος. In accordance with this view Spengel renders μουσεῖα λόγ. Tummelplätze von Reden = 'gymnasia,' 'exercise-grounds.' In Euripides χελιδόνων μουσεῖα is said of an ivy bush, as a haunt or concert-room of twittering swallows; and in the Helena, v. 1106, μουσεῖα happily expresses the leafy bower of the nightingale. To translate the word by 'repository,' as of curiosities, &c., would involve an anachronism, as that sense is, I apprehend, of modern origin. The same false association is suggested by Ast's "Blumenlesen," otherwise not an unhappy rendering. In any case the metaphor is obscure, but that the καλλιλεξία, the affected prettinesses of Polus, is what Plato meant to ridicule, there is, I think, no reasonable doubt. These he calls, with an affectation parodying that of the school he ridicules, 'shrines of

φην

ο γων, ὡς διπλασιολογίαν καὶ γνωμολογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν, ὀνομάτων τε Λικυμνίων ἃ ἐκείνῳ ἐδωρήσατο πρὸς ποίησιν εὐεπείας ;

ΦΑΙ. Πρωταγόρεια δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτ' ἅττα ;

ΣΩ. Ὁρθοέπειά γέ τις, ὦ παῖ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ

learned speech.' Mr. Cope's view (Journ. Phil. iii. 253 and note), that the words refer to a "collection of speeches for the use of Polus' school, similar to Gorgias' *laudes et vituperationes*, and Protagoras' *communes loci*, in which these new figures of speech were illustrated," does not, I confess, seem to me so probable as that of the old Greek commentator, though, of course, τὰ πάρισα or παρισώσεις are not the only figures to which the words apply. I think also with Spengel, that in the word λόγων itself there may lie a mocking allusion to the termination -λογία in διπλασιολογία, &c. Comp. 272, Βραχυλογίας καὶ ἐλεινολογίας . . . ἐκάστων τε ὅς' ἂν εἴδῃ μάθῃ λόγων. Mr. Cope differs from me further in retaining Bekker's ὅς for the ὡς of the Bodl. In this I should be glad to agree with him, if I could reconcile myself to the ellipse of εὔρεν which he supposes; for the use of ὡς in the sense of οἶον, 'veluti,' is certainly not common. If ὅς were established, I should be strongly moved to accept the conj. of Cornarius, and read προσεποίησεν, taking εὐεπείας as an acc. pl. with the gen. ὀνομάτων, 'nominum venustates.' προσεποίησεν might, I conceive, mean 'annexed,' 'added,' i.e. to the previously existing rhetorical figures: it certainly could not have the meaning 'arrogavit' (as if we had found προσεποιήσατο), as Stallb., who adopts the conj. in his last ed., seems to think. By διπλασιολογία Stallb. supposes that Polus meant τὰ πάρισα, that is, balanced clauses in which the changes are rung on a couple of words; as in the well-known passage of Gorg. 418 c, ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως εὐρημέναι, κ.τ.λ. The explanation of the Schol. has, at any rate, the merit of simplicity: οἶον τὸ φεῦ, φεῦ. He might have quoted the οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε of Demosthenes. The next word, γνωμολογία (comp. γνωμοτυπικός, Ar. Eq. 1378), seems to mean the 'style sententious' (ὡς τὸ "δεινὸν ἢ πονηρία," Schol.), while εἰκονολογία may

denote the free use of metaphor or simile, as when Gorgias called vultures 'living tombs.' The 'Licymnian names' are explained by the passage quoted from the Rhetoric, which is carefully discussed by Mr. Cope, l. i. p. 255. The genitive must depend on μουσεῖα, and ἐδωρήσατο is constructed with Λικύμνιος, understood from the derivative adj. For Λικυμνίων Ast would read Λικυμνίων, of which there is the trace in the corrupt reading of one MS. λυκυμνίων. But Lobbeck, the great authority on such questions, considers Λικύμνιος equally legitimate. "Possessivorum quae a propriis in -ios exeuntibus derivantur, terminatio duplex est, una omnibus partibus expressa, Ναυπλείος, Ἡλείος, altera concisior, δόλος Ναυπλίου, Phalar. Ep. ix. τὸ Ἡλίον, τὰ Ἡλία." Pathol. Serm. Gr. i. 340.

c. εὐεπείας] Dion. Hal. de Isocr. p. 538, ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ οὗτος (sc. Ἰσοκράτης) τὴν εὐεπείαν ἐκ παντὸς δίδωκε, καὶ τοῦ γλαφυρῶς λέγειν στοχάζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ἀφελῶς.

Πρωταγόρεια—μέντοι τοιαῦτ' ἅττα] 'were there not, as I fancy there were, some similar coinages of Protagoras?' For μέντοι in interrogat. see above, 261 c.

Ὁρθοέπεια] 'correct diction,' the title, as some think, of a grammatical work of Protagoras, whom we know from Crat. 391 c to have speculated upon the ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων. It appears certain that Protagoras wrote a work on Grammar, in which the moods of verbs and genders of nouns were enumerated, perhaps for the first time. See Frei Quaest. Protagg. p. 130 fol.; Spengel, Artt. Script. p. 40; and Cope, Journ. Phil. iii. 48. The explanation of Hermias is different. He supposes the word to denote the simple and straightforward style which Protagoras adopted in preference to the affected Sicilian rhetoric. ὀρθοέπειά γέ τις· τοῦτέστι, κυριολεξία· διὰ γὰρ τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων μετήρχετο ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν λόγον, καὶ οὐ διὰ παραβολῶν

καλά. τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἔλκο-
μένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ
Χαλκηδονίου σθένος. ὀργίσαι τε αὖ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς
ἀνὴρ γέγονε, καὶ πάλιν ὠργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλεῖν, ὥς
ἔφη· διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὁθενδὴ
κράτιστος. τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἔοικε
συνδεδογμένον εἶναι, ᾧ τινὲς μὲν ἐπ' ἀνόδον, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλο
τίθενται ὄνομα.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἕκαστα λέγεις ὑπομνήσαι ἐπὶ
τελευτῆς τοὺς ἀκούοντας περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω, καὶ εἴ τι σὺ ἄλλο ἔχεις εἰπεῖν λό-
γων τέχνης πέρι.

ΦΑΙ. Σμικρά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἐὼμεν δὴ τά γε σμικρά· ταῦτα δὲ | ὑπ' αὐγὰς 268
μᾶλλον ἰδῶμεν, τίνα καὶ ποτ' ἔχει τὴν τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν. 69 A

καὶ ἐπιθέτων. This sense of the word certainly agrees better with that which it bears in Dion. Hal. de Demosth. p. 1035, where Plato is called the καρὸν ὀρθοεπίας, in reference to his purity of style. Besides, if the ὀρθοεπία of Protagoras was purely grammatical, we should hardly expect to find it noticed in the Phaedrus. On the whole, I incline to the opinion that the ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων of the Cratylus was something different from the ὀρθοεπία of this passage. What the ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ may have been, we know not.

τῶν γε μὴν] Thrasymachus was a master of the art of composing pathetic commonplaces, applicable to the sorrows of age and penury. This meaning Plato has purposely wrapt in pompous poetic diction, in mockery of the 'mighty man of Chalcedon.' The dactylic, or rather choriambic, rhythm of the passage is remarkable. For ἐλκομένων ἐπὶ comp. inf. 271, ἐλκυσεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην τὸ πρόσφορον. Spengel's notion that ἐπὶ is separated from ἐλκομένων by tmesis, though ingenious, is untenable, as the middle ἐφέλικσθαι could bear no sense suitable to the passage, as the act. ἐφέλικειν would. Possibly allusion is made to the practice of bringing into court the aged and destitute, young children, &c. Περὶ, ὁ γὰρ Χαλκηδόνιος, ταυτέστιν, ὁ Θρασύμαχος, ταῦτα ἐδίδαξεν, ὥς δεῖ πρὸς

οἶκτον ἐγεῖραι τὸν δικαστήν, καὶ ἐπισπᾶσθαι ἔλεον, γῆρας, πενίαν, τέκνα ἀποδύ-
ρόμενον (sic Speng.; codd. ἀποδύρομενα). For an instance of a moving tale of age and penury, accompanied by the appearance of their victim in person, see Aeschines adv. Timarchum, c. 104, Bekk. From Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 1, we learn that Thrasymachus wrote Ἐλεοί, apparently a treatise, accompanied with examples, on the best mode of exciting compassion. To this Plato alludes, and from the sequel we are tempted to conjecture that Thrasymachus may have composed a similar work on the passion of anger, unless indeed his ἔλεοι had a wider scope than their name would indicate.

δ. ὁθενδῇ] 'on any or no grounds,' i. e. under circumstances most unfavourable to himself. ἀπολύσθαι διαβολήν, to wipe off an aspersion, is a common phrase.

ἄλλο—ὄνομα] According to the interpp. the terms omitted are ἐπιλογος or ἀνακεφαλαιώσεις. ἐπάνοδος, 'recapitulation,' is recognized by Arist. Rhet. iii. 13. 3.

268. ὑπ' αὐγὰς] See Ruhnken on Tim. Lex. in v., and add to his instances Eur. Hec. 1136, Pors., ἦνον θ', ὑπ' αὐγὰς τοῦσδε λεύσσουσαι πέπλους, Socr. proposes to submit the wares of Thrasymachus to a searching scrutiny, holding them up to the light, as purchasers in the cloth-market hold the web offered

ΦΑΙ. Καί μάλα ἐρρώμενην, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔν γε δὴ πλήθους συνόδοις.

ΣΩ. Ἐχει γάρ. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἰδὲ καὶ σὺ εἰ ὄρα καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται διεστηκὸς αὐτῶν τὸ ἡτρίον ὥσπερ ἐμοί. (μαρτυρ.)

ΦΑΙ. Δείκνυ μόνον.

ΣΩ. Εἰπέ δὴ μου εἴ τις προσελθὼν τῷ ἐταίρῳ σου Ἐρυξιμάχῳ ἢ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ Ἀκουμένῳ εἴποι ὅτι Ἐγὼ ἐπίσταμαι τοιαῦτ' ἅττα σώμασι προσφέρειν, ὥστε θερμαίνειν τ' ἐὰν βούλωμαι καὶ ψύχειν, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δόξῃ μοι, ἐμεῖν ποιεῖν, ἐὰν δ' αὖ, κάτω διαχωρεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ ἐπιστάμενος αὐτὰ ἀξιώ ἱατρικὸς εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖν ᾧ ἂν τὴν τούτων ἐπιστήμην παραδῷ τί ἂν οἶε ἀκούσαντας εἰπεῖν ;

ΦΑΙ. Τί γε ἄλλο ἢ ἐρέσθαι εἰ προσεπίσταται καὶ οὔστινας δεῖ καὶ ὁπότε ἕκαστα τούτων ποιεῖν, καὶ μέχρι ὅπου ;

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἴποι ὅτι Οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλ' ἀξιώ τὸν ταῦτα ὡς παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθόντα αὐτὸν οἶόν τ' εἶναι ποιεῖν ἃ ἐρωτᾷς ;

ΦΑΙ. Εἴποιεν ἄν, οἶμαι, ὅτι μαίνεται ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐκ βιβλίου ποθὲν ἀκούσας ἢ περιτυχὼν φαρμακίοις ἱατρὸς οἶεται γεγονέναι, οὐδὲν ἐπαῖων τῆς τέχνης.

for sale, in order to ascertain whether the texture is sound or defective.

διεστηκὸς—τὸ ἡτρίον] 'if they show the web' is, I believe, the corresponding English phrase. This would be the case, if the warp (ἡτρίον) had διαστήματα, gaps or faults in its texture. The iactaph. is preserved in δείκνυ μόνον.

τῷ ἐταίρῳ σου] Phaedr. and Eryximachus are together in the house of Callias (Protag. 315 c), and at Agathon's table in the Symposium. For Acumenus, see the commencement of this dial.

κ. κάτω διαχωρεῖν] Hippocrates uses διαχωρεῖν and ὑποχωρεῖν indifferently of the excretions: Aphorism 7. 67, τὰ διὰ τῆς κύστιος διαχωρόντα ὀρῆν δεῖ, εἰ οἷα τοῖς ὑγαινόνσι ὑποχωρέεται. Xen. Anab. viii. 20, καὶ ἡμουν καὶ κάτω διεχώρει αὐτοῖς. Here διαχωρεῖν is probably transitive, as freq. in the medical writers.

c. αὐτόν] 'of himself,' i. e. 'unassisted,' or, as we say, 'by the light of nature.' We have presently, 269 c,

αὐτοὺς παρ' ἐαυτῶν.

Εἴποιεν ἄν] MSS. εἴποι. But I have little doubt that Plato wrote εἴποιεν, as Steph. conj. The instances adduced in defence of the MS. reading are not in point. The following ἄν or preceding εἴποι would account for the error in transcription. εἴποι ἄν Ἐρυξιμάχος τε καὶ Ἀκουμένος would be good Greek, but εἴποι ἄν without a case cannot mean 'they would say.'

περιτυχὼν φαρμακίοις] 'having picked up a nostrum or two.' Compare Dryden's invective against the 'apothecary tribe,'

"From files a random recipe they take,
And many deaths of one prescription
make."

To John Dryden, Esq.

Sext. Emp. Math. ii. 41, ἀλλ' ὃν λόγον ἔχει φαρμακοπώλης πρὸς ἱατρὸν, τοῦτον δ' δημαγωγὸς πρὸς τὸν πολιτικόν.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ Σοφοκλεῖ αὖ προσελθὼν καὶ Εὐριπίδῃ τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐπίσταται περὶ σμικροῦ πράγματος ῥήσεις παμμήκεις ποιεῖν καὶ περὶ μεγάλου πάνυ σμικράς, ὅταν τε βούληται, οἰκτρὰς καὶ τὸνναντίον αὖ φοβερὰς καὶ ἀπειλητικὰς, ὅσα τ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ διδάσκων αὐτὰ ὁ τραγωδίας ποίησιν οἶεται παραδιδόναι;

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ οὗτοι ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι, καταγελῶεν, εἴ τις οἶεται τραγωδίαν ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων σύστασιν, πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνισταμένην.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἀγροίκως γε, οἶμαι, λοιδορήσειαν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν μουσικὸς ἐντυχὼν ἀνδρὶ οἰομένῳ ἀρμονικῷ εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τυγχάνει ἐπιστάμενος ὡς οἶόν τε ὀξύτατην καὶ βαρυτάτην χορδὴν ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἀγρίως εἴποι ἂν ὦ μοχθηρὲ, μελαγχολᾷς, ἀλλ' ἄτε μουσικὸς ὢν πραότερον, ὅτι ὦ ἄριστε, ἀνάγκη μὲν καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ἀρμονικὸν ἔσεσθαι, οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἀρμονίας ἐπαίειν τὸν τὴν σὴν ἕξιν ἔχοντα· τὰ γὰρ πρὸ ἀρμονίας ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἐπίστασαι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἀρμονικά.

ΦΑΙ. Ὅρθότατά γε.

| ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς τὸν σφισιν ἐπιδεικνύ- 269
μενον τὰ πρὸ τραγωδίας ἂν φαίη ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ τραγικά,
καὶ ὁ Ἀκουμένος τὰ πρὸ ἱατρικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἱατρικά.

ΦΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τὸν μελίγηρυν Ἀδραστον οἴομεθα ἢ καὶ

ὁ. τὴν τούτων σύστασιν] This apt reply of Phaedr. is evidently inconsistent with Ast's mean opinion of his understanding. Accordingly we are informed that the remark is plagiarized from Soer., sup. 264 c, δὲν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶν συνεστάναι, κ.τ.λ. This grouping or consistence of parts is essential to every λόγος, whether metrical or not; and to every art and science pretending to theoretical completeness.

πρέπουσαν—συνισταμένην] "πρέπουσαν per prolepsin quandam dictum, ut idem valeat quod ὥστε πρέπειν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ." Stallb.

ὡς οἶόν τε ὀξύτατην] Herm., τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν καὶ ἀνιέναι τὰς χορδὰς.

269. τὰ πρὸ τραγωδίας] The μαθήματα which precede tragedy, and are necessary to its production; its προγυμνάσματα, or preliminaries. Skill in these does not of itself constitute a tragic poet; but is a *sine qua non* towards becoming one.

τὸν μελίγηρυν Ἀδραστον] The epithet was probably suggested by Tyrtæus: γλῶσσαν δ' Ἀδρήστου μελιχόγηρυν ἔχοι (Fr. 8, v. 8, Bergk). The mythic king seems to have owed this epithet to the skill with which he worked on the feelings of Theseus on the occasion which forms the subject of the Suppliants of Euripides. The opinion of Ast, that, as Gorgias wears the mask of Nestor, and Thrasymachus or Theodorus that of

Περικλέα, εἰ ἀκούσειαν ὧν νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς διῆμιν τῶν παγκάλων τεχνημάτων, βραχυλογιῶν τε καὶ εἰκονολογιῶν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα διελθόντες ὑπ' αὐγὰς ἔφαμεν εἶναι σκεπτέα, B πότερον χαλεπῶς ἂν αὐτούς, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ὑπ' ἀγροικίας ῥῆμά τι εἰπεῖν ἀπαίδευτον εἰς τοὺς ταῦτα γεγραφότας τε καὶ διδάσκοντας ὡς ῥητορικὴν τέχνην, ἣ ἅτε ἡμῶν ὄντας σοφωτέρους κἂν νῶν ἐπιπληῆξαι, εἰπόν-
τας ὦ Φαῖδρέ τε καὶ Σώκρατες, οὐ χρὴ χαλεπαίνειν ἀλλὰ συγγιγνώσκειν εἴ τινες μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο ὀρίσασθαι τί ποτ' ἔστι ῥητορική, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ πάθους τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μα-
C θήματ' ἔχοντες ῥητορικὴν ᾤήθησαν εὐρηκέναι, καὶ ταῦτα

Ulysses" (p. 261 c), so by Adrastus some contemporary orator is here meant, and that this can only be Antiphon Rhamnusius, is supported by the following arguments. (1) We should expect a pair of orators answering to the pairs of poets and of physicians just introduced, and as the latter were real personages, there is a presumption that Adrastus, as well as Pericles, would be so too. (2) Antiphon, as we know from the Pseudo-Plutarch (Vitt. X Oratt. p. 341, Wytt.) and Philostratus (V. Sophist. 915), got the by-name of Nestor from his powers of persuasion; but as the disguise of Nestor had been used already, it was natural for Plato to substitute another 'honey-tongued' hero to personate another contemporary orator. (3) The fame of Antiphon's defence (Thuc. iv. 68), said to have been the finest effort of the kind that the men of that day had heard, may seem to justify his being coupled with Pericles, as Euripides with Sophocles. Against these considerations, however, may be set the fact, that Antiphon's style was noted by the ancient critics for its deficiency in sweetness, an impression also conveyed by the existing remains (Dion. Hal. de Comp. Verb. p. 52, Reiske; ib. p. 250, where he is classed with Aeschylus, Thucydides, and the other well-known representatives of the *αὐστηρὰ λέξις*). In the Menexenus, moreover, Plato's allusion to Antiphon is not complimentary: ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅστις ἐμοῦ κάκιον ἐπαιδεύθη, μοιτάην μὲν ἐπὶ Λάμπρου παιδευθείς, ῥητορικὴν δὲ ὑπ' Ἀντιφῶντος τοῦ Ῥαμνουσίου (p. 236). There is also force in Heindl's remark,

that the καὶ before Περικλέα implies a difference, "seu aetate seu genere," between the two orators mentioned. Lastly, from the magnificent terms in which Plato presently speaks of Pericles, it is probable that he looked upon him as standing quite alone among Athenian orators, as one, in fact, whose parallel could only be found in the heroic age. If this view is correct, we should mar a graceful compliment by refusing to take the passage in its literal sense, as referring to a hero familiar in Attic tradition.

οἰόμεθα] Hirsch. conj. οἰόμεθ' ἂν—not improbably, as the double ἂν is common in cases where the verb is distant in the sentence, as paul. sup., ὥσπερ ἂν μουσικὸς ἐντυχὼν . . . οὐκ ἀγρίως εἴποι ἂν. Before and after οἶμαι, ἂν is frequently suppressed by the scribes, who probably thought it a solecism, not being aware that in such cases it belongs to the following infinitive.

B. ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ] The ῥῆμα ἀπαίδευτον probably refers to the ἀτεχνος τριβὴ of p. 261 E, for which Socr., in his present courteous mood, indirectly apologizes.

μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι] Being no scientific dialecticians, the old rhetors were unaware of the importance of strict definition and of the mode of obtaining it. Hence they were ignorant of the true scope of their own science, and by consequence of the relation of its various parts to the whole and to each other. A true definition of rhetoric (such as the ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγων, p. 261) would have enlightened them on these points.

δὴ διδάσκοντες ἄλλους ἡγούνται σφισι τελέως ῥητορικὴν δεδιδάχθαι, τὸ δ' ἕκαστα τούτων πιθανῶς λέγειν τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον συνίστασθαι, οὐδὲν ἔργον, αὐτοὺς δεῖν παρ' ἑαυτῶν τοὺς μαθητάς σφων πορίζεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύει τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι τὸ τῆς τέχνης, ἣν οὔτοι οἱ ἄνδρες ὡς ῥητορικὴν διδάσκουσί τε καὶ γράφουσιν καὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ εἰρηκέναι. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὴν τοῦ τῷ ὄντι ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τέχνην πῶς καὶ πόθεν ἂν τις δύναιτο πορίσασθαι;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι, εἰκός, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἔχειν ὥσπερ τᾶλλα. Ζεῖ μὲν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει ῥητορικῶ εἶναι, ἔσει ῥήτωρ ἐλλόγιμος, προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην· ὅτου δ' ἂν ἐλλίπης τούτων, ταύτῃ ἀτελὴς ἔσει. ὅσον δὲ

c. οὐδὲν ἔργον] Hermeias reads ὡς οὐδὲν ἔργον ὄν, and so two MSS. But the omission of ὄν seems justified by Gorg. 507 E, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἐῶντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν, ἀνήντων κακόν, ληστοῦ βίου ζῶντα. Of the other passages quoted by Ast there is scarce one in which the participle does not seem to have been absorbed by a preceding word ending in -ον. In Crat. 386 E, οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ὄντα is not understood, but the words are constructed with ἔχοντα ἐστὶν οὐσίαν to be repeated from the foregoing clause. The phrases οὐ μικρόν, οὐκ ὀλίγον, οὐ μέγ' ἔργον, are familiar, and οὐδὲν ἔργον occurs in Philipides Comicus (ap. Meineke, iv. 471) — Πύκτη τ' ἐπιτιμᾶν οὐδὲν ἔργον μαχηόμεν, Αὐτὸν μάχεσθαι δ' οὐκέτ' ἐστὶ βράδιον, in the same sense as here, not, as more freq., with the force 'non opus.' That which the teachers of rhetoric regarded as a mere nothing, which their pupils were to extemporize at pleasure, was in truth the most difficult thing of all: viz. the judgment to use the different figures of speech impressively, joined with the skill to combine the parts of a discourse—its proem, its exegesis, &c.—into an harmonious whole.

D. Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, κ.τ.λ.] As for the power, says Soer.—if you mean that of becoming a finished performer—it will, or rather must, follow universal analogy:

if you are blessed with a natural faculty for speaking, and improve it by science and assiduous practice, you will be a considerable orator. This became a commonplace among the rhetoricians. Isoer. Antid. § 200, Bekk., λέγομεν ὡς δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας διοίσειν ἢ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἢ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἢ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐργασίας, πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι καλῶς ὃ ἂν προηρημένοι τυγχάνωσιν, ἔπειτα παιδευσθῆναι καὶ λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἥτις ἂν ἢ περὶ ἐκάστου, τρίτον ἐντριβεῖς γενέσθαι καὶ γυμνασθῆναι περὶ τὴν χρεῖαν καὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν αὐτῶν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἐργασίαις τελείους γίνεσθαι καὶ πολὺ διαφέροντας τῶν ἄλλων. This reads like Plato diluted; but on the other hand we might suspect that Plato had himself borrowed the sentiment from the oration c. Sophistas 291 D, a passage which he seems also to have had before him when he wrote Gorg. 463 D. An author, professing to be earlier than either, has the same sentiment: χρὴ γὰρ ὅστις μέλλει ἡτρικῆς ξύνεσιν ἀτρεκέως ἀρμόζεσθαι, τῶνδ' ἐμὴν ἐπιβολὴν γενέσθαι· φύσις, διδασκαλίας, τρόπου εὐφυΐας, παιδευμαθίης, φιλοποιίης, χρόνου, κ.τ.λ. Hippocratis Lex (i. 4, Kühn). But the genuineness of the piece is open to suspicion.

ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη] 'for as much of it as is technical.' This clause is in opposition to τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, precepts of art being contrasted with natural genius.

αὐτοῦ τέχνη, οὐχ ἡ Λυσίας τε καὶ Θρασύμαχος πορεύεται δοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι ἢ μέθοδος. >

ΦΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πῇ δῆ;

Ε ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰκότως ὁ Περικλῆς πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δῆ;

ΣΩ. Πᾶσαι ὅσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν, προσδέονται ἀδολεσχίας | καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι· τὸ γὰρ ὑψηλόνουν τοῦτο καὶ πάντη τελεσιουργὸν ἔοικεν ἐντευθεν ποθεν εἰσιέναι. ὃ καὶ Περικλῆς πρὸς τῷ εὐφυῆς εἶναι

The present professors, says Socr., are on a wrong track: we must look in a different direction if we would discover the true way of handling rhetoric as an art. The correction *Τισίαν* for *Λυσίαν*, adopted from Schaefer by Spengel and Stallb., is plausible, but far from certain: see below, 272 c, *εἰ τινα πῇ βοήθειαν ἔχεις ἐπακηκοὺς Λυσίου ἢ τινος ἄλλου*. The scribes disfigure the name *Τισίας* in almost every instance, but they never seem to confound it with *Λυσίας*. The emendation is supported by Krische, p. 113 and note, but with more subtlety than soundness. Why should not Plato single out Lysias as an instance of what he considered vicious practice, as Thrasymachus was an example of empirical theory?

Ε. *Κινδυνεύει—εἰσιέναι*] He now proceeds to show that a philosophic training is a necessary condition of attaining the highest excellence as a speaker. To prepare Phaedr. for a view so different from any to which he had been accustomed, the imposing example of Pericles is appealed to. It was to his frequent converse with Anaxagoras, that the great master of rhetoric owed his immense superiority. For, says Socr., no really great art can attain perfection without endless discussion and high speculative discourse upon nature. It is by that door that the loftiness of thought, the all-sided completeness which characterize such arts would seem to enter, and those qualities Pericles acquired, and added them to his great natural endowments. The 'great arts' here spoken of are opposed to *βαναυσίαι*, which rely solely on *τριβὴ* or *ἐμπειρία*, and imply no scientific insight. Rhetoric belongs to one class or the other, according to the spirit in

which it is pursued, and the capacity or incapacity of its professors.—The word *ἀδολεσχία*—endless chatter, garrulity—applied by the vulgar in contempt to philosophic *διάλεκτις*, is accepted by Plato and paraded with a kind of defiance. Thus in the *Parmenides* the youthful Socrates is exhorted to exercise and improve his powers, *διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας*: else, it is added, *σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια* (135 D). And in *Crat.* 401 B, *μετεωρολόγοι καὶ ἀδολεσχαί* are laudatory epithets—*κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ πῶτοι τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι οὐ φαῦλοι εἶναι ἀλλὰ μ. καὶ ἀ. τινές*. This usage, though echoed by later writers, seems originally to have been peculiar to Plato. It is characteristic of the proud humility which formed so considerable an element in the Socratic *εἰρωνεία*, for such epithets were bestowed with especial liberality upon Socr. and his clique. See *Arist. Nub.* 1485, 360. And in the next generation they were found equally convenient by the assailants of the Platonists: comp. *Isocr. c. Soph.* 292 C D, *νομίζουσιν ἀδολεσχίαν καὶ μικρολογίαν ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι τὰς τοιαύτας διατριβὰς* (a passage which probably reflects pretty fairly the prevailing opinion). In opposition to this prejudice, Plato asserts that such studies have a direct tendency to promote grandeur of conception and completeness of execution, whether in an orator, a physician, or any other of the higher class of *τεχνίται*. The epithets *ὕψηλ. καὶ τελεσ.*, it will be observed, are not restricted to Pericles, though most felicitous as applied to him. Of his *ἀδολεσχία* a curious instance is given by Plutarch, *V. Per. c. 36*.

ἐκτίησατο προσπεσὼν γάρ, οἶμαι, τοιούτῳ ὄντι Ἀναξαγόρα, μετεωρολογίας ἐμπλησθεὶς καὶ ἐπὶ φύσιν νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνοίας ἀφικόμενος, ὧν δὴ πέρι τὸν πολλὸν λόγον ἐποιεῖτο Ἀναξαγόρας, ἐντεῦθεν εἰλκυσεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην τὸ πρόσφορον αὐτῇ.

270. προσπεσὼν—Ἀναξαγόρα] A different estimate of Anaxagoras is formed in the *Phaedo* (p. 97 B), as of Pericles in the *Gorgias*. It is not, however, difficult to account for the seeming discrepancy. In the *Gorgias* Plato speaks of Pericles from an ethico-political, in the *Phaedrus* from an artistic point of view; while the defect in the Anaxagorean system pointed out in the *Phaedo* need not be supposed to have blinded Plato to its striking originality and superiority to the efforts of earlier speculators. We may well believe that he would cheerfully have accorded the praise of a *ὑψηλόνους* and *τελειουργὸς* to a philosopher who, according to Aristotle, in comparison with the random guesses of his predecessors, might be said to speak words of truth and soberness: *οἶον νήφων ἐφάνη παρ' εἰκῇ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον* (*Met.* i. 4. 16).

μετεωρολογίας—αὐτῇ] It was from converse with Anaxagoras, says Socr., that Pericles 'stored his mind with lofty speculations, and was able to penetrate to the essential nature of Intelligence and Unintelligence—the theme on which Anaxagoras chiefly loved to descant; and from that source he borrowed, for the behoof of his own art, all that could be made available for it.' The *νοῦς καὶ ἀνοία* of the text are the intelligent and unintelligent principles in Nature, which Anaxagoras was the first to place in sharp antithesis to each other (*Herm.*, *ἀνοίαν λέγει τὴν ὅλην*). Thus his celebrated *βιβλίον* commenced with the words, *δομὸν πάντα χρήματα, εἴτα Νοῦς ἐλθὼν διεκόσμησε*. On this account, says Plutarch, *Ἀναξαγόραν οἱ τότε ἄνθρωποι Νοῦν προσηγόρευον*, either, he adds, from admiration of his profound physiological genius, or because he was the first to dislodge Chance or Necessity and set up pure Intelligence in their room as the principle of law and order in the universe—*ἐν μεμιγμένοις πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀποκρίνοντα τὰς ὁμοιομερείας* (*Vit. Pericl.* c. 4). He adds, *τοῦτον ὑπερφυνὸς τὸν ἄνδρα θαυμάσας δὲ Περικλῆς, καὶ τῆς λεγομένης μετεωρολογίας καὶ μεταρσιολογίας ὑπο-*

πιμπλάμενος, . . . ὥς ἔοικε, τὸ φρόνημα σοβαρὸν καὶ τὸν λόγον ὑψηλὸν εἶχε καὶ καθαρὸν ὀχλικῆς καὶ πανούργου βωμολοχίας. To the same cause Plutarch attributes the superiority of Pericles to the vulgar *δαισιναιμία* which arises from ignorance of physical causation. All this is intelligible and not improbable; but Plato seems to say considerably more than this, viz. that it was to the lessons of Anaxagoras, especially on *νοῦς* and *ἀνοία*, that Pericles owed his deep knowledge of human nature (*τὸ διελέσθαι φύσιν ψυχῆς*, inf.). Now it is pretty certain that nothing of the kind was to be learnt from Anaxagoras, whose theory of a cosmical Intelligence had nothing to do with the theory of human nature. On the other hand, it is impossible either to understand the passage in an ironical sense, or to treat it as a mere rhetorical flourish. Plato's meaning was probably this. Pericles, having become familiar with the Anaxagorean distinction between the Rational and Irrational principles as exhibited on a great scale in Nature (*ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ φύσει*, inf.), found it easy to apply the same distinction to that department of nature (the mind of man) with which as an orator and statesman he had to do. He would know how to distinguish between the *λόγον ἔχον* and the *ἄλογον*—the reasoning and unreasoning principle in his audience—and to address himself successfully to each in its turn (compare sup. 246 B, *πάντα ἡ ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου*). It is thus, apparently, that Cicero understands the passage—*Orat.* iv. 14: *Nam nec latius nec copiosius de magnis variisque rebus sine philosophia potest quisquam dicere: si quidem etiam in Phaedro Platonis hoc Periclem praestitisse caeteris dicit oratoribus Socrates, quod is Anaxagorae physici fuerit auditor: a quo censet eum, quum alia praecleara quaedam et magnifica didicisset, uberem et fecundum fuisse, gnarumque (quod est eloquentiae maximum) quibus orationis modis quaeque animorum partes pellerentur*. The same view is more vaguely expressed in the *Brutus*

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις ;

B ΣΩ. Ὁ αὐτός που τρόπος τέχνης ῥητορικῆς, ὅσπερ καὶ ἱατρικῆς.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ ;

ΣΩ. Ἐν ἀμφοτέραις δεῖ διελέσθαι φύσιν, σώματος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ, ψυχῆς δ' ἐν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ, εἰ μέλλεις μὴ τριβῇ μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀλλὰ τέχνην τῷ μὲν φάρμακα καὶ τροφήν προσφέρων ὑγίειαν καὶ ῥώμην ἐμποιῆσαι, τῇ δὲ λόγους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεις νομίμους πειθῶ ἦν ἀνβούλη καὶ ἀρετὴν παραδώσειν.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως.

C ΣΩ. Ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἷεν δυνατόν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως ;

ΦΑΙ. Εἰ μὲν Ἱπποκράτει γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν

(xi. 44): Pericles primus adhibuit doctrinam: quae quanquam tunc erat nulla dicendi, tamen, ab Anaxagora physico eruditus, exercitationem mentis a reconditis abstrusisque rebus ad causas forenses popularesque facile traduxit.

B. Ὁ αὐτός που τρόπος, κ.τ.λ.] In modern language, Rhetoric is to be based on Psychology, in the same way as Medicine on Physiology; otherwise both are alike empirical. The parallel between ἀρετὴ and ὑγίεια is familiar in Plato. More remarkable is the statement that the final cause of rhetoric is to improve the morals and institutions of a people. Comp. Polit. 304, ῥητορεία, πείθουσα τὸ δίκαιον, ξυνδιακυβερνᾷ [τῇ βασιλικῇ] τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράξεις. See also the Introduction.

C. Ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν] The soul being a part of Nature, Psychology must needs be a branch of general Physics. This view is universal in Greek Philosophy.

Εἰ μὲν—γε] The MSS. have εἰ μὲν Ἱπποκράτει τε. Galen, in quoting this passage (Opp. xv. 4, Kühn), reads εἰ μὲν οὖν Ἱπποκράτει τῷ, κ.τ.λ. The reading in the text is that adopted by Stallb., Ast, and Hirschig. The Zurich Edd. have εἰ μὲν οὖν . . . γε, but μὲν οὖν would imply a modified dissent, which is out of place here.

Ἱπποκράτει γε] Protag. 311 B, Ἱπποκράτῃ τὸν Κῶν τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν. Concerning this medical caste, order, or corporation, see Grote, H. G. i. 248;

Sprengel, Gesch. der Arzneikunde, i. 237; Littre, Hippocrate, t. i. c. 1. According to Galen (or Pseudo-Galen), Isagog. p. 677, Kühn, the Asclepiads belonged to the Methodic, as distinguished from the Empirical, sect in medicine. One of their maxims was, ὑφηγήσεως ἀρχὴ ἡ φυσικὴ θεωρία—'nay,' it is added, ἀπλῶς καὶ Ἱπποκράτης ἔφη, "ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἐν ἱατρικῇ λόγου ἡ φύσις πρώτη." In the Comm. in Hippocr. de Natura Hominis (xv. 12, Kühn), Galen infers the genuineness of the treatise on which he is commenting from this passage of the Phaedrus: for the sentiment (οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ σώματος, κ.τ.λ.) is to be found, he says, οὐ καθ' ἓν ἄλλο παρὰ τὸ προκείμενον ἡμῖν σύγγραμμα τὸ περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου. The object of this work of Hippocrates is to show that the human body is not a homogeneous substance, as certain physicians, following the Ionic physiologists, had affirmed; but composed of four elements—αἷμα, φλέγμα, χολή ξανθὴ, and χολή μέλαινα, whence the old doctrine of temperaments (κράσεις) was derived. In § 13, we find the words, ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τῆς φύσιος τοιαύτης ὑπαρχούσης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, μὴ εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον τῶν στοιχείων τῶν ξυμβαλλομένων εἰς τὴν γένεσιν ἔχειν τιὰ δύναμιν ἐν τῷ σώματι οἷον περ ξυμβάλετο. And this is probably the passage to which we must understand Plato to refer, for it pronounces clearly in favour of the view ὅτι

δεῖ τι πείθεσθαι, οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος ἄνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

written ΣΩ. Καλῶς γάρ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, λέγει. χρὴ μέντοι πρὸς τῷ
and Ἱπποκράτει τὸν λόγον ἐξετάζοντα σκοπεῖν εἰ συμφωνεῖ.

ΦΑΙ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν περὶ φύσεως σκόπει τί ποτε λέγει Ἱπποκράτης τε καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος. ἄρ' οὐχ ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὅτουοῦν φύσεως; πρῶτον μὲν, ἀπλοῦν D ἢ πολυειδές ἐστιν, οὐ περί βουλησόμεθα εἶναι αὐτοὶ τεχνικοί καὶ ἄλλον δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν, ἔπειτα δέ, ἐὰν μὲν ἀπλοῦν ᾧ, σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς

τὸ σῶμα πολυειδές ἐστι. Compare also § 5, εἰ ἐν ᾗ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδέποτε ἂν ἦλθεν, κ.τ.λ. Possibly, too, he may refer to the first section of the treatise, which contains a protest against the hasty generalizations of contemporary physiologists, and may therefore be construed into an acknowledgment of the importance to the physician of a sounder method; and this is the colour put upon it by Galen. However this may be, Plato would naturally sympathize with the strong aversion expressed in the tract to the one-sidedness of the early physicians, seeing in Hippocrates' method a practical anticipation of his own principle, τὸ ἐν πολλά, τὰ πολλὰ ἐν. The medical precepts in Charm. 156 c are probably borrowed from Hippocrates or his school, and to a certain extent illustrate the passage before us.

οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος] i.e. δυνατόν ἐστι κατανοῆσαι. The genitive with περὶ is a not uncommon periphrasis for the accusative, as Ast observes: inf. 271 c, εἰδότες ψυχῆς περί παγκάλως: Gorg. 512. 8, ἐπιτρέψαντα περί τούτων τῷ θεῷ. The variation from the preceding constr., ψυχὴν κατανοῆσαι, is designed. We have κατανοεῖν περί τούτων in Xen. Cyr. i. 6. 20, quoted by Heind. In the next speech ὁ λόγος is personified, as throughout this dialogue. For ἐξετάζοντα Galen read ἐξετάζοντας.

ἄνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης] μέθοδος means either 'investigation' (going in quest), or a particular mode of investigation, our 'Method.' The μέθοδος here intended would seem to be that which connects any particular branch of inquiry with general physics. So we must under-

stand Plato, if his words are to be taken *au pied de la lettre*. But when he comes to the application, we look in vain for any such general theory of nature. The scheme of psychology he presently traces out rests solely on the observation of *human* nature, and is as inductive as Bacon himself could desire. And equally so is the method of Hippocrates, which Plato justly regards as parallel with his own. Both conform equally to the requirements of a sound dialectic; both equally eschew fanciful *a priori* reasonings. This difficulty, which seems to have escaped the commentators, is felt and clearly stated by M. Littré in the Introduction to his elaborate edition of Hippocrates (tom. i. p. 295 fol.). But I confess that his solution is not to me satisfactory. In the passage from the Hippocratean treatise de Vietus ratione (i. 627, Kühn), which M. Littré supposes to be that referred to sup. c, Dietetics are made to depend on the facts of human, not general physiology, precisely as Plato connects Rhetoric with those of human psychology. What if, after all, Plato means nothing more by ἡ τοῦ ὕλου φύσις than the general law of the One in Many, which holds alike in Nature and in Thought?

D. ἐὰν μὲν ἀπλοῦν ᾧ] If it (the substance on which art is to be exerted) be simple and uniform, we are to study its powers, both active and passive; also on what substances it can act, and by what it is acted upon. τίνα (sc. δύναμιν) πέφυκεν ἔχον is equiv. to τίνα φύσει ἔχει, and there is no necessity for altering ἔχον into ἔχειν, as Steph. proposed and

τὸ δρᾶν ἔχον ἢ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ ; ἐὰν δὲ πλείω εἶδη ἔχῃ, ταῦτα ἀριθμησάμενον, ὅπερ ἐφ' ἐνός, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἐφ' ἐκάστων, τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ ;

ΦΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἡ γοῦν ἄνευ τούτων μέθοδος εἰκοίαι ἂν ὥσπερ
E τυφλοῦ πορεία. ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν ἀπεικαστέον τόν γε τέχνην μετιόντα ὅτιοῦν τυφλῇ οὐδὲ κωφῷ, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς ἂν τῷ τις τέχνη λόγους διδῷ, τὴν οὐσίαν δείξει ἀκριβῶς τῆς φύσεως τούτου πρὸς ὃ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει· ἔσται δέ που ψυχὴ τοῦτο.

ΦΑΙ. Τί μὴν ;

271 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἄμιλλα αὐτῷ τέταται | πρὸς τοῦτο ὧρ 43
πᾶσα. πειθὼ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ. ἢ γάρ ;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ὁ Θρασύμαχος τε καὶ ὅς ἂν ἄλλος p 70 R

Heind. read. ἔχον is found in all the MSS. and in Galen, and may be defended by Xen. Symp. iv. 54, τὸν χρῶτα τοιοῦτον φῦναι ἔχοντα, which Ast quotes, observing that πεφυκέναι with the inf. has the sense "natura ita comparatum esse ut faciat." There is a clear distinction between πέφυκεν ἔχον here and ποιεῖν πέφυκεν in the next sentence, where ποιεῖν answers to εἰς τὸ δρᾶν, not to ἔχον. If the substance in question be not uniform, we are to count its different forms or manifestations, and repeat the process described in each instance: asking ourselves, as before, in what part (τῷ) its powers active and passive reside, what these powers are, and what the causes by which they are acted upon.

ἀριθμησάμενον] This reading is found in Galen, and adopted by Heind. The vulg. ἀριθμησάμενος is defended by Ast and Stallb. on the ground that anacoluthiae are common in Plato. The question is, however, whether in the present case such an anacoluthia as a nom. immediately preceding an inf. is tolerable or not ; and I cannot believe that Plato would have thought it so. It is clear from his writing ἰδεῖν that he intended the clause to be dependent on the foregoing δεῖ, whereas an anacoluthia implies that an author has inadvertently changed

the structure of his sentence. No one, I presume, will contend that ἰδεῖν is used imperatively.

E. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς] 'we must not doubt,' says Socr., 'that a rhetor who professes to furnish his pupil (τῷ) with speeches framed *secundum artem*, will exhibit to him the essential nature of that substance to which he will have to apply such speeches ; which substance, if I mistake not, will prove to be Soul.' In other words, a scientific Rhetoric must be founded on Psychology. In the text τῷ is omitted by the Boell. Compare τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῶ in the sequel. προσφέρειν λόγους is analogous to προσφέρειν φάρμακα.

Οὐκοῦν] 'Hence in Soul all his efforts centre, for it is in that he essays to work conviction.'

271. Δῆλον ἄρα] The rhetorician will (1) ascertain whether the soul is uniform and homogeneous, or whether it contains a variety of εἶδη, answering to the parts or elements of our bodily frame. εἶδη is explained by μόρια . . . οἷον ὅτι ἔχει φανταστικὸν θυμικὸν ὀρεκτικόν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα (Herm.). In the Timaeus Plato fixes the abode of each of these εἶδη, or principles : placing the reasonable soul in the brain, the irascible in the heart, the concupiscent in the liver, &c. Aris-

σπουδῇ τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῶ, πρῶτον πάσῃ ἀκριβείᾳ γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσῃ ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἐν καὶ ὁμοιον τέφκεν ἢ κατὰ σώματος μορφήν πολυειδές. τοῦτο γάρ φαμεν φύσιν εἶναι δεικνύναι.

ΦΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δέ γε, ὅτῳ τί ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ τέφκεν.

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα, δίεισι τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ, καὶ διδάσκων οἷα οὔσα ὑφ' οἷων λόγων δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ μὲν πείθεται, ἢ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ.

ΦΑΙ. Κάλλιστα γοῦν ἄν, ὥς ἔοικ', ἔχοι οὕτως.

tote, on the other hand, made the heart the centre of the entire consciousness, while the Stoic Chrysippus discarded the distinction of *εἶδη* altogether (*οὔτε τὴν θυμοειδῆ συγχωρήσας ὑπάρχειν οὔτε τὴν ἐπιθυμητικὴν*), but agreed with Aristotle in placing the reason and will (*προαίρεσιν*) in the heart. Galen. de Plat. et Hipp. vi. 1 al.

σπουδῇ] 'in earnest,' not as a mere amateur or *ιδιώτης*, but *ex cathedra*. διδόναι τ. ῥητ. probably refers to the practice of placing in the hands of their pupils manuals called *τέχναι*, which seems to have been nearly universal among the teachers of rhetoric.

Δεύτερον δέ γε] Having determined the constituent parts of the Soul, the philosophic rhetorician will proceed (2) to enumerate their modes of action, and the affections to which they are respectively subject. ὅτῳ, as τῷ paul. sup., denotes the *μόριον ψυχῆς* 'in' or 'by which' any particular functions are exercised. This part of Rhetoric and that which follows are handled by Aristotle in his inimitable second book.

τρίτον δὲ δὴ] His third and last step will be to classify, *διατάσσειν*, the different modifications of Soul and the various kinds of discourse, arranging them, as it were, in parallel tables for the purpose of pairing them according to their mutual correspondences: such a kind of discourse being good for the

emotive, such another for the rational part, &c. Nor will the theory be complete, unless he further show the causes of this compatibility,—why a soul so constituted is necessarily wrought on by discourses of such and such a kind, but insensible to those of a different description. Just as in Medicine, the ideal Physician knows how to adapt his treatment to different *κράσεις* or temperaments, as well as to the different parts of the body, and can explain the physical reasons which determine his choice of remedies in every case. The *λόγων γένη* enumerated by Hermias are, λ. ἀποδεικτικοί, δεικτικοί, ἐγκωμιστικοί. He adds, οἷον ὁ τῷ ὁρθῷ λόγῳ ἐπόμενος τοῖς ἀποδεικτικοῖς λόγοις χαίρει, ὁ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ζῶν τοῖς κολακικοῖς καὶ ἐγκωμιστικοῖς. Aristotle goes, of course, much deeper than this (Rhet. ii. 12—17).

β. Κάλλιστα γοῦν] I admit, says Phaedr., that the way you point out will be the best. Socr., dissatisfied with this concession, tells him there is no other method possible: this alone is in accordance with the idea of what art should be, no matter what the subject-matter to which the method may be applied. The existing technographers, he pretends, know this well, but are crafty enough to keep their psychological lore to themselves. The method of *συναγωγῇ* and *διαίρεσις* (p. 266) is therefore, according to Plato, equally ap-

ΣΩ. Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλως ἐνδεικνύμενον ἢ λεγόμενον τέχνη ποτὲ λεχθήσεται ἢ γραφήσεται οὔτε τι ἄλλο οὔτε τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οἱ νῦν γράφοντες, ὧν σὺ ἀκήκοας, τέχνας λόγων πανοῦργοί εἰσι καὶ ἀποκρύπτονται, εἰδότες ψυχῆς περὶ παγκάλως. πρὶν ἂν οὖν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον λέγωσί τε καὶ γράφωσι, μὴ πειθώμεθ' αὐτοῖς τέχνη γράφειν.

ΦΑΙ. Τίνα τοῦτον;

ΣΩ. Αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ ῥήματα εἰπεῖν οὐκ εὐπετές· ὥς δὲ δεῖ γράφειν, εἰ μέλλει τεχνικῶς ἔχειν καθ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

ΦΑΙ. Λέγε δῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὔσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ^D ψυχὴν ὅσα εἶδη ἔχει. ἔστιν οὖν τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα· ὅθεν οἱ μὲν τοιοῖδε, οἱ δὲ τοιοῖδε γίνονται. τούτων δὲ δὴ διηρημένων, λόγων αὖ τόσα καὶ τόσα ἔστιν εἶδη, τοιόνδε ἕκαστον. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοῖδε ὑπὸ τῶν

plicable to all arts and sciences. This supports the view that ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις refers, not to positive physical science, but to the principles which should regulate physical research. For Nature creates, as our minds conceive, according to genera and species. The One in Many is both a condition of thought and a law of things.

C. μὴ πειθώμεθ' αὐτοῖς τέχνη γράφειν] 'let us not believe them that they write *secundum artem*, i. e. let them not persuade us that,' &c.

ψυχαγωγία τις] Not the only, but one special mode of acting upon the Soul (sup. 261). Legislation, music, religion, are also forms of 'psychagogy' according to Plato and Aristotle. Poetry, so far as it is designed to act on the Will, may be classed as a branch of Rhetoric, which, like it, is a ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγων (261 A). In the elegant passage which follows, Plato sketches the ground-plan of an ideal philosophical Rhetoric—a plan upon which the treatise of Aristotle was afterwards constructed. The εἶδη ψυχῆς are, as before, the λόγον ἔχον and the ἄλογον, with their sub-

divisions—the faculties, the passions, the appetites, &c. It is from the combinations of these elements that we get the varieties of character (ὅθεν οἱ μὲν τοιοῖδε, κ.τ.λ.): and when these are determined (approximately, we may suppose) it will be time to make a corresponding list of the 'kinds of discourse' ('orationis modi'—Cic. Brut. 41), showing that 'persons of a given description are from such particular causes easily wrought upon by such and such modes of address, while persons of a different complexion are, for certain reasons, insusceptible of such influence.' This is evidently an application to Rhetoric of the general Method of Division sketched in p. 265 D fol., as indeed Galen points out, Hipp. et Plat., Opp. tom. v. p. 754, Kühn. He cites the present passage from ἐπειδὴ τοὺς δὲ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ, and proceeds to illustrate the subject further by a passage from the Philebus (18 D), where the diaeretic method is applied to the science of Grammar.

D. τοιόνδε ἕκαστον] Galen, τοιόνδε δὲ ἕκαστον.

τοιῶνδε λόγων διὰ τήνδε τὴν αἰτίαν εἰς τὰ τοιάδε εὐπει-
θεῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοῖδε διὰ τάδε δυσπειθεῖς. δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα
ικανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς
πράξεσιν ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, ὁξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύ-
νασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἣ μὴδὲν εἶναί πω πλέον αὐτῷ E
ὦν τότε ἤκουε λόγων ξυνών. ὅταν δὲ εἰπεῖν τε ικανῶς
ἔχῃ οἷος ὑφ' οἷον πείθεται, παραγιγνόμενόν τε δυνατὸς
ἢ διαισθανόμενος ἑαυτῷ ἐνδείκνυσθαι ὅτι οὗτός ἐστι | καὶ 272
αὕτη ἡ φύσις, περὶ ἧς τότε ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι, νῦν ἔργῳ
παροῦσά οἱ, ἣ προσοιστέον τούσδε ὧδε τοὺς λόγους ἐπὶ
τὴν τῶνδε πειθῶ,—ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη πάντα ἔχοντι, προς-

δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα] A theoretical knowledge of the varieties of human character is not enough: the student must have his senses sharpened to detect their manifestations in actual life and practice, 'or be thus far none the better or wiser for all the lessons he heard in the days of his pupillage.' The MSS. give ἢ μὴδὲ (εἰ μὴ Bodl.) εἰδέναι πω πλέον αὐτῶν (Bodl. αὐτῷ) ὦν τότε ἤκουε λόγων ξυνών. In the text I have adopted, which is Ast's, εἶναι is taken from the MSS. of Galen, μὴδὲν from Gal. and Hermeias, αὐτῷ from the Bodl. and some other MSS. Heind. and after him Bekk. adhere to the vulg., which would give the sense, 'or know no more than the mere (αὐτῶν) lectures he heard from his teachers.' But the amended text gives, in my judgment, a more pointed meaning. Plato would say that without tact and experience the labour of the schools is labour lost. The only objection to my rendering is grounded on the absence of a preposition before ὦν λόγων. "πλέον γίγνεσθαι et εἶναι τι νικῶν Graeci vulgo dicunt, πλέον εἶναι τινός τι νικῶν, quod sciam, non dicunt" (Heind.). To evade this objection, Ast resolves ὦν ἤκουε λόγων into λόγους ὦν ἤκουε, supposing λόγους to be the subject of εἶναι: "alioquin nihilum utilitatis afferre quae tum audiverit praecepta." But this seems to me harsher than to suppose an ellipse of the preposition, in which we are completely justified by Isoer. Antid. 315 D, ὦν οὐδὲν μοι πλέον γέγονεν, 'from all which performances I have reaped no benefit.' Hence in Euthyd. 290 D, for οὐδεμία τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστὶν

ἢ ὅσον θηρεῦσαι καὶ χειρώσασθαι we should perhaps read οὐδὲν . . . ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστίν. 'Of the art of hunting nothing comes except. . . ' The Zur. Edd. read with Ast; Hirsch. adheres to the vulg.

τότε—ξυνών = τότε, ὅτε ξυνῆν τῷ διδασκάλῳ. Gorg. 455 D, τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία, ἔσται ἐάν σοι ξυνῶμεν; where he might have said τί ἡμῖν πλέον ἔσται; E. ὅταν δὲ εἰπεῖν τε]

The particles τε —τε are emphatic. 'So soon as the student is not merely qualified to tell us what sort of men are influenced by such and such discourses, but able also to single out an individual hearer, and satisfy himself that the character of that man then present to him in the court or assembly answers to the description given in the lecture-room, &c.; when, I say, his attainments have reached this point, and he has also learnt when to speak and when to refrain, and can discern when the various rhetorical styles and figures—brevity, pathos, exaggeration, or what not—are in or out of season, then, and not till then, is he a perfect master of his craft.'

272. ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη] Gal. ταῦτα δὴ, which Hirsch. has adopted. Both readings are good, but that of the MSS. seems the more idiomatic. This is the form noted by Buttm.: "in qua particula δὲ apodosin occupat, non per oppositionem ad protasin, sed ita ut mera sit repetitio alius δὲ quod est in protasi" (Mid. p. 152). Here the δὲ after ὅταν is repeated before ἤδη πᾶντ' ἔχοντα by way of connecting the various conditions enumerated, and contrasting more vividly the entire description of the perfect artist with that of the mere schoolman.

λαβόντι καιροὺς τοῦ ποτε λεκτέον καὶ ἐπισχετέον, βραχυλογίας τε αὖ καὶ ἐλεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως ἐκάστων τε ὅσ' ἂν εἶδη μάθῃ λόγων, τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν διαγνόντι, καλῶς τε καὶ τελέως ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη ἀπειργασμένη, πρότερον δ' οὐ· ἀλλ' ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῶν τις ἐλλείπη λέγων ἢ διδάσκων ἢ γράφων, φῆν δὲ τέχνη λέγειν, ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ. τί δὴ οὖν, φήσῃ ἴσως ὁ συγγραφεύς, ὦ Φαῖδρέ τε καὶ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖ οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀποδεκτέον λεγομένης λόγων τέχνης;

ΦΑΙ. Ἀδύνατόν που, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως· καί τοι οὐ σμικρόν γε φαίνεται ἔργον.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. τούτου τοι ἕνεκα χρὴ πάντας τοὺς λόγους αἶνω καὶ κάτω μεταστρέφοντα ἐπισκοπεῖν εἴ τίς πῃ ῥάων καὶ βραχυτέρα φαίνεται ἐπ' αὐτὴν ὁδός, ἵνα μὴ μάτην πολλὴν ἀπὶ καὶ τραχεῖαν, ἐξδὼν ὀλίγην τε καὶ λείαν. ἀλλ' εἴ τινά πῃ βοήθειαν ἔχεις ἐπακρηκῶς Λυσίου ἢ τινος ἄλλου, πειρῶ λέγειν ἀναμιμνησκόμενος.

Buttm. quotes Phaed. 80 D, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἔρα, τὸ αἰδὲς . . . αὕτη δὲ ἡμῖν . . . εὐθὺς διαπεφύσεται: add inf. p. 277 E, ὁ δὲ γε ἐν μὲν τῷ γεγραμμένῳ λόγῳ . . . οὗτος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ· κινδυνεύει, κ.τ.λ. (where after οὗτος some few codd. give δῆ).

ἐλεινολογίας] Vulg. ἐλεεινολογίας. Galen's text preserves the Attic form.

δεινώσεως] J. Poll. iv. 33, ὑπερβολαί, δεινώσεις, δεινολογαί (apparently meant for synonyms). So the author of the *perì ὕψους*, § 11. 2, mentions δεινώσεις as an *idéa aḗxhseως*. 1b. § 12. 5, ἐν τε ταῖς δεινώσεσι καὶ τοῖς σφοδροῖς πάθεσι, καὶ ἐνθα δεῖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν τὸ σύνολον ἐκπλάξαι.

D. ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ] 'he who refuses to believe him, has the better case,' i. e. we have a right to say, I don't believe you. A proverbial phrase for *οὐ πειστέον*, as Heind. suggests. The version of Serranus is amusing: "is nimirum perveracia non ratione vincit." Epist. vii. 343 D, ὁ βουλόμενος τῶν δυναμένων ἀνατρέπειν κρατεῖ. Tim. 54, ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐχθρὸς ὦν ἀλλὰ φίλος κρατεῖ.

ὁ συγγραφεύς] That is, the ideal teacher of rhetoric described 271 A as one *ὅς ἂν σπουδῇ τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῶ*. Soer. had just said that the conditions laid down were equally binding upon

the public speaker, the oral instructor, and the writer on rhetoric (λέγων ἢ διδάσκων ἢ γράφων).

ἀποδεκτέον λεγομένης] 'are we to accept (acquiesce in) this account of rhetoric or some others in preference?' ἀποδέχεσθαι *cum gen. rei* is very rare, if indeed it ever occurs (Alec. ii. 150 c is not in point); and we are therefore to regard λεγομένης τέχνης as a *gen. absol.* He might have written ἀποδεκτέον, ἐὰν οὕτως λέγεται ἡ τῶν λόγων τέχνη, or ἀποδεκτέον οὕτως λεγομένην λ. τέχνην, or ἀποδ. οὕτως λεγόντων λ. τέχνην.

C. πολλὴν ἀπὶ] Of ἀπείναι so used with accus. I have no other instance at hand. Bailh. conj. περίη, observing, "Ridiculum est ἀπὶ: vid. infra περιτέον, περίοδος" (p. 274). Hirsch. accordingly reads περίη. Nor is the change in reality so great as it appears. περίη might easily degenerate into πῆ, and this be mistaken for ἀπὶ. Bast. Ep. Crit. p. 928, Schaeft., gives an instance of a mistake arising from the abbreviated way of writing περί, viz. as π with a small ε over it. C. F. Hermann, with curious infelicity, proposes αἰρή: Stallb. ἀνῆρ. I retain the vulg., to which there is no theoretical objection. Compare Lobeck on Soph. Aj. v. 20.

ΦΑΙ. Ἐνεκα μὲν πείρας ἔχοιμ' ἄν, ἀλλ' οὔτι νῦν γ' οὕτως ἔχω.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν ἐγὼ τι' εἶπω λόγον ὃν τῶν περὶ ταῦτά τινων ἀκήκοα ;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μὴν ;

ΣΩ. Λέγεται γοῦν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἰπεῖν.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ σύ γε οὕτω ποίει.

ΣΩ. Φασὶ τοίνυν οὐδὲν οὕτω ταῦτα δεῖν σεμνύνειν οὐδ' ἀνάγειν ἄνω μακρὰν περιβαλλομένους· παντάπασιν γάρ, ὃ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἶπομεν τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δέοι δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν περὶ πραγμάτων, ἢ καὶ ἀνθρώπων γε τοιούτων φύσει ὄντων ἢ τροφῇ, τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσσεσθαι. τὸ παράπαν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις τούτων ἀληθείας μέλειν οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ. τοῦτο δ' εἶναι τὸ εἰκός, ᾧ δεῖν προσέχειν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνη ἐρεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὖ τὰ πραχθέντα

Ἐνεκα μὲν πείρας] If 'trying' would avail, says Phaedr., he might perhaps remember,—but at the moment he can think of nothing.

νῦν γ' οὕτως = without further assistance or consideration.

Δ. τὸ τοῦ λύκου] The adage implies that even the worse cause should have a fair hearing. Our 'give the devil his due' expresses a similar feeling. The Greek comm. suppose the proverb to be derived from the Æsopian fable of the wolf and the shepherds, told thus by Plutarch: λύκος ἰδὼν ποιμένας ἐσθιοντάς ἐν σιηνῇ πρόβατον, ἐγγυς προσελθὼν, Ἑλίκος ἂν ἦν ὑμῖν θόρυβος εἰ ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἐποιοῦν (Sept. Sap. Conv. 156 A). Hence perhaps the proverb λύκου ῥήματα. We are reminded of the ecclesiastical 'Advocatus diaboli'—the wolf frequently supplying the place of the latter personage, as in the adage, εἰ καὶ λύκου ἐμνήσθης, equiv. to the Lat. 'lupus in fabula' and our 'talk of the devil' &c.

Φασὶ τοίνυν] Having propounded his new scheme of a philosophical Rhetoric, Socr. proceeds to examine the objections which the popular teachers will probably bring against it. 'No more,' they will say, 'of this parade of first principles—

this roundabout way of dealing with a simple matter. Probability, we repeat, and not truth—not the *verum*, but the *veri-simile*—is the province of the rhetor.' For μακρὰν περιβαλλ. comp. Symp. 222 C, οὕτω κομψῶς κύκλω περιβαλλόμενος. The usage is rare, and confined apparently to Plato and his later imitators. It may have come from the military sense of περιβάλλειν, to send round a detachment for the purpose of taking an enemy in the flank or rear. περιβάλλεσθαι is passive in form, but virtually neuter.

ὅτι οὐδὲν—δέοι] The sentence, as Heind. observes, wants its apodosis, ὅτι δέοι referring formally to ὃ εἴπομεν, but virtually taking the place of δεῖν after φασί. The connexion is re-established by μέλειν in the next sentence.

Ε. τοῦ πιθανοῦ] The persuasive, the objector goes on to say, is another word for the probable, which ought to occupy the attention of the skilled orator, if he would deserve that title. Hence even the facts are to be suppressed if they happen to be unlikely. For οὐδὲ γὰρ αὖ τὰ πρ., Heind. conj. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὖτὰ τὰ πρ., h. e. τὰ τῷ ὄντι πρ. But αὖ can hardly be spared in this connexion.

δεῖν λέγειν ἐνίοτε, εἴαν μὴ εἰκότως ἢ πεπραγμένα, ἀλλὰ τὰ εἰκότα, ἔν τε κατηγορίᾳ καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ· καὶ πάντως λέγοντα τὸ δὴ εἰκὸς διωκτέον εἶναι, πολλὰ εἰπόντα χαίρειν τῷ
 273 ἀληθεῖ. | τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου γιγνόμενον τὴν ἅπασαν τέχνην πορίζειν.

ΦΑΙ. Αὐτά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, διελήλυθας ἃ λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι εἶναι. ἀνεμνήσθην γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βραχέως τοῦ τοιούτου ἐφηψάμεθα, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦτο πάμμεγα εἶναι τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε Τισίαν αὐτὸν πεπάτηκας ἀκριβῶς. εἰπέτω τοῖνυν καὶ τόδε ἡμῖν ὁ Τισίας, μή τι ἄλλο λέγει τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ τῷ πλήθει δοκοῦν.

Β ΦΑΙ. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφὸν εὐρὼν ἅμα καὶ

καὶ πάντως] That is, not only in the practice of the law-court, in which κατηγορία and ἀπολογία have place, but also in that of the ἀγορά. Sup. 261 B, μάλιστα μὲν περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ δημγορίᾳ. Whatever be the occasion, the speaker should keep probability in view, without troubling himself about the truth. The double accus. after the verbal διωκτέον is too trite a usage to require illustration.

273. Αὐτά γε] Badh. recasts the parts thus:—Φ. Αὐτά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, διελήλυθας ἃ λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι εἶναι. Σ. Ἀνεμνήσθην γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βραχέως τοῦ τοιούτου ἐφηψάμεθα· δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦτο πάμμεγα εἶναι τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα. Φ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε Τισίαν αὐτὸν πεπάτηκας ἀκριβῶς. Σ. Εἰπέτω τοῖνυν καὶ τόδε ἡμῖν ὁ Τισίας, κ.τ.λ. This arrangement has the advantage of explaining the tense of ἀνεμνήσθην, and the use of γάρ. 'I have given the precepts of the rhetors word for word (αὐτά),' says Soer., 'because I bethought me that we had already touched briefly on the subject, and I know what importance is attached to it by the professional teachers.' On the other hand ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῖνυν seem to be hardly the particles required from the speakers in Badh.'s arrangement. Soer. would not have passed over without comment his companion's as-

sertion that he was familiar with the τέχνη of Tisias. He would have owned the impeachment or disowned it. In the former case, ἴσως, or some equivalent, would have preceded εἰπέτω τοῖνυν.

ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν] Sup. 259 E, οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην τῷ μέλλοντι ῥήτορι ἔσσεσθαι τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια μαρθάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαν' ἂν πλήθει, κ.τ.λ.

τὸν γε Τισίαν αὐτὸν πεπάτηκας] 'you have, at all events, read up your Tisias carefully.' αὐτὸν = in his own book. So Ar. Av. 471, οὐδ' Αἰσωπον πεπάτηκας, 'nor have you comed—are you at home in Aesop.' Hermias strangely mistakes the meaning: τουτέστιν, ἐδειξας μηδὲν ὄντα τὸν Τισίαν.

Β. Τοῦτο δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε] The instance of a suppressio veri which follows is doubtless extracted from the τέχνη of Tisias, which Phaedr. has at his fingers' ends. 'If a weak but courageous man be tried for beating a powerful but cowardly one, and robbing him of his cloak or the like, neither party is to state the precise truth. The coward is to pretend that the brave man was not alone when he thrashed him, while the other should first try to prove that no one else was by, and then make the most of the argument. How can a poor creature like me be supposed to have assaulted so fine a man? The other, we are told, will not avow his own cowardice, but will try to invent some other falsehood, whereby, if

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τεχνικὸν ἔγραψεν, ὡς ἔάν τις ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνδρικὸς ἰσχυρὸν καὶ δειλὸν συγκόψας, ἱμάτιον ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀφελόμενος, εἰς δικαστήριον ἄγεται, δεῖ δὴ τὰληθὲς μηδέτερον λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν δειλὸν μὴ ὑπὸ μόνου φάναι τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ συγκεκόφθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐλέγχειν ὡς μόνῳ ἦσθην, ἐκείνῳ δὲ καταχρήσασθαι τῷ πῶς δ' ἂν ἐγὼ τοιόσδε τοιῶδε ἐπεχείρησα; ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔρεῖ δὴ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κάκην, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο ψεύδεσθαι ἐπιχειρῶν τάχ' ἂν ἔλεγχόν πη παραδοίῃ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ. καὶ περὶ τὰλλα δὴ τοιαῦτ' αὐτ' ἐστὶ τὰ τέχνη λεγόμενα. οὐ γάρ, ὦ Φαῖδρε;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. Φεῦ, δεινῶς γ' ἔοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην ἀνευρεῖν ὁ Τισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δὴ ποτ' ὦν τυγχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος. ἀτάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τούτῳ ἡμεῖς πότερον λέγωμεν ἢ μῆ—

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὦ Τισία, πάλαι ἡμεῖς, πρὶν καὶ σὲ παρελθεῖν, τυγχάνομεν λέγοντες ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο τὸ εἰκὸς τοῖς πολλοῖς δι' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τυγχάνει ἐγγιγνόμενον· τὰς δὲ ὁμοιότηας ἄρτι διήλθομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ ὁ τὴν

it so happen, he will give his antagonist a fair chance of refuting him.' The impotent conclusion of these elaborate mystifications was not, we may presume, contemplated by Tisias, but is maliciously added by Socr.

c. Φεῦ, δεινῶς γ' 'bless me! what a dreadfully recondite artifice! whether Tisias has the merit of its discovery, or some one else, whoever he may be, or whencesoever it is his pleasure to be named.' Doubtless a mocking allusion to Corax and his ill-omened name. So Herm., τοῦτο εἶπεν ἴσως διὰ τὸν Κόρακα, ἐπειδὴ ἐλέγετο ὁ Κόραξ Τισίου μαθητὴς (pot. διδάσκαλος) εἶναι. Comp. the prov. κακοῦ κόρακος κακὸν ὦν (Proem. Gr. ii. p. 466, ed. Leutsch., where for Σισίαν read Τισίαν). The irony is increased by the circumstance that the formula ὁπόθεν χ. ὦν. was used in solemn prayer. Crat. 400 B, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς νόμος ἐστὶν ἡμῖν εὐχεσθαι, οἵτινές τε καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι (σι

θεοῖ). So Heind. ὁπόθεν here refers to the practice of giving the gods epithets taken from their favourite abodes: Δηλίε, Πύθιε, or the like.

τούτῳ] If τούτῳ could be dispensed with we should be tempted by Heind.'s τοῦτο, which τὸ ποῖον in the next sentence appears to presuppose. In every instance that I can find, τὸ ποῖον; or τὰ ποῖα; refers to some definite antecedent. Inf. 277 D, ἄρ' οὐ δεδήλωκε τὰ λεχθέντα δλίγον ἐμπροσθεν; τὰ ποῖα; Phil. 34 B, ἄρ' οὐν οὐ τόδε; τὸ ποῖον; In the present case three or four MSS. give τοῦτο. Perhaps Plato wrote τοῦτ' αὐτῷ.

d. πάλαι ἡμεῖς] Socr. informs Tisias that his objection has already been refuted, referring of course to p. 262 A, δεῖ ἄρα τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπατήσιν μὲν ἄλλον, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπατήσεσθαι τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ἀκριβῶς διειδέναι, κ.τ.λ. Likeness and unlikeness to truth can only be apparent to one who knows what the truth itself is.

ἀλήθειαν εἰδὼς κάλλιστα ἐπίσταται εὐρίσκειν. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἄλλο τι περὶ τέχνης λόγων λέγεις, ἀκούοιμεν ἂν· εἰ δὲ μή, οἷς νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν πεισόμεθα, ὡς ἔαν μή τις ἐ τῶν τε ἀκουσομένων τὰς φύσεις διαριθμῆσθαι, καὶ κατ' εἶδη τε διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα καὶ μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ δυνατὸς ἢ καθ' ἑν ἑκάστων περιλαμβάνειν, οὐ ποτ' ἔσται τεχνικὸς λόγων περί καθ' ὅσον δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ. ταῦτα δὲ οὐ μή ποτε κτήσεται ἄνευ πολλῆς πραγματείας· ἣν οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι τὸν σῶφρονα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένα μὲν λέγειν δύνασθαι, κεχαρισμένως δὲ πράττειν τὸ πᾶν εἰς δύναμιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄρα, ὦ Τισία, φασὶν οἱ σοφώτεροι ἡμῶν, 274 ὁμοδούλοις | δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι μελετᾶν τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα, ὃ τι μὴ πάρεργον, ἀλλὰ δεσπότηις ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν.

ὥστ'—λέγεις] Galen, who quotes this passage, from ὥστ' εἰ το δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ, gives λέγοις, and so Bekk. from some MSS. But ἀκούοιμεν ἂν having the force of a future, as πεισόμεθα in the next clause, the indic. is better. Presently Galen's MSS. give ἀδύνατος for δυνατός, and οὕτω ἔσται for οὕποτ' (ed. Kühn, v. p. 756). What Socr. desiderates in a speaker is, (1) a dialectical training, enabling him to 'divide' and to 'collect,' and (2) the power of applying his dialectical science to human nature and its varieties. διαριθμεῖσθαι means much the same as διατάξασθαι, sup. 271 B, to 'enumerate in order to classification.' The limitation καθ' ὅσον δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ is freq. introduced by Plato when speaking of things of high and difficult attainment, either in this form or with a preposition, as Rep. vi. 500 D, θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται: Tim. 46 C, τῇν τοῦ ἀρίστου κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἰδέαν ἀποτελᾶν. So presently, εἰς δύναμιν.

Ε. κτήσεται] So the Bodl. Bekk. gives κτήσεται on comparatively slender authority.

θεοῖς κεχαρισμένα] The sentiment is in conformity with Plato's celebrated dictum, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον θεός, Legg. iv. 716 C. "How many," asks Stallb., "of our writers on pulpit-eloquence" (*homileticen*) "treat this branch of theology in so lofty a spirit?"

φασὶν οἱ σοφώτεροι ἡμῶν] Probably he

alludes to the elder Pythagoreans, who, according to Proclus, Theol. i. 5, p. 13, are described Phileb. 16 C, in the words, οἱ παλαιοὶ κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες. So Hermias understands: οἱ σοφ. οἶον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι. The sentiment which follows, that all men are fellow-slaves under the superintendence of divine taskmasters, is found, as Heind. observes, in Phaed. 62 B: τότε γέ μοι δοκεῖ εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοῦ εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. Ib. 85 B, Socr. speaks of himself as ὁμόδουλος τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ. The word ὁμόδουλος occurs Theaet. 172 D in a different connexion, but still with reference to oratory: οἱ δὲ λόγοι αἱ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθημένοιν, the 'master' in this case being the dicast. Before ὁμοδούλοις the best MSS., including the Bodl., give ἥ, others μή. But nothing can be made of either, unless we admit the improbable supposition that some other substantive has been lost before ὁμοδούλοις.

274. ὃ τι μὴ πάρεργον] Herm., ὃ τι μὴ πάρεργον, ἀντὶ τοῦ, εἰ μὴ πάρεργον, τούτ' ἐστὶ, κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Eng. 'except incidentally,' or 'as a secondary consideration.' ὅστις μὴ and ὃ τι μὴ are of freq. occurrence, as Gorg. 522 E, οὐδείς φοβέται. ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνανδρός ἐστι, 'unless he be a very coward.'

ὥστ' εἰ μακρὰ ἢ περίοδος, μὴ θαυμάσης· μεγάλων γὰρ ἔνεκα περιυτέον, οὐχ ὧν σὺ δοκεῖς. ἔσται μὲν, ὥς ὁ λόγος φησὶν, εἴαν τις ἐθέλῃ, καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστα ἐξ ἐκείνων γιγνόμενα.

ΦΑΙ. Παγκάλως ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ οἷός τέ τις εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντί τοι τοῖς καλοῖς καλὸν καὶ πάσχειν ὃ τι ἂν τῷ ξυμβῇ παθεῖν.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων περὶ ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω.

ΦΑΙ. Τί μὲν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' εὐπρεπείας δὴ γραφῆς περὶ καὶ ἀπρεπείας, πῇ γιγνόμενον καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ὅπῃ ἀπρεπῶς, λοιπόν. ἦ γάρ;

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθ' οὖν ὅπῃ μάλιστα θεῷ χαριεῖ λόγων περὶ πράττων ἢ λέγων;

ὥστ' εἰ μακρά] 'marvel not, therefore, if the way be long and circuitous; it is for great ends, not for such as you imagine, that we are to take the winding road,' i.e. it is to please the gods, not, as you think, to gratify men, that we adopt the arduous and scientific in preference to the easy and empirical method. Heind.'s conj., ὧν for ὥς, which I have adopted, seems necessary in order to furnish an antecedent to ταῦτα in the following clause: 'not but what, as our reasoning shows, these ordinary purposes (ἀ σὺ δοκεῖς, sc. τὸ εἰκός, τὸ πιθανόν) may, if one has a mind, be attained, and in the best possible manner, as following out of the first.' He had before said that the best way of ascertaining the probable was first to learn the true. (Herm. explains ἐξ ἐκείνων by ἐκ τῶν θεῶν. Read ἐκ τῶν θεῶν, a good gloss, ταῦτα being equiv. to τὰνθρώπινα. So 246 A, θεῶν καὶ μακρὰ διήγησις is opposed to ἀνθρώπινη καὶ ἐλάττω.) Phaedr. admits that the Socratic way is in theory excellent, but doubts its practicability. To which Socr. replies, that, practicable or not, it is noble to aim at noble ends, even though the attempt should end in failure. And with

these words he dismisses the question of art or no-art.

B. Τὸ δ' εὐπρεπείας δὴ γραφῆς περὶ] At the commencement of the discussion following the last Erotic Discourse, Socr. had exposed the futility of the prejudice against authorship in general, and caused Phaedr. to admit ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν αὐτό γε τὸ γράφειν λόγους (258 D). This done, he makes the admission (ib. E) that there is a difference between τὸ καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν, and proposes, as the theme of the day's discussion, the question: ὅπῃ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅπῃ μὴ (259 E). The discussion however has to wait until the preliminary question (commencing 260 E) of τέχνη τε καὶ ἀτεχνία is disposed of: hence the present passage is, in form at least, a resumption of the thread of the dialogue, after a long parenthetical interruption. In commencing the art-discussion, he had roused the attention of Phaedr., by introducing a company of imaginary Δόγοι, uttering pretended Laconian apophthegms. Here he puts in the mouth of an Egyptian deity paradoxes redolent of an Attic phrontisterium.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. σὺν δέ;

ΣΩ. Ἀκοήν γ' ἔχω λέγειν τῶν προτέρων, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο εὖροιμεν αὐτοί, ἄρά γ' ἂν ἔθ' ἡμῖν μέλοι τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δοξασμάτων;

ΦΑΙ. Γελοῖον ἦρου. ἀλλ' ἃ φῆς ἀκηκοέναι, λέγε.

ΣΩ. Ἦκουσα τοίνυν περὶ Ναύκρατιν τῆς Αἰγύπτου γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ παλαιῶν τινὰ θεῶν, οὗ καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον [τὸ] ἱερόν, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσιν Ἰβιν· αὐτῷ δὲ ὄνομα τῷ δαίμονι εἶναι Θεύθ. τοῦτον δὲ πρῶτον ἀριθμόν τε καὶ λογισμὸν εὐρεῖν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἔτι δὲ πεττείας τε καὶ κυβείας, καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα. βασιλέως δ' αὖ τότε ὄντος Αἰγύπτου ὅλης Θαμοῦ περὶ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τοῦ ἄνω τόπου, ἣν οἱ Ἕλληνες Αἰγυπτίας Θήβας καλοῦσι, καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἀμμωνα, παρὰ τοῦτον ἐλθὼν ὁ Θεύθ τὰς τέχνας ἐπέδειξε, καὶ ἔφη δεῖν διαδοθῆναι τοῖς ἄλλοις Αἰγυπτίοις. ὁ δὲ ἤρετο ἥντινα ἐκάστη ἔχοι ὠφέλειαν. διεξιόντος δέ, ὃ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς δοκοίη λέγειν,

c. Ναύκρατιν] This was a Greek emporium in Egypt, originally, according to Herod. ii. 179, the only foreign port. Theuth or Thóth, the Egyptian Hermes, is again mentioned in Philob. 18 B. He was one of the twelve gods of second rank, and called by the Egyptians 'the scribe of the gods,' the 'lord of the divine word,' the 'writer of truth.' So Bunsen, Aegypten i. 462, from Lepsius. He was also the Moon-god. Herod. (ii. 67) informs us that the dead ibis was always taken for burial to Hermopolis, the city of Thoth (see Sir G. Wilkinson's note in Rawlinson's ed.) being, as Plato says, sacred to that god (Aelian, N. H. x. 29). The second article before ἱερόν admits, of course, of explanation, but probability would be much in favour of the emended reading of Heind., Ast, and Hirsch., οὗ καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον ἱερόν, even if we did not find it in the comm. of Hermias (who by the way gives a mystical reason of surpassing absurdity for the relation of the bird to the god, Schol. Herm. 199, Ast).

ἀριθμὸν τε καὶ λογισμὸν] The words recur, Rep. vii. 522 C. ἀριθμὸς for Arithmetic is common: Aesch. Prom. 459, ἀριθμὸν ἔσοχον σοφισμάτων, and a poet

(prob. Euripides) in Stobaeus: πρῶτα μὲν τὸν πάνσοφον Ἀριθμὸν εὐρηκ' ἐσοχὸν σοφισμάτων.

D. Θαμοῦ] It is impossible to say where Plato found this word, which seems a corruption or variety of Ἀμοῦς, Ἀμοῦν, the Egyptian name, according to Herodotus, of Zeus (Her. ii. 42). Accordingly his name heads the list of the eight superior deities. This Amon or Amn was besides in an especial sense the god of Thebes, hence styled by Herod. ibid. Ζεὺς Θηβαίεος. He was the Zeus Ammon of the Greeks, his image being κριοπρόσωπον, ib. Hence Thebes itself was styled Diospolis. With the anacoluthia ἦν . . . καλοῦσι, καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἀμμωνα compare a similar sup. 258 E, ὡν προλυπηθῆναι δεῖ ἢ μηδὲ ἡσθῆναι. τὸν θεὸν is, of course, the Thamus just mentioned. For ἦν, the reading received by all edd. since Heind., all the MSS. but one have ἦν.

ἐπέδειξε] So the Bodl., the majority of codd., and Hermias. Bekk. edits ἀπέδειξε from eight MSS. But ἐπέδειξε is better: 'exhibited,' or as Stallb. "ostentavit."

δοκοίη] Vulg. δοκοῖ, al. δοκεῖ. The Attic form is preserved in Stobaeus.

ὡς ἴη L5

τὸ μὲν ἔψεγε, τὸ δ' ἐπῆναι. πολλὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα Θαμοῦν τῷ Θεῷ λέγεται ἀποφήνασθαι, ἃ λόγος πολὺς ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν ἦν, Τοῦτο δέ, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὸ μάθημα, ἔφη ὁ Θεός, σοφωτέρους Αἰγυπτίους καὶ μνημονικωτέρους παρέξει· μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον εὐρέθη. ὁ δ' εἶπεν ὦ τεχνικώτατε Θεός, ἄλλος μὲν τεκεῖν δυνατὸς τὰ τῆς τέχνης, ἄλλος δὲ κρίναι τίν' ἔχει μοῖραν βλάβης τε καὶ ὠφελείας τοῖς μέλλουσι χρῆσθαι. | καὶ νῦν σύ, 275 πατὴρ ὢν γραμμάτων, δι' εὐνοίαν τούναντίον εἶπες ἣ δύναται. τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει, μνήμης ἀμελετησίᾳ, ἅτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπ' ἄλλοτριῶν τύπων, οὐκ ἔνδον αὐτοὺς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναμνησκομένους. οὐκ οὖν μνήμης ἀλλ' ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον εὑρες. σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν, οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις· πολυήκοοι γὰρ σοι γενόμενοι ἄνευ

E. ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα] 'for and against.' ἐπὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν ἦν, 'when he got upon the subject of written characters.' Polit. 274 B, ἐπ' αὐτῷ νῦν ἐσμὲν ἤδη.

μνήμης—φάρμακον] 'a specific for the memory and the wit.' So above, 230 D, σὺ μέντοι δοκεῖς μοι τῆς ἐξόδου τὸ φάρμακον εὐρηκέναι. A more usual form would have been λήθης καὶ ἀμαθίας φάρμακον, as we find in Eurip. Fr. Palam. 2, Dindl., τὰ τῆς γε λήθης φάρμακ' ὀρθώσας μόρους Ἀφωνα καὶ φανούντα, κ.τ.λ. But Synesius, π. ἐνυπν. p. 110, τὰς ἐλπίδας ἐνέχεεν ὁ Προμηθεύς, διαμονῆς φάρμακον.

275. καὶ νῦν σὺ—δύναται] 'so, in the present instance, you, who are the father of letters, have, out of tenderness for your offspring, attributed to them a power (or tendency), the contrary of that which they really possess.' ἣ δύναται for ἣ ὃ δύναται, or better οὐ ὢν δύναται, is confirmed by Phileb. 35 A, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἣ πάσχει, and by several other passages cited by Stallb. in his ann.

τοῦτο γάρ] Theuth's invention would impair the memory, by tempting men to neglect practising it. They would rely on written memoranda, and so get the habit of referring to outward symbols impressed on alien material, rather than to those stamped on the tablets

of the brain. Hence writing is an aid, not to memory, but to reminiscence; helping us not to retain impressions but to recover them. The commentators quote largely in illustration of this passage. Quint. Inst. xi. 2. 9, quamquam invenio apud Platonem, ob stare memoriae usum literarum: videlicet quod illa, quae scriptis reposuimus, velut custodire desinimus, et ipsa securitate dimittimus: where the annotators refer to Caesar, B. G. vi. 14, to show the existence of a similar prejudice among the Druids, who forbade their lore to be committed to writing: "quod neque in vulgum disciplinam efferri velint, neque eos qui discant, litteris confisos, minus memoriae studere." To these Stallb. adds Senec. Ep. 88. 28. An anecdote is related by Hermecias of a disciple of Plato, who, πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀπογραφάμενος ἀπέπλευσεν, καὶ ναυαγία περιπεσὼν πάντα ἀπώλεσε, καὶ ἐπέστρεψε πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον, ἔργῳ πειραθεὶς ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἐν βιβλίοις ἀποτίθεσθαι τὰ νοήματα; ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. This may have been suggested by a saying of Aristippus, of whom we are told ὅτι παρεκελεύετο τοῖς νέοις τοιαῦτα ἐφόδια κτᾶσθαι, ἢ τινα αὐτοῖς καὶ ναυαγήσασσι συνεκκολληθῆσαι (Stob. Anthol. Append. p. 66).

πολυήκοοι γὰρ σοι γενόμενοι] 'your

Er.
7.341 C-d; 344 d-e. Pl. is criticizing
himself in part

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην οἰόμενος ἐν γράμμασι καταλιπεῖν καὶ αὖ ὁ παραδεχόμενος, ὥς τι σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσόμενον, πολλῆς ἂν εὐθείας γέμοι καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὴν Ἀμμωνος μαντείαν ἀγνοοίη, πλέον τι οἰόμενος εἶναι λόγους γεγραμμένους τοῦ τὸν εἰδότα ὑπομνήσαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ᾗ τὰ γεγραμμένα.

D

ΦΑΙ. Ὅρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅμοιον ζωγραφία. καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἔστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρη τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ. ταῦτόν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι δόξαις μὲν ἂν ὡς τι φρονούντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρη τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἐν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταῦτόν ἀεὶ. ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ γραφῇ, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὁμοίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαύουσιν, ὡς δ' αὐτῶς παρ' οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς δεῖ τε καὶ μὴ. πλημμελούμενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ λoidορηθεὶς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ· αὐτὸς γὰρ οὐτ' ἀμύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὐτῷ.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ ταῦτά σοι ὀρθότατα εἴρηται.

C. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην] Socr. applies the pretended oracle of Ammon to the subject in hand. A written manual of rhetoric will not of itself make its readers skilful orators; its only value is to remind those who use it of what they knew already.

ἀγνοοίη] Of this reading we have trace in the ἀγνοοῖν of one cod. Vulg. ἀγνοοῖ.

πλέον τι—εἶναι λόγους γεγραμμένους] There is no necessity to substitute ἔχειν for εἶναι as Heind., or ποιεῖν as Stallb. suggests. εἶναι is here used idiomatically in the sense of *δυνασθαι*. Arist. Ran. 227, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστ' ἄλλ' ἢ κῶδξ. Aves 19, τῷ δ' οὐκ ἄρ' ἥστην οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν δάκνειν (which is perhaps better than Porson's ἥστην). Amphit. ap. Diog. Laert. iii. § 28, ὦ Πλάτων ὧς οὐδὲν ἥσθα πλὴν σκυθρωπάζειν μόνον. Vulg. ὀσθα. Cod. Arund. ἥσθα. Cobet. ἥσθα.

D. Δεινὸν γάρ που] There is one inconvenience in written speech, which is, in fact, incident to painting also. The creations of this latter art, though they

stand upright as if they were alive, if you ask them a question, will preserve a solemn silence.

δόξαις μὲν ἂν] 'you might fancy they had some conception of the meaning of what they say, but if you ask them, &c., they still tell the same unvarying tale.' So in the Protag. 347 E, the reading of the poets is denounced as unprofitable, and for a like reason, οὐς οὔτε ἀνερῆσθαι οἶδ' ὅτι ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, κ.τ.λ.

κυλινδεῖται μὲν] 'is handed about,' or 'circulates.' πλημμελούμενος, 'being sinned against,' i. e. subjected to ill-usage or indignity. Decret. ap. Demosth. Cor. p. 279, ὅπως μὴ περίδῃ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀσεβῶν Ἀμφισιῶν τὸν θεὸν πλημμελούμενον.

E. οἷς δεῖ τε] Vulg. δεῖ γε. Corr. Hirschig.

τοῦ πατρὸς] Theaet. 164 E, οὐτὶ ἂν, οἶμαι, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατήρ τοῦ ἐτέρου μύθου ἔζη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὀφθαλμὸν ὄντα αὐτὸν ἡμεῖς προσηλαΐζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' οἱ ἐπιτροποὶ οὐς Πρωταγ. κατέλιπε, βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν. Another

276 ΣΩ. Τί δ' ; ἄλλον ὀρώμεν | λόγον τούτου ἀδελφὸν γνήσιον, τῷ τρόπῳ τε γίγνεται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἀμείνων καὶ δυνατώτερος τούτου φύεται ;

ΦΑΙ. Τίνα τοῦτον, καὶ πῶς λέγεις γιγνόμενον ;

ΣΩ. Ὃς μετ' ἐπιστήμης γράφεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ μανθά-
νοντος ψυχῇ, δυνατὸς μὲν ἀμῦναι ἑαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμων δὲ
λέγειν τε καὶ σιγᾶν πρὸς οὓς δεῖ.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον λέγεις ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυ-
χον, οὗ ὁ γεγραμμένος εἰδῶλον ἂν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως.

13 ΣΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. τόδε δὴ μοι εἶπέ· ὁ νοῦν
ἔχων γεωργός, ὃν σπερμάτων κήδοιτο καὶ ἔγκαρπα βού-
λοιτο γενέσθαι, πότερα σπουδῇ ἂν θέρους εἰς Ἀδώνιδος
κήπους ἄρων χαίροι θεωρῶν καλοὺς ἐν ἡμέραισιν ὀκτῶ
γιγνομένους, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ ἑορτῆς χάριν
δρώῃ ἂν, ὅτε καὶ ποιοίῃ· ἐφ' οἷς δὲ ἐσπούδακε, τῇ γεωρ-
γικῇ χρώμενος ἂν τέχνῃ, σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσῆκον, ἀγα-
πῶν ἂν ἐν ὀγδόῳ μηνὶ ὅσα ἔσπειρε τέλος λαβόντα ;

and very elegant instance of Plato's fond-
ness for personifying the λόγος.

276. τούτου ἀδελφὸν γνήσιον] The
written λόγος is therefore the νόθος ἀδελ-
φός of the spoken. The distinction be-
tween the living and dead word which
follows is analogous to the Christian
antithesis of "letter" and "spirit," of
which the one "killeth," but the other
"giveth life." The Neo-platonists, from
Philo downwards, express the distinction
by λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορι-
κός, the words used by Hermias in com-
menting on this passage.

1231 B. ὁ νοῦν ἔχων γεωργός] 'would a
husbandman of any intelligence take
seeds which he cared for and wished to
bear fruit, and in sober seriousness plant
them during the heat of summer in gar-
dens of Adonis, and then rejoice as he
watched them coming up in full beauty
ere they had been eight days sown?'
Hesych., 'Ἀδώνιδος κήποι. ἐν τοῖς
'Ἀδωνιδος κήποις ἐκτὸς καὶ κήπους
ἐπ' ὀστράκων, καὶ παντοδαπὴν ὑπάραν
οἶον ἐκ μαράθρων καὶ θριδάκων παρασκευ-
άζουσιν αὐτῷ τοὺς κήπους· καὶ γὰρ ἐν
θριδάκαις αὐτῶν κατασκευάζονται ἐπὶ
'Ἀφροδίτης φασίν. The glosses of the
paroemiographers are to the same effect.

'Ἀδ. κήπ. ἐπὶ τῶν ἁράων καὶ μὴ ἐρρίζω-
μένων. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ Ἀδωνίς ἐρώμενος ὢν,
ὡς ὁ μῦθος, Ἀφροδίτης, πρὸ ἡβῆς τελευτᾷ,
οἱ ταῦτη ὀργιάζοντες, κήπους εἰς ἀγγεῖά
τινα φυτεύοντες ἢ φυτεύουσαι, ταχέως
ἐκείνων διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐρρίζωσθαι μαραιομένων,
'Ἀδωνίδος αὐτοὺς ἐκάλουν. Theocritus
xv. 111, Ἀρσινόα πάντεσσι καλοῖς ἀτι-
τάλλει Ἀδωνιν· Πὰρ μὲν οἱ ὦρια κείται
ὅσα δρυὸς ἄκρα φέροντι, Πὰρ δ' ἀπαλοὶ
κᾶποι, πεφυλαγμένοι ἐν ταλαρίσκοις Ἀρ-
γυρείοις, Συρίῳ δὲ μύρῳ χρύσει' ἀλάβαστρα,
κ.τ.λ. The use of ἀροῦν for σπείρειν, or
φυτεύειν, is not uncommon in poetry.
Soph. Frag. Ion, Ἐν Διὸς κήποις ἀροῦσθαι
μόνον εὐδαίμονας ὕλβους. So Oed. R.
1485, πατὴρ ἐφάνθη ἐνθεν αὐτὸς ἡρόθη,
for which we find, v. 1498, ὅθεν περ αὐτὸς
ἐσπάρη. The occurrence of the word
here is a poeticism, not out of keeping
with the general colour of the passage.

ἐφ' οἷς δὲ ἐσπούδακε] 'where he is
really in earnest, the cultivator will pro-
ceed on true principles of agriculture ;
he will sow his grain in fitting soil, and
be well content if it come to maturity
within eight months.' The MSS. show
some confusion in the placing of the
conditional particles: some giving ἂν
thrice. I have kept Bekk.'s text, as on

on "lay diton," Rep. 498a, Thes. 186c, Phila 273e

ΦΑΙ. Οὕτω που, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν σπουδῇ, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐτέρως ἄν, ἣ λέγεις, ποιοίη.

ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντα τοῦ γεωργοῦ φῶμεν ἥττον νοῦν ἔχειν εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ σπέρματα ;

ΦΑΙ. Ἕκιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σπουδῇ αὐτὰ ἐν ὕδατι γράψει μέλανι σπείρων διὰ καλάμου μετὰ λόγων ἀδυνάτων μὲν αὐτοῖς λόγῳ βοηθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων δὲ ἱκανῶς τάληθῃ διδάξαι.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐκουν δὴ τό γ' εἰκός.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ· ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι κήπους, Δ ὡς ἔοικε, παιδιᾶς χάριν σπερεῖ τε καὶ γράψει, ὅταν γράφῃ, ἑαυτῷ τε ὑπομνήματα θησαυρίζομενος, εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας ἔαν ἴκηται, καὶ παντὶ τῷ ταῦτὸν ἴχνος μετιόντι, ἡσθήσεται τε αὐτοὺς θεωρῶν φυομένους ἀπαλούς· ὅταν δὲ ἄλλοι παιδιαῖς ἄλλαις χρώνται, συμποσίοις τε ἄρδοντες αὐτοὺς ἐτέροις τε ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, τότε' ἐκείνος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀντὶ τούτων οἷς λέγω παίζων διάξει.

the whole the best. The former ἂν is, of course, a mere anticipation of that after ἀγαπή, to which verb both particles belong.

c. Οὐκ ἄρα σπουδῇ] The philosopher who has true scientific views of the Just, the Fair, and the Good, will surely deal as intelligently with this precious grain, the produce of his inner self, as the farmer does with his seeds. To commit them to paper would be like writing them in water; for what else is it to 'sow them in ink through a reed in the form of Discourses, as incapable of defending themselves logically, as they are of conveying an exact impression of the truth.' This, therefore, he will not do in his serious moods (σπουδῇ), but only by way of sport and recreation (παιδιᾶς χάριν).

ἐν ὕδατι γράψει] Another instance of Plato's way of sliding in a proverbial phrase by way of additional illustration. See 275 D. "ἐν ὕδατι s. καθ' ὕδατος enim γράφειν vel σπείρειν, ut Latinorum in vento et aqua scribere (Catull. lxx. 4), proverbialiter dicitur is, qui irriti quidquam facit, ἐπὶ τῶν μάτην πονουμένων, ut Suidas explicat" (Ast). "Here lies one

whose name was written in water" is the well-known inscription over the grave of an English poet. So, in verses attributed to Baëon :

"Who then to frail mortality shall trust,
But limns the water, or but writes in
dust!"

Works, vii. p. 271. Spedding.

D. ὑπομνήματα] The use of literature is to preserve memorials of oral discussion: also to furnish an innocent substitute for the grosser kinds of pastime. εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας ἔαν ἴκηται, 'should the writer ever reach oblivious old.' As Heind. observes, "verba hæc poetam sapiunt," and possibly they are a literal quotation. This is at any rate more likely than Winckelmann's wild or rather perhaps tame emendation: ἑαυτῷ τε ὑπ. θησ. εἰς τὸ γῆρας, λήθης φάρμακα, καὶ παντὶ, κ.τ.λ. The πᾶς δὲ ταῦτὸν ἴχνος μετιών, is of course the philosopher who adopts the Socratic method, literally, 'who hunts the same trail.'

ἀντὶ τούτων οἷς λέγω] The οἷς is explained by the following ἐν λόγοις. 'The philosopher will divert himself with the amusements I am describing, rather than

ὅρκους ἐγὼ γυναικὸς εἰς ὕδωρ γράφω Soph. fr. 811 P.

Ε ΦΑΙ. Παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδιάν, ὃ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παίζειν, δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄλλων ὧν λέγεις περί μυθολογοῦντα.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι γάρ, ὃ φίλε Φαῖδρε, οὕτω. πολὺν δ', οἶμαι, καλλίων σπουδὴ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπείρῃ μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἱ ἑαυτοῖς
277 τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοὶ | καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα, ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἦθεσι φυόμενοι τοῦτ' αἰεὶ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἱκανοί, καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατόν μάλιστα.

ΦΑΙ. Πολὺν γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔτι κάλλιον λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ ἐκείνα ἤδη, ὃ Φαῖδρε, δυνάμεθα κρίνειν, τούτων ὁμολογούντων.

with those of the vulgar. The old reading was οἷς λέγων, for which Heind. suggested ἐν οἷς λέγω. Bekk. found οἷς λέγω in the margin of one MS., and rightly adopted it. Heind.'s ἐν, though good in other respects, would mar the rhythm of the clause. Both are better than Ast's οἷα λέγω.

Ε. Παγκάλην — παρὰ φαύλην] 'the recreation you describe, that of him, &c., is as excellent as the other is contemptible.' Comp. the speech of Phaedr., 258 E, so strangely objected to by Heind.

μυθολογοῦντα] Heind. forbids us to restrict this word to mythical discourse. No doubt it will bear the more general sense 'fabulari,' 'sermocinari,' as *mῦθος* is not unfrequently used for *λόγος*: but I think that here at least Plato had a special view to the myths with which he delights to embellish his dialogues. His own form of composition was as nearly as possible an imitation of the process described so vividly in the next *ῥῆσις*: and he seems to have thought it the best attainable substitute for the oral *διάλεξις* which he extols. This being the case, the written copy could hardly be contrasted with the spoken original; the less so, as Plato, in his dialogues, takes pains to diminish the distance between the two, as by making his *λόγοι* not only able to defend themselves and crush their antagonists, but also careful to convey a right im-

pression of the mind of their parent, and of the truth. If this view be correct, we have in this and the succeeding passage an apology for the Platonic method of composition, both on its mythical and its dramatic side; the latter, however, rather by implication than expressly. In his larger commentary Ast seems to hint something of the same kind.

πολὺν δ', οἶμαι, καλλίων σπουδῇ] Rhetoric, at its very best, is inferior to pure Dialectic, which, when it works in minds of suitable capacity, is the surest method of propagating fruitful truths, and preserving them from extinction. The *λόγοι* thus sown owe their vitality to the circumstance, that they grow up, not all in the same kind of soil, in which case they would soon degenerate, but ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἦθεσι.

277. τοῦτ' αἰεὶ ἀθάνατον] Referred by Ast to *σπέρμα* (better to τὸ ἔχειν σπέρμα). Heind., from whom I dissent, understands τὸ βοηθεῖν ἑαυτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι.

Νῦν δὲ ἐκείνα] Having established, parenthetically, the superiority of oral to written speech, Socr. reverts to the subject proposed 274 B—τὸ εὐπρεπὲς ἀπὸ γραφῆς περί καὶ ἀπρεπείας, πῇ γιγνόμενον καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι, κ.τ.λ. The object of the dialogue, he says, had been twofold: (1) to ascertain the justice or injustice of the reproach implied in the term *λογγράφος* (sup. 257 C), and (2) to determine the conditions of a technical

ΦΑΙ. Τὰ ποῖα ;

ΣΩ. Ὡν δὴ περί βουλευθέντες ἰδεῖν ἀφικόμεθα εἰς τόδε, ὅπως τὸ Δυσίου τε ὄνειδος ἐξετάσαιμεν τῆς τῶν λόγων γραφῆς περί, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους οἱ τέχνη καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης γράφουσιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔντεχνον καὶ μὴ δοκεῖ μοι δεδηλωσθαι μετρίως.

ΦΑΙ. Ἔδοξέ γε δὴ. πάλιν δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με πῶς.

ΣΩ. Πρὶν ἂν τις τό τε ἀληθὲς ἐκάστων εἰδῇ περὶ ὧν λέγει ἢ γράφει, κατ' αὐτό τε πᾶν ὀρίζεσθαι δυνατὸς γένηται, ὀρισάμενός τε πάλιν κατ' εἶδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν ἐπιστηθῇ· περί τε ψυχῆς φύσεως διδὼν κατὰ ταῦτά, τὸ προσαρμόττον ἐκάστη φύσει εἶδος ἀνευρίσκων, οὕτω τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμῇ τὸν λόγον, ποικίλη μὲν ποικίλους ὁ ψυχῇ καὶ παναρμονίους διδούς λόγους, ἀπλοὺς δὲ ἀπλῇ, οὐ πρότερον δυνατὸν τέχνη ἔσεσθαι καθ' ὅσον πέφυκε μεταχειρισθῆναι τὸ λόγων γένος, οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ πείσαι, ὥς ὁ ἔμπροσθεν πᾶς μεμήνυκεν ἡμῖν λόγος.

ΦΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε οὕτω πως ἐφάνη.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ

or scientific Rhetoric. The second head having been satisfactorily disposed of, he is now in a condition to discuss the former. This intention is interfered with by Phaedr., who wishes to be reminded of the results arrived at in the course of the art-discussion. These are accordingly enumerated by Soer. in a passage of singular pregnancy and neatness.

B. Πρὶν ἂν τις, κ.τ.λ.] It has been shown, says Soer., that it will not be possible for speeches, whether didactic or persuasive, to be constructed technically, so far as it is in their nature to admit of such handling, unless the following conditions be fulfilled: (1) unless the speaker or writer have been thoroughly trained in dialectic, so as to be able to define any general term he may make use of, and then conversely to dissect it into its constituent species, until he reach the point when such dissection is no longer possible: (2) unless he can look with the discerning eye of a dialectician at Soul and its species, so as to find out what manner of speeches suit

the several varieties of mental character, and plan and adjust his discourse accordingly, providing simple speeches for the simple soul, but for minds of more varied development discourses of varied range, and of intricate but harmonious structure. For ἔσεσθαι we should rather have looked for ἔσται, but the inf. depends virtually on δεδηλωσθαι δοκεῖ. Notwithstanding this, Plato adds the clause ὥς ὁ ἔμπροσθεν . . . μεμήνυκεν ἡμῖν λόγος, just as he would have done had the sentence not been oblique.

D. Τί δ' αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν.] The original question which has been so long delayed, is now shown by Soer. to have been virtually disposed of in the course of the foregoing discussions. Speech-writing is disgraceful if the writer use terms he cannot explain, especially if such terms involve important moral distinctions; whereas, if the author know how to appraise his art at his true value and no higher, being master of the noble art of writing his thoughts on receptive and congenial

λόγους λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν, καὶ ὅπη γιγνόμενον ἐν δίκη λέγοιτ' ἂν ὄνειδος ἢ μή, ἄρα οὐ δεδήλωκε τὰ λεχθέντα ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν.

ΦΑΙ. Τὰ ποῖα ;

ΣΩ. Ὡς εἴτε *Λυσίας* ἢ τις ἄλλος πώποτε ἔγραψεν ἢ γράψῃ, *ιδία* ἢ δημοσία, νόμους τιθείς, σύγγραμμα πολιτικὸν γράφων, καὶ μεγάλην τινὰ ἐν αὐτῷ βεβαιότητα ἡγούμενος καὶ σαφήνειαν, οὕτω μὲν ὄνειδος τῷ γράφοντι, Εἴτε τίς φησιν εἴτε μή. τὸ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν ὕπαρ τε καὶ ὄναρ δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων περὶ καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐκφεύγει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ οὐκ ἐπονείδιστον εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γε ἐν μὲν τῷ γεγραμμένῳ λόγῳ περὶ ἐκάστου παιδιάν τε ἡγούμενος πολλὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ οὐδένα πώποτε λόγον ἐν μέτρῳ οὐδ' ἄνευ μέτρου μεγάλης ἄξιον σπουδῆς γραφῆναι, οὐδὲ λεχθῆναι ὡς οἱ ῥαψωδού-
278 μνοι ἄνευ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς πειθοῦς ἔνεκα | ἐλέχθησαν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι αὐτῶν τοὺς βελτίστους εἰδόντων

souls—in that case ‘he will go near to be one whom both Socr. and his friend would heartily pray to be like’ (278 B).

νόμους τιθείς, σύγγραμμα πολιτικὸν γράφων] ‘proposing laws, and so being the author of a political treatise.’ The text is perfectly sound, Plato meaning to say that the public man is essentially an author, however much he may repudiate the title. So presently 278 C, *ὅς τις ἐν πολιτικοῖς λόγοις, νόμους ὀνομάζων, συγγράμματα ἔγραψεν*. Comp. sup. 257 E fol. Heind. objects that an accurate writer would have used *συγγράμματα* rather than *σύγγραμμα*, and therefore, with Ast and Schleierm., condemns *νόμους τιθείς* as a gloss. On the other hand, an elegant writer would hardly have put *γράφων* so soon after *γράψει*, as Plato would have done if *νόμους τιθείς* had not intervened. ‘In his capacity of lawgiver, the statesman is in effect an author,’ would be our modern way of expressing the meaning of the passage. So Stallb., “Indem er Gesetze gebend eine Staatschrift

verfasst.”

E. ὕπαρ τε καὶ ὄναρ] ‘waking or sleeping,’ i. e. under all circumstances or conditions of mind. ‘To have no knowledge, clear or confused, of justice and injustice, &c., cannot but be a reproach to a writer, though the multitude with one voice applaud such ignorance.’ Philib. 65 E, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὐτ’ ὕπαρ οὐτ’ ὄναρ αἰσχρὸν οὐτ’ εἶδεν οὐτ’ ἐπενόησεν.

ὡς οἱ ῥαψωδοῦμενοι] ‘as the speeches recited by rhapsodes have been spoken with a view to persuasion, and without any attempt at questioning or teaching.’ See below 278 C, καὶ Ὅμηρος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ποίησιν ψιλὴν . . . συντέθεικε, whence it follows that οἱ ῥαψωδοῦμενοι (λόγοι) is to be understood literally, and not as Stallb. and Heind. suppose, of the declamations of sophists. ἀνάκρισις is met with in non-technical sense in Charm. ad fin., βιάσει ἄρα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ οὐδ’ ἀνάκρισιν μοι δώσεις; where, as here, the reference is to Socrates’ interrogatory method. There is therefore no occasion for Heind.’s conj. ἀνεὺ κρίσεως. For ὡς οἱ Schleierm. conj. ὕσοι.

ὑπόμνησιν γεγονέναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις καὶ μαθήσεως χάριν λεγομένοις καὶ τῷ ὄντι γραφομένοις ἐν ψυχῇ περὶ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, ἐν μόνοις τό τε ἐναργὲς εἶναι καὶ τέλεον καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς· δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιοῦτους λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἷον νίεις γνησίους εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἐὰν εὐρεθεὶς ἐνῇ, ἔπειτα εἴ τις τούτου ἔκγονοί τε καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἅμα ἐν ἄλλαισιν ἄλλων ψυχαῖς κατ' ἀξίαν ἐνέφυσαν· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους χαίρειν ἑῶν—οὗτος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ κινδυνεύει, ὃ Φαῖδρε, εἶναι οἷον ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ εὐξαίμεθ' ἂν σέ τε καὶ ἐμὲ γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε βούλομαί τε καὶ εὐχομαι ἃ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οὖν ἤδη πεπαίσθω μετρίως ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ λόγων· καὶ σύ τε ἐλθὼν φράζε Λυσία, ὅτι νῶ καταβάντε εἰς τὸ Νυμφῶν νᾶμά τε καὶ μουσεῖον ἠκούσαμεν λόγων, οἱ ἐπέστελλον λέγειν Λυσία τε καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος συντίθῃσι λόγους, καὶ Ὀμήρῳ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὖ ποιήσιν ψιλὴν ἣ ἐν ᾧδῇ συντέθεικε, τρίτον δὲ Σόλωνι καὶ ὅστις ἐν

278. ἐν μόνοις] We must either read with Heind. ἐν μόνοις τούτοις, or eject ἐν, with Hirsch. and Stallb. The former expedient seems to me preferable.

ἐὰν εὐρεθεὶς ἐνῇ] Not equiv. to εὐρεθῇ ἐνῶν, but rather to ἐὰν ὁ ἐνῶν λόγος ὑφ' αὐτοῦ εὐρεθῇ—the word within, if it have been discovered by himself, or, as it were, self-sown, and not transplanted from some other mind.

β. ἄλλαισιν] This Ionic or rather old Attic form is freq. in Plato. See instances, p. 240 B, note. On this archaism see Bentley, Dissert. on Phalaris, § xiii. (vol. ii. p. 6, Dyce).

οὗτος δέ] Some MSS. give δῆ, but see above, p. 272 A.

εἰς τὸ Νυμφῶν νᾶμά τε καὶ μουσεῖον] Alluding to the recess on the banks of the Ilissus, described in the opening scene of the dialogue, which was sacred to Pan and the Nymphs, and decorated with images inserted in niches carved on the rocks. Strictly speaking this was a Παναῖον or Νυμφαῖον, Pan and the Nymphs being inseparable in such localities. But the Musae Ilissides, to whom an elegant temple was dedicated

on the opposite side of the stream, were in fact river-nymphs. See Servius ad Virg. Ecl. vii. 21. "*Nymphae, noster amor, Libethrides*: Libethros fons est ubi coluntur Musae, et sic ait *Libethrides*, ac si diceret *Hippocrenides* a fonte Hippocrene, ut autem poetae invocent Nymphas, sicut hoc loco: etiam in fine (Ecl. x. 1), *Extremum hunc, Arethusa, mihi concede laborem*; haec ratio est, quod secundum Varronem ipsae sint Nymphae quae et Musae, nam et in aqua consistere dicuntur, quae de fontibus manant," &c. Aristides Rhet. ii. p. 708, Dind., ἀνεμνήσκωμεν δὲ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅτι Νύμφας καὶ Μούσας ἀεὶ πως συνάγουσιν. So also Hesych., Νύμφαι Μούσαι θεαί. It is curious that there is no trace of this connexion in Homer; from which however we are not to infer that it was a later invention. See Wele. Gr. Götterlehre, i. 705. By νᾶμα is meant, not the Ilissus, but the fountain μάλα ψυχροῦ ὕδατος described 230 B, which flowed into the stream.

c. ποιήσιν ψιλὴν ἣ ἐν ᾧδῃ] This distinction is explained by Legg. 669 D, which the comm. quote: ταῦτα γὰρ

πολιτικοῖς λόγοις νόμους ὀνομάζων συγγράμματα ἔγραψεν· εἰ μὲν εἰδὼς ἢ τάληθές ἔχει συνέθηκε ταῦτα, καὶ ἔχων βοηθεῖν, εἰς ἔλεγχον ἰὼν περὶ ὧν ἔγραψε, καὶ λέγων αὐτὸς δυνατὸς τὰ γεγραμμένα φαῦλα ἀποδείξαι, οὗ τι τῶνδε
 1) ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχοντα δεῖ λέγεσθαι τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐφ' οἷς ἐσπούδακεν ἐκείνων.

ΦΑΙ. Τίνας οὖν τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῷ νέμεις ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν σοφόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλεῖν ἔμοιγε μέγα

δρῶσι πάντα κυκλόμενα καὶ ἔτι διασπῶσιν οἱ ποιηταί, ῥυθμὸν μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλους χωρὶς, λόγους ψιλοὺς εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες, μέλος δ' αὖ καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ἀνευ ῥημάτων, ψιλῇ καθαρίσει τε καὶ αὐλήσει προσχρῶμενοι : whence it appears that the dialogue of tragedy would be ranked as *ποίησις ψιλῇ*. In the passage of the *Laws* Plato seems to regret the divorce between poetry and music, as a sign of declining Art.

ὅς τις ἐν πολιτικοῖς λόγοις] 'whoever, under the form of political discourses, which he names laws, has composed written treatises,' and so committed himself to an act of authorship. Schleierm.'s *συλλόγους* for *λόγοις* is plausible, but needless.

λέγων αὐτὸς δυνατὸς — φαῦλα ἀποδείξαι] 'able, by his own *viva voce* efforts, to demonstrate the inferiority of written speech to oral.' Previously (277 E) one condition of a first-rate (i. e. a philosophical) writer was stated to be a disposition to disparage writing : καὶ οὐδένα πάποτε λόγων μεγάλῃς ἄξιον σπουδῆς γραφῆναι. The meaning is not that the philosopher will give a formal proof of the inferiority of writing, but that, by the skill with which he conducts a *viva voce* inquiry, he will leave that impression on the minds of his hearers. Stallb. quotes in illustration of this use of ἀποδείξαι, *Phaed.* 72 C : τελευτῶντα πάντα λήρον τὸν Ἐνδυμῖωνα ἀποδείξειεν.

οὗ τι τῶνδε — ἀλλ' ἐφ' οἷς ἐσπούδακεν ἐκείνων] He who fulfils the conditions last enumerated, who employs no terms which he is not prepared to define, and makes no statements which he cannot defend, &c., must not on any account receive a designation proper to any of the above-named pursuits, but must be named after those which form the serious business of his life. In other words, he is not to be classed as *λόγων συγγραφεὺς* with Lysias, as *ποιητῆς* with Homer, or

as *νομογράφος* with Solon, but with the sincere investigators of truth as a Philosopher. The former names may serve for the author who has nothing in him greater or more glorious than the phrases which he has put on paper, or delivered in the form of a set speech, whatever pains he may have taken in the arrangement and combination of the parts.

D. Τὸ μὲν σοφόν — θεῶ μόνῳ πρέπει] The comm. quote Parmen. 134 C, οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην. The terms *φιλόσοφος* and *φιλοσοφία* are traditionally said to have been invented by Pythagoras (*Cic. Tusc. Qu. V. 3*). At what time they came into general use in Athens may be a question. Probably, however, not before the time of Socrates, from whom Isocrates may have conceived the idea of appropriating them, as he frequently does, to himself and his occupation. Of the comic poets *Aristophanes* is the first who uses *φιλόσοφος*, but in a late play, the *Ecclesiazusae* * (*v. 571*). A passage in *Aristides, Rhet. ii. 407*, Dind., is illustrative of the history of the word, and indirectly of the passage before us. He protests against the restriction of the term to any particular class or sect of thinkers or writers, maintaining that in the best times *φιλοσοφία* meant *φιλοκαλία τις καὶ διατριβὴ περὶ λόγους*, καὶ οὐχ ὁ νῦν τρόπος οὗτος, ἀλλὰ παιδεία κοινῶς. This general sense, he says, is attested by "Demosthenes and thousands of others," including Plato himself, who uses the term both in its popular and its restricted acceptation. The same passage reviews the history of the word *σοφιστής*, which in the days of

* Where, however, W. Dindorf proposes *φιλοδῆμον*, *metri causa*. Meineke adheres to the received reading, which is much more suitable to the context.

εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ θεῷ μόνῳ πρέπειν· τὸ δὲ ἢ φιλόσοφον ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι μᾶλλον τε ἂν αὐτῷ ἀρμόττοι καὶ ἐμμελεστέως ἔχοι.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄπο τρόπου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα τιμιώτερα ὦν συνέθηκεν ἢ ἔγραψεν ἄνω κάτω στρέφων ἐν χρόνῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν, ἐν δίκη που ποιητὴν ἢ ἑλλόγων συγγραφέα ἢ νομογράφον προσερέῃς ;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μὴν ;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν τῷ ἐταίρῳ φράζε.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δὲ σύ ; πῶς ποιήσεις ; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸν σὸν ἐταῖρον δεῖ παρελθεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τίνα τοῦτον ;

ΦΑΙ. Ἴσοκράτη τὸν καλόν. ὦ τί ἀπαγγελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες ; τίν' αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι ;

ΣΩ. Νέος ἔτι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, Ἴσοκράτης· ὁ μέντοι μαντεύομαι | κατ' αὐτοῦ, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

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the Empire had lost much of its invidious meaning. Lysias, we are told, called not only Aeschines Socraticus, but Plato himself, a Sophist (possibly in his speech against the former, of which we have a short but curious fragment). Isocrates, too, not only calls the Eristics (τοὺς περὶ τὴν ἔριν) Sophists, but those too who would have called themselves dialecticians. Plato, says Aristides, τὸν σοφιστὴν δοκεῖ μὲν πῶς κακίζειν αἰεὶ, καὶ ὃ γε δὴ μάλιστα ἐπαναστὰς τῷ ὀνόματι Πλάτων εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ. "The cause of this was his contempt for the vulgar, and for his own contemporaries generally." Yet even Plato, he says, on one occasion could use this invidious name as a title of honour, "when he called the God of all wisdom and truth a τέλειος σοφιστής." The plain truth seems to be, that when σοφιστής had become a term of reproach, φιλόσοφος or some equivalent became indispensable. 'Philosopher' was then, as it has remained to this day, a prized and honoured name, and no sect or profession, literary or scientific, willingly renounced the pretension to wear it. The subsequent recognition of the superior claim of the speculative sects was owing partly to the imposing character and vast ability of Plato and Aristotle; partly also to

the extinction of political life, which impaired the value of rhetoric in public estimation.

ἐν δίκη] So Bekk., though the Bodl. and others give δίκη without the preposition. But it is doubtful whether δίκη alone can have the force of the Lat. 'jure,' and the prep. may easily have been absorbed by the preceding word.

Ι. Ἴσοκράτη τὸν καλόν] The epithet in cases like the present does not imply personal beauty: Epist. ii. 314 c, Σωκράτους νέου καὶ καλοῦ γεγονότος. Nor youth: Athen. 505 E, ἡκεῖ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς τε καὶ χρυσοῦς Γοργίας—where Plato is the supposed speaker. In the instances quoted by Heind., on Hipp. i. init., it is applied to a variety of persons—Philebus, Callias, Euthydemus, Critias—who seem to have had nothing in common but the taste for letters or philosophy. 'Gentle' or 'accomplished' would convey something like the same associations. The reading Ἴσοκράτη is in the Bodl. and other first-rate codd. Vulg. Ἴσοκράτην. So Ἴπποκράτη, Protag. 328 D.

Νέος ἔτι] Isocr. was six or seven years older than Plato, hence thirty-five or thirty-six at the death of Socr. (B.C.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δῆ;

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἀμείνων ἢ κατὰ τοὺς περὶ Λυσίαν εἶναι λόγους τὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἔτι τε ἤθει γεννικωτέρῳ κεκρᾶσθαι ὥστε οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο θαυμαστὸν προΐουσης τῆς ἡλικίας εἰ περὶ αὐτοὺς τε τοὺς λόγους, οἷς νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ, πλέον ἢ παίδων διενέγκοι τῶν πώποτε ἀψαμένων λόγων, εἴτε εἰ αὐτῷ μὴ ἀποχρήσαι ταῦτα, ἐπὶ μείζω [δέ] τις αὐτὸν ἄγοι ὁρμὴ θειότερα. φύσει γάρ, ὦ φίλε, ἔνεστί τις φιλοσοφία τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ. ταῦτα δῆ

399). The dramatic or fictitious date of the Phaedr. falls after the return of Lysias from Thurii (B.C. 411); and we may therefore suppose Isocr. to be under thirty when the remark is supposed to be made. He was two and twenty years the junior of Lysias.—This entire passage is translated by Cicero in the Orator, xiii. 41: Est enim quasi in extrema pagina Phaedri his ipsis verbis loquens Socrates: "Adolescens etiam nunc, o Phaedre, Isocrates est, sed quid de illo augurer, lubet dicere. Quid tandem?" inquit ille. "Majore aetate ingenio videtur esse quam ut cum orationibus Lysiae comparetur. Praeterea ad virtutem major indoles: ut minime mirum futurum sit, si, quum aetate processerit, aut in hoc orationum genere cui nunc studet, tantum, quantum pueris, reliquis praestet omnibus, qui unquam orationes attigerunt: aut (εἴτε), si contentus his non fuerit, divino aliquo animi motu majora concupiscat. Inest enim natura philosophia in hujus viri mente quaedam." Haec de adolescente Socrates auguratur. At ea de seniore scribit Plato, et scribit aequalis, et quidem, exagitator omnium rhetorum, hunc miratur unum. Me autem, qui Isocratem non diligunt, una cum Socrate et cum Platone errare patiantur.

279. ἔτι τε ἤθει γεννικωτέρῳ κεκρᾶσθαι] The phraseology is borrowed from the medical writers and their doctrine of temperament. "The elements were kindlier mixed" in Isocr. than in Lysias. Comp. Epist. vii. 326 c, οὐχ οὕτω θαυμαστῇ φύσει κραθήσεται, where φύσις, as in the clause preceding this passage, refers to intellectual endowments, not moral (ἤθει). Legg. xi. 930 A, εἰκὸς εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους μὴ πράσιν ἤθεσι κεκραμένους.

πλέον ἢ παίδων διενέγκοι] Epist. vii.

326 c, προσήκει πλέον ἢ παίδων τῶν ἁλ-
λων ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν.

ἔτι τε εἰ αὐτῷ μὴ ἀποχρήσαι] Vulg. ἔτι τε. I have restored to the text the reading of the Bodl. and first Vatican, supported by several other codd. of note, and by Cicero, l. l., who omits in his version the δὲ of the following clause. This omission is not noticed by Spengel, who was the first to call attention to the importance of the variant adopted in the text. (See Appendix II.) Socrates would not be surprised if Isocrates should either, as a speech-writer, distance all his rivals in that profession, or should be dissatisfied with this his present employment, and borne by a diviner impulse to higher things. Herm., μὴ ἀποχρήσαι ταῦτα, τοιτέστι, τὸ λογογραφεῖν, ἀλλὰ τραπηθείη κατ' εὐμοίριαν τινὰ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν. In other words, two courses were before him: that of persevering in his present employment, in which case Soer. augurs that he will throw all other logographers into the shade; secondly, that of abandoning the rhetorical and adopting the philosophic profession. Isocr., as we know, chose the former alternative. If the Vulgate reading ἔτι δὲ be retained, the meaning will rather be, that Isocr. will add to his eminence in the λόγοι οἷς νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ some further accomplishments of a higher kind; that without ceasing to be a λογογράφος, he will infuse into his rhetorical exercises an element of philosophic speculation. A favourable critic might say that the prediction, thus understood, was verified in his practice. But it is difficult to believe that the shreds of philosophy with which Isocr. garnishes his orations would have excited the admiration of Plato; and the less so, as the rhetorician omits no opportunity of disparaging that very science of dia-

οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν παρὰ τῶνδε τῶν θεῶν ὡς ἐμοῖς παιδικοῖς
'Ισοκράτει ἐξαγγέλλω, σὺ δ' ἐκείνα ὡς σοῖς Λυσία.

ΦΑΙ. Ταῦτα ἔσται. ἀλλὰ ἴωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πνίγος
ἡπιώτερον γέγονεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εὐξαμένῳ πρέπει τοῖσδε πορεύεσθαι;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί, δοίητέ
μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι τάνδοθεν· ἔξωθεν δ' ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς
ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια. πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν. ^{scilicet}
τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλήθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε
ἀγειν δύναιτ' ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σάφρων.

*Ετι ἄλλου τοῦ δεόμεθα, ὦ Φαῖδρε; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ
μετρίως ἡῖκται.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτα συνεύχου· κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν
φίλων.

ΣΩ. ἴωμεν.

lectic, which it is the object of the
Phaedr. to exalt above all others.

B. τοῖσδε] Of course to the θεοὶ and
δαίμονες ἐντόπιοι (262 D), to Pan, Ache-
lous, and the Ilissian Muses or Nymphs,
whose ἀγάλματα are mentioned in the
opening scene, p. 230 B.

δοίητέ μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι τάνδοθεν]
Soer. prays—(1) that he may be 'made
beautiful in the inward parts;' (2) that
such outward advantages as he possesses
may not interfere with his soul's health;
(3) that he may count the wise wealthy;
and (lastly) that the amount of gold at
his disposal may be such as the tem-
perate man, and he only, can 'bear and
carry.' The last clause of the prayer is
ambiguous, for the temperate man, the
man of well-regulated mind, can 'bear
and carry' more gold than another with-
out injury to his moral being: he can
also dispense with money and money's
worth better than others. And this am-
biguity seems intentional, implying that
Socrates neither prays for wealth with
the worldling, nor deprecates it with the
Cynic. Both the sentiment and lan-
guage of this petition derive illustration
from a fine passage of the Critias, where,
in describing the spirit and temper of
the citizens of his Atlantis, Plato says,
διὸ πάλιν ἡμεῖς πάντα ὑπερρωπῶντες αἰμαρὰ
ἡγοῦντο τὰ παρόντα, καὶ βραδίως ἔφερον
οἶον ἄχθος τὸν τοῦ χρυσοῦ τε καὶ

τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων ὄγκον, ἀλλ'
οὐ μεθύοντες ὑπὸ τρυφῆς διὰ πλοῦτον
ἀκράτορες αὐτῶν ὄντες ἐσφάλλοντο (p.
120 E). The Commentators seem to me
to mistake Plato's drift, when they quote
as in point the speech of Antisthenes in
Xenophon's Banquet iv. 34. The Cynic
thinks τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ
τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν πενίαν ἔχειν ἀλλ' ἐν
ταῖς ψυχαῖς, and so far agrees with Soer.
in the text; but the remainder of his
speech is an ἐγκώμιον πενίας going far
beyond the moderate views of Plato.
Of the phrase ἀγειν καὶ φέρειν used sensu
bono, as they say, Heind. gives one
other instance from Plato, Legg. 817 A:
ἐάν τινες (τῶν περὶ τραγῳδίαν ποιητῶν)
ἐπανερωτήσωσιν οὕτως πῶς ὦ ξένοι,
πότερον φοιτῶμεν ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν πόλιν τε
καὶ χώραν ἢ μή; καὶ τὴν ποίησιν φέρωμέν
τε καὶ ἄγωμεν; i. e. 'may we have free
ingress and egress with our poetical
wares?' But in this passage of the
Phaedr. it is rather equiv. to 'manage,'
'administer,' as in Plutarch, de Frat.
Amore, 486 E: ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἀγει καὶ φέρει
πάντα, καὶ θαυμάζεται καὶ θεραπεύεται·
σοὶ δὲ οὐδεὶς πρόσσεισιν. Both senses
are to be distinguished from the much
more familiar usage of ἀγειν καὶ φέρειν
in the sense of 'plundering' or 'harry-
ing' an enemy's country, or 'sacking' a
captured town.

APPENDIX I.

ON THE EROTIC DISCOURSES OF SOCRATES.

THE FIRST DISCOURSE OF SOCRATES.

OF the two speeches put into the mouth of Socrates in this dialogue, the first is a homily on the evil effects and inherent baseness of the practice of *παιδεραστία* as it was understood by Lysias and followed by the Athenians of his day. The arguments adduced by Lysias had all been founded on considerations of expediency: the *ἐρώμενος* would gain more in fortune and lose less in reputation by complying with the entreaties of a suitor who had no real affection for him than he would by yielding to a truly impassioned admirer: he is advised, in short, to consent to dishonour for the sake of worldly advantage. Socrates artfully suppresses his indignation on hearing sentiments so cynical and immoral, pretending to have paid attention only to the style and arrangement (*τὸ ῥητορικόν*) of the discourse, without heeding its subject-matter. His own counter-speech is confined to establishing the first of Lysias's topics, "that it is not good to show favour to a suitor who is in love." His arguments, like those of his predecessor, professedly appeal to self-interest, but to a self-interest more enlightened comprehensive and far-sighted. The vulgar *ἐραστής* is, he insists, of all companions the most disagreeable and the most pernicious. By yielding to his importunities the *ἐρώμενος* will deliver himself body and soul into the power of a jealous and capricious, a selfish and brutal tyrant: he will surrender all he holds most dear without an equivalent either of pleasure or profit. The pleasure, such as it is, will be reaped by the *ἐραστής* alone, while the consequences to the *ἐρώμενος* will be the probable wreck of his worldly prospects and bodily health, and the certain deterioration of his mental culture, "the thing which is of all most precious in the eyes

of gods and men," 241 c. Incidentally, and as if unintentionally, Socrates paints in the blackest and we may add the truest colours that passion which was the bane of Athenian society. In Athens the list of "things, of which it is a shame even to speak," was briefer than with us; and Socrates would have been untrue to his calling had he been deterred by prudery or fastidiousness from approaching a subject of which poets sang, men of letters wrote, and fine gentlemen in their "noctes coenaeque deum" delighted to reason. The sanctity of Socrates is not the less to be acknowledged, because unalloyed with sanctimoniousness: and those who are inclined to be sceptical as to the unblemished purity of his sentiments and teaching upon this to us offensive subject, ought to have their doubts dispelled when they find the literal and not over-retained Xenophon uniting his testimony with that of Plato. Xenophon was under no temptation to represent his master as a loftier thinker or purer moralist than he really was: if his picture of Socrates is unfaithful it is either because he purposely throws into the shade the more unpopular of his characteristics—those qualities in fact which stood in the most marked contrast to the maxims and usages of his time and country: or because he occasionally sacrifices general effect to accuracy of detail. It is the more satisfactory that in the discourse on Love, put into the mouth of Socrates in Xenophon's Banquet¹, we find arguments which so strikingly resemble those in the speech under our review, as to make it very probable that in both we have the actual sentiments of Socrates represented—we may even say reproduced—by his rival disciples. From both we rise with the feelings expressed by the

¹ c. viii. There is this difference between the two speeches that Plato's is addressed to the ἐρώμενος, Xenophon's to Callias, who was in the condition of an ἐραστής. But allowing for this, the train of reasoning is substantially the same, and the resemblance in certain passages striking. Compare, for instance, the following:—

Xen. § 21, οὐ μὴν ὅτι γε ὥραϊος ἄνθρωπος ὅτι γε καλὸς οὐκέτι καλῶ καὶ ἐρῶντι οὕτω ἔρῶν ἡμελεῖ, φιλήσει αὐτόν.

§ 23, ἀεὶ γάρ τοι προσαιτῶν καὶ προσαιόμενος ἢ φιλήματος ἢ ἕλλου τινὸς ἀνελυφύμετος παρακολουθεῖ.

§ 33, ὅτι ἀνεὺ φιλίας συνουσία οὐδεμία ἀξιόλογος πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα . . . τῶν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμούντων πολλοὶ μισοῦσι τὸν ἐρώμενον . . . καὶ μὴν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ σώματος χρήσει ἔνεστί τις κόρος, ὥστε ἅπερ καὶ πρὸς τὰ σίτια διὰ πλησιονῆν ταῦτα ἀνάγκη καὶ πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ πείσσειν.

Plato, 240 c, νεωτέρῳ γὰρ πρεσβύτερος συνών, κ.τ.λ. Ib. D. ὁρῶντι μὲν ὅψιν πρεσβυτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὥρᾳ.

Ib., ὁρῶντι ἀκούοντι ἀπτομένῳ καὶ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν αἰσθανομένῳ τοῦ ἐρωμένου, ὥστε μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀραρότως αὐτῶ ὑπηρετεῖν.

241 c, ταῦτά τε οὖν χρή, ᾧ παῖ, ξυννοεῖν καὶ εἰδέναι τὴν ἐραστοῦ φιλίαν, ὅτι οὐ μετ' εὐνοίας γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ σιτίου τρόπον χάριν πλησμονῆς, . . ὥς λύκοι ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ' ὥς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί.

Lyeon of Xenophon (c. 9. 1), *νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ὃ Σώκρατες, καλὸς τε κάγαθός δοκεῖς μοι ἀνθρώπος εἶναι.*

Concerning this first discourse of Socrates, we may further observe, that it is accompanied with a brief prefatory exposition of the Passion of Love. This preface, it must be allowed, does not either in matter or manner harmonize with the impressive exhortation which follows it. This Plato seems to have felt, for he has separated the preface from the main body of the discourse by a dramatic interlude. Its purpose is, however, clear. Plato meant to intimate that the *ἔρως* of which the first discourse treats is the son not of Venus Urania, but rather of Venus Pandemus². It is an appetite for pleasure combined with a sensibility to beauty just sufficient to create a personal preference, but insufficient to elevate or purify the compound emotion of which it is an ingredient. Itself feeble, the Love of Beauty derives its strength and fire from its baser but more powerful companion. It is when the delight in beauty is thus alloyed with appetite and strengthened by the alloy, that to the irresistible passion resulting from the combination the name of Love is ordinarily assigned. This is probably the meaning of the very obscure etymological definition of *ἔρως* which concludes the prefatory exposition referred to (p. 238 c).

We have seen that Socrates in this speech confines himself to one of the two topics handled by Lysias. He proves convincingly *ὅτι οὐ χρὴ τῷ ἐρῶντι χαρίζεσθαι*; but he omits to show *ὅτι χρὴ χαρίζεσθαι τῷ μὴ ἐρῶντι*. His motives for this omission are to us obvious, but it is not his way to explain his true motives. Accordingly he affects an exceeding horror at his own impiety, and deep contrition for the wrong he has done to one of the Immortals. "Is not Eros," he exclaims, "a god and a son of Aphrodite?" "So we are told," replies Phaedrus. "Lysias does not tell us so, nor does that discourse which fell indeed from my lips, but represents your views of the nature of Eros rather than my own, for you bewitched me, and I spoke under a spell." In other words, your views of Love and those of Lysias are unworthy and ignoble: there is another and purer passion of which you reck not, a passion alone entitled to the sacred name which you abuse³.

² Compare Xen. *Symp.* c. viii. §§ 9, 10.

³ This passage conveys a bitter reflection upon the *ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι* of Lysias, and perhaps upon other popular compositions of the day. Whether it is fair to read in it a sweeping condemnation of the so-called sophists is another matter. So far as we know, Lysias was the first to commit to writing discourses of this description, and it is an injustice to Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias to make them accomplices in the offence. That the speech of Lysias is in a very legitimate sense of the word *sophistical* we may freely grant: but that Plato produces it as a specimen of

This sudden outburst of pious remorse will surprise no one who has studied either the Socrates of Plato or the Socrates of Xenophon. Though something of irony is mixed with it, it is not wholly ironical. Socrates never affected to have shaken off the religious prejudices of his time and country: he even added to them some private fancies of his own. Though the *δαιμόνιον*, the voice or inward monitor of which he often speaks, was not, as later and particularly Christian writers have assumed, a natal Genius or familiar Demon, he doubtless supposed it to come from some external and supernatural source. And as regards the god Eros in particular, he repeatedly avows himself his servant and votary. On this point his language is so strong as to have laid him open to grave misapprehensions on the part of his contemporaries. In Xenophon's *Banquet* he calls himself a *θιασώτης* of Eros⁴, an adept in all Love's mysteries, and declares that he cannot remember the time at which he was not in love with some one or other—*οὐκ ἔχω χρόνον εἰπεῖν ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔρῶν τινος διατελῶ*. In the *Theages* again he tells us that the only science he is thoroughly acquainted with is the Erotic⁵ (*σμικροῦ τινος μαθήματος*)—"a poor thing, but his own." Neither must we forget the eloquent peroration of his speech in Plato's *Symposium*⁶—*καὶ αὐτὸς τιμῶ τὰ ἐρωτικά, καὶ διαφερόντως ἀσκῶ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρακελεύομαι, καὶ νῦν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ἐγκοιμιάζω τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἀνδρείαν τοῦ Ἐρωτος καθ' ὅσον οἶός τ' εἰμί*. In the same dialogue he names Alcibiades as the object of his then ruling passion. We know how Alcibiades had misunderstood him, and how he had been undeceived. No one now-a-days puts so gross a meaning upon the words of Socrates, but there is another misconception against which we shall do well to guard. The *ἔρως* of Socrates is not that mystical emotion which Plato paints in the highly imaginative mythical discourse which we shall presently consider. If less exalted and poetical, it was more unequivocally pure. It was not the beauty of Alcibiades, but his splendid mental endowments, his great capacity for good or for evil, which excited the admiration and the solicitude of Socrates. *Οἱ εὐεργετοῦντες μᾶλλον φιλοῦσι τῶν εὐεργετουμένων* is the deep and true remark of Aristotle; and it was the memory of what he had done and suffered for his brilliant but erring friend which warmed the heart of Socrates towards Alcibiades, and prompted him to ever greater efforts in his behalf. This affection was not diminished by

the general teaching of those whom he would have styled Sophists, is an assumption which none but loose or prejudiced thinkers will be disposed to make. The bearing of this last observation will be intelligible to those who have been in the habit of reading their Plato by the light of Stallbaum's notes.

⁴ Xen. Conv. viii. 2.

⁵ p. 128.

⁶ p. 212 B.

the grievous faults in the character of its object, and would have remained equally strong had Alcibiades been as ugly as a Satyr; as indeed Theaetetus, another of his *ἐρώμενοι*, seems to have been⁷. For an attachment like this, *φιλία* seemed and was too cold a word. Socrates could find no other name for it than *ἔρως*, and he represents himself as the *ἐραστής* of Alcibiades accordingly. In like manner, Euripides does not scruple to denote by the same terms the passionate love of a son for a tender and noble mother—

*ἐρᾶτε μητρὸς παῖδες, οὐ γὰρ ἔστ' ἔρως
τοιούτου ἄλλος ὅστις ἡδίων ἐρᾷν*⁸.

That Socrates was to this extent serious in professing himself the votary of Eros there can be little doubt. But with this seriousness was mixed in large measure that humorous affectation of qualities the opposite of his own which the Greeks knew as the *εἰρωνεία* of Socrates. Intellectually the acutest man of his age, he represents himself in all companies as the dullest person present. Morally the purest, he affects to be the slave of passion, and borrows the language of gallantry to describe a benevolence too exalted for the comprehension of his contemporaries. He is by turns an *ἐραστής*, a *προαγωγός*, a *μαστροπός*⁹, a *μαιευτικός*¹, disguising the sanctity of his true vocation by names suggestive of vile or ridiculous images. The same spirit of whimsical paradox leads him, in Xenophon's Banquet², to argue that his own satyr-like visage was superior in beauty to that of the handsomest man present. That this irony was to some extent calculated is more than probable; it disarmed ridicule by anticipating it, it allayed jealousy and propitiated envy: and it possibly procured him admission into gay circles from which a more solemn teacher would have been excluded. But it had for its basis a real greatness of soul, a hearty and unaffected disregard of popular opinion, a perfect disinterestedness, an entire abnegation of self. He made himself a fool that others by his folly might be made wise: he humbled himself to the level of those among whom his work lay that he might raise some few among them to his own level: he was "all things to all men, if by any means he might win some." "Of you who are present," says Alcibiades in the Symposium³, "there is not one who understands Socrates: but I will unfold to you his true character. You all see or think you see that Socrates is a pas-

⁷ Theaet. 143 E. How austere his view of the duties of an *ἐραστής* we see from Lysis 210 E, *ταπεινούντα καὶ συστέλλοντα, κ.τ.λ.* He is to "minish and keep low" his *παιδικά*.

⁸ Erechth. 360.

⁹ Xen. Symp. iii. 10.

¹ Theaet. 161 E al.

² Cap. v.

³ p. 216 C, foll.

sionate admirer of beautiful persons, that he is ever in their company, and professes to be enslaved by their charms: again, his ignorance is boundless—he knows absolutely nothing. Yet all this is counterfeit: it is but the grotesque Silenus-mask which conceals the features of the god within: for if you remove the covering, how shall I describe to you, my friends and boon companions, the excellent virtue you will find within. I assure you that if a youth be ever so handsome, his beauty is nothing to Socrates: he looks upon it with a contempt you cannot fathom. So too if a man be rolling in wealth, or be remarkable for any other attribute which the vulgar admire and envy—all such advantages he counts as dross, and their possessors as mere cyphers. Thus does he spend his whole life dissembling and playing with the rest of mankind. Whether any of you have seen him in his serious mood, when he has thrown aside the mask and disclosed the divine features beneath it, is more than I know. But I have seen them, and I can tell you that they seemed to me glorious and marvellous and truly godlike in their beauty.”

This splendid *éloge*⁴, artfully put by Plato in the mouth of Alcibiades, doubtless represents the feelings with which Socrates was regarded by the philosopher himself. But his picture of Socrates as a man was more faithful than his picture of Socrates as a philosopher. Plato was not content, like Xenophon, with reproducing from memory or from written memoranda, the doctrines which actually fell from his master's lips. When Socrates died, the philosophical education of Plato had but completed its first stage. The acquaintance with other more ambitious systems which his travels enabled him to acquire or to perfect⁵, though it never disturbed his reverence for the teacher of his youth, greatly enlarged his views of philosophy and the philosophic calling: and as, in his earlier compositions, Socrates had ever been the *voûs τῆς διατριβῆς*⁶, the ruling and informing spirit of the dialogue, he continued in his later writings to credit his first master with all the results of thought and study with which his own researches or the conversation of others from time to time enriched him. The alternative course would have been to have spoken in his own person or in that of some other philosopher. And this he has occasionally done, as in the *Timæus*, where a Pythagorean, and in the *Sophistes* and *Politæus*, where an Eleatic Philosopher conducts the dialogue, to say nothing of his

⁴ I have ventured to call it so, in spite of the foolish and ill-natured remark of Theodoret, ἃ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ περὶ Σωκράτους ἔφη Πλάτων μὲν ἔγραψεν, ἐγὼ δὲ φειδοῦ τοῦ Σωκράτους εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἀνέξομαι. *De Virt. activ.* p. 174.

⁵ A locus classicus on this subject is *Cic. de Repub.* i. 10. 16.

⁶ The terms by which, as is well known, Plato denoted the young Aristotle.

latest work, the Laws, in which Plato himself appears in the thin disguise of a "Stranger from Athens." But these are exceptional instances; and in the majority of the works written during his maturity, Socrates occupies the same place of honour as in the more juvenile dialogues.

THE SECOND DISCOURSE OF SOCRATES.

This Discourse is a striking instance of the "*quidlibet audendi potestas*" which Plato assumed in his character of a philosophic artist. The doctrines it is intended to convey were specially and exclusively his own; they are not only non-Socratic, but they are precisely those in which the distinction between Platonism and pure Socraticism is to be looked for and indeed is affirmed by Aristotle to reside. The imagery under which those doctrines are conveyed is drawn from the most various sources, Eleatic, Pythagorean, Orphic: but the doctrines themselves are his own, and may be traced with sufficient distinctness through the many-coloured veil of their allegorical presentment⁷.

In endeavouring to analyze this speech, we should perhaps consult clearness by taking the philosophical before the mythical, the thing signified before the sign. The two are, however, so interwoven that it is no easy task to keep them entirely apart. It was Plato's design in this discourse to construct a psychological theory of the passion of Love: to analyze it into its constituent elements, and to refer each of such elements to that region of the human soul to which it rightfully belonged. In order to this, he presents us with a statement of the divine origin and antecedent as well as prospective existence of the soul: of its threefold nature, and of the relation *de jure* as well as *de facto* of the inferior to the higher faculties. Plato's Ethical theory is based upon Psychology, as indeed all sound Ethical science must be: it was therefore in his view impossible to consider Love in its moral until it had been viewed in its psychological aspect; and as it was not his way to isolate the various branches of philosophy, but rather to consider them in their vital connexion with each other and with their common root, we must not be surprised if we are presented at an early stage of the discourse with a concise exposition of the nature and true conception of the soul or vital principle. This investigation is prefaced by a discussion on Madness. It had been assumed in the former speeches that the Lover was mad. The position is granted, but that, it is

⁷ At a later stage of the discussion Plato represents Socrates as attributing the speeches he had uttered to the direct inspiration of the local deities, &c., καὶ ἑταίρε ὦ Φ. αἰτιῶμαι τοὺς ἐντοπίους θεούς, κ.τ.λ. 262 D.

urged, is no reason for slighting the Lover in comparison with his cool and sane rival. Madness is not *per se* an evil⁸. There is a madness of heavenly, as there is one of earthly origin: one which raises a man above, as well as one which sinks him below his normal self. There is a madness of the seer, a madness of the priest, a madness of the poet⁹, and from these three manifestations of madness have flowed the choicest blessings to mankind. Love too is an ecstasy, a sacred rapture, a madness inspired by heaven. Its origin is divine, its result the highest bliss¹. This, says Socrates, it will be our business to demonstrate, and our proof will be such as to satisfy the educated philosopher, however it may fail of convincing the disputer of the law courts or the wrangler of the schools². But a proof satisfactory to the philosopher must not rest on mere popular principles. Love being a condition of the Soul, we must first inquire what soul is, and what are its *ἔργα καὶ πάθη*, the functions, active and passive, of which it is capable.

In the theory of Love hereafter to be developed, the antecedent immortality of the Soul is postulated. This position accordingly Socrates begins the second part of his discourse by affirming. His reasoning is *σοφοῖς πιστή*, in other words it would have been accepted as satisfactory by minds trained in the loftier schools of Grecian speculation, as in that of Pythagoras, from which the technical terms employed seem to have come³. It is assumed, as self-evident, that soul or life is the first cause of all motion, matter its opposite being capable of receiving and propagating, but not of originating, motion. But if it is the first cause of motion, Soul moves itself, otherwise we must assume a cause of motion earlier than the first, which is a contradiction. Moreover, motion or activity being of the essence of Soul, it cannot cease to move without ceasing to be. And if it cease to be, the course of Nature must stand still. Neither, as *γένεσις* is a form of *κίνησις*, can Soul ever have come into being. It is *ἀγεννητὸν* as well as *ἀδιάφθορον*, antecedently as well as prospectively immortal. To sum up its definition (*οὐσία, λόγος*) in brief,

⁸ p. 244 A.

⁹ p. 245.

¹ *ἐπ' εὐτυχίᾳ τῇ μεγίστῃ παρὰ θεῶν ἢ τοιαύτῃ μακρὰ δίδονται.* 245 B.

² *δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή.* 245 C. The word *δεινός* is applied both to the *ρήτωρ* and the *εἰστικὸς σοφιστὴς*—and here perhaps includes both. It denotes cleverness without wisdom, talent without insight, acuteness without depth. *δεινός* is moreover a term perpetually applied by Plato to his opponents, philosophical or otherwise, and perhaps in this place is equivalent to the '*plebei philosophi*' of whom Cicero speaks in his well-known comment on this passage. Tusc. c. 23, *Licet concurrant plebei omnes philosophi, sic enim ii qui a Platone et Socrate et ab ea familia dissident appellandi videntur.*

³ *ἀεικλινάτος* is found in the fragments of Philolaus, who also defined the soul as an *αὐτοκλινάτος ἀριθμός*. It may be observed that the remains of this Philosopher's writings are accepted as genuine by most historians of philosophy, all the Pythagorean fragments besides his being either certainly or probably spurious.

Soul is an essence self-moved and self-moving, without beginning and without end of existence.

This argument, oracular in its tone and dogmatic in its method, is not, as Plato admits, sufficient of itself to convince the gainsayer and sceptic. It assumes, on the part of the reader, a familiarity with such dialectical investigations as we meet with, for instance, in the *Phædo*. To an audience thus prepared, the σοφοί of whom he speaks, this argument, he thinks, is convincing. We must therefore regard it as a résumé of principles and results, thrown into the form of an *à priori* demonstration, of which the premisses are assumed rather than proved. But with this allowance, there is nothing to which exception can fairly be taken. The brief authoritative tone is an echo of the earlier philosophers, such as Anaxagoras and the Pythagoreans, and the exordium is pitched in the same key as the sequel of the Discourse. In such compositions, which “fill up the intervals of severer investigation,” Plato himself tells us that analogy and probability (the εἰκότων μύθων ἰδέα⁴) are admissible: and if we interpret ψυχὴ to mean Soul in the abstract, the animating principle of the universe, most persons will assent both to the premisses and the conclusion of the argument.

But between the eternity of the animating principle and the individual immortality of the Souls of Gods and men, there is plainly a wide interval, which Plato cannot be said to have bridged over, at least in this Discourse. The steps that are wanting seem to be supplied in a passage of the *Laws*⁵, though after a fashion not satisfactory to the modern mind. From this curious passage, occurring in the gravest and most dogmatic of his works, we gather Plato's deliberate opinion⁶, that the rational soul by which the material universe is informed and governed is distributed into a number of distinct divine personalities, to each of which is assigned the government of some one or other of the heavenly bodies. Whether these divine or “angelic” souls are linked each to its own material body, or whether, unfettered by matter, they guide the stars in their orbits by the exercise of some marvellous powers transcending human analogy, is an alternative which the philosopher proposes without determining⁷. He seems however in this place of the *Laws*

⁴ Timæus 59 c.

⁵ Book x. 896 A, where the λόγος ψυχῆς is said to be, ἡ δυναμένη αὐτὴ αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν.

⁶ At least the opinion of his old age; for in the *Laws* the mythical matter of earlier dialogues is recast in a dogmatic form. Dialectic and Poetry seem to blend in Metaphysic, losing their vitality in the process. The Myths of Plato's mature life thus forms a transition from his early dialectical scepticism to the dogmatism of his declining years.

⁷ 899 A, ἡ τρίτον, αὐτὴ ψυχὴ σώματος οὐσα (ἡ ψυχὴ) ἔχουσα δὲ δυνάμεις ἄλλας τινὰς ὑπερβαλλούσας θάνατον παθηγεῖ.

to lean to the latter supposition, and what is more curious still, we find him attributing to unbodied Soul the possession of passions and feelings, to the exercise of which, from other parts of his writings, we should rather have inferred that he deemed a corporeal investiture indispensable².

However this be, the tripartition of the Soul into *νοῦς θυμὸς* and *ἐπιθυμία* which is lucidly set forth in the Republic, and is here figured by the charioteer and his pair of steeds—is predicated both of the Divine Spirits who lead, and of the as yet in one sense unbodied Souls who accompany them in the heavenly journey. Neither the created Gods, nor the souls formed in their image, are pure intelligences. Both are the subjects of analogous passions, both moved by anger and desire, by impulse and appetite, for by these terms the *θυμὸς* and *ἐπιθυμία*, figured by the two horses, may in their greatest generality be most aptly denoted. But as we gather from the mythical account of the Creation given in the *Timæus* (p. 30 foll.), the Gods were the handiwork of the supreme Artificer of the Universe, who delegated to these subordinate divinities the task of forming the inferior orders of the rational creation. To this end God, we are told, created a certain definite number of Souls or distinct personalities, which he "sowed" (*ἐσπείρε*) among the stars³, assigning to each soul its proper habitation. The God to whom each particular heavenly body belonged, attached these souls to perishable bodies, endued with organs of sense, and with limbs capable of moving in all directions through space. The souls of men and animals, it would seem, have all at one time animated a celestial body, which they are enabled to re-enter after the completion of a millennial cycle, and so to return *εἰς τὴν τοῦ συννόμου οἴκησιν ἄστρον*⁴.

The Platonic doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul is thus, we find, a doctrine of Metempsychosis, derived possibly from Oriental sources by Pythagoras, but at any rate reaching Plato through Pythagorean channels⁵. The personal identity is unaffected by the successive incarnations, but the personal consciousness is liable to a periodic eclipse, at any rate to serious obscurations in the passage of

² *Laws*, p. 897 A, where to Soul *before* it is linked to body, not only will, reflection, opinion, &c., are attributed, but also joy and sorrow, courage and fear, love and hate.

³ *Tim.* 42 D, *ἐσπείρε τοὺς μὲν εἰς Ἥλιον τοὺς δ' εἰς Σελήνην, τοὺς δ' εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα ὄργανα χρόνου.*

⁴ A notion this, it may be observed, very different from that of emanation and absorption, with which some interpreters are inclined to identify it.

⁵ This he intimates plainly enough, when he makes *Timæus*, a Pythagorean contemporary of Socrates, the mouthpiece of these doctrines. A like intimation is conveyed in the *Phædo*, by the introduction of the Pythagoreans Cebes and Simmias, of whom the former is mentioned in the *Epistles* as one of Plato's Italian intimates.

the soul from one tabernacle to another. The Gods of the Mythus are twelve in number : but Plato in the *Timæus* knows but of seven planets, the sun and moon included, for, as is well known, the earth was the centre of the planetary system in the eyes of most astronomers from Plato to Copernicus³. In explanation of the number twelve, a later Platonist⁴ supposes the heaven divided by twelve concentric spheres, the outermost being that of the fixed stars, ἡ ἀπλανὴς σφαῖρα, next to that the sphere or orbit of Saturn (*Cronos*), then those of Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury, the Sun and Moon, after these the sphere of Fire, of Air, of Water, and last of all the Earth, also ἀπλανὴς, though revolving, as Plato taught, upon her axis⁵. It is not impossible that he may have intended this twelve-fold distribution in the mythus before us, but as his purpose is not cosmical but moral, it was not worth his while to explain his meaning fully. It is however more than probable that by the οὐρανὸν ῥῶτον (247 c), towards which at fixed periods the heavenly procession moves, he meant the outer surface of the sphere in which the fixed stars (the *ἄστρα* proper) are situated, and in the fields of space above he has placed the eternal Ideas on which the Gods and the more favoured of their mortal attendants feed their gaze. This part of the tale must be taken as purely figurative. The ideas were in Plato's view exempt from all conditions of time and space. They are the objects of pure intelligence, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεαταὶ ῥῶ, "spiritual and spiritually discerned," and therefore stand in no relation to the fixed or any other stars. In truth, whatever may have been Plato's cosmical or astronomical theories, too much stress should not be laid upon the physical details, which belong, for the purposes of this mythus, entirely to the poetical investiture, the "machinery" of the tale. Nor are the discrepancies between this mythus and that in the *Timæus* (quoted above) of any real importance. Whether, for instance, we regard the number of the twelve Gods as denoting the number of the spheres, or as introduced in mere accommodation to popular belief, is of little moment. Nor are the names of such of the twelve as Plato condescends to name,—Jupiter, Apollo, Mars, Juno, and Vesta,—to be pressed into accordance with any statements, Pythagorean or otherwise, which we may elsewhere

³ The Pythagoreans made the earth a planet, as well as the sun, moon, &c., and conceived them all to revolve round a central fire, their *Hestia*.

⁴ Jambl. ap. Stallb. Proll. ad *Phædr.* p. lxx. ed. 2.

⁵ Tim. 40 B. γῆν δὲ τροφὴν μὲν ἡμετέραν, εἰλλομένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένην. Aristotle understood εἰλ. to mean revolving (κινουμένην). The later Platonists interpret σφιγγομένην, but this sense would have required the perfect participle. V. Arist. de Cælo, 2. 13, εἴλλεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι. Aristoph. Nub. 761, μὴ νῦν περὶ πάντων εἶλλε τὴν γνώμην ἀεὶ. *Hestia*, who in the *Phædræ* mythus μένει ἐν θεῶν οἴκῳ μόνῃ, will in this place represent the Earth.

meet with; for even in the *Timaeus*, a professedly physical work, Plato speaks lightly of the received nomenclature of Olympus⁶. The really important feature in the mythus, and that for the sake of which its gorgeous machinery was constructed, is the doctrine of the divine original and subsequent fall of the human soul. The souls which follow in the train of their respective liege lords are called in one place *δαίμονες*. They hold a subordinate rank in the heavenly hierarchy, being united to bodies of spiritual or ethereal substance, similar to those of the Gods themselves, but seemingly alloyed with baser matter⁷. The teams of the Gods obey the reins, and travel with equable and evenly poised motion (*ισορρόπως εἰήνια ὄντα πορεύεται*, 247 B): but those of the attendant spirits are thrown out of balance by the greater weight of the steed which "partakes of baseness" (*τῆς κακῆς μετέχει*). Hence their ranks are disordered, their cars collide, and their plumage is ruffled and broken, insomuch that, a few favoured spirits excepted, they fall from sphere to sphere, lighting finally on the earth and there entering for the first time into tabernacles of human flesh. All souls, on their first descent from the empyrean, are incarnated as men⁸, for all have had some glimpse of the eternal Ideas, and it is the prerogative of man to see the Idea as revealed in the objects of sense, the One in the Many—*διὰ πολλῶν ἰέναι αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον*, 249 B, a privilege of which the irrational part of creation is *ex vi termini* incapable. But the destinies of these fallen Souls vary, it seems, in a kind of compound proportion to the greatness and excellence of the heavenly Power in whose train they have followed, and to the clearer or more imperfect manifestations which have been afforded them of the supercelestial verities. Those who have been enrolled under Jove (Zeus), and with him have gained the upper surface of the sphered heavens, after their fall—a fall occasioned in their case partly by some fatal mishap (*συντυχία τινί*), and not wholly by the pravity of steed or driver—enter the body of some man of the highest, that is of *Jovial, temperament*⁹, and lead a life answerable to their glorious antecedents. They addict themselves to the pursuit of

⁶ *Tim.* p. 40 D. Compare A. Butler's *Lectures*, vol. ii. p. 23, note 13.

⁷ Even Aristotle thought that the heavenly bodies were composed of a substance purer and more divine than any one of the four elements—earth, water, air, or fire. This he denotes as the Fifth Substance or Essence, *πέμπτη οὐσία*, whence the Latin *quinta essentia* and our quintessence. It is not until their fall to our earth that the souls in this mythus are invested with an *earthly* body (*σῶμα γηγινὸν λαβοῦσαι*). Yet from the first there is some mixture of evil in their composition, and in the *Timaeus* we are told that their union with the "spiritual body" they receive even in their original abode is dissoluble: whereas the souls of the created Gods are *ἀλυστα θεοῦ γε θέλοντος*.

⁸ 248 C.

⁹ This follows from 252 B, *οἱ μὲν οὖν Διὸς Διόν τινα εἶναι ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ὀφ' αὐτῶν ἐρώμενον*, where the comm. refer to *Phileb.* 30 D.

Wisdom or of Beauty, or, finally, they indulge the passion for beautiful youths in a pure or philosophic spirit—*παιδεραστοῦσι μετὰ φιλοσοφίας*¹.

What then is this Platonic *παιδερασία*, as set forth in the *Phaedrus*? It has been said already that it is a passion less free from alloy than that *ἔρως* with which Socrates was inspired by the young men of genius with whom he associated in the course of his missionary labours. In the first place the Platonic *ἔρως* is excited by the aspect of corporeal beauty². All beauty of face or form³ is according to Plato a copy or reflection of that perfect or ideal beauty which the Soul beheld in the heavenly places before her incarceration in the flesh. Beauty it is true is not the only 'Idea' thus incarnate. Wisdom, and we may suppose Virtue and Good too, have each their appropriate material antitypes; and if the eye could see them, as it beholds the beauty of outward form, they would stir the soul with "throes of direst love"⁴. But as none of the bodily senses can vie in distinctness with that of sight, which brings the mind as it were face to face with its objects—and as of all the great archetypal forms Beauty is the only one which has access to the soul by this channel—we cannot wonder that warmer emotions are excited by it than by any other embodied Idea. It is the privilege of Beauty, says Plato, to be at once *ἐκφανέστατον* and *ἐρασμιώτατον*—most manifest and most lovable (250 D). The aspect of Beauty, however, works diversely on different natures. Those from whose souls, by lapse of time or contagion of the flesh, the memory of the glorious imagery they once beheld has faded, are stirred by no sacred awe at the aspect of beautiful forms, nor are they carried back in spirit⁵ as into the presence of the primal Beauty: they are flushed with brute desire, and not ashamed or afraid to abandon themselves to pleasures from which Nature revolts. Whereas the true *αὐτοπτής*, he in whose soul the memory of the unveiled images—more august than those which the Eleusinian hierophant discloses to the trembling mystae—still lives fresh and undimmed, is smitten with a sacred horror akin to that which he felt when face to face with the divine archetype: he worships its image here below, and

¹ 249 A compared with 248 D.

² ὅταν θεοειδὲς πρόσωπον ἴδῃ κάλλος εὖ μεμιμημένον, ἢ τινα σώματος ἰδέαν, 251 A.

³ He elsewhere adds 'of manners and of sciences,' *Symp.* 212 B.

⁴ δεινούς γὰρ ἦν παρίχεν ἔρωτας, κ.τ.λ., 250 D.

⁵ 250 B, οὐκ ὀξέως ἐνθ' ἑνὶ ἐκεῖσε φέρεται πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος . . . ὥστ' οὐ σέβεται προσορᾶν, ἀλλ' ἡδονὴν παραδοῦς . . . καὶ ὕβρει προσομιλῶν οὐ δέδοικεν οὐδ' αἰσχύνεται παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονὴν διώκων.

but that he fears to be counted mad, would offer sacrifice to the idol of his heart⁶.

In this passage and in the sequel we have no difficulty in discerning the two Loves, the *σκαῖος* and the *δεξιὸς ἔρως*, which, according to Plato, it is the chief merit of this Erotic Discourse to have set forth⁷. In both there is a sensuous element, which in lower natures gains the mastery and so gives character to the whole complex passion; whereas in those whose organization follows a higher type it is subdued or even absorbed by those emotions which are the natural allies of the reason. True Love is not therefore, according to Plato, a mere *φιλία* or friendly regard, warmed and heightened by congeniality of temper or pursuit; it is a passion which absorbs the whole complex nature of man, which carries him out of himself, causing him to spurn all restraints of convention or worldly expediency, to overleap every barrier, except those which his own reason and conscience erect, between his passion and its object. This, were that object other than is here supposed, would be a picture as philosophically true as it is vividly portrayed; in fact no philosopher has trodden this, the debatable ground of morality, with so firm a step before or since. No man can quarrel with Plato for refusing the name of *ἔρως* to any passion from which the physical element is excluded: the dark spot in his theory is the direction which that desire is supposed to take. But to have represented the other sex as the object of a refined and exalted passion is more than was to be expected from an Athenian of the fourth century before Christ. Even Plutarch, who elsewhere shows a juster feeling on these subjects, in his *Eroticus* speaks disdainfully of what he calls the Love of the *Gynaecoonitis*⁸. This perversity of sentiment has been traced partly to the institution of the Gymnasium, and partly to the semi-Oriental depression to which the female sex, at least in Athens and the Ionian States, was condemned. Such women as Aristophanes depicts were certainly ill-fitted to inspire a lofty or virtuous affection; and passion being thus forbidden to flow in the channels Nature had marked out, it became of necessity erratic and perverse. This state of manners and sentiments caused to Plato the deepest solicitude; and in the *Laws* he speaks in terms of unequivocal reprobation of the passion alluded to, while he places

⁶ πρῶτον μὲν ἔφριξε καὶ τι τῶν τότε ὑπῆλθεν αὐτὸν δειμάτων, εἴτα προσορῶν ὡς θεὸν σέβεται, κ.τ.λ. 251 A.

⁷ 265 D, 266 A.

⁸ *Plut. Erot.* 750 C, ἔρωτος ἀληθινοῦ οὐδὲν τῆς γυναικωνιτίδος μέτεστιν, οὐδ' ἐρᾶν ἔστιν. Ἐργὰ γὰρ φημι τοὺς γυναικῶν προσπειρανθότας ἢ παρθένους. *Ibid.*, ἔρως . . . εὐφυοῦς καὶ ὑπαλῆς ψυχῆς ἀφάρμενος εἰς ἀρετὴν διὰ φιλίας τελευτᾷ.

restraints on the commerce of opposite sexes far more stringent than any legislator before his time had thought practicable or even desirable⁹. It is satisfactory to find that, before the close of its course, so great a mind had thus run itself clear of taint¹. In the Republic,—the work of his mature, as the Laws was the offspring of his advanced age,—his views on these subjects are expressed with something of hesitation: and though it is clear in what direction his moral instincts pointed, in one place at least he makes concessions which we must lament to the popular sentiment of the day².

These remarks may serve to throw some light on the concluding portion of the Erotic Discourse³, that portion of it which stands most in need of apology⁴. But in judging of this passage we must not leave out of account a consideration which Plato himself suggests to us in other parts of the Dialogue. We have already seen that this entire Discourse is intended as a pattern of philosophical Rhetoric. Now, one condition of a true Rhetoric is, that it shall adapt its arguments to the character of the hearer: thus it shall know οἶος ὕφ' οἷων λόγων πείθεται (271 E). The hearer is in this case a man of passionate and excitable temperament, of tastes genial but imperfectly refined, and of faculties rather receptive than original. For Phaedrus' sake, Socrates tells us, he has been compelled to use a diction more poetical than was meet (ὀνόμασι ποιητικωτέροις τισὶν ἡναγκασμένος διὰ Φαῖδρον χρῆσθαι); and for Phaedrus' sake, as we may well suppose, he has ventured into regions which might else have remained untrodden. That this is no mere fancy, appears from Plato's language in another place (265 B)—a passage which sums up in brief nearly all that is worth saying on this subject. After a short *résumé* of his theory of madness in its human or morbid, and in its divine aspect, he proceeds thus:—"Of all these manifestations of madness, the Erotic we pronounced the best: we then gave a figu-

⁹ τὸ τῶν ἀρρένων πάμπαν ἀφελοῖμεθ' ἄν, τὸ δὲ γυναικῶν, κ.τ.λ. Legg. viii. 841 D.

¹ By this I would not be understood to favour the idle calumnies which anti-Platonists like Athenæus invented or propagated. I think the tradition preserved by one of his biographers more probable than these: Πλάτων δὲ φιλόσοφος λέγεται μὴ γάμον τινα μὴδὲ ὁμιλίαν σώματος καθάπαξ ἀνασχέσθαι. Hesych. Miles. Vit. Plat. init. The epigrams attributed to Plato, even if they are his, prove nothing; and some of them, among the rest that to Archeanassa, have been attributed with greater probability to other authors. Nor, had not his character been free from stain, would Aristotle have spoken of him as of ἀνδρὸς ἃν οἷδ' αἰνεῖν τοῦτι κακοῦσι θέμις.

² See Republ. v. p. 468 B.

³ p. 255 foll.

⁴ It seems impossible that Plato can seriously have entertained the paradox, that the παιδῶν ἔρως was a necessary step towards moral perfection. All that can fairly be gathered from his words is, that those who struggle victoriously with appetite, will come out from the conflict stronger and happier than they were before it commenced—that the trials of the soul are the occasions of its triumphs. Compare A. Butler's Lectures, ii. p. 238.

rative description, which I know not how to characterize, of the madness of the Lover, in which I doubt not we obtained some hold of the truth, though it is probable enough that in some directions we went astray⁵: and so on the whole we concocted a Discourse not altogether unimpressive or unconvincing, and may flatter ourselves that we have gratified our Lord and Master Eros with a mythic hymn disfigured neither by want of skill nor want of piety⁶."

There remain two points which need further elucidation: the "tripartition" of the Soul, and the doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις*. We have seen that the charioteer and his two steeds figure to us the three principles (*εἶδη*) which Plato in the Republic designates as *λόγος* or *τὸ λογιστικόν*, *θυμὸς* or *τὸ θυμοειδές*, and *ἐπιθυμία*. Of these the first and last are easily intelligible; but a few words on the second of the three may not be out of place. The author of the *Magna Moralia* attributed to Aristotle, presents us at the commencement of that treatise with a very concise sketch of the history of antecedent ethical speculation. Moral Philosophy, he tells us, originated in the Pythagorean schools; it was then taken up by Socrates, whose doctrines were modified and greatly improved by Plato. The Pythagorean theory, he says, was mixed with much alien matter. They conceived that the virtues were so many numbers. For instance, Justice was with them a square number (*ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκεις ἴσος*). The doctrine of Socrates, though less fantastic, was not less arbitrary; for he insisted that all the virtues were but modifications of Science. For instance, Temperance (*σωφροσύνη*) was the knowledge of what was really pleasant or painful; Valour (*ἀνδρεία*) was the Science of what was really formidable or the contrary; Justice, of that which might or might not lawfully be done (*τῶν νομίμων τε καὶ μὴ*). These three examples are given us by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia*: but the critique which follows is Aristotle's. "In this way," he observes, "Socrates ignores and virtually annihilates sentiment and passion" (which are of course essential ingredients in human nature)⁷. This error, according to Aristotle, Plato saw and avoided; for he took pains to distinguish the rational from the irrational part of man's nature, and he assigned to each of these two principles their appropriate Virtues (*ἀπένειμεν ἐκάστω τὰς προσήκουσας ἀρετάς*). In the Allegory of the *Phaedrus*, the charioteer is of course the rational

⁵ *τάχ' ἂν καὶ ἕλλοσε παραφερόμενοι.*


⁶ That of Lysias was neither *μέτριος* nor *εὐφημος*. It was coarse in sentiment and feeble in execution.

⁷ This Socratic paradox was revived by the Stoics. Compare Galen. *Hipp. et Plat. T. v. p. 515, Kühn.* And *ib. p. 595.* Both these passages, as so much else in Galen, are highly interesting to the student of philosophical opinion.

(τὸ λόγον ἔχον), while the two steeds divide between them the irrational principle, under its twofold aspect of θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία*.

It has been usual to translate θυμὸς by the word 'iracundia,' and θυμοειδὲς by 'irascibile' or some equivalent Latin term. Hence Bacon, who apparently read his Plato in a Latin interpretation, censures him for using a term of too restricted meaning. Plato ought rather, he says, to have used a word equivalent to the Latin 'animositas'.¹ Now it so happens that Plato's θυμοειδὲς is better translated by 'animositas' than by 'ira' or 'iracundia'; in fact, 'animositas' represents the meaning of the Greek better than any Latin word which we can imagine; and Bacon, who thought to censure Plato, has merely translated him. Anger, it is evident, is only one of many manifestations of the passionate or impulsive principle; and though in the Fourth Book of the Republic, p. 440 seq., where the theory is first propounded, anger or irascibility is the manifestation chiefly dwelt upon, it is evident from other passages in the same work that Plato intended by his θυμοειδὲς a much more comprehensive principle. Thus in B. viii. p. 548 D we find φιλονεικία and φιλοτιμία, emulation and ambition, expressly referred to this principle (ἐπὶ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς κρατοῦντος φιλονεικαίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαί). An irascible man is not necessarily ambitious or a lover of distinction, though it may be true that a capacity of anger is an element in an ambitious man's constitution. But in p. 553 C, θαυμάζειν καὶ τιμᾶν¹ are mentioned among the functions of the very same principle. Now, if we turn to the Phædrus, we find the nobler courser characterized as τιμῆς ἐραστὴς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς, καὶ ἀληθυῆς δόξης ἐταῖρος: predicates evidently very inappropriate to the mere passion of anger², but agreeing perfectly with the attributes just cited from the

* This is one of the dichotomies which Plato so greatly affected. We have—



Comp. Heraclitus de Alleg. Hom.

¹ "Sententia introducta a Platone, qua intellectus in cerebro, tanquam in arce collocatus est: animositas (quam ille satis imperite iracundiam vocavit, cum tumori et superbiæ sit propior) in corde: concupiscentia autem et sensualitas in jecinore, neque prorsus contemnenda est neque cupide recipienda."—Bacon Aug. Sc. l. iv. c. 1, extr. Plato gives us the rationale of his own nomenclature in Repub. 580 E, τὸ δὲ τρίτον διὰ πολυειδίαν, κ.τ.λ.

² Compare Arist. Pol. vii. c. 7, ὁ θυμὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν, αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις ἥ φιλοῦμεν.

³ In the Timæus, a dialogue in which the psychology of man is treated in connexion with his physiology, Plato divides the body into three regions, corresponding

Republic³. We shall therefore, I conceive, be justified in enlarging the term *θυμὸς* so as to include, not merely anger, but all the passions and sentiments which prompt to energetic action, and which are thus the natural counterpoise to the appetites, of which either sensual pleasure or mere bodily repletion (*πλησμονή*) is the object⁴. To descend to a more minute classification would lead us beyond the limits of the Platonic psychology, which, though sound as far as it goes, was undoubtedly imperfect, so far at least as its nature is to be made out from his written teaching. At the same time it is not difficult to divine the reasons which induced Plato to put anger as it were in the front rank of the impulses which ally themselves with the Reason in the inward struggles of the soul (*ὅπλα τίθενται μετὰ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει*, Rep. iv. 440 E). It is not too much to say, that without the capacity of being angry, moral disapprobation becomes impossible. The very terms by which we denote such disapprobation prove this. We speak of certain actions as vile, odious, abominable. But this is the language, not of pure intelligence, but of passion; it denotes that we have within us a principle which enables us to feel anger, indignation, hatred, at the spectacle of certain actions, or in the contemplation of certain states of mind in ourselves or in other men. The stronger our disapprobation, the more intense the language in which it is expressed; and the emotions of anger, hate, or scorn which prompt to the use of such language, are intense in the same proportion. But the actions

to the three main divisions of the soul. The *νοῦς*, or rational principle, he places in the head, or citadel (*ἀκρόπολις*), the approach to which is guarded by a narrow isthmus, the neck, which separates it from the thorax—and this as it were ensures the safety of the governing powers above. In the thorax, a region parted in its turn from the lower region by the diaphragm, as by a wall, he plants that part of the soul which partakes of *ἀνδρεία* and *θυμός*, which here again he designates as *φιλόνεικον*—contentious or quarrelsome. The object of this arrangement, he tells us, is that these faculties, being within hearing of the reason, may help it in its warfare with the lower appetites, the *ἐπιθυμιαί*, which, as we should expect, are relegated to the inferior regions, the *φρένες* or diaphragm serving to divide the living dwelling-place of the soul, just as in a Greek house a cross-wall separated the *ἀνδρῶν* from the *γυναικωνίτις*, the apartments of the male from those of the female inmates.—Tim. p. 70 A foll.

³ There is therefore no ground for the suspicion expressed by Van Heusde, that "Plato cum Phaedrum scriberet nondum videtur notionem *θυμοῦ* satis sibi distincte proposuisse." Init. P. P. iii. p. 26. See Repub. iv. 441, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει ξυνείχεν αὐτὴν τρία γένη, χρηματιστικὸν ἐπικουρικὸν βουλευτικόν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ τρίτον, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ θυμοειδές, ἐπικουρον ὃν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρή. Compare the τροφή δοξαστὴ χρώνται of Phaedr. 248 n.

⁴ In a MS. of the late S. T. Coleridge (hitherto, so far as I know, unpublished), I remember, many years ago, to have seen a distinction between the Appetites and what the writer proposed uncouthly, but expressively, to call the "*Impetites*." The details I am unable to recall, but the distinction seemed to me at the time to correspond pretty exactly to the Platonic distinction of *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμός*, a correspondence of which Coleridge himself was apparently unconscious. The MS., I may add, was lent to me by the late Mr. John Sterling.

or appetites which are the natural objects of such emotions, of this purified and well-directed anger, are mostly those which originate or reside in our lower or bestial nature: these appetites are powerful incentives to action, whereas Reason, in and of itself, has no tendency to produce or restrain action, and would therefore be powerless in contending with the appetites, were it not allied with some more energetic principle. Its success in the conflict will depend, not on its own strength or clearness, but on the steadiness and intensity of the resistance which its ally opposes to the common enemy: in other words, our self-control will be proportionate to the anger we are capable of feeling towards all that is odious or evil. A well-directed irascibility is thus, we find, an indispensable element in the moral nature⁵. We could not be moral, were we incapable of being made angry. To this extent it is true that anger is the natural ally of the reason. Of course it does not follow that anger is the only or even the principal ingredient in the moral faculty. The power of hating certain qualities presupposes the power of loving or admiring their opposites⁶: hence Plato is perfectly consistent with himself when he places wonder and reverence (τὸ τιμᾶν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν) in the same region of the soul with the malevolent emotions, and when he makes the *θυμοειδὲς μέρος* τῆς ψυχῆς, the impassioned or emotive principle, include both the one and the other. And in the existing state of philosophical language, it does not seem that he could have selected a more expressive term than that which, as we have already observed, Bacon, with unconscious accuracy, represents by the Latin ‘animositas.’

In the struggle with the refractory horse, Plato represents the nobler one as helping the driver. This however takes place only in the case of the well-trained philosophic nature, in which the sentiments are in harmony with the reason. The charioteer *reminds* his willing steed of that eternal beauty which they beheld together in the regions above the stars, being himself reminded of it by the spectacle of its incarnate antitype in the person of the beloved. (πάλιν εἶδεν αὐτὴν μετὰ σωφροσύνης ἐν ἁγνῷ βάλθρῳ βελῶσαν). This, if rationalized, might be understood to mean, that the intellect acts

⁵ Compare the following passage in Sir J. Macintosh's Ethical Dissertation (Works, i. p. 324, Whewell), “When anger is duly moderated—when it is proportioned to the wrong—when it is detached from personal considerations—when dispositions and actions are its ultimate objects—it becomes a sense of justice, and is so purified as to be fitted to be a new element of conscience,” with the context, and with Plato, *Republ.* iv. p. 440 foll.

⁶ In the parable of the chariot, it is the business of the nobler steed to drag the soul upwards—not merely to contend with his baser yokefellow. He therefore represents the love of excellence (τὸ φιλόκαλον) as well as the principle which resists appetite.

upon the sentiments through the medium of the imagination. It has however a more special meaning, which may be thus illustrated. The Platonic doctrine of Reminiscence or Suggestion (*ἀνάμνησις*)—Platonic in the strictest sense, for it was Plato's peculiar invention, and seems to have been dropped by his immediate successors—is briefly this: The mind is capable of apprehending certain ideas which experience alone is incapable of furnishing. Such, in particular, are the fundamental ideas of Geometry, which, though suggested to the mind by the senses, transcend in clearness and certainty the notions which reach us through the channels of sight or touch. Such, to borrow the instance given in the *Phaedo*, is the conception of equality, which, though originally no doubt suggested by the observation of apparent equality in the size of visible objects, would remain clear and certain, though it should be as demonstrable as it is probable that there are no two things of precisely equal dimensions in the universe. In modern phrase, there is in our perceptions of mathematical truth a rational as well as an empirical, an *à priori* as well as an *à posteriori*, element; or, to adopt a more antique phraseology, outward things partake of invisible realities, which are to be apprehended only by the eye of the mind—*οὐσίας μετέχει ψυχῆς κυβερνήτη μόνῳ θεατῆς ἴδῃ*. In the *Meno*, Socrates is represented as giving an experimental proof of this doctrine: the experiment being tried upon a slave-boy whom Meno lends for the purpose, and in whose untutored mind the operator produces, to the entire satisfaction of his master, an *ἀνάμνησις* of a well-known proposition in Geometry⁷. Whatever we may think of the conclusiveness of this particular experiment, the general doctrine it was intended to illustrate is still maintained to be sound doctrine by many modern metaphysicians: in fact, had Plato stopped here, many would be of opinion that he had proved his point. But he did not stop at the fact, as at an ascertained ultimate fact of consciousness. He first extends the principle from the ideas of mathematical to those of moral or metaphysical relation, and then invents an hypothesis to account for the phenomenon in both cases. The great moral generalizations denoted by the words Good, Beautiful, and the like, he conceived, like the primary intuitions of Geometry, to contain an *à priori* element, for the existence of which experience is unable to account. These ideas, he argues, are not born with us—they are not “innate ideas,” in the sense in which Locke and his followers use the phrase—a sense which Plato disavows as clearly as Locke himself. Not being born with us, whence do we obtain them? They are not to be found in the notions of the

⁷ *Meno*, p. 82 n. Arist. *Anal. Pr.* ii. 21, p. 67. *Anal. Post.* i. 1.

senses, for the senses tell us nothing about justice or goodness, but only about hot and cold, white and red, and the like. Neither can we obtain them by reflecting on the phenomena of sensation, for reflection can only arrange existing materials, it cannot enrich the mind with fresh matter. It remains then either that these ideas came to us at our birth— a supposition already rejected— or that, having been ours in a state of existence prior to birth, we have been reminded of them subsequently by experience. The antecedent existence of the human soul is thus, we see, an inference from a fact or supposed fact of consciousness; in other words, an hypothesis to account for such fact. The doctrine and the hypothesis are succinctly stated in a well-known passage of the *Phaedo* (72 E). “There is another theory of yours, Socrates,” says Cebes in that dialogue, “which, if true, proves the antecedent existence of the Soul: a theory I have frequently heard you propose. It is to the effect, that what we call Learning is neither more nor less than an act of recollecting (ὅτι ἡμῶν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οἶσα); if this, I say, be true, we must have learnt at some previous period the truths of which in this life we are from time to time reminded; but that would be impossible except on the supposition that our souls existed before they entered a human form: so that from this point of view also, the soul would appear to be immortal.” On this hint Socrates speaks, and presents his hearers with an inductive proof of what he had shown experimentally in the *Meno*. It is remarkable that in both passages he rests the proof on the nature of mathematical conceptions, and asserts without proving, that his argument holds good of moral ideas also⁸.

⁸ οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ δόσιου, καί, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τοῦτο ὅ ἐστι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκριόμενοι, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῶν εἶναι τούτων ἀπάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. *Phaed.* p. 75 D.

APPENDIX II.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ISOCRATES, AND HIS RELATION TO THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.

[Phædrus, p. 278 E foll.]

THERE are few writers whose reputation has passed through so many vicissitudes as that of Isocrates. The ancient critics are divided in opinion as to his merits: Cicero, persuaded perhaps that it is his duty to err with Plato, is hyperbolic in his praises of an orator extolled in the Phædrus; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, though in some points discriminating, is still on the whole highly favourable¹; and the same may be said of Quintilian, and the grammarians and rhetoricians generally, whose esteem for Isocrates is significantly shown by the comparatively perfect state in which they have handed down his text. On the other hand, with the philosophers, from Aristotle downwards, he is by no means a favourite²; and the last, though not the least of Greek critics, the author of the treatise *περὶ ὑψους*, speaks of him in terms bordering on contempt³. Descending to modern times, we find Isocrates in high favour among the literati of the Renaissance. The easiness of his Greek, the admiration of Cicero, the orthodoxy, apparent rather than real, of his ethical sentiments, combined to recommend him to the teachers of that day; and the same causes have helped in our own time to make him a favourite in quarters where Greek learning is still in a backward

¹ Dionysius extravagantly compares Isocrates to Polycletus and Phidias. His remark that Lysias *is* graceful, Isocrates *would be*, is much more happy: *πέφυκεν ἡ Λυσίου λέξις ἔχειν τὴν χάριν, ἣ δ' Ἰσοκράτους βούλεται*.

² The 30th Socratic Epistle, written apparently by a Platonist, is one proof of this.

³ § 38. 2, 'Ὁ γοῦν Ἰσοκράτης, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως, παιδὸς πρῶγμα ἔπαθεν, διὰ τὴν τοῦ πάντα ἀσχητικῶς ἐθέλειν λέγειν φιλοτιμίαν, κ.τ.λ.

state. But in proportion as Thucydides, Plato, Demosthenes, and the real representatives of Greek intellect come to be appreciated, we find that the reputation of Isocrates has invariably declined. Our own Dobree, who has done as much as any modern scholar towards the criticism and elucidation of his text, is at no pains to conceal his unfavourable opinion of the author whom he knows so well; and he concludes his ungrateful labours with the pathetic exclamation, "Tandem eluctatus sum tedium, quod summum fuit, relegendi et annotandi. Deo gratias!" If from England we turn to Germany, we find the most intelligent scholars of the same mind with Dobree. Niebuhr, as might have been expected, had no respect for Isocrates, either in his literary or his political character. "He is a thoroughly worthless and miserable author, and one of the most thoughtless and poorest minds. It is inconceivable to me how the ancients could so much esteem and admire him⁴." In another place he calls him a thoroughly bad citizen and an ineffable fool; strong language it must be confessed, but hardly more than the due of a publicist who traces all the misfortunes of his country to her naval supremacy⁵, and who wrote a letter of congratulation to Philip after the battle of Chaeronea⁶.

But with the literary or political merits of Isocrates we are not at present concerned. The passages in his writings to which attention will now be directed, relate rather to the literary history of his age and to his relations with other literary celebrities, especially Plato and other members of the Academy. At the same time they incidentally illustrate the personal character of the writer, and throw light on what we now call the "educational" notions of a period of high intellectual culture and refinement. They are also useful as showing the amount of egotism and self-praise which was tolerated by a Greek public, and put us in a better position for pronouncing on the curious question—Whether Plato's portraits of the earlier 'teachers of wisdom' are in these respects caricatures of their originals?

Plato and Isocrates were in the strictest sense contemporaries. Isocrates was but seven years older than Plato, and outlived him

⁴ Lect. Anc. Hist. ii. p. 335.

⁵ See the *Oratio De Pace* (N.C. 356) *passim*.

⁶ Niebuhr apparently believes in the traditional story that the death of Isocrates was caused by the news of this disaster (*Phil. Mus.* i. 492). But the 2nd Epistle to Philip (*Ep.* iii.) bears every mark of genuineness; and so far from showing any trace of mortification or alarm, it ends with an expression of thankfulness that the writer had been spared to see the fulfilment of his political aspirations: *ἂν νέος ὦν διενεούμην καὶ γράφειν ἐπεχείρουν ἐν τε τῷ πανηγυρικῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς σέ πεμφθέντι, ταῦτα νῦν τὰ μὲν ἤδη γιγνόμενα διὰ τῶν σῶν ἐφορῶ πράξων, τὰ δ' ἐλπίζω γενήσεσθαι.*

only about ten years. Unlike as they appear in character and genius, both were educators of youth, and in that capacity exerted a greater influence on their contemporaries than any other Athenians of their epoch⁷—that is to say, than any of the numerous teachers of Eloquence and Philosophy who flourished in the interval between the death of Socrates and the battle of Chaeronea. They professed, moreover, to belong to the same calling, for Isocrates insists strenuously on his right to be styled ‘philosopher,’ and speaks perpetually of ἡ ἐμὴ φιλοσοφία. This claim is to a certain extent admitted by Plato in the Phædrus—ἔστι φιλοσοφία τις τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ—possibly not without a reference to the reiterated assertions of Isocrates himself. Of the celebrities of the epoch, there was hardly one who had not at some period of his life studied under either Plato or Isocrates, and some are mentioned as having been pupils of both. Each seems to have taught on system, and their writings enable us to form a reasonably distinct idea of their respective methods of procedure.

At first sight it would appear that no two systems could be more directly opposed. The antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic, between the art which seeks only to persuade and that which professes to be satisfied with nothing short of conviction, represents pretty faithfully the relation between the methods of Isocrates and Plato. Yet their teaching may have had some elements in common. Isocrates, e.g., acknowledges the educational value of geometry and astronomy⁸. Those, he says, who apply themselves to the accurate study of these sciences, and are thus forced to fix their attention on obscure and difficult subjects without allowing their thoughts to wander, have their minds sharpened by these exercises and are enabled to learn and appreciate things of greater dignity and moment. By these more important things Isocrates means first the power of speaking and writing, and secondly the gift of political discernment and statesmanlike sagacity, as exemplified in his own political discourses. See, inter alia, Antid. § 196, 290, from a comparison of which passages we obtain a complete notion of what Isocrates means by “philosophy,” a combination of the accomplishments of the ῥήτωρ and the πολιτικός. But in other respects Plato would have found little to object to in this view, for he too speaks of geometry and astronomy rather as parts of a proposed entire discipline than as sciences deserving to be cultivated for their own sake. I have no doubt that the passage quoted from the Antidosis refers specially to Plato and his followers,

⁷ In Antid. 318, he says, that it had been objected to him that he had a larger number of disciples than all the philosophers put together.

⁸ Antid. § 280, 283. Bekk. Comp. Panath. § 29 sqq.

who in the vocabulary of Isocrates are denoted as οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς λόγοις⁹. The instructions of these eristic dynasts, these Lords of Disputation, he proceeds to say, "are beneficial rather than injurious to their pupils, not to the extent they themselves pretend, but more than the public at large imagine," § 280. For the candour and tolerance implied in these expressions, Isocrates takes great credit to himself. These Eristics, he tells us, had dealt with him far less gently. They had blasphemed his favourite art (§ 276) as offensively as the lowest of the populace could do (βλασφημοῦσιν ὥσπερ οἱ φανότατοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν), not, he charitably adds, for want of knowing better, but in the hope, if not of drawing away his pupils, at any rate of exalting their own pursuits by comparison. He might, if so inclined, speak as bitterly of them as they had done of him—perhaps even more so; but this course he disdains. The men were harmless, though not so useful to the community as others whom he could name (ἤττον δ' ἐτέρων εὐεργετῆν δυνάμενους).

This passage indicates great soreness; and we naturally ask, Whence these tears? The answer is not far to seek. In a dialogue such as the *Gorgias*, written partly to show the shallowness of the culture imparted in the rhetorical schools, passages occur which could not fail to offend the susceptibility of so vain a man as Isocrates. It is indeed probable that the compliment passed upon him at the conclusion of the *Phaedrus* would be looked upon as but poor amends for the stinging sarcasms showered so profusely on his art and its professors in other parts of the dialogue. But the *Gorgias* contains no such propitiatory phrase; and though the master of Isocrates is treated respectfully by the philosophic satirist, the fool Polus and the libertine Callicles in effect represent between them the two elements, rhetorical and political, of which, as we have seen, the φιλοσοφία of Isocrates consists. Here, too, as in the *Phaedrus*, much contempt is poured upon the figures of rhetoric, those ἰδέαι λόγων, the use of which Isocrates inculcated on his pupils both by precept and example¹. There are also passages in the *Gorgias* containing distinct

⁹ In the Epistle to the young Alexander, he says, ἀκούε σε . . . τῶν φιλοσοφῶν οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζειν μὲν οὐδὲ τὴν περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας . . . alluding to the lessons of his tutor Aristotle. Throughout, Isocrates is the only φιλόσοφος: the philosophers are mere ἐριστικοί, wranglers, word-splitters, and so forth. The impudence of so nick-naming the Aristotelian philosophy is remarkable, but it does not diminish the interest of the notice.

¹ Thus, in Panath. 233 n, he boasts that his orations, πολλῶν μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων γέμειν, οὐκ ὀλίγων δ' ἀντιθέσεων καὶ παρισώσεων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ῥητορείαις διαλαμπουσῶν καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπισημαίνεσθαι καὶ θορυβεῖν ἀναγκάζουσῶν, "abound in the figures which light up a rhetorical composition, and extort the applause of an audience," where the word διαλαμπουσῶν reminds us of the so-styled λαμπάδες of Gorgias. So Antid. § 196, οἱ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὄντες τὰς ἰδέας ἀπάσας αἷς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος διεξέρχονται τοῖς μαθηταῖς.

verbal parallelisms with corresponding passages in Isocrates. Who, for instance, can doubt that when Socrates speaks of rhetoric as *ἐπιτήδευμα ψυχῆς στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας* (Gorg. 463), he is thinking of the boast of Isocrates, that to become an accomplished speaker is a matter requiring much study, *καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι*². Still less can we hesitate as to Isocrates' meaning, when he says in a very late oration³, that of two bad things,—inflicting evil upon others and suffering it ourselves,—the infliction is much less bad than the endurance. For instance, if the choice were offered to the Athenians of unjustly tyrannizing over the Spartans, or submitting to their unjust domination, no sensible man would scruple to prefer the former alternative, though it is true that if you consult the self-styled philosophers, some few would maintain the opposite opinion, *ὁλγοὶ δ' ἂν τινες τῶν προσποιουμένων εἶναι σοφῶν ἐρωτηθέντες οὐκ ἂν φήσαιεν*. The reference to the noble paradox of Socrates in the Gorgias, *ὅτι κρείττον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν*, is not to be mistaken, nor in the 'pretenders to philosophy' can we fail to recognize the followers of Plato. On the other hand, when Callicles (Gorg. 484) is made to express a patronizing approval of philosophy as a pleasant and profitable employment for the youthful mind, but as deadly in its effects on the character if pushed too far, we are struck by the similarity of the sentiment to a passage in the well-known Antidosis of Isocrates, which, written late in the life of the orator, contains a statement and defence of the views which he had advocated during the whole of his professorial career. "I should recommend our younger men," he says, "to spend some time on these branches of education, but not to suffer their genius to waste and shrivel while they pore over unprofitable subtleties⁴."

In the Helenae Encomium, a scholastic exercise written apparently in rivalry of his master Gorgias, Isocrates begins his discourse with

² Contra Sophist. 294 D. This was an early oration, Antid. § 206, *ὅτ' ἡρχόμεν περὶ ταύτην εἶναι τὴν πραγματείαν, λόγον δίδωκα γράψας, κ.τ.λ.*

³ Panath. p. 257, § 117. The Panath. was written after the death of Plato, and when Isocrates was ninety-four years of age.

⁴ § 287, Bekk. *διατρίβει μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς παιδείας ταύτας χρόνον τινὰ συμβουλευόμεν ἂν τοῖς νεωτέροις, μὴ μέντοι περιδεῖν τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν κατασκελετευθεῖσαν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοῖς.* § 288, *δεῖν δὲ τοὺς προύργου τι ποιεῖν βουλευόμενους καὶ τῶν λόγων τοὺς ματαίους καὶ τῶν πράξεων τὰς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν βίον φερούσας ἀναιρεῖν ἐξ ἅπασων τῶν διατριβῶν.* It is remarkable that among the authors of *λόγοι μάταιοι* he mentions his own preceptor Gorgias, referring however to his metaphysical speculations, not to his rhetoric. So too in the Hel. Enc. 208 c, *Γοργίαν τὸν τολμήσαντα λέγειν ὥς οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἔστιν.* It is highly probable that this passage is but a new version of remarks occurring in the earlier speech against the Sophists, which, as we have seen, Plato had probably read, and of which we have only a fragment remaining to us. Isocrates himself quotes his earlier speech in the Antidosis, and prides himself not a little on the consistency of his youthful and later opinions. Far from imitating the well-known 'inconstantia' of Plato, it is evident that during a long life of teaching he had "learnt nothing and forgotten nothing."

a formal attack upon the leaders of the three principal Socratic sects. The attack is, so far as appears, entirely gratuitous, for it is not pretended that either Antisthenes, Plato, or Euclides, had breathed a word against the fame of Helen. Socrates, indeed, in the *Phaedrus*, alludes in complimentary language to the well-known poem in which Stesichorus had attempted to restore the tarnished reputation of this heroine; and Isocrates intimates very plainly that it would have been better for his followers had they devoted their powers to the discussion of equally edifying topics. There are some⁵, he gravely complains, whose vanity is gratified if they can succeed even tolerably well in defending an absurd and paradoxical thesis; he is acquainted with persons who have grown grey (*καταγεγηράκασιν*) in arguing⁶ that it is impossible to say that which is false, to contradict an adversary, or to hold two opposing arguments on the same theme; others who have spent a long life in defending the paradox, that Valour, and Wisdom, and Justice mean all the same thing, that we possess none of these virtues by nature, but that there is one science which includes all. Others, again, pass their time in eristic disputations which answer no end but that of giving trouble to their pupils. Trifling like this, he proceeds to say, has not even the merit of novelty, for it is well known that Protagoras and Gorgias, that Zeno and Melissus had in their day maintained still more startling paradoxes in books even more unreadable. It is clear from this passage that Isocrates is writing at a time when Socrates and the so-called Sophists had passed away, and when the ground was occupied by the now mature Socratic sects; and it is strange that the author of a *Critical History of the Sophists* should have maintained that the *Helenae Encomium* is an early work⁷. The passage shows considerable satirical ingenuity; and its writer probably prided himself on the happy expedient of interpolating Plato between two rivals, with one of whom the philosopher had been engaged in brisk controversy, while he looked upon the second as a well-meaning but somewhat narrow-minded brother in the faith⁸.

⁵ *Hel. Enc. init.*, Εἰσι τινες οἱ μέγα φρονοῦσιν, ἣν ὑπόθεσιν παράδοξον ποιησάμενοι περὶ ταύτης ἀνεκτῶς εἰπεῖν δυνηθῶσιν.

⁶ οἱ μὲν οὐ φάσκοντες οἶόν τ' εἶναι ψευδῇ λέγειν οὐδ' ἀντιλέγειν οὐδὲ δύο λόγῳ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἀντειπεῖν, οἱ δὲ διεξιόντες ὡς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταυτὸν ἐστί, καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν, μία δ' ἐπιστήμη καθ' ἀπάντων ἐστίν· ἄλλοι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας διατρίβουσιν, κ.τ.λ.

⁷ *Gel.* in an *Epistle to Weleker*, *Rh. Mus.* 1839. Antisthenes died at the age of sixty-seven, B.C. 367. The perfect *καταγεγηράκασιν* implies that both he and Plato were still alive: and we cannot therefore be far wrong if we fix B.C. 370 as the approximate date of the speech in question. At that date Plato would be fifty-nine, and Antisthenes about sixty-four.

⁸ Euclides of Megara.

Equally well aimed is the bolt shot at Antisthenes, whose well-known dialectical paradoxes are refuted in more than one Platonic dialogue; and who, by the way, is said to have written a reply to one of the speeches of Isocrates².

Another reflection upon Plato seems to lurk in a passage of the *Antidosis*, § 303, where Isocrates complains that the epithet *εὐφνής* is much misapplied. People call those *εὐφνείς*, he says, who indulge in ribaldry, and have a talent for jesting and mimicry¹, whereas the word ought to be used to denote natural goodness of heart. This, it may be said, is perhaps intended rather for the comic poets, who did not spare Isocrates. But the poets of the middle comedy do not seem to have risen above mediocrity, and it is more likely that Isocrates had been vexed by hearing the epithet applied to Plato—the *εὐφνής*², or man of genius *κατ' ἐξοχὴν* of his day, one too, whose mimetic powers far transcend those of the poets referred to. In another passage he betrays vexation at the popularity of the Socratic dialogues, which he spitefully alludes to as *τοὺς διαλόγους τοὺς ἐριστικούς καλουμένους*, in which young men took far too much delight, but which their seniors could not endure: *οἷς οἱ μὲν νεώτεροι μᾶλλον χαίρουσι τοῦ δέοντος, τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων οὐδεὶς ἐστὶν ὅστις ἂν ἀνεκτοῖς αὐτοὺς εἶναι φήσειεν*. Panath. § 29, p. 238 B. This passage also points principally to Plato, whose dialogues far surpassed all others in popularity.

We have seen that Isocrates asserted his right to be called a philosopher, and that this claim was to a certain extent conceded by Plato, as it may have been by others. But this limited concession did not satisfy the vanity of Isocrates. His teaching was not only a philosophy, but *the* philosophy. All other professors, whether of rhetoric or dialectic, he qualifies with the dreaded name of *σοφισταί*. Not even Plato is excepted³, when he is speaking by name of his two greatest works. If we ask what are the characteristics of the "philosopher" according to the Isocratic pattern, we shall find them the precise antithesis of those insisted on by the orthodox schools.

² Diog. Laert. in vita Antisthenis. L. vi. 1. 15.

¹ Ammonius. *εὐφνής λέγεται παρ' Ἀττικοῖς ὁ σκωπτικός*.

² Plato is called *εὐστοχος* by Lucian in the *Anthology*.

³ Philipp. 84 B. *ὁμοίως οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ἄκυροι τυγχάνουσιν ὅντες τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις*. The Philippus was written 316, Plato died circ. 318. The passage is remarkable as proving that the Laws were in general circulation within two years of Plato's death—a fact, it seems to me, quite decisive of the genuineness of that work. See the 30th Socratic Epistle, where the reference is recognized. If this is true, as with Spengel I believe it to be, it refutes the current tradition that the Laws was a posthumous work.

We know the pains taken by Plato in distinguishing between δόξαι and ἐπιστήμαι; between the popular and the scientific way of handling a subject. This antithesis, which is admitted by all philosophic writers, however they may differ in its application, was by no means ignored by Isocrates. But he stands alone in claiming for the man of opinion, ὁ δοξαστικός, the title appropriated to the man of science. Those, he says, I call wise men, σοφοί, who are able to strike out the most probable opinions, and those I hold to be 'philosophers' whose studies enable them most readily to acquire this branch of wisdom⁴. He is aware that this opinion is paradoxical, and that he stands alone in maintaining it. In that wonderful effusion of senile self-complacency, the Panathenæicus⁵, he boasts that his genius, though ill-fitted for the management of public affairs, and indeed for public speaking, enables him to arrive at the truth by the way of opinion far better than the pretenders to so-called science, *δοξάσαι περὶ ἐκάστων τὴν ἀλήθειαν μάλλον δυναμένην τῶν εἰδέχαι φασκόντων*. And in a passage already quoted he extols rhetoric as the proper employment of a mind *δοξαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας*, vigorous and fertile in opinion. Still more plainly antisocratic is a passage in the speech *κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν*, in which he says that he finds much more agreement among those who are content with δόξαι than among those who profess to be in possession of ἐπιστήμη⁶. In this description it does not appear that Plato is necessarily included, for the persons he alludes to are paid teachers, who have undersold Isocrates in the education market. He speaks of them as poor men (*αὐτοὶ πολλῶν δεόμενοι*), who took small fees from their pupils—three or four minae only for a complete course⁷; a meanness of spirit, he thinks, much to be reprobated, and standing in disadvantageous contrast to his own more magnanimous practice⁸. Neither the poverty nor the fees are Platonic; but some of the minor Socratics are probably the offenders complained of⁹.

⁴ Antid. § 290, σοφοὺς νομίζω τοὺς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένου, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις διατρίβοντας, ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήψονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν.

⁵ p. 231 D sqq.

⁶ 292 C.

⁷ Ib. 291 D.

⁸ Isocr. is said to have received 10 minae = 1000 drachms from each pupil. Plut. Vitæ X Rhet. 838 E. His pupils were numerous. His course frequently lasted three or four years. Antid. § 93, Bekk. At the end of that time, when his pupils were about to depart (ἀποσπείν), they took leave often with tears. Ibid. 1000 drachms seems to have been the stated fee for a course. Demosth. adv. Laerit. p. 938.

⁹ The speech against the Sophists was written at the beginning, the Antidosis towards the end of the professorial life of Isocrates. In the former there is no passage which points to Plato, who had probably not yet come forward as the head of a school which was destined to throw all others into the shade. But the scientific aim of the teachers described, coupled with their moderate earnings, and contemptible, genuine or affected, of 'filthy lucre' (ἀργυρίδιον καὶ χρυσίδιον τὸν

But it would be tedious to quote all the passages in which Isocrates gives expression to the jealous feelings which rankled in his mind. Those already referred to are sufficient to illustrate the opposition between his school and that of Plato, and to show that of the two rivals, if we may so call them, one at least was unfavourably disposed towards the other. It remains to ascertain, if possible, how far these feelings were reciprocated by Plato. And here it cannot but strike us as singular that the only passage in the Platonic dialogues in which Isocrates is named should be one in which he is favourably contrasted with a rival Logographus, in which his claim to be a philosopher is partially conceded, and he is pronounced to be capable of eminence in a still higher sphere of literature. This too at the end of a dialogue in which the Sicilian school, which Isocrates represented more truly than any other Attic writer, is assailed with mischievous raillery; insomuch that if no names of contemporaries had been mentioned, it would not have been unreasonable to suspect that he and not Lysias was the orator at whom Plato's censures were principally aimed¹. For in the extant orations of Lysias we look in vain for any traces of the affectation which Plato ridicules; whereas the show-speeches of Isocrates are full of them. Of this difficulty the ancient critics do not seem to have been conscious. Cicero, who records in more than one place the feud between Isocrates and Aristotle, believes that Isocrates and Plato were the best of friends². Nor was this, according to Cicero, a mere youthful friendship³. Such too seems to have been the traditional opinion of the schools. "The philosopher," says Laertius (iii. 9), "was a friend of Isocrates, and Praxiphanes has written a dialogue in which they are represented as conversing *περὶ ποιητῶν* in Plato's country-house, where Isocrates was a guest." This Praxiphanes was one of Aristotle's successors⁴, and as a Peripatetic would not be prejudiced in favour of either of the illustrious disputants.

Nor is it easy to find any trace of a contrary opinion, if we except

πλοῖ τον ἀποκαλοῦντες), are features which meet in the minor Socratics, and in them only.

¹ Compare in particular Phædr. p. 267 A, *τά τε αὖ σμικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαίνεσθαι* ποιοῦσι διὰ ῥώμην λόγου, καὶνὰ τ' ἀρχαίως καὶ τὰ ἐναντία καὶνῶς, κ.τ.λ., with Paneg. § 8, where Isocrates boasts: *ὅτι οἱ λόγοι τοιαύτην ἔχουσι τὴν φύσιν, ὥσθ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πολλαχῶς ἐξηγήσασθαι, καὶ τὰ τε μεγάλα ταπεινὰ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς μέγεθος περιθεῖναι, καὶ τὰ παλαιὰ καὶνῶς διελθεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν νεωστὶ γεγενημένων ἀρχαίως εἰπεῖν*. Plato jeeringly attributes this boast to Tisias and Gorgias: Isocrates adopts it as his own in perfect seriousness. The date of the Panegyricus is B.C. 380.

² "Exagitator omnium rhetorum hunc miratur unum. Me autem qui Isocratem non diligunt una cum Socrate et Platone errare patiantur." Brut. xiii. 42.

³ "Ea de seniore scribit Plato et scribit aequalis." Ibid.

⁴ Anon. Vit. Aristotelis, in Appendix to Diogenes Laertius, ed. Didot, p. 13. Also named by Diog. Laert., and by Marcellinus in Vita Thucydidis.

a passage in that one of the Socratic Epistles, the XXXth⁶, which alone has any pretension to authenticity. Had the tradition of a "simultas" between Plato and Isocrates reached the ears of Athenæus, he would probably have made the most of it, for his learning was equalled by his virulence and love of defamation. We cannot therefore be surprised if some recent expositors of Plato have adhered to the old tradition, not reflecting that until recent times little or nothing had been done in the way of exhuming the allusions to contemporaries which lie beneath the surface of the Socratic Dialogues⁶.

One of these personal allusions it is now time to discuss. In the Dialogue called *Euthydemus* occurs a passage in which Heindorf, Schleiermacher, Spengel, Dobree, and the Dutch scholars generally, see a distinct reference to Isocrates. The dialogue at the end of which this passage appears is a curious one. Socrates relates to his friend Criton a conversation between himself and a couple of foreigners, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus. These were sophists of the Eristic or Contentious sort, formidable in word-combat, and capable of refuting any proposition *ὁμοίως ἐὰν ψευδὲς εἴη τε ἀληθὲς ᾖ*. The narrated dialogue consists of a series of quibbling arguments of the paltriest kind, and is apparently designed to bring into contempt a certain class or school of philosophic or pseudo-philosophic disputants. The motive of its publication by Plato it is not difficult to divine. We know from the passages already quoted from Isocrates that the epithet *ἐριστικός* was used by the rhetoricians as a convenient term of reproach to designate the stricter schools of philosophy; not only the minor Socratic sects and the obscurer pretenders to logical prowess—all in short who preferred the closed fist of logic to the open palm of rhetoric—but also Plato, Aristotle, and the professors of the Academy generally. Now Plato, in exalting Dialectic, which he represents as the *prima philosophia*, and its professors as alone philosophers, takes great pains to distinguish this queen of sciences from her spurious counterfeit, Eristic. This distinction is brought out with technical clearness in that masterly dialogue, the *Philebus*⁷, and it affords the key to much of the subtle argumentation of the *Sophistes* and *Politicus*. But these are dialogues beyond the popular comprehension; and the *Euthydemus* seems to have been written to make the distinction palpable to ordinary minds. The rhetors had

⁵ An Epistle purporting to be addressed to K. Philip, Ἰσοκράτης . . . οὕτε Πλάτωνος ἐν τοῖς πρὸς σε πεμφθεῖσι λόγοις ἀπέσχηται.

⁶ Is Dobree the first Commentator on Isocrates who suspected the anti-Platonic allusions?

⁷ p. 17 A, οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.

vexed the Socratics by calling them Eristics. See, says Plato, what an Eristic is, and how little he has in common with us or with our Master. Our contempt for verbal quibbles is as strong as yours, and far more intelligent; we know the false principles on which the Eristic art is founded, and are besides able to hold it up to ridicule with a force and humour of which you are incapable. Of this design Plato gives us a plain intimation—first, in the model dialogue between Socrates and Clinias, p. 278 E, which is meant by way of foil to the quibbling arguments of the two strangers; and secondly, in the concluding conversation between Socrates and Criton. After he has finished his recital of the performance of the two sophists, Socrates ironically suggests that his friend would do well to join them; for among other recommendations they boasted, as other quacks since their day have done, that their course might be pursued without any interruption of ordinary business. *ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ χρηματίζεσθαί φατον διακολλίειν οὐδὲν μὴ οὐ παραλαβεῖν ὁρτυροῖν ἐπέτεως τὴν σφετέραν σοφίαν.* In declining this proposal, Criton takes occasion to offer to Socrates a respectful remonstrance. It seems ridiculous, he says, that *I* should admonish *you*, nevertheless I will tell you what somebody said of you in my hearing, a person who was actually present during the interview which you have just described. The person, he goes on to say, was one who had no mean opinion of his own wisdom—one in fact of those who composed speeches for the law-courts with ability and success (*ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πᾶν εἶναι σοφός, τούτων τις τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια δεινῶν*). After ironically expressing his surprise that Criton had not thought it worth his while to listen to wisdom such as this, this person had proceeded to express in no measured terms his contempt for philosophy, of which, as he professed to think, the two strangers were among the most eminent professors, and to intimate his surprise that a man like Socrates should have lent himself to so absurd an exhibition (*πᾶν ἂν σε οἶμαι αἰσχυνθῆναι ὑπὲρ τοῦ σεαυτοῦ ἐταίρου· οὕτως ἦν ἄτοπος ἐθέλων ἑαυτὸν παρέχειν ἀνθρώποις οἷς οὐδὲν μέλει ὃ τι ἂν λέγωσι, παντὸς δὲ ῥήματος ἀντέχονται*). The fact was, the study and its professors were alike worthless and ridiculous. Now, says Criton, though I entirely dissent from this estimate of philosophy, I do think the critic was right in censuring you for condescending to dispute in public with two such charlatans as those you have described.

Now this passage, it may be said, though probably intended to account for the confusion in the mind of a superficial observer between the Dialecticians and Eristics, contains nothing which compels us to think of Isocrates in particular. Why should not Lysias stand for the original of the picture, or why may not a class or school be meant rather than any particular individual? With

his usual address, Plato has contrived to put in a touch which enables us, as I think, to answer these inquiries. What did you think of the discussion? said Criton to the anonymous person of whom he speaks: *Τί δὲ ἄλλο, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἢ οἶά περ ἂν αἰέ τις τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούσαι ληρούντων, καὶ περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἀναξίαν σπουδὴν ποιουμένων*. I am quoting, says Criton to Socrates, the very words this person used, *οὕτως γάρ πως καὶ εἶπε τοῖς ὀνόμασι*. This is an intimation that some one in particular is meant, and that the reader is expected to recognize the author by his style. The antithetic turn of the last clause, *περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἀναξίαν σπουδὴν ποιουμένων*—a false antithesis by the way—the smoothness of the rhythm, and the frequent alliteration naturally suggest Isocrates. This impression is strengthened when Criton tells Socrates that his critic “was any thing but a speaker; in fact,” says he, “I doubt whether he ever got up in court in his life, though they do say that he is thoroughly well acquainted with his profession, and that he writes capital speeches⁸.” It is added that “he is one of those whom Prodicus described as dwellers on the debateable land between the Philosophers and the Statesmen” (*μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε αἰὶρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ*), a really happy description of Isocrates, but as little fitting Lysias as it would fit Isaac or any other mere barrister or chamber-counsel of the day⁹. Socrates further observes that his censor is one of a set of men who deem themselves and are deemed by many others far the wisest of all. They flatter themselves that but for the philosophers their claim would be universally allowed, and that if they could destroy the reputation of their rivals, the palm would be unanimously awarded to their own profession. It is impossible to describe better the feeling which animates such speeches as the Panathenaicus and Antidosis, and when we are further told that these men *μετρίως μὲν φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν μετρίως δὲ πολιτικῶν*, we are inevitably reminded of the description of Isocrates in the Phaedrus as one in whose genius *ἐνεστί τις φιλοσοφία*. The finishing touch in the picture—*ἐκτὸς δὲ ὄντες κινδύνων καὶ ἀγώνων καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν*—agrees perfectly with the account of himself and his own way of life, which is given by Isocrates with no little self-gratulation in the Antidosis¹. We may add that it is not appropriate to the metæe Lysias, whose abstinence from public affairs was owing not to choice but to necessity.

⁸ Lysias did on one memorable occasion plead his own cause. The excellent speech *κατὰ Ἐρατοσθένους* was delivered by him during his brief tenure of the Athenian franchise. While at Thurii he took an active and leading part in the local politics.

⁹ Lysias was a clear-headed practical man, and seems to have made no pretension to philosophy. For this, among other things, he is rebuked in the Phaedrus.

¹ See especially §§ 158-9, Bekk. and § 162. With *καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν* compare the synonymous phrase *ἀπολέλκεν τοῦ πράγματος*, Antid. § 208, Bekk.

In fact the combination of a smattering of philosophy, a measure of political knowledge, great talent as a writer of forensic speeches², and a boundless and intolerant vanity, is one which we find in the writings of Isocrates and in no others of that epoch³.

The rebuke with which Socrates dismisses his anonymous critic is moderate and dignified. We ought not, he says, to be irritated by such pretensions to superiority, ill-founded as they are; for we have no right to quarrel with any man who can teach us any thing holding of wisdom—any one in short who works at his literary calling diligently, and expounds his views manfully, with vigour and perseverance (*πάντ' ἄνδρα χρὴ ἀγαπᾶν ὅστις καὶ ὅτιοῦν λέγει ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως*⁴ *πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἀνδρείως ἐπεξίων διαπονεῖται*). The perseverance with which Isocrates inculcates—the ingenuity with which he amplifies—the very few ideas he possesses, is one of the most remarkable features in his writings.

On the whole, I think it will be agreed that there is a high degree of probability in the supposition that the passage commented on refers directly to Isocrates; and that if so, the tradition of his friendly relations with Plato is erroneous. Plato could scarcely have failed to resent the querulous and contemptuous remarks upon himself and his school, with which, as we have seen, the speeches of Isocrates abound. But that his resentment amounted to enmity we have no reason to infer from this or any other passage; in fact, the remark of Socrates just quoted was apparently designed to calm the irritable feelings of Plato's admiring followers, who doubtless were exasperated by these attacks upon their master.

If we now recur to the passage of the *Phaedrus*, we find a flattered likeness of the same original. In both we read of a successful speech-writer; in both of a speech-writer with some pretensions to philosophy. But in one of the two pictures shadows are put in which are wanting in the other; and the inference seems natural that Plato's feelings towards Isocrates had undergone a change in

² The forensic orations of Isocrates are his best. They are free from the affectations of his show-speeches, and are thought by Dion. Hal. superior in some respects to the speeches of his rival Lysias.

³ At a later period of his life Isocrates expresses great soreness at the prevalent opinion of his arrogance and intolerance of other literary men. He says he had been told that three or four Sophists of the rank and file (*ἀγελαῶν*) had been discussing him in the Lyceum: and that one of them (*τὸν τολμηρότατον*) had said, *ὡς ἐγὼ πάντων καταφρονῶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τὰς τε φιλοσοφίας τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὰς παιδείας ἀπάσας ἀναιρῶ, καὶ φημι πάντας ληρεῖν πλὴν τοὺς μετασχηκότας τῆς ἐμῆς διατριβῆς*. This he says surprised and distressed him, for he had always thought himself remarkable for modesty and humility, and a sworn foe to vanity and ostentation in other persons (*ᾧ μιν ἐπιφανὴς εἶναι τοῖς ἀλαθρονομοῖσι πολεμῶν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ μετρίως διελεγμένους, μᾶλλον δὲ ταπεινῶς*).

⁴ Isocrates calls his own philosophy a *φρόνησις* in *Antid.* § 290.

the interval between the composition of the two dialogues, whichever we assume to have been written first.

But it is well known to persons conversant with recent Platonic literature that the passage of the Euthydemus is a main argument of those who support the old tradition that the Phaedrus was the first-written of the dialogues. The date of the Euthydemus we have absolutely no means of determining, and if we set aside tradition, that of the Phaedrus may be said perhaps to be equally uncertain. Under such circumstances, we may venture, I think, to recognize in the portrait given in the Euthydemus the orator whose features are so faithfully portrayed, without thinking it necessary on that account to reject such internal indications of a later date as we may discover in the Phaedrus. I say nothing of the consideration, that the complimentary phrases put into the mouth of Socrates may have suggested to the readers of Plato a comparison between the prophecy and its fulfilment, neither favourable to the subject of the prediction, nor altogether undesigned by its author.

APPENDIX III.

THE EROTICUS OF CORNELIUS FRONTO.

THE following speech, though of little intrinsic value, is sufficiently curious to deserve a place in an edition of the Phaedrus. It was written as an imitation of the erotic discourse of Lysias; and, if it had no other use, might serve by way of foil to a composition, the literary merit of which is certainly underrated by Plato. But it is further entitled to notice on account of the circumstances under which it was written. Fronto, as is well known, was the tutor of the imperial philosopher, M. Aurelius, and seems to have written this speech for his pupil's delectation. The Latin letter which follows it was written by the young Caesar, who addresses his middle-aged friend in terms borrowed from the vocabulary of the lover. The 'erotic' language, which in this case it is fortunately impossible to misinterpret, illustrates what has been said above¹ respecting the use of such phraseology by Socrates and his followers; and enables us to avoid misunderstanding an expression in that one of the Platonic Epigrams which has perhaps the best claim to be accepted as genuine². It is also worthy of note, that neither Fronto nor Aurelius seem to doubt that the speech in the Phaedrus was really written by Lysias. In the lists of this orator's works preserved by pseudo-Plutarch and other grammarians, we read of both *ἐπιστολαὶ* and *ἐρωτικοί*; and it is quite possible that specimens of either kind may have survived to Fronto's time. What may have been the precise difference between an "erotic speech" and an epistle it is hard to say. Fronto, though his speech is called *ἐρωτικός*, uses the verb *ἐπιστέλλω* at its commencement, and speaks of *τὰ*

¹ Appendix I, p. 152.

² That which ends with the line: *ὦ ἔμδν ἐκμήνας θυμὸν ἔρωτι Δίῳν*. Diog. Laert. iii. c. 23.

πρότερον διὰ Λυσίου καὶ Πλάτωνος ἐπεσταλμένα. Nor is there any thing in the form of these compositions to prevent us from calling them ἐπιστολαὶ if their authors had encouraged us to do so.

It is only necessary to add that the text as here given is taken, with a few variations, from the latest edition of the Letters of Fronto, published by Naber at Leipsie in 1867.

p. 234 van den Hout
(Ἐρωτικός.)

ὦ φίλε παῖ, τρίτον ἤδη σοι τοῦτο περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιστέλλω, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διὰ Λυσίου τοῦ Κεφάλου, δεύτερον δὲ διὰ Πλάτωνος τοῦ σοφοῦ, τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον διὰ τοῦδε τοῦ ξένου ἀνδρός, τὴν μὲν φωνὴν ὀλίγον δεῖν βαρβαρόν, τὴν δὲ γνώμην, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, οὐ πάννυ ἀξυνέτου. Γράφω δὲ νῦν οὐδέν τι τῶν³ πρότερον γεγραμμένων ἐφαπτόμενος, μὴδὲ ἀμελήσης τοῦ λόγου ὡς παλιλλογούντος. Εἰ δέ σοι δόξει τῶν πρότερον διὰ Λυσίου καὶ Πλάτωνος ἐπεσταλμένων πλείω τάδ' εἶναι, ἔστω σοι τεκμήριον, ὡς εὔλογα ἀξιώ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπορῶ λόγων. Προσέχεις δ' ἂν ἤδη τὸν νοῦν, εἰ καινά τε ἅμα καὶ δίκαια λέγω.

Ἔοικας, ὦ παῖ, πρὸ τοῦ λόγου πάντως βούλεσθαι μαθεῖν, τί δὴ ποτέ γε μὴ ἐρῶν ἐγὼ μετὰ τῶσαύτης σπουδῆς γλίχομαι τυχεῖν ὧν περ οἱ ἐρῶντες. Τοῦτο δὴ σοι φράσω πρῶτον ὅπως ποτ' ἔχει. Οὐ μὰ Δία πέφυκεν ὁρᾶν ὁξύτερον οὐτοσί ὁ πᾶν ἐραστής ἐμοῦ τοῦ μὴ ἐρώнтος, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦ σοῦ κάλλους αἰσθάνομαι οὐδενὸς ἦττον τῶν ἄλλων· δυναίμην δ' ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τούτου καὶ πολὺ ἀκριβέστερον. Ὅπερ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν πυρεπτόντων καὶ τῶν εἴ μίλα ἐν παλαίστρῃ γυμνισαμένων δρῶμεν, οὐκ ἐξ ὁμοίας αἰτίας ταῖτον συμβαίνειν· διψῶσιν [μὲν] γὰρ ὁ μὲν ὑπὸ νόσον, ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ γυμνασιῶν τοιάνδε τινὰ κάμοι ⁴ λειπὸν τε ἅμα καὶ ὀλισθόν. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔμοιγε ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ πρόσσει, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τινὶ ὁμιλήσεις, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παντὶ ἀγαθῷ. Καὶ ὠφελοῦνται γὰρ καὶ διασώζονται οἱ καλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἐρώντων μάλλον, ὥσπερ τὰ φυτὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ὑδάτων. Οὐ γὰρ ἐρῶσιν οὔτε πηγαὶ οὔτε ποταμοὶ τῶν φυτῶν, ἀλλὰ παριόντες οὕτω δὴ καὶ παραρρέοντες, ἀνθεῖν αὐτὰ καὶ θάλλειν παρεσκεύασαν. Χρήματα δὲ τὰ μὲν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ διδόμενα δικάως ἂν καλοῖς δῶρα, τὰ δ' ὑπ' ἐκείνου λύτρα. Μάντεων δὲ παῖδες φασιν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἡδίους εἶναι τῶν θυσιῶν τὰς χαριστήριους ἢ τὰς μειλιχίους· ὧν τὰς μὲν οἱ εὐτυχοῦντες ἐπὶ φυλακῇ καὶ κτήσει τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὰς δὲ οἱ κακῶς πράττοντες ἐπ' ἀποτροπῇ τῶν δεινῶν θύουσιν. Τάδε μὲν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν σοί τε κἀκείνῳ ὠφελίμῃ ἐιρήνηται.

⁵ Εἰ δὲ [διὰ] τοῦτο δίκαιός ἐστιν τυχεῖν τῆς παρὰ σοῦ βοηθείας . . . ερεῖσω συ τοῦτο . . . αὐτῷ ποιεῖν δὲ τεκτινῶ καὶ μηχανήσω τὰς θεττα . .

³ τῶν Naber, doubtless a misprint.

⁴ "Desiderantur paginae saltem duae." N.

⁵ "Sequuntur xiv versus evanidi, quos dabo fide Maii. Pleraque in iis absurda sunt." N.

μεν . . . ων . . . ἐρῶς . . . δὲ πα . . . εἶπε . . . τοτα κον . . . (ἀ)ναίτιος . . .
 τινὸς διὰ τὴν αὐτῷ κατακο . . . κο . . . πλὴν εἰ μὴ τι ὀφθεῖς ἡδίκηκας.

Μὴ ἀγνοεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀδικηθεὶς αὐτὸς καὶ ὑβριζόμενος οὐ μετρίαν ἤδη ταίτην τὴν ὕβριν, τὸ ἅπαντας εἰδέναι τε καὶ φανερώς οὕτως διαλέγεσθαι, ὅτι σου εἷη ὁδε ἐραστής· φθάνεις δὲ καὶ πρὶν τι τῶν τοιῶνδε πράξει, τοῦνομα τῆς πράξεως ὑπομένων. Καλοῦσί γ' οὖν σε οἱ πλείστοι τῶν πολιτῶν τὸν τοῦδε ἐρώμενον· ἐγὼ δέ σοι διαφνύλῃω τοῦνομα καθαρὸν καὶ ἀνύβριστον. Καλὸς γὰρ οὐχὶ ἐρώμενος τό γε κατ' ἐμὲ ὀνομασθήσεται. Εἰ δὲ τούτῳ ὥς δικαίῳ τινὶ χρήσεται, ὅτι μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἴστω ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀλλ' ἰταμώτερον. Τὰς δὲ μυίας καὶ τὰς ἐμπίδας μάλιστα ἀποσοβοῦμεν καὶ ἀποθνήμεθα, ὅτι ἀναιδέστατα καὶ ἰταμώτατα ἐπιπέτονται. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ θηρία ἐπίσταται φεύγειν μάλιστα πάντων τοὺς κυνηγέτας, καὶ τὰ πτηνὰ τοὺς θηρευτάς. Καὶ πάντα δὲ τὰ ζῶα τούτους μάλιστα ἐκτρέπεται τοὺς μάλιστα ἐνεδρεύοντας καὶ διώκοντας.

Εἰ δέ τις οἶεται ἐνδοξότερον καὶ ἐντιμότερον εἶναι τὸ κάλλος διὰ τοὺς ἐρωστίας, τοῦ παιτὸς διαμαρτάνει. Κινδυνεύετε μὲν γὰρ οἱ καλοὶ περὶ τοῦ κάλλους τῆς ἐς τοὺς ἀκούοντας πίστεως διὰ τοὺς ἐρώντας [μετέχειν?], δι' ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους βεβαιωτέραν τὴν δόξαν κέκτησθε. Εἰ γοῦν τις τῶν μηδέπω σε ἑωρακῶτων πνιθάνοιτο, ὅποῖός τις εἴης τὴν ὕψιν, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἂν πιστεῦσαι ἐπαινοῦντι, μαθὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἐρῶ τῷ δ' ἀπιστήσαι, ὥς οὐκ ἀληθῶς ἀλλ' ἐρωτικῶς ἐπαινοῦντι. "Οσοῖς μὲν οὖν λώβῃ τις σώματος καὶ αἵσχος καὶ ἀμορφία πρόσσειν, εἴξαιεντ' ἂν εἰκότως ἐραστὴς αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑπ' ἄλλων θεραπεύοντο ἢ τῶν κατ' ἐρωτικὴν λῆτταν καὶ ἀνάγκην προσιόντων. Σὺ δὲ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε κάλλει οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι καρπώσει πλεόν ὑπ' ἐρωτος. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον δέονται σου οἱ μὴ ἐρώντες. Ἀχρεοὶ δὲ οἱ ἐρασταὶ τοῖς ὄντως καλοῖς οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ τοῖς δικαίως ἐπαινουμένοις οἱ κύλακες. Ἀρετὴ δὲ καὶ δόξα καὶ τιμὴ καὶ κέρδος. Κόσμος θαλάττῃ μὲν ραῦται καὶ κυβερνῆται καὶ τριήραρχοι καὶ ἔμποροι καὶ οἱ ἄλλως πλείοντες, οὐ μὴ Δία δελφίνες, οἷς ἀδύνατον τὸ ζῆν ὅτι μὴ ἐν θαλάττῃ, καλοῖς δὲ ἡμεῖς οἱ τηράλλως ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ ἀσπαζόμενοι, οὐχὶ ἐρασταί, οἷς ἀβίωτον ἂν εἶη στερομένοις τῶν παιδικῶν. Εὖροις δ' ἂν σκοπῶν πλείστης ἀδοξίας αἰτίους⁶ ὄντας τοὺς ἐραστάς· ἀδοξίαν δὲ φεύγειν ἅπαντας μὲν χρή τοὺς εὐφρονοῦντας, μάλιστα δὲ τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἐπὶ μακρότερον ἐγκείσεται τὸ κακὸν ἐν ἀρχῇ μακροῦ βίου προσπесόν.

"Ωσπερ οὖν ἱερῶν καὶ θυσίας, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ βίου τοὺς ἀρχομένους εὐλογίας μάλιστα πρ[έπει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι] τοῖς τῶν . . . εἰς ἐσχάτην ἀδοξίαν α . . . τούτους δὲ χρηστοὺς ἐραστὰς ἐξὸν εἰ . . . πέντε καὶ . . . α νεκ . . . νον χρήμα ἐρασταῖς . . . του . . . δὲ καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐρώντες διὰ τῶν τοιῶνδε φορημάτων οὐκ ἐκείνους τιμῶσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ ἀλαζονεύονται τε καὶ ἐπιδοκνῶνται, καὶ ὥς εἰπεῖν ἐξορχοῦνται τὸν ἔρωτα. Συγγράφει δέ, ὥς φασι, ὁ τοῦ ἐρωστῆς ἐρωτικά τινα περὶ σοῦ συγγράμματα, ὥς τούτῳ δὴ

⁶ αἰτίους μὲν. N.

μάλιστά σε δελεάσων καὶ προσαξόμενος καὶ αἰρήσων· τὰ δ' ἔστιν αἰσχρὰ καὶ οὐκ οὐκ καὶ βοή τις ἀκόλαστος ἐπ' οὐστρου προπεριπομένη, ὅποιαι θηρίων ἢ βοσκημάτων ἐπ' ἔρωτος βρυχωμένων ἢ χρεμετιζόντων ἢ μεκωμένων ἢ ὠρνομένων. Τούτοις ἔοικε τὰ τῶν ἐρώτων ἄσματα. Εἰ γοῦν ἐπιτρέψαις σαιτὸν τῷ ἐραστῇ χρῆσθαι ὅπου καὶ ὅποτε βούλοιο, οὐτ' ἂν καιρὸν περιμείνας ἐπιτήδειον, οὔτε τόπον, οὔτε σχολήν, οὔτε ἐρημίαν, ἀλλὰ θηρίου δίκην ἐπὶ λήττης εὐθὺς ἔχοιτο ἂν καὶ βαίνειν προθυμοῖτο μηδὲν αἰδούμενος.

Τούτῳ ἔτι προσθεὶς καταπαύσω τὸν λόγον, ὅτι πάντα θεῶν δῶρα καὶ ἔργα ὅσα ἐς ἀνθρώπων χρεῖαν τε καὶ τέρψιν καὶ ὠφέλειαν ἀφίκει, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν πᾶν καὶ πάντῃ θεῖα, γῆν φημι καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ ἥλιον καὶ θάλατταν, ὑμνεῖν μὲν καὶ θαυμάζειν πεφίκαμεν, ἐρᾶν δ' οὐ, καλῶν δέ τινων φανλοτέρων καὶ ἀτιμωτέρας μοίρας τετυχηκότων, τούτων ἤδη φθόνος καὶ ἔρωτος καὶ ζήλος καὶ ἥμερος ἄπτεται. Καὶ οἱ μὲν τινες κέρδους ἐρώσιν, οἱ δὲ ὄψων αὖ, οἱ δὲ οἶνον. Ἐν δὲ τῷ τοιῷδε ἀριθμῷ καὶ μερίδι καθίσταται τὸ κάλλος ἐπὶ τῶν ἐρώτων, ὅμοιον κέρδει καὶ ὄψῳ καὶ μέθῃ· ἐπὶ δ' ἡμῶν τῶν θαυμαζόντων μὲν, μὴ ἐρώτων δέ, ὅμοιον ἡλίῳ καὶ οὐρανῷ καὶ γῇ καὶ θαλάττῃ· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα παντὸς ἔρωτος κρείττω καὶ ὑπέρτερα. Ἐν τί σοι φράσω πρὸς τούτοις, ὃ καὶ σὺ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους λέγων παῖδας, πῶθ' εἶναι δόξεις. Εἰκὸς δέ σε ἢ παρὰ μητρὸς ἢ τῶν ἀναθρεψαμένων μὴ ἀνῆκοον εἶναι, ὅτι τῶν ἀνθῶν ἐστὶν τι ὃ διὰ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐρᾶ καὶ πάσχει τὰ τῶν ἐρώτων, ἀνατέλλοντος ἐπαιρούμενον καὶ πορευομένου καταστρεφόμενον, δύνοντος δὲ περιτρεπόμενον· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν γε πλέον ἀπολαύει, οὐδὲ εὐμενεστέρον πειρᾶται διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦ ἡλίου. Ἀτιμώτατον γοῦν ἐστὶν φυτῶν καὶ ἀνθῶν οὔτε εἰς ἐορταζόντων θαλίῳ οὐτ' ἐς στεφάνους θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων παραλαμβανόμενον. Ἐοικας, ὦ παῖ, τὸ ἄνθος τοῦτο ἰδεῖν ἐθέλειν, ἀλλ' ἔγωγέ σοι ἐπιδείξω, εἰ εὐθὺς πρὸς τὸν Ἰλιστὸν ἄμα ἄμφω βαδίσαιμεν.

Supersunt novem versus, quorum scriptura prorsus evanuit. Nihil apparet praeter correctoris subscriptionem :

Feliciter.

HAVE MI MAGISTER OPTUME.

Age perge, quantum libet, comminare, et argumentorum globis criminare: numquam tu tamen crasten tuum, me dico, depuleris: nec ego minus amare me Frontonem praedicabo, minusque amabo, quo tu tam variis tamque vehementibus sententiis adprobaris minus amantibus magis opitulandum ac largiendum esse. Ego hercule te ita amore depereo neque deterrebtor isto tuo dogmate: ac si magis eris alieis non amantibus *facilis* et promptus, ego tamen *non minus te* [tuosque] amabo. Ceterum quod ad sensuum densitatem, quod ad

† Xabier gives ἀπάλαστοι, which has no meaning. Cod. ΑΠΟΛΑΤΕΙ, originally perhaps ΑΠΟΛΑΤΕΙ. But the present is required by the context.

inventionis argutiarum⁸, quod ad aemulationis tuae felicitatem adinet, nolo quicquam dicere, [nisi] te multo placentis illos sibi et provocantis Atticos antevenisse.

Ac tamen nequeo quin dicam; amo enim, et hoc denique amanti-
bus vere tribuendum esse censeo, quod victoriis τῶν ἐρωμένων magis
gaude[rent. Vi]cimur igitur, [vici]mus inquam. Num
praestabilius . . . ubique eam sub . . . trapae . . . tram promsi
. . . ei quo . . . adsis . . . disputari utra re magis caveret. Quid
de re ista [oro] . . . nam tulerit an quod magister meus de
Platone?

Illud quidem non temere adiuravero: siquis iste revera Phaeder
fuit, si umquam is a Socrate afuit, non magis Socratem Phaedri
desiderio quam me perisse [sines] . . . duo menses . . . arsisse . . .
in . . . amet, nisi confestim tuo amore corripitur. Vale mihi
maxima res sub caelo, gloria mea. Sufficit talem magistrum habuisse.
Domina mea mater te salutat.

⁸ Buttm. argutiam.

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
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